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Preface 
This volume is the result of the 2010 congress of the EATLP held in Leuven. The main subject 
of this conference was retroactivity in taxation. By way of preparation a questionnaire, 
national reports, and a general report were written. After the conference we asked the 
national reporters to finalize their reports on the basis of the discussions in Leuven and our 
comments and questions. Most of the national reports were finalized by the end of 2010. We 
subsequently revised the general report.
In this volume of the EATLP International Tax Series, we are publishing the revised general 
report, the questionnaire, and the finalized national reports. Some of these national reports 
are quite succinct because of lack of information or because many of the issues do not arise.1 
We are nevertheless including these national reports because the more (structured) the 
information offered here, the more insights the reader may gain. Further, a number of spe-
cial topics are dealt with in separate chapters as, in the process of drafting the questionnaire 
and the general report we encountered a number themes which are of particular impor-
tance with regard to retroactivity of tax legislation. The 2010 Leuven congress dealt with 
three of these themes:
– Legislating by Press Release, introduced by Melvin Pauwels and debated by Philip Baker 
and Johanna Hey; 
– Validation Statutes and Interpretative Statutes, introduced by Fabrizio Amatucci and 
debated by Bruno Peeters and Peter Melz;
– Retroactivity in Law & Economics, introduced and debated by Daniel Shaviro and Char-
lotte Crane.
Another theme was ‘Retroactivity of the European Court of Justice judgments’, which was 
introduced by Mathieu Isenbaert and debated by Peter Wattel and Pasquale Pistone. Not 
being related to retroactivity of tax legislation this issue will not be included in this volume.
The above-mentioned special topics related to retroactivity of tax legislation are dealt with 
in this volume. Furthermore, there are a few contributions on some other special themes 
which we found less suitable for a debate with the large audience in Leuven.2 
Consequently, this book is organized as follows: the general report (Part 1), the contribu-
tions on the special topics, starting with the contributions of a more general nature and 
concluding with contributions written from an economic perspective (Part 2), and finally 
the questionnaire and the national reports in alphabetical order (Part 3). Taken together, 
the contributions on the special topics and the reports contain a wealth of information 
which enable the reader to gain an insight into a very complex subject.
1.	 Questions	concerning	issues	on	which	no	information	is	available	or	which	are	not	applicable	are	omitted	in	these	
national	reports.	
2.	 Peter	Essers	very	skilfully	chaired	the	lively	debate	in	Leuven,	for	which	we	owe	him	many	thanks.
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We owe many thanks to the national reporters and contributors to this book, to Peter Essers 
for his encouragement and to Maiko van Bakel who assisted in the editing.
Hans Gribnau and Melvin Pauwels
November 2011
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Part 1
General Report
Hans Gribnau and  
Melvin Pauwels
1.1. Introduction
This general report deals with a number of topics. These topics concern terminology, i.e. the 
different concepts in uses with regard to retroactivity (and retrospectivity), ex ante evalua-
tion of retroactivity; the use of retroactivity in legislative practice, ex post evaluation of 
retroactivity (in case law), and views in the literature. In the parts on ex ante evaluation of 
retroactivity, the use of retroactivity in legislative practice and ex post evaluation of retroac-
tivity (in case law), the focus is on the various possibilities to use retroactive tax legislation 
and limitations on the use of retroactive tax legislation. In presenting the information with 
regard these topics we will not always strictly follow the questionnaire; for the purpose of 
readability we sometimes combine related issues (questions). Of course, it is not possible to 
present the information in the national reports down to the smallest detail. The answers 
received to some questions were too diverse to recapitulate in this general report. 
Another set of remarks concerns the focus of the questionnaire and this general 
report. The focus is mainly retroactivity of tax legislation. The issue of retroactivity of case 
law is thus not discussed in this general report, notwithstanding the importance of the 
subject.1 Furthermore, in particular retroactivity of Acts of Parliament is discussed. Thus, 
hierarchical lower tax rules, such as subordinate legislation, regulations, decrees, etc. are 
largely left aside. Moreover, we mainly deal with substantive tax law and not with proce-
dural tax law. Finally, the focus is on tax law, not on criminal law; hence, retroactivity with 
regard to criminal offences against taxation laws is only indirectly touched upon. 
As concerns the method used, we note the following. First, a draft questionnaire was 
compiled and sent to the various national reporters for comments. Some of the national 
reporters provided us with comments, which we used to adjust and to extend the question-
naire. The final questionnaire was then sent to the national reporters.2 The national report-
ers submitted (draft) national reports based on the questionnaire. These national reports 
have been used in writing a draft general report. This draft was published on the EATLP 
website for the purpose of the 2010 EATLP congress in Leuven on 28 May 2010. After the 
2010 EATLP congress, the draft was sent to the national reporters for consultation. The 
national reporters were invited to comment on the draft general report, especially whether 
the report contained vague or even mistaken interpretations of the national reports or 
needed to be supplemented. Some national reporters provided us with comments, for 
which we are very grateful. The national reporters were also asked to finalize their national 
reports further to the EATLP congress. In this respect, we asked some of the national report-
1.	 During	the	2010	EATLP	congress,	one	debate	session	concerned	this	subject,	in	particular	retroactivity	of	case	law	of	
the	ECJ.	This	debate	was	introduced	by	Mathieu	Isenbaert;	debaters	were	Peter	Wattel	and	Pasquale	Pistone.
2.	 The	questionnaire	is	included	in	this	book.
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ers individually to expand on some issues in their report, either because the issue discussed 
was interesting and deserved more attention or for clarification reasons. This general report 
has been written based on the draft version of the general report, the comments from the 
national reporters on it, the final national reports, and the discussions during the EATLP 
congress. Compared to the draft version, information concerning more countries has been 
included in this final general report, since not every national report was available at the 
moment the draft version was compiled. 
Finally, this report could not have been written without the work done by the 
national reporters; we are very grateful for their industry.
1.2. Terminology
1.2.1. Introduction
Before it is possible to analyse the issue of retroactivity with respect to substance, the termi-
nology used should be made clear. This is necessary because there is an important risk of 
misunderstanding. The reason is that, in the literature as well as in case law, different con-
cepts are used with various meanings when dealing with the phenomenon of retroactivity 
in legislation.3 
We note that when dealing with the issue of retroactivity in this report we do not 
make a distinction between the introduction of a tax statute and the change (amendment) 
of an existing tax statute, for there is no conceptual difference between the two. After all, a 
change in an existing statute is realized by means of the introduction of a statute that pro-
vides for the change.
1.2.2. Retroactive vs. retrospective
In the English language a potential misunderstanding may arise when using the concepts of 
retroactivity and retrospectivity. First of all, these concepts are sometimes (implicitly or 
explicitly) considered synonyms or interchangeable, but sometimes a conceptual distinc-
tion is (implicitly or explicitly) made between retroactivity and retrospectivity. Secondly, if a 
conceptual distinction is made, the meaning of retroactivity and retrospectivity is not the 
same in the various countries and legal discourses in which English is spoken or used. It is 
even the case that what in the one country is called ‘retroactive’, in another country is called 
‘retrospective’, and vice versa. This latter has been established more in particular for the area 
of taxation by, for example, Bobbett in an article in British Tax Review4 with references to the 
way both terms are used in the case law in various English-speaking countries. The mixed 
use of retroactivity and retrospectivity has also been noted in the national reports of Canada 
and the United Kingdom.
3.	 See	in	this	regard	amongst	others	Catherine	S.	Bobbett,	‘Retroactive	or	retrospective?	A	note	on	terminology’,	
British	Tax	Review	(2006),	at	pp.	15-18	and	M.R.T.	Pauwels,	Terugwerkende	kracht	van	belastingwetgeving:	gewikt	
en	gewogen	(Retroactivity	of	tax	legislation:	weighing	and	balancing)	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Uitgevers,	2009),	chapter	
2.
4.	 Bobbett,	supra	note	3,	at	pp.	15-18.	See	also	E.	Edinger,	‘Retrospectivity	in	law’,	University	of	British	Columbia	Law	
Review,	(1995),	at	p.	10,	G.T.	Loomer,	‘Taxing	out	of	time:	parliamentary	supremacy	and	retroactive	tax	legislation’,	
British	Tax	Review	(2006),	at	pp.	65-66,	and	B.	Juratowitch,	Retroactivity	and	the	common	law,	(Oxford:	Hart	
Publishing,	2008),	at	pp.	5-13
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In accordance with Bobbett’s5 proposal and in line with the way the ECJ uses the term6, this 
general report uses the term ‘retroactive’ for the situation in which a legal provision 
changes the past legal consequences of facts that occurred before the provision was offi-
cially published. In other words, the term is used where the legal provision is applicable to 
taxable events that occurred prior to its official publication. The term ‘retrospective’ will be 
used for the situation in which a new legal provision has ‘immediate effect’, without grand-
fathering7 existing situations, and as such is also applicable to the future consequences of 
transactions or events that have already happened.8
In almost all countries, the courts or at least legal discourse does make a comparable 
conceptual distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’ (casu quo between the 
national counterparts of these concepts).9 It is interesting to mention that in many of these 
countries the national language has its limits in the sense that, other than in the English 
language, two separate terms are not available. In these countries the language has only one 
term, but nonetheless a conceptual distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’ is 
achieved, e.g. by adding adjectives to the term (e.g. formal and material, true and untrue, 
etc.).
The above-mentioned use of the concepts of ‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’ in this 
report implies that the term ‘retroactive’ is used in the narrow sense. In the literature, not 
only the law and economics literature but also in other legal literature, the term ‘retroactive’ 
is sometimes also used in the broad sense, i.e. also covering what is called here ‘retrospec-
tive’.10
The risk of conceptual misunderstanding also appears from the fact that a great vari-
ety of terms exists. This is confirmed by analysis of the various national reports. These 
reports show that a many different terms are (or were) used in the various countries. Terms 
are used such as ‘actual retroactive’, ‘formal retroactive’, ‘true retroactive’, ‘real retroactive’, 
‘absolute retroactive’, ‘juridical retroactivity’, ‘maximal retroactivity’, ‘retroactive stricto 
sensu’, and ‘proper retroactivity’; these terms correspond more or less with what is called 
‘retroactive’ in this report. Further, terms are used such as ‘non-actual retroactive’, ‘material 
retroactive’, ‘pseudo retroactive’, ‘unreal retroactivity’, ‘de facto retroactive’, ‘relative retroac-
tive’, ‘improper retroactive’ ‘medium retroactive’, ‘false retroactive’, ‘inappropriate retroac-
tive’, ‘retroactive in the social sense’ and ‘economic retroactive’; these terms more or less 
correspond with what is called ‘retrospective’ in this report. Moreover, illustrative for the 
potential misunderstanding is that in Denmark the term ‘material retroactive’ is used for 
what in this report is called ‘retroactive’, while in other countries, if used, the term is usually 
5.	 Bobbett,	supra	note	3,	at	p.	8	concludes:	‘perhaps	it	would	be	better	to	follow	the	Canadian	meaning:	restrict	retro-
active	to	statutes	that	alter	or	do	something	to	the	past	(Latin:	retroagere	meaning	to	lead	back,	to	reverse);	and	use	
retrospective	for	statutes	that	recognise	past	transactions	but	alter	the	consequences	of	them	in	the	future	without	
changing	the	past	(Latin:	retrospicere	meaning	to	look	back).’	See	also	the	Canadian	report	for	the	present	Canadian	
use	of	the	concepts	of	‘retroactivity’	and	‘retrospectivity’.
6.	 E.g.,	ECJ	C-376/02,	26	April	2005,	case	Stichting	Goed	Wonen.
7.	 Grandfathering	means,	in	short,	that	the	old	rule	remains	(temporarily)	applicable	to	certain	situations.
8.	 As	discussed	below,	a	further	distinction	is	made	in	Canada.
9.	 Austria,	Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Hungary,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Portugal,	
Spain,	Sweden,	Turkey.	However,	in	Finland	only	one	term	(taannehtivuus)	is	used,	and	in	fact	only	for	the	phenom-
enon	retroactivity	and	not	for	the	phenomenon	retrospectivity.	Furthermore,	in	Greece	in	principle	only	one	term	is	
used	without	making	a	distinction;	it	should	be	noted	that	although	in	the	Greek	literature	a	distinction	is	some-
times	made	between	‘true	retroactivity’	and	‘non-true	retroactivity’,	the	latter	concept	does	not	correspond	with	
‘retrospectivity’,	but	in	fact	seems	to	be	a	special	variant	of	‘retroactivity’.
10.	 Note	that	the	US	reporter	remarks	that,	in	the	US,	a	clear	distinction	between	retroactivity	and	retrospectivity	is	not	
usually	made,	and	that	the	term	‘retroactive’	is	often	used	to	describe	both.
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used for what is called in this report ‘retrospective’.11 Another example is the use of the term 
‘non-true retroactivity’ in Greece. In the Greek theory of law, the term does not correspond 
to ‘retrospectivity’ (as one may expect) but refers to the phenomenon that the legislator 
‘intervenes’ in procedures that are pending for the tax authorities or the courts,12 which – in 
the terminology of this general report – is an example of retroactivity.
Finally, we note that although it is conceptually possible to make a distinction 
between retroactivity and retrospectivity, the difference between these two has less rele-
vance from the viewpoint of legal certainty and of their impact. From these viewpoints, the 
difference between retroactivity and retrospectivity is mostly considered to be a matter of 
degree.13
1.2.3. Retrospectivity
We note that also national reporters of the countries in which the concept ‘retroactivity’ is 
distinguished from the concept ‘retroactivity’ – as described above –, often remark that the 
concept of ‘retrospectivity’ is not well-defined or is an ‘open concept’ or is ‘rather vague’.14 
On the one hand, it appears that some cases of legislation would certainly be called 
retrospective. In the questionnaire, the example is given of a statute that enters into force on 
1 January 2010, and that stipulates that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that 
date without the grandfathering of accrued but unrealized gains. As a result, gains that 
accrued prior to 1 January 2010 but that are realized after that date are not tax exempt 
either, although they accrued in a period when the exemption applied.15
On the other hand, it is hard to provide general criteria to draw a line between retro-
spectivity of a statute and non-retrospectivity of a statute, taking into account that a new stat-
ute generally – unless there is a grandfathering provision – has some influence on future conse-
quences of past events and past transactions. A fine example of the latter issue is provided in 
the German national report.16 Noteworthy is that Hungary not only has a broad concept of 
retrospectivity,17 but also prohibits retrospectivity. So grandfathering is the main rule in Hun-
gary. Furthermore, in Denmark, legislative practice reveals that retrospectivity (‘non-actual 
retroactivity’) is avoided if at all possible (although there is no prohibition of it in the Danish 
constitution). As a result, transitional rules tend to be extensive and very complicated.
We note that in the literature on legal theory it is generally accepted that it is not 
possible to make a sharp distinction between retrospectivity and non-retrospectivity. To the 
contrary, retrospectivity is mostly considered to be a matter of degree. Also, especially the 
law and economics literature remarks that (almost) any change in tax rules will have an 
effect on the value of assets and liabilities, and from that point of view is retrospective.
11.	 In	Denmark	the	term	‘formal	retroactive’	is	used	for	the	situation	in	which	the	tax	authorities	apply	a	statute	before	
the	statute	enters	into	force.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	term	‘formal	retroactive’	is	used	for	what	is	called	‘retroactive’	
in	this	general	report.
12.	 However,	this	is	not	the	opinion	in	the	case	law	of	Greek	administrative	tax	courts	which	consider	the	legislature’s	
intervention	in	pending	trials	to	be	a	case	of	retroactivity.
13.	 See	in	this	respect	the	contribution	of	Melvin	Pauwels	in	this	book,	with	further	references	to	the	literature.
14.	 Austria,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Portugal,	Sweden.
15.	 See	also	the	national	reports	of	Denmark,	Hungary,	the	Netherlands	and	Turkey	discussing	this	(or	a	comparable)	
example.
16.	 Another	example	is	the	discussion	in	Danish	legal	discourse	with	respect	to	the	question	whether	or	not	in	the	
situation	in	which	new	legislation	affects	‘facta	pendentia’	(this	is	legislation	that	has	an	effect	on	continuous	
events	and/or	transactions,	and	as	such	also	covers	events	that	occur	partly	before	and	partly	after	the	point	of	time	
when	the	relevant	statute	comes	into	effect)	the	legislation	can	be	characterized	as	retroactive.
17.	 For	example,	if	a	statute	changes	the	taxation	of	interest,	and	would	also	be	applicable	to	existing	loans,	this	would	
be	considered	retrospective.
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Further, we note that it may sound appealing to draw the line between retrospective and 
non-retrospective at whether or not legitimate expectations are infringed by the statute 
concerned. However, this approach not only mixes up the conceptual question with the 
question of the legitimacy, it also shifts the issue, namely to the question which standards 
should be used to assess whether expectations are legitimate or not.
Notwithstanding the above, in some countries a definition of retrospectivity is available. 
For example, the Belgian reporter provides as definition that a retrospective rule has an imme-
diate effect, which implies that a new legal rule is both applicable to legal facts that occur after 
the date of entry into force of this new rule, as well as to legal consequences occurring after the 
date of entry into force, even though these consequences relate to legal facts that took place 
before this date. In the same line the reporter for Turkey describes retrospectivity as the case in 
which a new tax provision affects the tax obligations of the taxpayer after the commencement, 
but prior to the completion, of the taxable event. In Denmark the concept of retrospectivity 
(‘non-actual retroactivity’) is related to the situation of ‘facta pendentia’; it concerns legislation 
with an effect on continuous events or transactions. Furthermore, interestingly, in Canada a 
further distinction is made with respect to what is called in this general report ‘retrospective’. 
In Canada the term ‘retrospective’ is only used for a statute that changes the future legal conse-
quences of transactions or events that already happened. The term is not used where a statute 
has immediate effect on current, continuing rights, which situation is considered to fall into a 
separate category. However, Canadian scholars have observed that it can be exceedingly diffi-
cult to distinguish between these two categories.
1.2.4. ‘Comparison moment’
Misunderstandings when discussing retroactivity could also arise because of a different use 
of the ‘comparison moment’. That comparison moment is the moment with which compari-
son is made in order to determine whether a statute has retroactive effect. 
Some countries use the date of the entry into force of a statute as the ‘comparison 
moment’.18 This choice of the comparison moment seems to be related to the fact that, at 
least in most of these countries, the constitution (or another relevant law) provides that a 
statute should not enter into force prior to the date of publication.19 In connection with the 
date of the entry into force of a statute as the ‘comparison moment’, legal discourse in most 
of these countries employs a conceptual difference between the date of entry into force of a 
statute and the ‘effective entrance date’ (or a comparable term such as ‘date of effect’) of a 
statute.20 For example, if a tax statute enters into force on 1 December 2009 and states that it 
is applicable as from the tax year 2010, the effective entrance date is 1 January 2010. Hence, 
in the approach taken by these countries, in the case of retroactivity, the date of entry into 
force is still a future date, but the effective entrance date is a date in the past.
Some other countries use the date of publication of the statute in the government 
gazette as the comparison moment.21 It seems that in some of these countries it is possible 
that the date of entry into force is set at a date of the past.22 In that case retroactivity could 
be recognized where the date of entry into force of a statute is set prior to the moment of 
the publication. 
18.	 Belgium,	Finland,	France,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Sweden.
19.	 Belgium,	Finland,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Sweden.
20.	 Belgium	Finland,	France,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Sweden.	This	distinction	is	also	made	in	Poland.
21.	 Denmark,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Luxembourg.	Note,	however,	that	in	Denmark	legal	discourse	employs	a	
conceptual	difference	that	in	outline	has	similarities	with	the	other	approach.	In	Canada	the	date	of	Royal	Assent	is	
the	comparison	moment.
22.	 For	example,	Austria.
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The different approaches with respect to the comparison moment are not of a great rele-
vance, but only affect the way ‘retroactivity’ is defined. Theoretically the two approaches 
could have different results with respect to the label ‘retroactivity’ in a concrete case, but the 
appraisal should not differ. For example, a statute that is published in the government 
gazette on 1 December 2010 enters into force on 1 February 2011, and would be applicable 
to taxable events that occurred after 1 December 2010 would be called retroactive in the 
first view but would not be called retroactive in the second view. However, it could be 
assumed that in the countries in which the first view is used, this retroactive effect would 
not be regarded as problematic at all from a legal certainty point of view (leaving aside the 
possible issue of retrospectivity).
1.2.5. ‘Tax period-related concept’ or ‘taxable event-related concept’ of retroactivity
A very interesting difference that appears from the national reports concerns the following 
issue. The issue is whether a tax statute that is enacted during a tax period (for example on 
15 November 2010) and is applicable as from the start of that tax period (for example, 
1  January 2010) should be characterized as ‘retroactive’. 
In some countries such a statute would indeed be called retroactive.23 The basic idea is 
that such a statute should logically be characterized as retroactive, since the statute is also 
applicable to a period prior to the date of publication of the statute in the government 
gazette (or – depending on the comparison moment – the date of entry into force of the 
statute). Furthermore, the characterization ‘retroactive’ is considered appropriate because 
the statute applies to the events (expenses, income earned, transactions, etc.) that occurred 
prior the date of publication (or the entry into force). One could say that these countries use 
a ‘taxable event-related concept’ of retroactivity.
However, there are also many countries in which such a statute would not be consid-
ered retroactive but retrospective, at least by the courts.24 In these countries a statute is only 
considered retroactive in case a tax statute is applicable to a tax period prior to the period in 
which the statute is enacted. The basic idea is that the tax obligation of period-related taxes 
(such as the personal income tax and corporate income tax) only arises at the end of the 
period, that the tax case therefore is not closed until the end of the period, and that there-
fore a statute enacted prior to the end of the period is not considered retroactive if it applies 
as from the start of the period. One could say that these countries have a ‘tax period-related 
concept’ of retroactivity.25 
It is worth mentioning that in the UK the phenomenon that a tax statute is intro-
duced during a tax year and applies as from the beginning of that tax year is even standard 
practice.26 This UK practice (however) has to do with the constitutional requirement that, in 
short, there must be a Finance Act in every year. Also in Canada statutes are regularly intro-
23.	 Denmark,	Finland,	Hungary,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Sweden.	In	Portugal,	the	issue	is	still,	after	the	constitutional	
revision	of	1997,	under	discussion.	In	Greece	the	issue	is	not	considered	important	because	retroactivity	of	tax	
statutes	is	constitutionally	permitted	as	long	as	the	retroactivity	does	not	extend	beyond	the	financial	year	prior	to	
the	year	of	the	enactment	of	the	statute.
24.	 Belgium,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	Spain,	Turkey.	Noteworthy	is	that	this	approach	by	the	German	
courts	has	been	upheld	by	the	German	Constitutional	Court	in	its	important	decisions	of	7	July	2010.
	 In	Belgium,	until	recently,	the	Supreme	Court	had	even	a	more	far-reaching	view	(that,	however,	deviated	from	the	
view	of	the	Constitutional	Court):	according	to	the	Supreme	Court,	the	applicable	income	tax	rules	for	year	x	could	
not	only	be	changed	up	to	31	December	of	year	x,	but	even	up	to	31	December	of	year	x+1	(the	assessment	year),	
without	being	considered	(actually)	retroactive.	The	opinion	in	Canada	seems	not	to	be	clear;	the	Canadian	reporter	
notes	that	it	can	be	argued	that	such	a	statute	is	not	retroactive.
25.	 Cf.	the	German	reporter	Hey.
26.	 In	the	US	as	well	the	practice	is	common.
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duced that are applicable as from the beginning of the tax year. These statutes, however, 
tend to involve ‘annual concepts’, like thresholds and personal tax credits, rather than 
affecting transactions that occurred earlier.
These different approaches are not only of technical relevance. They have also conse-
quences for the substance. As – in most countries – the standards that courts use for retroac-
tivity differ from the standards used for retrospectivity,27 it could obviously matter signifi-
cantly whether or not a tax period-related approach of retroactivity is used in case a statute 
is tested that was enacted during a taxable period and applies as from the beginning of that 
period.28 Furthermore, in connection with the latter point, even if courts in two countries 
were to use the exact same standards to judge retroactivity, the assessment of that statute 
would differ if in the one country a tax period-related concept of retroactivity is used, while 
in the other country a taxable event-related concept is used.
Worth mentioning is that some of the national reporters of the countries in which the 
tax period-related concept of retroactivity is used, note that this concept was developed by the 
courts, and that the approach is criticized in the literature and by some (lower) courts.29
If a tax period-related concept is used, the question arises to which kind of taxes the 
concept is applicable. Obviously, the concept applies to typical period-related taxes such as 
the personal income tax and corporate income tax. It is remarkable that the German legisla-
tor even considers the inheritance tax to be a period-related tax. Furthermore, it appears 
that in Germany the value added tax is also regarded as a period-related tax. In Belgium this 
is not the case.
1.2.6. Interpretative statutes30
Another conceptual variation relates to what are known as interpretative statutes. An inter-
pretative statute is a statute that provides for the interpretation of another statute. Similarly, 
a statute that amends another statute in order to establish a certain interpretation of that 
statute can also be regarded as an interpretative statute. Interpretative statutes are often 
applicable as from the (past) entrance date of the interpreted statute. Various issues and 
questions arise with respect to the temporal effect of such statutes, including the characteri-
zation as retroactive. 
First of all, it should be noted that, in some countries, the phenomenon ‘interpreta-
tive statutes’ is explicitly recognized as such. Interpretative statutes are considered a special 
category of statutes. This special status can have a legal basis31 or can be construed in case 
27.	 Namely	that	retroactivity	is	in	principle	not	allowed	while	retrospectivity	is	in	principle	allowed.
28.	 Note,	however,	that	the	German	reporter	remarks	that	in	July	2010	the	German	Constitutional	Court	delivered	
important	judgments.	In	these	judgments	the	‘tax	period-related	concept’	of	retroactivity	was	again	confirmed.	
However,	in	these	judgments,	the	court	also	postulated	protection	against	retrospective	changes,	which	is	new.	The	
German	reporter	notes	that,	therefore,	the	difference	between	the	‘tax	period-related	concept’	and	the	‘taxable	
event-related	concept’	of	retroactivity	will	probably	lose	relevance.
29.	 Belgium	and	Germany.
30.	 See	on	this	topic	the	contribution	of	Bruno	Peeters	and	Patricia	Popelier	in	this	book.
31.	 Belgium	and	Luxembourg:	in	the	Constitution;	Italy	(legge	di	interpretazione	autentica):	not	in	the	constitution	but	
in	the	civil	code and	the	statute	of	taxpayer’s	rights;	Spain	has	interpretative	ministerial	orders,	which	have	a	legal	
basis	in	the	General	Tax	act.;	United	Kingdom:	the	Interpretation	Act	1968	(which	is	a	general	Act	of	Parliament).	
Canada	has	the	Interpretation	Act.	This	act	provides	for,	amongst	other	things,	transitional	rules	with	respect	to	the	
effects	of	legislative	repeal	and	amendment;	one	of	the	provisions	(paragraph	44(f))	of	this	act	seems	to	have	an	
effect	that	corresponds	to	an	interpretative	statute.	Greece	takes	a	special	position	in	this	respect.	Interpretative	
statutes	have	a	legal	basis	in	the	Constitution	(referring	to	the	‘authentic	interpretation’	that	rests	with	the	legisla-
tive	power).	However,	as	concerns	tax	statutes,	the	prevailing	opinion	is	that,	because	of	a	constitutional	provision	
with	respect	to	retroactivity	of	tax	statutes	in	general,	tax	interpretative	statutes	only	have	retroactive	effect	that	
does	not	extend	beyond	the	financial	year	prior	to	the	year	of	the	enactment	of	the	statute.
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law.32 In other countries ‘interpretative statutes’ are not explicitly recognized as a special 
category.33 However, the national reports show that, nevertheless, the national legislators of 
some of the latter countries sometimes also grant retroactive effect to a statute, justifying 
the retroactivity by claiming that the statute only provides for a clarification of the interpre-
tation of another statute.34 In a few countries, however, retroactive interpretative statutes 
are (nearly) unknown or are considered invalid.35 To conclude, most of the countries are in 
some way familiar with the phenomenon of retroactive interpretative statutes.
Secondly, the question arises whether, if an interpretative statute is applicable as 
from the past entrance date of the interpreted statute, the interpretative statute would be 
considered ‘retroactive’. In most of the countries in which the law does not explicitly recog-
nize ‘interpretative statutes’ as such, the answer to that question is positive: the statute 
would in general indeed be considered retroactive.36 The question, however, is especially 
interesting with respect to countries in which ‘interpretative statutes’ are a special category. 
In some of these countries the statute would not be considered retroactive.37 The basic idea 
is that the interpretative statute is supposed not to bring anything new to the interpreted 
statute. However, in other of these countries the term ‘retroactive’ is used, although distin-
guished from ‘pure’ retroactivity.38
Thirdly, the question arises whether the retroactivity of interpretative statutes is 
assessed in a different way from retroactivity of other statutes. This question is usually inter-
related with the question what standards are used to distinguish an interpretative statute 
from a non-interpretative statute. Both questions are interesting especially, but not only, 
with respect to the countries in which the phenomenon ‘interpretative statutes’ is recog-
nized as such in the law.
To start with the second question, theoretically two approaches can be distinguished. 
The first approach is – what we would like to call – the formal approach. In that approach a 
statute is considered interpretative if the legislator has labelled it ‘interpretative’. Thus, the 
courts do not assess whether such a statute is really interpretative.39 On the same lines, in 
some countries, the courts will, as a rule, give effect to the will of parliament if an interpreta-
tive statute is introduced.40
The second approach is – what we would like to call – the substantive approach. In 
this approach the national court assesses by means of certain standards whether a statute 
that is labelled interpretative by the legislator indeed can be characterized as interpretative. 
It could obviously be the case that a national legislator wrongly labelled a statute as ‘inter-
pretative’.41 In most of the countries basically the second approach is taken.42 
The subsequent issue is how to determine whether a statute is indeed interpretative. 
It seems that different standards are used. It is reported that an interpretative statute should 
not have new legal content.43 Then the question remains when a statute is considered to 
32.	 France	(loi	interprétative).
33.	 Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	Germany,	Hungary,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Sweden,	Turkey,	the	USA.
34.	 Austria,	Canada,	Germany	(Klarstellungsinteresse),	the	Netherlands,	and	the	USA	(‘technical	corrections’	and	
‘restatement	of	intended	meaning’).
35.	 Hungary,	Poland,	Sweden,	Turkey.
36.	 Denmark,	Finland,	Germany,	the	Netherlands.
37.	 France,	Luxembourg.
38.	 Belgium.
39.	 This	is	approach	seems	to	be	followed	by	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	(Council	d’Etat)	in	France.
40.	 Canada,	United	Kingdom.
41.	 In	French	legal	discourse	the	term	‘falsely	interpretative	statute’	(loi	faussement	interpretative)	is	used.	In	Greece	
the	terms	‘not	truly	interpretative’	and	‘pseudo-interpretative	statute’	are	used.
42.	 Belgium,	Greece,	and	also	the	Supreme	Court	(Cour	de	cassation)	in	France.
43.	 National	reports	of	Austria,	France	and	Italy.
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have new legal content. The issue is deeply intermingled with the issue of interpretation 
methods.44 In Germany, an interpretative statute is considered interpretative if it stays 
within the interpretation limits of the statute to which the interpretative statute applies. 
This is even the case if the interpretation provided for by the interpretative statute deviates 
from the interpretation that the Supreme Court gave or might give.45 Some other countries, 
however, seem to have a more strict view on interpretative statutes. For example, in Belgium 
it is the case that the interpreted legal provision, from its origin, could not possibly be com-
prehended in a way different from what was indicated in the interpretative law. If a statute 
that is labelled interpretative by the Belgian legislator does not meet this requirement, the 
retroactivity of the statute will be judged by the courts on the basis of the standards for 
retroactivity of ‘normal’ statutes. In Greece an important issue is whether the interpreted 
statute was indeed unclear; if that is not the case the interpretative statute is not considered 
truly interpretative. More or less the same applies for Italy, in which the standards are that 
there should be uncertainty, unclearness of the interpreted statute, different or contrasting 
interpretations by the courts or by the tax authorities. In Austria it is not regarded a prob-
lem that the interpretative statute confirms the view of the tax authorities, while some tax-
payers have a defensibly different interpretation of the interpreted statute.46 The ratio is that 
if there are different defensible interpretations, the taxpayer cannot trust a certain interpre-
tation.
With respect to the first question, we note that in the above-mentioned countries in 
which an interpretative statute that is applicable to the past is not considered retroactive, 
the standards for ‘retroactivity’ of interpretative statutes are obviously different from those 
for retroactivity of other statutes. Some other countries provide a fine illustration of the 
interrelation between the first question and the second question. For example, in Belgium 
the standards for retroactivity of interpretative statutes are lower than for retroactivity of 
other statutes, but there is – as just seen – a strict view of the definition of an interpretative 
statute. In some countries in which interpretative statutes are not recognized as such, in 
principle no explicit different standards are used to evaluate retroactive interpretative stat-
utes.47 Obviously, if the interpretation provided is the same as the interpretation that the 
courts would give if the interpretative statute had not been enacted, the retroactivity is not a 
problem.
In various national reports it is explicitly noted that regularly statutes that are 
labelled interpretative by the legislator or as only a clarification are not really interpretative 
or, as the case may be, more than a clarification.48 Furthermore, it is even noted that ‘it has 
been common practice throughout the last 100 years that [government] uses an act of par-
liament to reverse the effect of a court decision or to remove a doubt about interpretation in 
favour of the official view.’49
1.2.7. Validation statutes50
An interesting phenomenon is the retroactivity of what are known as validation statutes. 
Such a statute ‘validates’ an existing legal practice and/or a certain view of, often, the tax 
authorities. The various national reports show that most of the countries are familiar with 
44.	 Cf.	German	national	report.
45.	 Germany.
46.	 This	also	seems	to	be	the	case	in	Belgian.
47.	 Canada,	Denmark.
48.	 Canada,	Germany,	Italy.
49.	 National	report	of	the	United	Kingdom.
50.	 See	on	this	topic	the	contribution	of	Bruno	Peeters	and	Patricia	Popelier	in	this	book.
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the fact that the tax legislator sometimes introduces a statute with retroactive effect to 
validate an existing legal practice and/or a certain view of the tax authorities.51 In some 
countries, however, retroactive validation statutes are (nearly) unknown or would be con-
sidered invalid.52
Three types of situation can be distinguished. A first type is that the validation statute 
is enacted at a moment that the courts have not yet decided whether or not the existing 
legal practice and/or the view of the tax authorities has sufficient legal basis in the law, i.e. is 
valid.53 Sometimes the legislator then argues that the statute only provides a clarification of 
the existing law. We note that there could be a conceptual overlap with the phenomenon of 
interpretative statutes, described above, in case the statute ‘validates’ an interpretation. 
A second type concerns the situation where the legislature acknowledges that a cer-
tain tax practice has no legal basis, and introduces a validation statute that is explicitly 
intended by the legislature to provide for a validation, i.e. a legal basis for that practice.54
The third type is that the validation statute is enacted further to a decision of a court 
in which the legal practice or the view concerned is rejected because it has no legal basis in 
the law or another view should be regarded as the correct one.55 Especially where a court 
decision reveals there is a ‘gap’ in the tax law, the legislator may enact a validation statute 
with retroactive effect. In this second type the national authorities often first announce to 
the public, e.g. by press release or a circular, that a validation statute will be introduced, in 
order to avoid taxpayers developing confidence in the court’s decision concerned.
In some reports the retroactivity of validation statutes is criticized especially with 
respect to the second or third type of situation.56
1.2.8. The relevance of the character of the statute concerned: procedural or 
substantive
Case law of the European courts, the ECJ as well as the ECtHR, shows that in order to deter-
mine the temporal effect of a statute the character of the statute is relevant. A substantive 
statute that has immediate effect applies to taxable events occurring after the date on which 
the statute enters into force. However, a procedural statute that has immediate effect is 
directly applicable to pending proceedings (so also to proceedings regarding taxable events 
that occurred prior to the date on which the statute enters into force). 
For example in the (tax) case ECJ C-61/98 (De Haan), the ECJ ruled: ‘it should be noted 
(…) that (…) procedural rules are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the 
time when they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not 
applying to situations existing before their entry into force.” The ECtHR takes a similar 
approach.57
51.	 Belgium,	Canada,	Germany,	France	(loi	de	validation),	Italy	(convalida	legislativa),	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Sweden,	
the	United	Kingdom,	the	US.
52.	 Finland,	Greece	(nowadays),	Luxembourg,	Hungary,	Poland,	Portugal,	Sweden,	Turkey.	A	middle	position	seems	to	
be	the	case	in	Denmark:	if	granted	retroactive	effect,	a	‘validation	statute’	would	normally	not	be	granted	further	
retroactive	effect	than	on	the	date	on	which	the	bill	is	introduced	to	parliament.
53.	 The	French	reporter	call	this	‘indirect	validation’.	This	technique	has	the	aim	‘to	change	the	law	applicable	to	a	
dispute	pending	before	a	court	in	order	to	prevent	the	annulment	of	the	decision.’
54.	 This	is	considered	a	true	validation	statute	(loi	de	validation)	in	France.
55.	 E.g.	Belgium,	Canada	(‘remedial	retroactive	tax	legislation’),	Germany	(Nichtanwendungsgesetze),	Italy,	the	
Netherlands.
56.	 E.g.	the	national	reports	of	Germany,	Italy	(‘abuse	of	judicial	activity’).
57.	 E.g.	(the	non-tax	case)	ECtHR	No.	26737/95,	19	December	1997,	case	Brualla	Gomez,	para.	35	refers	to	‘’a	generally	
recognised	principle	that,	save	where	expressly	provided	to	the	contrary,	procedural	rules	apply	immediately	to	
proceedings	that	are	under	way.”
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Analysis of the various national reports shows that the above generally also applies in most 
of the countries,58 however not in all countries.59 A variant is that procedural rules do not 
apply to procedures initiated before the date the statute enters into force.60 Note that also in 
this variant the new procedural rule does apply to the (new) procedures that relate to tax 
events that occurred in the past.
Thus, in principle, new procedural rules also apply to new, and often also pending, 
proceedings even if the matter of the proceeding is a taxable event that occurred prior to 
the date on which the statute enters into force. An exception, mentioned in most of the 
national reports, is the case in which the new procedural statute contains a transitional 
provision that states differently.
Furthermore, some of the national reports mention more specific exceptions. The 
immediate effect of a procedural rule may be limited to the extent that a new procedural 
rule cannot stipulate duties to cooperate for the past, based on the principle that a law may 
not impose an impossible obligation.61Also, sometimes, some rules of evidence or burden of 
proof will not be given immediate effect.62 More in general the critical issue is raised that, 
from the perspective of taxpayers’ rights, it is not always possible to differentiate between 
procedural and substantive rules.63
1.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
1.3.1. Limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
Retroactive tax legislation is a commonly known phenomenon in the countries referred to 
in this general report. In the United Kingdom, Parliament has the power to enact by statute 
any fiscal law, retroactive tax laws included. In Canada, there are no constitutional limita-
tions on retroactive taxation which means that it is legislative self-restraint that determines 
the frequency and extent of retroactive tax measures. In the other countries, however, there 
are (constitutional) limitations to the retroactivity of tax statutes. 
Portugal and Sweden have a constitutional provision prohibiting retroactive tax laws. 
In Portugal, this constitutional provision is quite strictly applied. However, in Sweden the 
constitutional prohibition turns out to be a limitation, rather than a strict prohibition.64 On 
the other hand, there are countries which are quite strict on retroactivity due to the (consti-
tutional) courts. In Hungary and Poland, the constitutional courts developed quite a strict 
prohibition based on constitutional principles.65 
Limitations may partially be absolute, turning out to be an absolute prohibition of 
retroactivity but only with a regard to a specific kind of legislation. This is the case in France 
with respect to the binding force of a judicial decision.
58.	 Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Portugal,	
Sweden,	Turkey,	United	Kingdom.
59.	 Finland	and	the	US.	The	Danish	report	notes	that	Danish	legal	theory	as	well	as	case	law	is	not	consistent	with	
respect	to	procedural	statutes	at	this	issue.
60.	 Spain.
61.	 Germany.
62.	 France,	Sweden.
63.	 E.g.	the	national	reports	of	Greece,	Hungary	Italy,	and	Luxembourg.
64.	 Nonetheless,	this	is	a	strong	prohibition.	There	is	a	communications	procedure	introduced	as	an	instrument	for	
parliament	to	legislate	retroactively	in	certain	situations,	but	this	procedure	has	been	created	to	maintain	the	rule	
of	law	in	situations	where	rapid	changes	in	tax	law	are	motivated	by	strong	public	interests.
65.	 The	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	principle	of	the	democratic	state	under	the	rule	of	law,	respectively.
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In practice, therefore, in almost none of the participating countries does there exist an abso-
lute ban on retroactive tax legislation, though in countries like Poland, Portugal and Hun-
gary (through the court) a near prohibition exists, at least with regard to retroactive tax 
legislation which is unfavourable for taxpayers. Furthermore, the existing limitations are a 
matter of degree. Though (constitutional) limitations have a prima facie force, other reasons 
may have more force. Therefore, the force of the limitations to retroactivity have to be 
weighed against reasons pro, for example, grounds of general interest. See further sec-
tion 1.5 on ex post evaluation (case law). 
With regard to the legal source of the limitations to retroactive tax legislation there 
seem to be five variants. Sometimes different variants are present in one and the same coun-
try. Note that these variants concern tax statutes, not hierarchically lower tax rules. 
The following variants may be distinguished.
– the limitations are derived from a general principle that is laid down in the constitution 
or in a constitutional text, e.g., the principle of legality, the principle of fairness, the 
principle of legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of 
equality, the principle of the rule of law, the ability-to-pay principle, and the protection 
of property, personal freedoms, democratic state under the rule of law.66
– the limitations are explicitly laid down in a general provision, not only regarding tax 
statutes. This variant may be possible in theory, but does not occur in any of the coun-
tries under examination.67 
– the limitations are explicitly laid down in a constitutional provision that specifically 
regards taxation.This variant occurs in Greece, Article 78. Para. 2 of the Constitution of 
Greece;68 Portugal, Article 103, no. 3 of the Portuguese Constitution; Sweden, Article 2:10 
of the Instrument of Government.
– the limitations are derived from an unwritten general principle of law; such as the prin-
ciple of legal certainty, the principle of equality, the principle of legitimate expectations, 
the principle of equality, the principle of the rule of law.69 
– the limitations are laid down in a non-tax law which is applicable to tax statutes, and 
reflect a general principle of law. This is the case in Belgium, Art. 2 of the Civil Code, and 
Luxemburg, also laid down in the Civil Code. 
66.	 Austria,	Belgium,	equality;	Finland,	a	constitutional	principle	of	‘avoidance’	of	retroactive	tax	legislation;	France,	the	
necessity	of	‘guaranteeing	rights’	and	of	the	separation	of	powers	(respect	of	the	binding	force	of	a	judicial	deci-
sion);	Germany,	the	rule	of	law;	Greece,	the	principle	of	equality	(with	regard	to	tax	abatements);	Hungary,	the	
principle	of	the	rule	of	law;	Italy,	the	ability-to-pay	principle,	and	the	principle	of	legitimate	expectations	(derived	
from	the	principle	of	equality);	Poland,	democratic	state	under	the	rule	of	law;	Spain,	the	principle	of	legal	certainty;	
Turkey,	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law;	USA,	the	Fifth	Amendment	to	the	American	Constitution	(‘No	person	shall	be	
…	deprived	of	life,	liberty,	or	property	without	due	process	of	law’)	and	the	contract	clause.
67.	 Many	constitutions	contain	a	prohibition	of	retroactivity	for	criminal	law,	see	e.g.	Belgium,	Canada,	Germany,	
Greece,	the	Netherlands,	Turkey,	USA.	Consequently,	retroactivity	of	the	more	severe	tax	penal	statutes	may	be	
absolutely	prohibited.	Interestingly,	the	Greek	Council	of	State	does	not	apply	the	constitutional	prohibition	of	
retroactivity	for	criminal	law	in	the	case	of	tax	penal	statutes	even	in	the	case	of	the	more	severe	ones.	However,	in	
its	recent	case	law	of	the	last	five	years	it	applies	Art.	7,	para.	1	ECHR	on	tax	fines.
68.	 Greece	has	a	constitutional	provision	prohibiting	the	unfavourable	retroactive	tax	law	if	this	tax	law	is	effective	
prior	to	the	fiscal	year	preceding	the	imposition	of	the	tax.	Furthermore,	the	Greek	Constitution	(Art.	78,	para.	3)	
establishes	that	it	is	possible	to	collect	consumer	taxes	and	duties	from	the	date	on	which	a	relevant	bill	is	intro-
duced	in	parliament,	i.e.,	before	the	bill	is	put	to	the	vote,	as	long	as	a	time-limit	for	the	promulgation	of	the	law	
imposed	by	the	Constitution	is	observed.
69.	 Examples	of	this	variant	with	regard	to	the	principle	of	legal	certainty	are	Belgium,	Denmark	and	the	Netherlands.	
In	Denmark,	several	other	principles	are	at	stake:	the	principle	of	legitimate	expectations,	the	principle	of	equality,	
the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	and	the	ability-to-pay	principle.
Gribnau & Pauwels Part 1.   General Report – 1.3.2. 
53
1.3.2. Transition policy
Besides the constitutional and legal factors just mentioned, there are also ‘informal’ limita-
tions. The legislator may formulate rules which set boundaries to the use of retroactive legis-
lation (self-binding). Thus, the legislator may offer taxpayers guidance with regard to the 
use of the instrument of retroactive tax legislation. This is quite an exceptional situation. 
Some guidance may be offered by a parliamentary committee, as is the case in Finland, 
where lines are set by the standing Constitutional Law Committee.
A single country has an explicit ‘transition policy’ in the field of tax statutes, viz. the 
Netherlands. In his capacity of co-legislator, the Netherlands State Secretary of Finance has 
published (and discussed with parliament) a memorandum that incorporates the main 
lines of his ‘transition policy’ with respect to the introduction of tax statutes. The memoran-
dum is not legally binding – it is a soft law instrument –, but it has some influence in the 
parliamentary debate, for example, in the event that a bill includes retroactive effect. The 
memorandum (also) contains policy guidelines with respect to granting retroactive effect 
to statutes and grandfathering.70 In Canada the Department of Finance published a list of 
self-imposed restrictions on the use of retroactive tax legislation in a document issued in 
1995 (the ‘Finance Report’) which – only – sets guidelines for the use of retroactive tax mea-
sures to clarify or correct an unintended interpretation of a tax provision by a court.
In other countries, less guidance is offered by government. Governments may have a 
general policy with regard to the quality of legislation, which also covers tax legislation, for 
example Denmark. However, this general legislative policy does not include a transition 
policy. Sometimes a general legislative policy concerns not the national but a regional level. 
For example, the Flemish region in Belgium played a pioneering role in developing a gen-
eral legislation policy concerning the quality of tax legislation. 
The German national reporter notes that there are neither official nor unofficial 
guidelines on the tax transition policy. The Ministry of Finance, who is drafting the tax bills 
in Germany, decides case by case. Sometimes a certain regularity may be apparent in the 
situations in which government provides for transitional rules, as is the case in Austria. It is 
very well possible that this regularity indicates a transition policy. Sweden reports that, it 
may be possible to derive an implicit governmental policy from the preparatory works – 
although a transition policy for legislation (tax legislation included) is lacking. In Novem-
ber 2004 the French government pledged to stop using retroactive provisions detrimental 
to the taxpayer. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether it marks a major change in 
legislative practice.
Furthermore, there may be ‘rules of legislative technique’ which also regulate the 
issues concerning transitional provisions. In Poland, these are rules of a technical character: 
recommendations as to the language of a statute, typical terms of a legislative language, 
layout of a normative act, etc.
Of course, a (constitutional) court may develop an (implicit) policy on the possibility 
of retrospective legislation with particular regard to retroactivity. Consequently, the tax 
legislator may be careful not to transgress the boundaries set by the court (infra, sec-
tion 1.4).
70.	 The	memorandum	sets	out	as	the	starting	points	of	tax	transition	policy	that	in	principle	no	retroactive	effect	will	be	
granted	to	statutes	and	that	statutes	in	principle	will	have	immediate	effect	(without	grandfathering).	Further-
more,	the	question	whether	or	not	(formal)	retroactivity	is	justified	is	regarded	a	question	of	the	balancing	of	
interests:	on	the	one	hand,	legal	certainty	of	the	individual	taxpayers	concerned	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	inter-
ests	of	society	as	a	whole	that	are	served	by	granting	retroactive	effect	to	the	statute	concerned.	Whether	or	not	
retroactivity	in	a	concrete	case	is	justified	depends	on	the	circumstances	of	the	case.	However,	two	elements	are	
distinguished:	whether	or	not	a	justification	exists	for	granting	retroactive	effect	(‘the	substantive	element’)	and	
the	period	of	retroactivity	(the	‘timing	element’).
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With regard to retroactive tax statutes that are favourable to taxpayers, these are generally 
not regarded problematic (e.g. Denmark and Luxembourg). Finland does not raise a ques-
tion of retroactivity from the constitutional point of view and there is a policy, although not 
expressly stated. As for the Netherlands, the above-mentioned general memorandum of the 
State Secretary of Finance does not pay any attention to this topic.
1.3.3. Ex ante control by an independent body 
Part of the legislative process may be the consultation of formal bodies which give their 
opinion on the quality of draft legislation, retroactivity included. However, an independent 
body applying any set of rules on an ex ante basis to review negative retroactivity, favour-
able retroactivity, retrospectivity, or grandfathering in tax legislation is by no means univer-
sal, as the examples of Austria and Canada show.71 In many countries, though, a formal 
institution exists which reviews or advises on (draft) legislation. 
This body may be another ministry, for example the Ministry of Justice, which reviews 
all bills.72 Another variant is that consultative committees, such as a Council of State,73 Coun-
cil on Legislation,74 or a court could (or even, should) be asked for – non-binding – advice.75 
However, the competence of such formal body may be limited, as is the case in Greece, 
where the Council of State has no consultative competence on substantive tax elements.76
Apart from these formal bodies, still other consultative committees may play an 
important role in the legislative decision procedure. This is the case in, for example, Greece 
which has a Court of Auditors.77 Another example is Belgium, without there being specific 
formal advisory or consultative obligations for fiscal matters. 
Finally, there may be a (parliamentary) standing committee for constitutional law, 
which examines a statute for compliance with the constitution before it is enacted. 
The ex ante control by an independent body may be of a legal-technical nature or of a 
substantive nature. In Denmark, for example, the review by the Ministry of Justice is partly 
of a legal-technical nature, but also includes constitutional principles, EU law and retroac-
tivity.78 
The Belgian Council of State gives judicial, linguistic and legislative advice about 
draft decrees, preliminary bills and proposals of law, decree or ordinance as well as amend-
ments concerning these.
The publication of the criteria for good legislation applied in the review process 
would enhance its transparency. However, these criteria are often not published. The Danish 
Ministry of Justice, for example, has not laid down explicit rules concerning this review. 
71.	 Nonetheless,	the	Canadian	Senate	might	ask	the	House	of	Commons	to	adjust	the	effective	date	of	a	tax	amendment,	
but	in	practice	the	Senate	never	does	this.	It	is	also	possible	for	the	executive	to	issue	a	‘’reference”	to	the	Supreme	
Court	of	Canada	regarding	proposed	legislation,	although	this	process	never	occurs	with	respect	to	the	proposed	
retroactivity	of	tax	laws.
72.	 In	Denmark,	for	example,	all	ministerial	bills	pass	a	consultation	process	that	includes	a	review	by	the	Ministry	of	
Justice.
73.	 E.g.	Belgium,	France,	Greece,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands.
74.	 In	Sweden	government	is	in	principle	obliged	to	remit	major	items	of	draft	legislation	to	the	Council	on	Legislation,	
composed	of	members	of	the	Supreme	Court	and	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court.
75.	 In	Turkey	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	has	advisory	competence	with	regard	to	draft	legislation	in	general,	
but	this	court	has	not	advised	in	tax	matters	yet.
76.	 Substantive	tax	elements	are	established	only	by	act	of	parliament,	for	which	the	Greek	Council	of	State	has	no	
consultative	competence.
77.	 Although	the	consultative	competence	of	the	Greek	Court	of	Auditors	does	not	regard	tax	bills,	but	pension	law	bills	
only.
78.	 Moreover,	the	bills’	wording	is	also	examined	for	precision	and	potential	vagueness.
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Rules may also not be known because the advice of this institution, which possibly may 
contain rules, is not published, as is the case with the advice of the French Council of State. 
Even if criteria or rules are published, these may be general rules, which apply to all 
kinds of legislation. This goes for Sweden, which has no particular rules regarding tax legis-
lation.
Also with regard to retroactivity itself, criteria or rules may be published which do 
not specifically concern tax statutes, but are of a general nature. The website of the Belgian 
Council of State, for example, uses a manual with recommendations published on its web-
site. This manual also contains observations regarding retroactivity. Yet these observations 
do not specifically concern tax statutes, but are of a general nature. The manual states that, 
in general, legislative and administrative rules do not have retroactive effect. For retroactiv-
ity to be justified, certain conditions have to be met. 
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the Council of State has laid down criteria with 
respect to the question of when, in its opinion, granting retroactive effect to tax statutes is 
allowed. This Council of State uses these rules to review whether exceptional circumstances 
justify (formal) retroactivity that is disadvantageous for the taxpayers, with respect to the 
period of retroactivity, and whether or not grandfathering is necessary. 
1.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
1.4.1. ‘Legislation by press release’ 
The legislator often announces envisaged changes of tax legislation. Sometimes, it also 
proposes retroactivity till the date of the announcement. In this respect, for example, it may 
use the instrument of ‘legislating by press release’:79 it is announced in a press release that a 
bill is (or will be) proposed in parliament and that the bill provides for retroactivity till the 
date of the press release. Such a press release, which makes an envisaged change of tax legis-
lation known to the public at large, is a particular kind of announcement. An official 
announcement may also be found in the parliamentary proceedings, for example with 
regard to a bill, a motion or an amendment.80 Typically, here the temporal reach of the retro-
activity of the tax act is connected to the date of the announcement.
As will be shown below, there are several variants. The general idea, however, is that, 
on the one hand, there is some kind of an announcement allowing taxpayers to adjust their 
expectations, and rely with reasonable certainty on what the law will be (legal certainty of 
taxpayers), and, on the other hand, retroactivity is applied till the date of the announce-
ment (the timing element). 
Of course, press releases are often used to announce cabinet decisions to put forward 
a bill or legislator’s acceptance of a bill.81 The bulk of the tax changes is often be introduced 
in the annual budget. Then, tax enactments may be made effective from the date of the 
annual budget announcement, as is the case in Canada.82 In Sweden there is even a general 
obligation to communicate a proposal concerning retroactive tax legislation.83 These press 
releases, however, are not used for setting the date as from which the new law will be 
79.	 For	an	example,	see	the	disputed	retroactivity	in	ECJ	C-376/02,	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II.
80.	 In	the	Netherlands	a	bill	only	is	published	after	the	advice	of	the	Council	of	State.	In	this	constitutional	context,	a	
press	release,	for	example	published	on	the	date	the	bill	is	brought	before	parliament	(and	sent	to	the	Council	of	
State	for	advice),	is	an	instrument	to	inform	the	public	of	intended	changes	of	legislation.
81.	 In	the	Netherlands	press	releases	in	tax	matters	are	issued	by	a	single	member	of	government,	the	State	Secretary	of	
Finance,	regularly	after	consultation	of	the	Council	of	Ministers.
82.	 In	Canada	it	is	less	common	for	changes	to	be	announced	by	press	releases,	which	do	not	have	the	constitutional	
formality	or	public	exposure	of	annual	budgets.
83.	 This	is	normally	done	through	a	press	release	or	even	a	press	conference.
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applied. Thus, press releases, occasionally with respect to envisioned tax policy changes, are 
purely used for information purposes without any legal consequences attached to them (see 
for example Luxembourg and Turkey). 
The legislative technique of ‘legislation by press release’ is not used in all countries in 
tax matters, as the reports from Austria, Denmark,84 Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, 
and Portugal show. In some countries, for example Hungary and Poland, the constitutional 
court acts as a blockade to ‘legislation by press release.’
This use of this legislative technique may cause different degrees or intensities of 
retroactivity. This degree or intensity of retroactivity depends on the amount of time 
between the press release or announcement, i.e. the date till which retroactivity is applied, 
and the publication in the government gazette.
1.4.2. Kinds of situation
There are several variants. In the Netherlands, it happens that a press release announces that 
a bill will be proposed in parliament and that the bill provides for retroactivity till the date 
of the press release. Less far reaching is the situation in which it is announced in a press 
release that new tax legislation will be applied as from the date of the press release follow-
ing the session of the Council of Ministers that has decided to propose a certain tax measure 
to be voted by parliament (for example, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden). 
Belgium also offers an example for another variant of this technique: the entry into force as 
from the date upon which the decision to enact the new legislation was published in the 
Belgian Official Gazette. In Spain, retroactivity is permitted back to the date of the publica-
tion of the draft retroactive provisions in the parliament’s official journal. In the USA, Con-
gress will frequently use a date prior to the enactment date of legislation as the limit of the 
extent to which the substantive provisions will be retroactively applied. Various dates may 
be used, including a date connected to an administrative pronouncement, or a date with 
significance in the legislative process including a presidential budget message, a committee 
announcement or press release, the release of a committee report and the date a conference 
agreement is reached. All these events may in some way be announced, for example by press 
release.85
Legislation by announcements, for example, a press release, pushes aside the legal 
certainty provided by the rule of law requirement of formal promulgation of new statutes in 
the constitutionally provided organ of publication.86 Taxpayers are required to take note of 
an emerging new statute by other sources, which do not have the same reliability, as the 
constitutionally provided official gazette. No wonder that in many countries this practice 
gives rise to serious scholarly debate. 
A justification may be found in cases of anti-abuse legislation or in cases where gov-
ernment wants to prevent what is known as the announcement effect, i.e. the situation 
where taxpayers, as soon as they become aware of future changes in legislation, take certain 
actions, make use of a loophole, which will undermine the effect of the legislation.
84.	 Promulgation	by	press	release	(and	other	media,	such	as	radio	and	TV)	has	occurred	in	Denmark,	but	not	in	connec-
tion	with	tax	statutes.	Retroactivity	by	press	release,	on	the	other	hand,	is	very	uncommon	in	Denmark	other	than	in	
legislation	in	connection	with	collective	agreement	negotiations	that	break	down	and	result	in	strikes.	
85.	 Canada	reports	that	there	are	many	situations	where	a	tax	enactment	might	be	made	effective	from	the	date	of	a	
press	release	rather	than	the	more	customary	budget	announcement,	thus	avoiding	the	government	going	through	
the	more	onerous	budget	process.	Apparently,	this	method	is	used	whenever	the	Department	of	Finance	feels	it	is	
appropriate.
86.	 The	one	exception	is	the	situation	that	the	announcement	and	the	formal	publication	of	an	approved	bill,	i.e.	new	
statute,	in	the	constitutionally	provided	organ	of	publication	bear	the	same	date.
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In most countries it is hardly possible to classify the types of case in which the instrument of 
‘legislation by press release’ is used. Such an announcement is likely to be used in various 
types of tax and other legislation, as the US report points out. In France, ‘legislation by press 
release’ is used for new tax incentives, in order to get effects of from the date of the 
announcement. With regard to the Netherlands, however, there are roughly two types of 
situation in which the instrument is used. The first is that the new statute is aimed at (exist-
ing or expected) abuse or improper use of tax rules. The second type of situation is that an 
existing favourable tax policy rule is changed or withdrawn, for example, a fiscal subsidy. 
1.4.3. Retroactive period further back than the date of announcement
In exceptional cases the retroactive period of tax legislation reaches further back in time 
than the date of the announcement.87 This occurrence may be related to a certain technique 
of retroactive legislation, for example validation statutes. In countries in which validation 
statutes occur, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Turkey (supra, section 1.1 ‘Ter-
minology’) the retroactive period of tax legislation sometimes reaches further back in time 
than the date of the announcement. This also holds for cases where the legislator uses inter-
pretative statutes.
It may also be the case that media reports, instead of an official press release, inform 
the general public, thus weakening the trust of the taxpayers (Germany). 
Of course, a (constitutional) prohibition of retroactivity may rule out this possibility 
of retroactivity which reaches further back in time than the date of the announcement, as is 
the case in, for example, Portugal. In other countries, although a constitutional prohibition 
is lacking, this far-reaching form of retroactivity is rarely used.88 
Note, however, that in several countries a (constitutional) temporal limitation exists 
as a consequence of which retroactivity which reaches further back in time than the date of 
the announcement is not banned. According to the Constitution of Greece, for example, 
retroactivity is permitted which does not extend beyond the fiscal year prior to the year of 
publication of the law. In Finland there also is a limitation: retroactivity may reach back to 
the beginning of the fiscal year. Obviously, this also holds for countries with a taxable peri-
od-related concept (supra, section 1.1 ‘Terminology’).
There may be reasons for retroactivity which reaches further back in time than the 
date of the press release. These reasons may also occur in combination: 
– public interest because of the risk of serious announcement effects (Belgium & Germany), 
possibly in conjunction with the degree of legal uncertainty for the taxpayers (Spain);
– tax avoidance or more broadly the elimination of a loophole (Canada,89 the Netherlands, 
USA);
– correction of technical errors and omissions in prior legislation (Canada90, the Nether-
lands, USA);
– inadvertently created hardships or benefits (USA);
– obvious (substantive) omissions and errors (the Netherlands);
– unfavourable judicial decisions (Canada), for example those with drastic negative budg-
etary consequences (the Netherlands).
87.	 E.g.	Belgium,	France,	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	Spain,	Sweden,	USA.
88.	 E.g.	Denmark,	Finland,	Poland.
89.	 To	prohibit	a	particular	tax	avoidance	strategy	the	Canadian	legislator	here	uses	remedial	retroactive	tax	legislation,	
to	‘clarify’	a	tax	provision.	The	same	strategy	may	be	applied	to	‘overrule’	an	unfavourable	judicial	decision	(see	
below).
90.	 Canada	calls	these	kinds	of	errors	neutral,	corrective	amendments,	such	as	those	that	fix	numbering,	cross-referenc-
ing,	and	linguistic	errors.
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1.4.4. Pending legal proceedings
1.4.4.1. Influence of retroactive tax statutes
Retroactive effect granted to substantive statutes may influence pending legal proceedings, 
even though it may take much time for disputed issues to move through the objection and 
appeal process.
In some countries such as France, this often happens and it is frequently the explicit 
aim of the statute. This is occurs especially in cases of validation statutes. The same goes for 
Germany, where more generally, a statute which is enacted with unlimited retroactivity 
applies to any pending procedure. Pending cases are normally not excluded from the appli-
cation of the new statute. 
The USA reports that there is no established modern practice for Congress, but early 
cases allowed Congress to affect the outcome in pending cases through the enactment of 
retroactive legislation.
In the United Kingdom this sometimes happens, but not very frequently. In the same 
vein, Canada, where it can occur where there are long delays between the announcement 
and the enactment of legislation; in such cases the litigants are bound by the amended 
law.91
In Sweden retroactivity is generally not a problem since pending legal proceedings 
concern, with the exception of advance rulings, transactions already carried out. This way, 
legislation enacted (or a communication submitted) could not be applicable to a pending 
case. However, an advance ruling is based on the legislation in force when the ruling is 
given. If the legislation is changed before the transactions are made, the latter legislation is 
applicable and the advance ruling does not detract from that legislation.
1.4.4.2. Pending legal proceedings excluded from application of retroactivity?
In some countries, such as Canada and the Netherlands, there is no explicit prohibition in 
this respect. In the Netherlands, however, because most of the cases of retroactivity of legis-
lation concern ‘legislation by press release’ the retroactive effect does not normally have the 
effect that pending legal proceedings are influenced. The same goes for Sweden; normally it 
is not a practical problem since retroactivity is generally not granted for more than perhaps 
a couple of months – not years.
In some countries pending legal proceedings are excluded from the application of 
the new statute, for example Denmark92, Hungary, Italy, Portugal (because of the general 
non-retroactivity in tax matters). In Finland it is a merely theoretical situation, for retroac-
tive effect is granted very seldom and in those cases the legislator acts fast.
In Greece pending cases may be affected only by explicit provision, and, in any case, 
within the limited time frame set by the constitution which expressly permits retroactivity 
as long as the latter does not extend beyond the financial year prior to the year of enact-
ment of the law.
Spain reports that, in principle, pending legal proceedings are excluded from the 
application of the new statute, so there seems to be some latitude for the legislator. 
91.	 Although	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	legislation	that	is	retroactive	prior	to	announcement	can	affect	pending	legal	
proceedings	that	turn	on	substantive	issues	which	arose	years	in	the	past	(but	after	the	effective	date).
92.	 In	Denmark	it	is	commonly	accepted	that	amendment	of	procedural	statutes	has	effect	on	pending	legal	cases	
unless	otherwise	stated	in	the	amendment’s	transitional	provisions.	As	a	rule,	however,	procedural	legislation	will	
contain	transitional	provisions.
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The same goes for Belgium: in principle, pending legal proceedings are excluded from the 
scope of a new substantive statute. If this occasionally happens, however, strict conditions 
have to be met.
1.4.5. Retroactivity favourable to taxpayers
The legislator sometimes grants retroactive effect to tax statutes that are favourable to tax-
payers. However, in some countries this does not happen, an example being Belgium. 
In other countries, such as Hungary and Greece, granting such favourable retroactive 
effect to tax statutes is possible, but it does occur only in very exceptional cases, and, espe-
cially in Greece, only if the constitutional principles of tax equality and of separation of 
powers (and res judicata) are not infringed. Germany reports that, although the legislator is 
free to grant this kind of retroactive effects to tax statutes, favourable changes with retro-
active effect are rather rare. One of the reasons for this might be to compensate for a 
long-lasting political debate or a protracted legislative procedure. In Turkey this type of 
retroactivity occurs, whereas the principle of equality sets limits to the measure concerned 
(although there is some scholarly debate on this issue). Spain reports that this kind of retro-
activity only applies to administrative penalties, surcharges and, occasionally, to late inter-
est and special cases of tax liability.
Still other countries report a more frequent use of favourable changes with retroactive 
effect. In Austria, Canada and the United Kingdom it is not uncommon. In France it happens 
frequently, in cases of ‘legislation by press release’, and in Italy it is generally permitted
The Netherlands legislator regularly grants retroactive effect to tax statutes that are 
favourable to taxpayers, seemingly mostly in situations in which the field of application rati-
one materiae of a provision has a different scope than expected and intended.
The USA reports that such effects are common when, as part of the income tax, Congress 
enacts “extender” legislation after a provision that was subject to sunset has expired.
As for the kind of situation in which this kind of favourable retroactivity is granted, there 
often is no specific pattern, as Danish reporter states, the decisive factor being a political 
desire to favour taxpayers retroactively. On the other hand, in Finland a tax relief is consid-
ered a typical situation. 
1.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity; case law on retroactivity
1.5.1. Introduction
If the legislator introduces a tax statute with retroactive effect that is disadvantageous for 
taxpayers, taxpayers may appeal to court to challenge the retroactivity. Whether or not such 
a challenge would be successful depends on (i) the possibilities the courts have to test retro-
activity, (ii) on the standards that the court uses to assess whether or not the retroactivity 
concerned is legitimate, and of course, (iii) on the legislator’s reasons for the retroactivity at 
hand. In this section, we deal with the first two aspects. In principle, courts would have the 
following the possibilities to test retroactivity:
– testing against the national constitution; 
– testing against general principles of law;
– testing for compatibility with international treaties.
There may be an overlap between these possibilities. The principle of legal certainty is 
a fine example. This principle is, in the first place, a general principle of law. The principle 
may, however, also be enshrined in the constitution (or courts may derive the principle 
from another general principle enshrined in the constitution). Furthermore, the principle 
of legal certainty is also relevant when testing of retroactivity for compatibility with inter-
national treaties. First of all, according to settled case law of the ECJ, the principle of legal 
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certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations are characterized as general princi-
ples of EU law.93 Secondly, although the principle is not explicitly laid down in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Court has ruled that the principle of legal 
certainty is necessarily inherent in the law of the Convention.94 As such, the principle plays a 
role in the case law of the European Court with respect to, for example, Article 6 ECHR and 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR.
1.5.2. Possibilities and limitations to test retroactivity
Not all the above-mentioned three possibilities may be available for national courts. The 
courts’ competence may be limited, for example by the constitution. In this respect the 
nature of the tax statute concerned may also be relevant.
In most countries the courts are allowed to test statutes, including acts of parliament, 
for compatibility with the constitution.95 Note, however, that in some of these countries not 
all courts are permitted to do such a test, but only a specific court, often the constitutional 
court, is allowed to do so.
In the Netherlands, however, the Constitution prohibits acts of parliament being 
tested for compatibility with the Constitution or with (‘unwritten’) general principles of 
law. Acts of parliament may only be examined for compatibility with international trea-
ties.96 Since the constitutional prohibition of testing legislation only concerns acts of parlia-
ment, other legislation (for example, municipal legislation) could, however, be examined 
for compatibility with the Constitution as well as with general principles of law. In France 
the situation was very similar to the situation in the Netherlands. However, recently the 
French Constitution has been amended and it is noted by the French reporter that the 
impact of this reform is hard to predict. Further, in Canada and the UK courts do not test tax 
statutes for compatibility with the constitution or general legal principles.97 This is based on 
the idea of sovereignty or, as the case may be, supremacy of parliament. In these countries, 
the issue of retroactivity is for courts only an issue of statutory interpretation: whether or 
not a statute has retroactive effect98 – if it has retroactive effect, the courts apply the statute 
retroactively.99
The international treaties that are the most relevant for testing retroactivity are – at 
least in the European context – the EU Treaty and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
As mentioned above, according to settled case law of the ECJ, the principles of legal 
certainty and legitimate expectations are considered general principles of EU law. Hence, in 
case the national tax legislation concerned falls under the scope of EU law, the retroactivity 
can be tested against the EU principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. Thus, 
if the national legislation concerns VAT, the retroactivity can be tested against these princi-
93.	 ECJ	C-376/02,	26	April	2005,	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II,	para.	31.
94.	 E.g.	the	non-tax	case	ECtHR	no.	6833/74,	13	June	1979,	case	Marckx,	para.	58.
95.	 Austria,	Belgium,	Denmark,	Finland,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Italy,	Poland,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden,	Turkey,	the	
USA.
96.	 It	should	be	noted	that	at	this	moment	there	is	a	legislative	proposal	pending	to	change	the	Constitution	on	this	
issue.	The	proposal	does	not,	however,	provide	for	an	overall	withdrawal	of	the	constitutional	prohibition,	but	only	
in	an	amendment	of	it	to	allow	–	as	an	exception	–	the	judge	to	test	acts	of	parliament	against	certain	constitutional	
provisions.
97.	 The	Canadian	reporter	notes	that	some	taxpayers	have	challenged	retroactivity,	advancing	arguments	based	on	the	
Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	the	Bills	of	Rights	and	unwritten	unconstitutional	principles,	but	that	all	these	
challenges	have	failed.
98.	 In	this	respect	a	‘rebuttable	presumption	of	non-retroactivity’	applies.
99.	 The	same	applies	de	facto	in	Finland	and	Denmark.
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ples.100 Moreover, as the case at hand should fall under the scope of EU law, not in all cases 
can retroactivity of national tax legislation be tested for compatibility with these EU princi-
ples.101 Thus, the nature of the statute concerned, or at least of the case at hand, is important 
in this respect. As regards the standards to judge retroactive tax legislation, case law of the 
ECJ shows that retroactivity is in principle prohibited (“the principle of legal certainty pre-
cludes a measure from taking effect from a point in time before its publication”). However, 
this is not an absolute prohibition. If two requirements are met, the retroactivity may be 
permissible according to the ECJ. Retroactivity may be permissible “where the purpose to be 
achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly 
respected.”102 Note that although retrospectivity is in principle allowed according to the ECJ, 
in that case as well legitimate expectations should be respected.103
With respect to the European Convention on Human Rights, in principle, Article 6 
ECHR, Article 7 ECHR and Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR are important for testing ret-
roactivity. The principle of non-retroactivity of Article 7 ECHR, however, only concerns crim-
inal offences. Furthermore, according to settled, but criticized, case law of the ECtHR, pure 
tax disputes do not fall under the scope of Article 6 ECHR.104 Therefore, for retroactivity of 
tax legislation (not concerning tax penalties) only Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR 
remains as a possibility to test retroactivity. Indeed, case law of the ECtHR shows that retro-
activity of tax legislation can be tested against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR.105 How-
ever, retroactive tax legislation is in principle not prohibited by Article 1 of the First Proto-
col ECHR.106 The question to be answered is whether “the retrospective application of the 
law imposed an unreasonable burden (…) and thereby failed to strike a fair balance 
between the various interests involved.” Whether or not this is the case, “depends, first, on 
the reasons for the retroactivity and, secondly, on the impact of the retroactive law on the 
position of the applicants.”107 Important is that the ECtHR has ruled that “a Contracting 
State, not least when framing and implementing policies in the area of taxation, enjoys a 
wide margin of appreciation” and that the legislator’s assessment is accepted unless it “is 
devoid of reasonable foundation”.108 It should be noted that the ECtHR is stricter towards 
retroactivity with respect to one type of situation. This concerns the situation where the 
100.	 E.g.,	ECJ	C-381/97,	3	December	1998,	Belgocodex,	ECJ	C-396/98,	8	June	2000,	Schloßstraße,	ECJ	C-62/00,	11	July	
2002,	Marks	&	Spencer,	and	ECJ	C-376/02,	26	April	2005,	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II.	See	also	for	retrospectivity	
ECJ	C-487/01	and	C-7/02,	29	April	2004,	Gemeente	Leusden/Holin	Groep.	For	retroactive	charging	by	the	tax	admin-
istration	see	e.g.	ECJ	C-181/04	and	183/04,	14	September	2006,	Elmeka.
101.	 The	answer	to	the	question	when	exactly	an	act	can	be	tested	for	compatibility	against	a	general	principle	of	EU	law	
does	not	seem	to	be	very	clear	yet.	See	for	one	view	S.	Douma,	‘The	principle	of	legal	certainty:	enforcing	interna-
tional	norms	under	community	law’,	in:	S.	Douma	and	F.	Engelen	(eds.),	The	Legal	Status	of	the	OECD	Commentar-
ies	(Amsterdam,	IBFD,	2008,)	at	pp.	217-249.
102.	 EC,	C-376/02,	26	April	2005,	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II.	See	also	e.g.	ECJ	C-381/97,	3	December	1998,	Belgocodex,	
ECJ	C-396/98,	8	June	2000,	Schloßstraße,	ECJ	C-62/00,	11	July	2002,	Marks	&	Spencer.	For	retroactive	charging	by	
the	tax	administration	see	e.g.	ECJ	C-181/04	and	183/04,	14	September	2006,	Elmeka.
103.	 E.g,	ECJ	April	29,	2004,	C-487/01	and	C-7/02	(Gemeente	Leusden/Holin	Groep).
104.	 ECtHR	no.	44759/98,	12	July	2001,	Ferrazzini.	This	case	law	has	been	criticized	in	the	literature;	see	for	example	Lee,	
Natalie,	‘Time	for	Ferrazzini	to	be	reviewed?’,	British	Tax	Review	(2010),	at	pp.	589-609.
105.	 E.g.	ECtHR	10	March	1981,	no.	8531/79	(A.B.C.	and	D.),	ECtHR	23	October	1997,	nos.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93	
(National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.),	ECtHR	10	June	2003,	no.	27793/95	(M.A.),	and	ECtHR	23	July	2009,	
no.	30345/05	(Joubert).	See	about	the	ECtHR	case	law	in	this	respect,	e.g.,	Baker,	Philip,	‘Retroactive	tax	legislation	
and	the	European	convention	on	human	rights’,	British	Tax	Review	(2005),	pp.	1-9,	and,	in	extenso,	Pauwels,	supra	
note	3,	at	pp.	401-440.
106.	 E.g.	ECtHR	no.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,	(M.A.).
107.	 E.g.	ECtHR	no.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,	(M.A.).
108.	 E.g.	ECtHR	nos.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93,	23	October	1997,	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.	and	
ECtHR	no.	27793/95	10	June	2003,	(M.A.).
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retroactive law decisively influences a pending proceeding before court. The ECtHR consid-
ers that “the principle of the rule of law and the notion of fair trial (…) preclude any inter-
ference by the legislature – other than on compelling grounds of the general interest – with 
the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute.” 
This rule also applies to retroactive tax laws.109 Note that also here there is no absolute pro-
hibition, as there may be “compelling grounds of the general interest” that justify the legis-
lature’s interference through the retroactive law.110
It can be assumed that, in principle, the possibilities that international treaties pro-
vide to courts for testing retroactivity are less important in the countries in which courts are 
constitutionally allowed to test retroactivity against the constitution, than in countries in 
which courts are not permitted to do so. 
This assumption gets support in the various national reports, at least with respect to 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. On the one hand, in most of the countries in which 
courts are constitutionally allowed to test retroactivity against the constitution, Article 1 of 
the First Protocol ECHR does not play a role in case law (at least up till now).111 On the other 
hand, in countries in which there are constitutional restrictions for the court to review acts 
of parliament, Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR is regularly invoked by taxpayers for the 
courts to challenge retroactivity.112 
In general, in countries in which courts test retroactivity of tax statutes for compati-
bility with Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR, the various national courts have not, or very 
rarely, ruled retroactivity incompatible with that provision.113 
Notwithstanding the above, it could (at least theoretically114) be that also in countries 
in which courts are constitutionally allowed to test retroactivity against the constitution, 
international treaties provide extra possibilities. This could be the case if the constitution 
does not impose restrictions on the retroactivity of tax legislation. This could also be the 
case if the restrictions that the constitution imposes (or at least the restrictions that courts 
derive from the constitution) are less strict than the restrictions that the international trea-
ties impose.
1.5.3. Standards applied when testing retroactivity
The standards applied to test retroactivity of tax statutes in the different countries vary. An 
important reason is the variety of the restrictions that the constitutions impose with respect 
to retroactivity. 
Furthermore, even if roughly the same standard were to be used in two countries, the 
way the courts use the standard may differ. This is caused by the fact that standards are 
usually abstract to a certain extent, which may have the effect that the application of the 
standard in a concrete case may differ. For example, the standard may be that retroactivity is 
only allowed in the case of special circumstances, or in case there are weighty reasons, but 
109.	 E.g.	ECtHR	nos.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93,	23	October	1997,	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.	and	
ECtHR	no.	30345/05,	23	July	2009,	Joubert.
110.	 Which	was	the	case	in	ECtHR	nos.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93,	23	October	1997,	National	&	Provincial	Building	
Society	c.s.	
111.	 Austria,	Hungary,	Germany,	Greece,	Italy,	Poland,	Portugal,	Spain,	Turkey.	This	is	obviously	also	the	case	in	countries	
in	which	the	national	legislator	does	not	introduce	(disadvantageous)	tax	statutes	with	retroactive	effect;	for	
example	Luxembourg.
112.	 France,	the	Netherlands.
113.	 Belgium,	Denmark,	Finland,	France	(exceptions	are	some	administrative	court	decisions	on	a	specific	interpretative	
act,	but	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court	has	not	ruled	yet),	the	Netherlands	(exception	is	one	case	of	a	high	
court),	Sweden,	the	UK.
114.	 In	none	of	the	various	national	reports	an	example	was	mentioned	along	this	line.
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there could be different results in a concrete case due to the fact that judgments may differ 
with respect to the question whether or not special circumstances exist, or whether the 
reasons the legislator had for the retroactivity are sufficiently ‘weighty’.
Not in all countries are standards of the courts for testing retroactivity of tax statutes. 
This is obviously the case in countries in which the legislator does not introduce tax legisla-
tion with retroactive effect, notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional prohibition for 
the legislator in this respect.115
It could also be that standards are absent for another reason. One reason could be 
that there is a constitutional obstacle for courts to test retroactivity, which is – as seen 
above – the case in France and the Netherlands, at least with respect to acts of parliament. 
Another reason for the lack of standards could be that, although tax statutes may in princi-
ple be tested for constitutionality, case law shows that the chance that a court would declare 
retroactivity unconstitutional is merely theoretical.116 In the same line, standards could be 
absent in countries in which the courts do not test the retroactivity of tax statutes, because 
granting retroactive effect to a tax statute is considered a political decision or because of the 
idea of the sovereignty/supremacy of parliament.117
However, the national reports show that in most of the countries standards are devel-
oped and used by the courts to test retroactivity, albeit sometimes standards are laid down 
directly in the constitution concerned.
In some countries the standards applied with respect to retroactivity are (partly) 
formal in the sense that the period of retroactivity is a decisive factor. 
The most extreme standard in this respect is that – due to constitutional restrictions 
or due to restrictions derived by the courts from a general principle of law – retroactivity is 
never allowed in case it is disadvantageous for taxpayers.118 
Another example is the standard that retroactivity is never allowed if and insofar as 
the period of retroactivity reaches beyond a certain period. This is the case in Greece for 
retroactivity that is unfavourable for taxpayers.119 The Greek Constitution provides that such 
retroactive effect of a tax statute may not go beyond the fiscal year preceding the year of the 
publication of the statute (hence, a tax statute imposed in 2010 may not impose retroac-
tively tax on income earned in the year 2008).120
The period of retroactivity could also be a decisive factor the other way around, 
namely that retroactivity is in any case allowed as long as retroactivity stays within a certain 
period. This is the case in Greece: retroactivity of tax statutes to the fiscal year preceding the 
year of publication of the statute is in any case allowed. In a certain sense this is also the case 
in countries that have a ‘tax period-related concept’ of retroactivity (supra, section 1.1). 
Since in these countries a statute that is introduced during a fiscal year (e.g. in November 
2009) and that applies as from the beginning of that year (e.g. 1 January 2009) is not consid-
ered retroactive, backdating is thus in any case allowed to the extent that it stays within the 
fiscal year.
115.	 Luxembourg.
116.	 Denmark,	Finland.	In	Finland	the	courts	see	themselves	to	be	bound	in	their	judicial	review	to	the	guidelines	of	the	
Constitutional	Committee.	If	the	Constitutional	Committee	has	not	challenged	retroactivity,	the	courts	dare	to	do	
that	independently.	
117.	 Canada,	the	UK.
118.	 Hungary,	Poland,	Portugal.
119.	 For	favourable	retroactivity	no	time	limit	applies.
120.	 An	exception	applied	in	a	situation	in	which	the	ECJ	found	a	tax	exemption	provided	by	the	Greek	tax	law	to	be	
prohibited	state	aid.	The	tax	that	was	levied	retroactively	beyond	the	time	limit	allowed	by	the	Greek	Constitution.	
The	Greek	Council	of	State	did	not	consider	this	to	be	a	violation	of	the	Greek	Constitution.
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In most countries, however, courts employ, whether together with a formal standard in the 
above-mentioned sense or not, substantive standards. The following can be derived from the 
national reports:121
– In Austria the Consitutional Court considers retroactivity incompatible with the princi-
ple of equality, viz. its sub-principle legal certainty, if it infringes legitimate expectations. 
To assess whether there is such an infringement, the Court first looks at the clarity of the 
legal statute that was changed retroactively. If it was clear that that legal statute provided 
for a lower tax burden, then the significance of the tax burden and the gravity of the 
grounds of justification for the retroactivity are taken into account in order to assess 
whether the principle of legitimate expectations is infringed. These criteria have to be 
balanced case by case.
– In Belgium the Constitutional Court does not consider every retroactive statute to consti-
tute an infringement of the principle of legal certainty. First of all, it is possible that 
retroactive provisions simply confirm legal rules that had been published earlier. Sec-
ondly, retroactivity can be justified in certain circumstances. Whether grounds for justifi-
cation are present is examined on a casuistic basis. Justification is possible when the 
retroactive effect of a legal rule is indispensable to achieve a goal of public interest, such 
as the well-functioning or continuation of public services. The interest of public revenue 
is only accepted as a justification when it is accompanied by other persuasive consider-
ations. Furthermore, in the situation in which the retroactive effect of an act substan-
tially influences the outcome of pending cases, a strict approach applies: either “excep-
tional circumstances” or “compelling motives of public interest” are required. Notwith-
standing these strict requirements, case law shows that it is possible that there are situa-
tions in which courts accept that such exceptional circumstances are present.
– In Finland the Supreme Court would rule that retroactivity is unconstitutional in case 
the legislator does not meet the test formulated by the Constitutional Law Committee.
– In Germany the Constitutional Court holds in principle that there is a ban of retroactiv-
ity, but allows exceptions.122 A first exception is the situation in which a reasonable tax-
payer cannot claim trust in the (still) prevailing legal situation, which is the case (i) from 
the date of adoption of the bill in parliament, or (ii) in the case of an evidentially unclear 
or unconstitutional legal situation.123 A second exception is the situation in which the 
confidence in the prevailing legal situation has to be subordinated to the interest of the 
legislator to change the law retroactively. This applies if (i) the disadvantage the taxpayer 
suffers from the retroactive enactment is negligible (de minimis rule; it can be seen as an 
outcome of the principle of proportionality), and (ii) the legislator can claim overriding 
urgent/compelling public interest. Mere public revenue interest has never been accepted 
as the only ground of justification, but it could be combined with facts which shake the 
taxpayer’s faith, for example the legislative intent to combat announcement effects.
– In Italy the Constitutional Court tests retroactivity against the constitution and the 
enshrined general principles; the constitutional ‘ability-to-pay principle’ is invoked, but 
more recently also the principle of legitimate expectations is used. On the basis of this 
latter principle, retroactivity of tax statutes must be justified by ‘reasonablness’ and may 
121.	 Please	take	into	consideration	that	that	the	question	whether	or	not	a	justification	exists	for	retroactivity	is	preceded	
by	the	question	whether	or	not	there	is	retroactivity.	As	the	latter	question	may	be	answered	differently	(for	exam-
ple,	depending	on	whether	a	‘tax	period-related	concept’	or	a	‘taxable	event-related	concept’	of	retroactivity	is	used;	
see	section	1.2.5)	it	could	be	that,	for	the	same	situation,	the	court	in	the	one	country	has	to	answer	the	former	
question	but	that	the	court	in	another	country	does	not	get	around	to	that	question.
122.	 For	the	approach	of	the	German	Constitutional	Court	with	respect	to	retrospectivity,	see	the	German	national	
report.	Here	we	note	that,	interestingly,	the	court	has	recently	imposed	more	strict	limitations	to	retrospectivity.
123.	 This	latter	exception	was	invented	to	overcome	the	transition	period	after	the	Second	World	War,	but	has	hardly	
ever	been	used.
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not be in conflict with ‘values and constitutional interests’. In general, the protection of a 
higher collective interest could be accepted as a justification: for example, the curbing of 
tax evasion and the abuse of tax laws, or the existence of an extraordinary economic 
situation. Sometimes also ‘Treasury requirements’ based on extraordinary fiscal needs 
are accepted.
– In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court takes the position that deviation from “the legal 
principle based on the requirements of legal certainty that legislative measures should 
only apply for the future” to the disadvantage of taxpayers is only justified in the case of 
‘special circumstances.’124 It is not entirely crystallized out which circumstances could 
qualify as such a special circumstance. Though it is clear that in case the taxation for 
which the retroactive rule provides was foreseeable for taxpayers, the retroactivity con-
cerned could be justified. Up till now, the Supreme Court has never ruled in a concrete 
case that the retroactivity at stake was incompatible with the principle of legal certainty. 
The Supreme Court did, however, once rule in a case of retrospectivity (immediate effect 
without grandfathering) that the principle of legal certainty had been infringed.
– In Spain retroactivity of tax statutes is forbidden unless ‘it is justified by serious reasons 
of general interest.’ Constitutional case law provides examples of cases in which retroac-
tivity is considered not unconstitutional as well cases in which retroactivity is deemed to 
be unconstitutional.
– In Sweden, based on a constitutional provision, retroactivity of tax statutes is in principle 
prohibited, unless one of the exceptions applies that is described in detail in that consti-
tutional provision. One of these exceptions applies when the government or a parlia-
mentary committee has presented a tax bill to parliament. In such a case, tax can be 
levied already as of the day that the bill was presented to parliament. The same applies 
when the government transmits to parliament a written communication stating that a 
tax bill will be forthcoming. This possibility has frequently been used, especially in order 
to hinder undesired consequences of tax law, such as undesired tax planning and tax 
evasion. According to the constitutional provision, the parliament may furthermore 
prescribe that exceptions shall be made on the principle of non-retroactivity if it consid-
ers this is warranted on special grounds connected with war, the danger of war or grave 
economic crisis. It is noted that only once did a court deem a retroactive tax statute 
unconstitutional.
– In Turkey the Constitutional court takes the following position: ‘Under the principle of 
non-retroactivity, the statutes must be applied on subsequent legal actions, events or 
transactions that are occurred after their enactment. Exceptional cases may appear 
which are accepted as necessary for public interest or public order or for the protection 
of vested rights or for the improvement of financial rights.’ Although the Constitutional 
Court has tested retroactive tax statutes in a few cases, no retroactive tax statute has 
found to be incompatible with the Constitution.
– In the US, there are technically two strains of federal constitutional doctrine that can be 
invoked to limit the enactment of retroactive taxes,125 but in modern practice these two 
are generally viewed as one. In the important case United States v. Carlton (1994) it was 
noted by the majority opinion of the Supreme Court: ‘Provided that the retroactive appli-
124.	 Note	that	this	case	law	concerns	rules	not	being	acts	of	parliament.	As	mentioned	above,	the	Netherlands	courts	are	
not	allowed	to	test	acts	of	parliament	against	the	Constitution	or	‘unwritten’	general	principles	of	law,	but	only	
against	norms	included	in	treaties.
125.	 The	first	involves	potential	limits	on	the	power	of	the	federal	Congress,	primarily	under	the	Fifth	Amendment’s	
command	that	property	not	be	taken	by	Congress	without	due	process	of	law,	but	also	under	the	‘contract	clause.’	
The	second	involves	the	potential	limits	under	the	fourteenth	amendment	on	the	state	legislatures’	ability	to	
impose	taxes.
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cation of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational 
means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive 
province of the legislative and executive branches.’ Furthermore, the majority opinion 
effectively dismissed the only set of cases (dating from the years 1927 en 1928) in which 
the Supreme Court held that, in these cases, retroactive taxes imposed by Congress were 
invalid. Thus, nowadays, the Supreme Court does not impose strict limitations on the use 
of retroactivity.126 In a certain type of situation the Supreme Court is, however, more 
stringent. The Supreme Court is very hostile to attempts by state legislators to limit the 
effect of judgments holding state taxes invalid. It is expected – based on the separation of 
powers doctrine – that the same would apply in case the Congress were to try to cure 
defective (federal) tax collections.
This overview shows that the substantive standards to test retroactivity vary. However, there 
are some general lines. The general substantive standard is generally that there should be a 
justification for retroactivity that is disadvantageous for taxpayers. There are basically two 
lines of justification, although not in all above-mentioned countries the two lines are both 
employed. First, the line that concerns the expectations of taxpayers: retroactivity could be 
allowed in case retroactivity is considered not to infringe taxpayers’ reasonable expecta-
tions. Secondly, the line of a compelling public interest: retroactivity could be allowed in 
case an overriding public interest is served by the retroactivity. Note that the first line 
implies that the weight of legal certainty is considered low, while the in the second line the 
public interest outweighs the principle of legal certainty. Both lines show that the issue of 
retroactivity is a ‘balancing act’. Noteworthy is also that, at least in some of the countries, 
the mere public revenue interest is not accepted as the only justification for retroactivity.
1.5.4. Final observations
In general, it can be observed that in the various countries the standards that courts impose 
for retroactivity of tax legislation differ significantly. On the one side, there are countries in 
which the courts (almost) fully leave the issue of granting retroactive effect to tax legislation 
to the discretion of the legislator (or parliament, as the case may be). On the other side, 
there is a group of countries in which an (almost) absolute prohibition of retroactive taxes 
applies. Between these opposite positions, there are countries in which courts review 
whether legislator’s decision to grant retroactive effect stays within certain (formal and/or 
substantive) standards. These differences are at first sight remarkable.
More research should be done on this issue, but it seems that the differences partly 
have historical roots. Countries in which the restrictions for retroactivity are the most strin-
gent have often recently overcome a non-democratic past.127 Further, countries in which 
courts in principle (almost) fully respect the legislator’s decision to grant retroactive effect 
to tax statutes often have a strong democratic history.
126.	 Please	note	that	the	state	courts	(at	least	some	of	them)	impose	more	stringent	limitations	on	retroactivity	than	the	
Supreme	Court.	There	are	also	recent	examples	of	cases	in	which	a	state	court	found	retroactivity	invalid;	see	the	US	
report.
127.	 Compare	the	Hungarian	national	report	for	an	observation	along	this	line	for	Hungary.
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1.6. Views in the literature
1.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
The literature regarding the prohibition on retroactive legislation corresponds, to a large 
extent, to the national constitutional and legal provisions and the national case law on 
retroactivity. In Greece, for example, the prevailing opinion is that there is a duty to protect 
the constitutional temporal restrictions. In the USA, academic writers find few constitu-
tional problems with retroactive tax legislation. The Turkish literature strongly opposes the 
case law of the Turkish Constitutional Court. 
In one country there is hardly any debate in the literature (Hungary). In many coun-
tries, the literature largely focuses on conceptual distinctions and the legal consequences 
connected to the different concepts, the (weight of the) principle of non-retroactivity, and 
grounds of justifications (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands). Tax law scholars and sometimes 
constitutional law scholars may contribute to the debate (e.g. Sweden). In Austria the tax 
literature does not deal with the problem of retroactivity in a way that goes beyond the case 
law of the Constitutional Court.
Scholars generally take a critical stance towards retroactivity, their concern being 
among other things proportionate protection of legal certainty and predictability (e.g. 
Spain). In Canada practitioners tend to criticize all forms of retroactive tax laws, while aca-
demic lawyers approach the problem more thoughtfully. Possible justifications of the use 
retroactivity are often debated, e.g. targeting abuse or avoidance or the prevention of 
announcement effects or ‘windfall gains’, and sometimes closing gaps in tax law. However, 
even when scholars accept that retroactive effect may sometimes be granted, this does not 
imply a communis opinio with respect to the question when retroactivity of tax legislation is 
justified (e.g. the Netherlands). Policy changes in favour of the taxpayer are often debated, 
also in countries with a prohibition of non-retroactivity (Poland, Portugal). In the USA, the 
desirability of general policies when tax changes are made is still a matter of considerable 
debate, especially to prevent infringements of the principle of equality.
Therefore, it seems that the appreciation of retroactivity partly depends on the legal 
culture of a country.
1.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view has hardly provoked any debate in the tax literature, as far as 
the reviewed European countries and Canada are concerned. In these countries, though, in 
other fields of law the law and economics movement is often flourishing. The one country 
where law and economics is an important view in the scholarly tax literature is the USA.
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Part 2
Special Topics
2.1.
Legal certainty: a matter of principle
Hans Gribnau 
2.1.1. Introduction 
People value legal certainty. Predictability of law protects those subject to the law from 
arbitrary state interference with their lives. Legal certainty enables people to plan their 
future. Retroactive rule-making compromises the ideal of legal certainty. Therefore, legisla-
tors considering the possibility of introducing retroactive legislation should proceed care-
fully. This is easier said than done. 
The use of retroactive rules to redress or repair situations or decisions deemed unfa-
vourable is not a recent invention. Moreover, even the world’s greatest minds are sometimes 
tempted to make use of retroactivity. The public interest is often invoked to justify retroac-
tive legislation. As did Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), American statesman and co-author 
of one of the most famous political treatises, the Federalist Papers. Hamilton lived in a time 
of great societal upheaval. After losing the city elections of New York for the state legislature, 
he and fellow Federalists appealed to Governor John Jay (co-author of the Federalist Papers) 
to convene the outgoing state legislature to impose new rules for choosing presidential 
electors. ‘Most shocking of all, they wanted this new system applied retroactively, to over-
turn the election.’1 Hamilton argued that ‘in times like these in which we live, it will not do 
to be overscrupulous. It is easy to sacrifice the substantial interests of society by a strict 
adherence to ordinary rules.’2 
Here, we breathe in the typical odour of retroactivity: to cheat, to play a trick on the 
rule of law, to recede from a decision, which may lead to frustrated prospects and plans, 
financial losses, diminished trust in government, etc. No wonder retroactivity of legislation 
is a controversial issue. This also goes for retroactive tax legislation. Decreasing legal cer-
tainty may chip away at the tax legislator’s legitimacy, and may produce decreasing tax-
payer compliance.
1.	 R.	Chernow,	Alexander	Hamilton	(New	York:	The	Penguin	Press,	2004),	at	p.	609.
2.	 Chernow,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	609.	Chernow	adds:	‘This	from	a	man	who	had	consecrated	his	life	to	the	law.’
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Consequently, retroactivity of tax legislation is a controversial issue which is related to 
many legal and even political themes. On the one hand, legislation is the primary legal 
source of taxpayers’ rights and obligations; on the other hand, legislation is the product of a 
political process. Legislation provides the legal basis for the levy of taxes. Legislation and 
the imposition of taxes are both an exercise of (political) power with an inherent risk of 
abuse of power. Distribution of power according to the principle of separation of powers is 
an important instrument to protect taxpayers against arbitrary interferences and abuse of 
power. Checks and balances are a complement to this distribution of power among the 
branches or powers of government – legislative, executive, and judicial. However, checks 
and balances will never be able to completely control the use of power. This also goes for the 
power of the legislator, particularly the power to enact tax legislation with retroactive effect. 
The legislator, therefore, should restrain himself; he should exercise self-discipline.
Tax legislation with retroactive effect is but a part of a wider phenomenon, viz. the 
change of the body of (tax) laws. Therefore, the main problem to be addressed will be: 
which norms guide the legislator willing to change the body of tax laws in the exercise of 
self-discipline? Which norms enable an assessment of the use of retroactive tax legislation 
from the perspective of legal certainty? 
In getting a grip on this research problem the following ideas will figure as a leit-
motiv. Laws have to keep up with all kinds of societal and economic changes. Therefore, 
change is a characteristic of the body of legal rules. However, a measure of stability is indis-
pensable in order to offer people guidance. This area of tension explains the need for norms 
which enable us to assess the legitimacy of changes in tax legislation, including the use of 
retroactive tax legislation. These norms regard the legislator’s use of rules, i.e., the introduc-
tion, amendment and abolishment of legal rules. These norms aim at achieving certainty of 
law. This certainty of law, legal certainty, has to be distinguished from certainty through law, 
i.e., the more abstract ideal of the legal system as a whole providing security for the liberty 
of human beings. 
Rules play an important role in the human need for certainty. Rules offer structure, 
regularity, stability, reliability and predictability. Law as a body of rules aims at sharing 
these virtues. Legal rules enhance certainty of law. Rules are the stuff legislation is made of. 
Legislative rules attaching legal consequences to taxpayers’ actions guide taxpayers’ 
behaviour. Thus, taxpayers can calculate their tax liability and predict the tax administra-
tion’s behaviour. Legal rules enable taxpayers to cope with uncertainties involved in the 
levying of taxes. However, these legal rules themselves are subject to change. Change has 
impact on the degree of guidance rules offer. 
This raises important questions: is the rule of law to be reduced to the rule of rules? 
Does a legal system consist of rules which can be changed at will, for example with retroac-
tive effect? Do rules exhaust the rule of law, or are other general legal norms part of the 
legal system? That is to say, are there other legal norms which enable us to assess the (retro-
active) change of rules? As will be shown, this question touches upon the difference 
between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law. It will be argued that the law 
is not morally neutral as to the end to which it as an instrument is put. Therefore, the rule of 
law as a means should not be disconnected from the external end(s) its serves.
Legal principles, embodying the internal morality of law, enable us to assess changes in 
tax legislation, legislative changes included. Legal rules are meant to offer certainty, and they 
can fulfil this function in different ways, as expressed by the different aspects of the principle 
of legal certainty. Each of these different aspects of the principle of legal certainty has its own 
demands which have to be balanced. They enable us to pinpoint the virtues and vices of legisla-
tive changes with regard to legal certainty, the certainty legislative rules aim to provide.
To address the research problem a number of research issues will be dealt with. These 
questions may be of a normative, descriptive, explanatory or evaluative nature. The research 
problem, therefore, is a mix of different kinds of research questions. The explanation and 
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evaluation call for the development of a theoretical framework necessary for any reflection 
on a legislative practice, viz., the use of retroactive tax legislation. This practice is partly 
political and partly legal in nature. Therefore, to answer the research issues, I will make use 
of legal and political theory. An interdisciplinary approach to legal certainty will thus be 
adopted.3
Here, I will not develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the assessment of 
the use of retroactive tax legislation.4 However, I will give some theoretical reflections on the 
principle of legal certainty and its place in the legal system, necessary for the assessment of the 
use of retroactive tax legislation. I will start with the importance of rules for human beings. 
Law will be elaborated upon, being a system of rules which enhances important values such as 
stability, regularity and reciprocity. Then, I will set out a conception of the rule of law. This 
conception in its turn is based on a conception of law itself, in which values and principles 
constitute the fundamental norms of the legal system. Then, I will deal with the notion of legal 
certainty, subsequently distinguishing different aspects of legal certainty. 
2.1.2. The rule of law
The rule of law is an essentially contested concept which inevitably involves endless dis-
putes about its proper use.5 Nonetheless, there seems to be a general consensus as to the 
core of the ideal of the rule of law. Bingham suggests that the core of the principle of the 
rule of law ‘that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promul-
gated and publicly administered in the courts.’6 The exercise of power by rulers, such as the 
levying of taxes, should be restrained by law.7 The rule of law – government by law – should 
have primacy over the rule of men. 
The concept of the rule of law has two different – but closely connected – meanings. 
The first meaning is government sub lege, i.e., government govern in accordance with the 
established laws. This also holds for legislators: they should exercise their power in accor-
dance with the existing basic norms of the legal system (pre-established legal principles 
included). The rule of law can also refer to government per leges. This means that govern-
ment must function through laws, i.e., through general and abstract norms rather than 
specific and concrete decrees.8 According to the widespread ideal of the rule of law, govern-
ment should exercise power via general legislation. This requirement of general legislation 
serves as an important protection against arbitrary interferences with individual rights and 
liberties by the public authorities.
3.	 Here	the	term	‘interdisciplinary	approach’	–	going	beyond	a	multidisciplinary	treatment	of	the	tax	subject	–	is	used,	
meaning	‘that	the	tax	researcher	adopts	the	perspectives	and	research	approaches	of	more	than	one	academic	
discipline’,	M.	Lamb	et	al.	(eds.),	Taxation:	An	Interdisciplinary	Approach	to	Research	(Oxford/New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2005),	at	p.	7.
4.	 For	a	comprehensive	theory	of	retroactive	tax	legislation,	see	M.R.T.	Pauwels,	Terugwerkende	kracht	van	belastin-
gwetgeving:	gewikt	en	gewogen	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Uitgevers,	2009),	at	pp.	1-322.	See	also	M.	Schuver-Bravenboer,	
Fiscaal	Overgangsbeleid	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2009).
5.	 W.	Gallie,	‘Essentially	Contested	Concepts’,	in:	W.	Gallie,	Philosophy	and	the	Historical	Understanding	(Chatto	&	
Windus,	London,	1964),	at	p.	157.	He	convincingly	argues	that	this	essential	contestability	is	proof	of	the	continuing	
need	of	‘vital,	agnostic	philosophy’	(156).
6.	 T.	Bingham,	‘The	Rule	of	Law’,	Cambridge	Law	Journal,	66(1),	2007,	pp.	67–85,	at	p.	69.
7.	 H.	Gribnau,	‘General	Introduction’,	in:	G.T.K.	Meussen,	ed.,	The	Principle	of	Equality	in	European	Taxation	(The	
Hague,	London,	Boston:	Kluwer	Law	International,	1999),	pp.	1-33,	at	pp.	6-8.
8.	 N.	Bobbio,	‘The	Rule	of	Men	or	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in:	N.	Bobbio,	The	Future	of	Democracy	(Minnea	polis:	University	of	
Minnesota	Press,	1987),	at	pp.	143-144.	For	an	overview	of	the	history	of	this	idea,	see	G.	Kirchhof,	Die	Allgemeinheit	
des	Gesetzes	(Tübingen:	J.C.B.	Mohr	(Paul	Siebeck),	2000),	at	pp.	39-173.
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This general law is opposed to any kind of individual command (rule of men). It is an 
abstract rule which does not mention particular cases or individually nominated persons, 
but is issued to apply to all cases and persons in the abstract.9 Law conceived as a general 
and abstract norm is attributed the intrinsic virtue of promoting certainty, equality, and 
liberty.10 With regard to legal certainty, the capacity of law to provide certainty depends its 
abstractness, which is a purely formal characteristic of law.11 This ideal of rule-governance 
developed into a central pillar of liberal and constitutional government during the nine-
teenth century.12
Thus, there are strong ties between rules, legal certainty, and the rule of law. On the 
one hand, the rule of law refers to a legal system based on general and abstract rules. On the 
one hand, legal certainty is one of the central tenets of the rule of law. For example, the Rule 
of Law Index, published by the World Justice Project, gives legal certainty a prominent place 
among the four universal principles from international sources. As used by the World Jus-
tice Project, the rule of law refers to a rules-based system in which four universal principles 
are upheld, one of these being: ‘The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and fair, and protect 
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.’13 As stated above, there 
are many conceptions of the rule of law, but the principle of legal certainty is generally 
recognized to be a key ingredient of it.14 I will now elaborate on the links between rules, 
legal certainty, and the rule of law. 
2.1.3. Formal conceptions of the rule of law
2.1.3.1. The rule of rules 
Friedrich Hayek’s influential definition of the rule of law is clear on the relationship 
between rules, legal certainty and the rule of law: ‘stripped of all technicalities, this means 
that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand, rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.’15 A law may be bad or unjust, therefore, but the demand that law must be just 
falls outside the scope of a formal conception of the rule of law, its only (formal) criteria of 
9.	 F.L.	Neumann,	The	Rule	of	Law.	Political	Theory	and	the	Legal	System	in	Modern	Society	(Leamington	Spa:	Berg	Publish-
ers,	1986),	at	pp.	212-213;	according	to	Neumann,	this	formal	structure	of	law	contains	at	the	same	time	‘a	material	
element,	namely	the	prohibition	of	retroaction.’	
10.	 For	the	connection	between	liberty	and	certainty	in	the	sense	of	guaranteeing	liberty	(‘freiheitrechtlicher	Schutz’	/	
‘freiheitssicherende	Kraft	des	allgemeinen	Steuergesetz’),	see	Kirchhof,	supra	note	8,	at	pp.	535	ff	and	G.	Kirchhof,	
‘Netto-Prinzip	umd	gemischte	Aufwendungen:	Zu	den	drei	Ebenen	der	Verfassungsdeutung’,	in:	Gestaltung	der	
Steuerrechtsordnung:	Festschrift	für	Joachim	Lang	(Cologne:	Verlag	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt,	2010),	pp.	563-588,	at	p.	587.
11.	 By	contrast,	the	capacity	of	law	to	promote	equality	stems	from	another	formal	characteristic	of	law,	viz.	the	nature	of	
the	general	norm	as	one	which	applies	not	just	to	an	individual	but	to	a	class	of	individuals	and	which	can	even	be	
formed	by	all	the	members	of	a	social	group;	Bobbio,	supra	note	62,	at	pp.	143-144.
12.	 F.	Dallmayer,	‘Hermeneutics	and	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in:	G.	Leyh.	ed.,	Legal	Hermeneutics.	History,	Theory	and	Practice	
(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1992),	at	p.	9.	He	argues	that	‘rule-governance	or	the	rule	of	law	underwent	
a	subtle	change:	namely	in	the	direction	of	a	steady	formalization	and	legalization.’
13.	 The	World	Justice	Project,	Rule	of	law	Index	2010,	www.worldjusticeproject.org,	at	p.	2.	The	other	three	universal	
principles	are:	The	government	and	its	officials	and	agents	are	accountable	under	the	law;	The	process	by	which	the	
laws	are	enacted,	administered,	and	enforced	is	accessible,	fair,	and	efficient;	Access	to	justice	is	provided	by	compe-
tent,	independent,	and	ethical	adjudicators,	attorneys	or	representatives,	and	judicial	officers	who	are	of	sufficient	
number,	have	adequate	resources,	and	reflect	the	makeup	of	the	communities	they	serve.	
14.	 See,	for	instance,	Bingham,	supra	note	6,	at	p.	69	who	identifies	as	the	first	sub-rule	of	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	
law,	that	‘the	law	must	be	accessible	and	so	far	as	possible	intelligible,	clear	and	predictable.’
15.	 F.	Hayek,	The	Road	to	Serfdom	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1996),	at	p.	80.	
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justice being generality and equality. These criteria must be observed if the rule of law is to 
be effective, for effectiveness is what a formal conception of the rule of law is about.16 The 
rule of law in this sense enhances individual freedom by allowing people to choose between 
options. This is the notion of ‘legal liberty’: freedom to do what the law permits. Individual 
liberty is promoted by rules which enable individuals to know the range of activities which 
are not prohibited by the law. In this range they are completely free to choose between 
options as they please without being exposed to government coercion.17 Thus, in a free 
society ‘the private individual cannot be ordered about but is expected to obey only the 
rules which are equally applicable to all.’18
Thus, the rule of law boils down to the rule of rules, for Hayek wants people to be free 
from state interference that is not specified in a rule. This formal conception of the rule of 
law has its drawbacks. Gray criticizes Hayek’s underlying conception of liberty, especially 
the claim that it is subjection to arbitrary will that constitutes unfreedom. If, as Hayek 
argues, we have to obey general and abstract rules irrespective of their application to us, ‘it 
is the case that many different sets of rules will be left in the field’, according to Gray. For 
Hayek, promotion of the common good is the (utilitarian) criterion for just rules. However 
Hayek’s theory lacks any serious side-constraint principles on maximizing aggregate social 
utility. The central defect of his theory, therefore, is the lack of any substantive conception of 
individual rights offering protected areas of action. Gray concludes that Hayek blurs the 
boundaries of individual freedom and assimilates it to other goods such as the rule of law 
and social stability.19 Substantive conceptions of the rule of law remedy this defect; here 
individual rights guarantee liberty. I will come back to the substantive conceptions of the 
rule of law in the next section.
Both formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law view rules as a means to 
enhance certainty. Hayek, defending a formal conception of the rule of law, elaborates on 
this issue. According to Hayek, the rule of law requires that the laws must be general, 
abstract rules. Moreover, these rules must be known and certain, and should apply equally.20 
These important characteristics of rules distinguish the rule of law from the rule of men, as 
mentioned above. Legal rules, therefore, are construed at a high level of generality and 
impersonality. With regard to the first attribute of ‘true laws’, he points out that general and 
abstract rules are laid down in advance irrespective of their application. These general, 
abstract rules are ‘essentially long-term measures, referring to yet unknown cases and con-
taining no references to particular persons, places or objects.’21 In order to satisfy the 
demand of equality, the third requirement, a law must be general ‘in referring only to for-
mal characteristics of the persons involved.’22
As for the second chief attribute, legal certainty, my main concern here, Hayek offers 
us two observations.23 On the one hand, the importance of legal certainty for ‘the smooth 
and efficient running of a free society can hardly be exaggerated.’ Nonetheless, Hayek main-
tains that ‘complete certainty of the law is an ideal which we must try to approach but 
16.	 F.A.	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1960),	at	pp.	208-210.
17.	 B.Z.	Tamanaha,	On	the	Rule	of	Law:	History,	Politics,	Theory	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	at	p.	66.
18.	 Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	208.
19.	 J.	Gray,	‘Hayek	on	Liberty,	Rights	and	Justice’,	in:	J.	Gray,	Liberalisms:	Essays	in	Political	Philosophy	(London/New	
York:	Routledge,	1989),	at	pp.	89-102;	cf.	Tamanaha,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	70-71.	
20.	 Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	208-210.
21.	 Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	208.	Cf.	at	pp.	151-154.
22.	 Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	209.
23.	 For	an	overview	of	some	moments	in	the	history	of	this	idea,	see	A.	von	Arnauld,	Rechtssicherheit.	Perspektivische	
Annäherungen	an	eine	idée	directrice	des	Rechts	(Tübingen:	Mohr	Siebeck,	2006),	at	pp.	9ff.	Cf.	J.R.	Maxeiner,	
“Some	Realism	About	legal	certainty	in	the	Globalization	of	the	Rule	of	Law’,	in:	M.	Sellers	&	T.	Tomaszewski,	eds.,	
The	Rule	of	Law	in	Comparative	Perspective	(Dordrecht:	Springer,	2010),	at	pp.	41-55.	
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which we can never perfectly attain.’24 On the other hand, the extent to which this relative 
certainty has in fact been achieved should not be belittled.25
2.1.3.2. Law is a knife
Legal certainty is also a central tenet of a more recent view on the rule of law put forward by 
the legal philosopher Raz, who also asserts a formal conception of the rule of law. He 
observes that government’s subjection to the rule of law drastically restricts the possibility 
of arbitrary use of its power. Nonetheless, many forms of arbitrary rule are compatible with 
the rule of law. ‘A ruler can promote general rules based on whim or self-interest, etc. with-
out offending against the rule of law.’26 Moreover, the rule of law furthers individual liberty 
and human dignity. It enables people to plan their activities with foreknowledge of their 
potential legal implications. Respecting human dignity entails respecting people’s auton-
omy, i.e. ‘treating humans as capable of planning and plotting their future autonomy.’27 
Thus, people are enabled to be author of their own lives. Autonomy is the ability or capacity 
to govern oneself. ‘Autonomy’ carries a connotation of consciousness, of ‘the capacity to 
make choices upon reflection.’28 This personal autonomy alludes to the condition of a man 
whose choices and actions are an expression of his own preferences and aspirations.29
Raz followed in the footsteps of Hayek when he identified ‘the basic intuition’ under-
lying the rule of law: ‘the law must be capable of guiding behaviour of its subjects.’30 The law 
must be such that people can acquire knowledge of the law. If not, the law is not capable of 
being obeyed, for its subjects cannot find out what it is they cannot act on it. Conformity to 
the rule of the law is a necessary condition for the law to be serving directly any good pur-
pose. Raz compares law to a knife. ‘A good knife is, among other things, a sharp knife. Simi-
larly, conformity to the rule of law is an inherent value of law, indeed it is their most impor-
tant inherent value.’ Conformity to the rule of the law is ‘the virtue of law in itself, law as law 
regardless of the purposes it serves. […] Like other instruments, the law has a specific virtue 
which is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put.’31 
24.	 Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	208.
25.	 Hayek	offers	a	kind	of	measurement	for	the	degree	of	certainty	of	the	law:	‘the	disputes	which	do	not	lead	to	litigation	
because	the	outcome	is	practically	certain	as	soon	as	the	legal	position	is	examined’;	Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	208.
26.	 J.	Raz,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	its	Virtue’	[1977],	in:	J.	Raz,	The	Authority	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	
at	pp.	210-229.	Moreover,	the	belief	that	the	rule	of	law	is	particularly	relevant	to	the	protection	of	(substantive)	
equality	and	that	equality	is	related	to	the	generality	of	law	is	mistaken.	‘Racial,	religious	and	all	manner	of	discrim-
ination	is	not	only	compatible	but	often	institutionalized	by	general	rules’	(at	p.	216).	
27.	 Raz,	supra	note	26,	at	p.	221.
28.	 R.	Dagger,	‘Politics	and	the	Pursuit	of	Autonomy’,	in:	J.R.	Pennock	&	J.W.	Chapman,	eds.,	Justification,	[Nomos	
XXVIII]	(New	York/London:	New	York	University	Press,	1986),	pp.	270-290.	This	connotation	of	consciousness	is	
absent	in	ordinary	uses	of	‘liberty’	and	‘freedom.’
29.	 H.	Spector,	Autonomy	and	Rights:	The	Moral	Foundations	of	Liberalism	[1992],	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2007),	at	pp.	90-91,	referring	to	Rousseau’s	dictum	that	an	autonomous	man	is	obedient	to	a	law	he	prescribes	to	
himself.	For	the	(Kantian)	idea	of	autonomy,	echoing	Rousseau,	as	self-legislation,	see	J.B.	Schneewind,	The	Inven-
tion	of	Autonomy,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	at	pp.	483ff.	See	J.	Rawls,	‘The	Idea	of	Public	
Reason	Revisited’,	in:	J.	Rawls,	Collected	Papers,	ed.	S.	Freeman,	(Cambridge/London,	Harvard	University	Press,	
1999),	at	p.	586	on	political	and	moral	autonomy.
30.	 J.	Raz,	supra	note	26,	at	p.	214.	To	be	sure,	Raz	also	criticizes	Hayek’s	position	which	‘inevitably	leads	to	exaggerated	
expectations’	(at	p.	226).
31.	 Raz,	supra	note	26,	at	pp.	225-26.	This	way	of	conceiving	goodness	or	virtue	of	anything	or	excellence	(aretē)	dates	
back	to	Aristotle,	see	Aristotle,	The	Nicomachean	Ethics,	ed.	D.	Ross	(Oxford/New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	
1984),	1097b24-1098a18.	He	answers	the	question	about	the	nature	of	a	thing	by	‘formally	looking	to	function	or	
characteristic	activity	or	essence	(ergon)’;	J.	Roberts,	Aristotle	and	the	Politics	(London/New	York:	Routledge,	2009),	
at	pp.	11-12.
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Raz, therefore, disconnects the rule of law as means and the external end(s) it serves. It is a 
purely instrumental, morally empty understanding of the rule of law. This version of the 
rule of law has no content requirement, which ‘renders it open to a range of ends.’32
According to Raz, many principles can be derived from the basic idea of the rule of 
law; they depend for their validity or importance on the particular circumstances of differ-
ent societies. Raz sees little point in trying to enumerate all these principles. He only men-
tions some of the more important ones. Significantly, he starts with two principles which 
are connected to the ideal of legal certainty. First, Raz mentions the principle that all laws 
should be prospective, open and clear. Here, he immediately points out that retroactive law 
cannot guide people’s behaviour.33 However, retroactive law in itself is not a line that must 
never be crossed, for when it is known for certain at the time of action that a retroactive law 
will be enacted, there is ‘no conflict with the rule of law (though it may be objected to on 
other grounds).’34 Moreover, the law must be open and adequately publicized. If the law is 
not knowable people cannot find out what the law is, and it will not guide their conduct. In 
order to guide, the law’s meaning must be clear, i.e., the law should not be ambiguous, 
vague, obscure or imprecise. The second principle connected to the ideal of legal certainty is 
that laws should be relatively stable. Frequently changing laws hamper people in finding 
out what the law is at any given moment and they won’t be sure the law has not been 
changed since the last time they learnt what it was. Raz points out that stability regards 
short-term decisions as well as long-term planning. ‘Knowledge of at least the general out-
lines and sometimes even of details of tax law and company law are often important for 
business plans which will bear fruit only years later.’35
2.1.4. Substantive conceptions of the rule of law
2.1.4.1. Law as command versus tacit reciprocity 
Substantive conceptions of the rule of law oppose the idea that law is a neutral instrument; 
they oppose the idea that anything goes. Defendants of a substantive conception of the rule 
of law argue that fundamental legal norms, viz., general legal principles, set boundaries to 
lawmaking. The legislature and other lawmaking institutions are bound by these funda-
mental legal norms. These general legal principles limit the lawmaker’s freedom. Law is 
connected to the fundamental norms and values prevalent in a society of free and equal 
citizens by means of general legal principles. Principles can be considered to be expressions 
of legal values which constitute the normative foundation of law in a modern democratic 
state. Law in its turn seeks to implement legal values, such as equality, efficiency and cer-
tainty, which can be regarded as reflections of social and cultural norms and values.36
Formal conceptions of the rule of law boil down to a command theory of law: law is 
seen as the command of the sovereign lawmaking power. This command theory implies a 
denial of the relevance of general legal principles. These principles are not viewed as basic 
norms of the legal system which are binding upon the lawmaking institutions. However, if 
32.	 Tamanaha,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	94.	As	Hayek	already	pointed	out,	this	formal	legality	is	in	essence	a	matter	of	rules.
33.	 Cf.	K.	Tipke,	Die	Steuerrechtsordnung:	Vol.	I	(Cologne:	Verlag	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt,	2000),	at	pp.	145	ff,	who	character-
izes	the	principle	of	non-retroactivity	as	a	formal	principle	of	the	state	under	rule	of	law.
34.	 Raz,	supra	note	26,	at	p.	214.
35.	 Raz,	supra	note	26,	at	p.	215.
36.	 For	a	comprehensive	legal	philosophy	with	legal	values	at	its	core,	see	G.	Radbruch,	‘Legal	Philosophy’,	in:	The	Legal	
Philosophies	of	Lask,	Radbruch	and	Dabin	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1950),	at	pp.	107-111.	For	
Radbruch’s	conception	of	values	as	standards	of	evaluation,	see	S.	Taekema,	The	Concept	of	Ideals	in	Legal	Theory	
(The	Hague,	London,	New	York:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	pp.	69-93	and	Gribnau,	supra	note	7,	at	pp.	
20-21.	For	a	substantive	conception	of	the	rule	of	law,	see	Bingham,	supra	note	6.
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the relation between the state and the individual is seen as ‘nothing more than that of a 
superior to inferior, the sovereign will as expressed in legislation, may be arbitrary, despotic 
and irrational.’37 In this Hobbesian view legislation is regarded as the command of the sov-
ereign, i.e. the legislator.38 To be sure, Hobbes does recognize some limits to legislation 
– notably the demand of promulgation and non-contradiction. Still, in my view a command 
theory of law is inadequate. Law is not to be reduced to a command of the sovereign (legis-
lature). Montesquieu, therefore, defined laws as follows: ‘Laws, in their most general signifi-
cation, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things.’39 Montesquieu spoke 
of law as a relation precisely because ‘he did not regard it as the command of a superior or 
the will of a sovereign.’40 In short, legal rules lead to the desired behaviour if they ‘concur 
with the values of the people whose behaviour they try to guide and influence.’41
In the same vein, the legal scholar Kahn observes that law’s rule includes a family of 
related ideas. Law cannot be reduced to commands which have to be obeyed independent 
of their content. Legal rules, important though they are, do not make up the whole picture. 
There is more to law, for those ideas underlying the rule of law include ‘expectations about 
regulations, procedures, and institutions, conceptions of authority, justice and legitimacy.’42 
This stress on expectations fits well in with the argument of the legal philosopher Fuller that 
the lawgiver should take citizens more seriously than proponents of command theory of 
law seem to do. He opposes the view that the essential characteristic of law lies simply in the 
fact that it is exercise of authority. ‘Sharing a traditional liberal suspicion of legislators 
exercising top-down control’,43 he explicitly connects reciprocity to the ideal of the rule of 
law. He even denies the existence of a rational ground for asserting that a man can have a 
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that completely violates a fundamental principle such 
as legal certainty, for ‘at some point obedience becomes futile.’44 
Fuller elaborates on the work of the sociologist Simmel, who maintains that action is 
mutually determined, even in cases of ‘superordination and subordination.’45 Consequently, 
the state’s position of superior power rests ultimately on a tacit and relatively stable reci-
procity.46 There is a tacit reciprocity between government and the citizens with respect to 
the observance of rules. If the citizens follow the rules government expects them to follow, 
they should have government’s assurance that these are the rules that will be applied to 
their conduct. ‘When this bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by govern-
ment, nothing is left on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules.’47 Fuller’s 
37.	 C.K.	Allen,	Law	in	the	Making,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1961,	at	p.	411.
38.	 Th.	Hobbes,	Leviathan	[1651],	ed.	R.	Tuck,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992),	XXVI,	at	p.	187:	the	Law	is	
‘a	Command,	and	a	Command	consisteth	in	declaration,	or	manifestation	of	the	will	of	him	that	commandeth,	by	
voyce,	writing,	or	some	other	sufficient	argument	of	the	same.’
39.	 Montesquieu,	The	Spirit	of	Laws	[1748],	eds.	A.M.	Cohler,	B.C.	Miller	&	H.	Stone	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	1998),	I,	1,	at	p.	3.
40.	 J.N.	Shklar,	Montesquieu	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1987),	at	p.	71;	she	goes	on	to	acknowledge	that	‘relation	
may	be	a	somewhat	vague	word,	but	what	it	does	not	mean	may	be	more	important	than	what	it	does	imply,	in	this	
case.’
41.	 G.	Hofstede,	Culture’s	Consequences:	Comparing	Values,	Behaviors,	Institutions,	and	Organizations	Across	Nations	
(Thousand	Oaks	[etc.]:	Sage	Publications,	2001),	at	p.	147.	According	to	Hofstede,	a	scholar	who	compares	cultures,	
law	is	one	of	the	domains	developed	in	societies	through	which	we	try	to	defend	us	against	uncertainties	in	the	
behaviour	of	others.
42.	 P.	Kahn,	Law	and	Love:	The	Trials	of	King	Lear,	(New	Haven	and	London:	Yale	University	Press,	2000),	at	p.	xvi.
43.	 K.L.	Winston.	‘Introduction	to	the	Revised	Edition’,	in:	Lon	L.	Fuller,	The	Principles	of	Social	Order,	ed.	K.L.	Winston	
(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2001),	pp.	1-23,	at	p.	21.
44.	 L.L.	Fuller,	The	Morality	of	Law	[1964]	(New	Haven/London:	Yale	University	Press,	1977),	at	p.	39.
45.	 K.H.	Wolff	(ed.),	The	Sociology	of	Georg	Simmel	(Glencoe	(Ill.):	The	Free	Press,	1950),	at	p.	183.
46.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	61.	
47.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	40.	
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point of departure is law’s central purpose to provide baselines for human interaction. Law 
serves the purpose of putting in order and facilitating human interaction. It follows that 
‘the existence of enacted law as an effectively functioning system depends upon the estab-
lishment of stable interactional expectancies between lawgiver and subject.’48 In this way, 
Fuller draws attention to the two-sided nature of legal relationships.49 A lawgiver, therefore, 
who issues unintelligible or contradictory rules, commands the impossible, or changes legal 
rules every minute lacks any respect for the principle of legal certainty. This lawgiver flouts 
the factual dependence of a legal system on the interplay of reciprocal expectancies, and 
thus threatens the bond of relatively stable reciprocity between government and the citi-
zen.50
The importance of the interplay of reciprocal expectancies between legal actors 
points beyond a formal conception of the rule of law. These reciprocal expectancies are 
partly dependent on values and norms. Legitimate lawmaking, therefore, has to respect the 
values and norms shared by the people whose behaviour the law tries to guide and coordi-
nate. These societal values and norms may become part of the legal order and thus be mor-
ally binding upon the legislator. These reciprocal values and norms are expressed in individ-
ual rights offering protected areas of action (supra, section 2.1.3.1). This line of reasoning 
accounts for a substantive conception of the rule of law. Consequently, the law is not mor-
ally neutral as to the end to which it is put. Legal principles play a crucial role in a substan-
tive conception of the rule of law. This will be shown in the next section.
2.1.4.2. Law and legal principles51 
As shown above, formal theories of law as advocated by Hayek and Raz focus on the virtue of 
law, regardless of the purposes it serves. The law has a specific virtue which is morally neu-
tral in being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put. However, as the leading 
contemporary philosopher of law, Ronald Dworkin points out, the concept of law refers to a 
social and institutional practice that has a normative dimension. The normative dimension 
of the institutional practice of law does not only stem from the fact that it is regulated by 
rules, but that it rests on certain assumptions about what can acceptably count as law.52 In 
short, what counts as law is dependent on what people value in law, and that is a normative 
question. This fits well in with one of Hofstede’s findings that (legal) rule-makers should 
take into account ‘the values of the people whose behaviour they try to guide and influence’.
48.	 Lon	L.	Fuller,	‘Human	Interaction	and	the	Law’,	in:	Fuller,	supra	note	43,	pp.	231-266,	at	p.	254.	Cf.	Fuller,	supra	note	
44,	at	p.	209.
49.	 W.J.	Witteveen,	‘Rediscovering	Fuller:	An	Introduction’,	in:	W.J.	Witteveen	&	W.	van	der	Burg,	eds.,	Rediscovering	
Fuller:	Essays	on	Implicit	and	Institutional	Design	(Amsterdam:	Amsterdam	University	Press,	1999),	pp.	21-48,	at	
pp.	33ff.
50.	 Fuller	does	not	advocate	a	positivistic	conception	of	the	rule	of	law,	though	he	does	not	have	a	(formal	and	substan-
tive)	principle	of	equality	as	one	of	his	principles	of	the	internal	morality	of	law.	T.R.S.	Allan,	Constitutional	Justice:	
A	Liberal	Theory	of	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	at	pp.	52	ff	convincingly	argues	that	
Fuller’s	principles,	as	well	as	his	claim	that	they	make	up	a	morality,	require	the	principle	of	equality	if	Fuller	is	not	
to	be	turned	into	a	proponent	of	a	rather	formal,	positivistic	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	(such	as,	for	example,	
Joseph	Raz).	Fuller’s	first	principle,	the	principle	of	generality,	is	one	of	the	most	important	principles	of	the	rule	of	
law	because	it	serves	the	value	of	equality	before	the	law.	Cf.	D.	Dyzenhaus,	‘The	Dilemma	of	Legality	and	the	Moral	
Limits	of	Law’,	in:	A.	Sarat,	L.	Douglas	&	M.	Merrill	Umphrey,	eds.,	The	Limits	of	Law	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	
Press,	2005),	at	pp.	109-154.
51.	 For	an	earlier	version	of	this	section,	see	H.	Gribnau	&	M.R.T.	Pauwels,	‘Retroactivity	and	Tax	Legislation	in	the	
Netherlands:	A	theoretical	approach	and	assessment’,	Rivista	di	Diritto	Tributario	Internazionale,	2009/3.	See	M.	
Pauwels,	‘Retroactive	and	Retrospective	Tax	Legislation’,	in	this	volume.	
52.	 R	Dworkin,	Justice	in	Robes	(Cambridge	Mass./	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006),	at	pp.	2-10.
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Substantive theories of law, therefore, add content specifications which are viewed as an 
integrated part of the ideal of law.53 Substantive theories of law account for the fact that the 
law in a given society is inevitably linked to the political values in that society. These politi-
cal values codetermine the outcome of conflicts between legal certainty and other values, 
such as equality, or interests and policies. Moreover, political values inform the relationship 
and interaction between the lawmaking powers, and, therefore, the actual law in force in a 
society.
Dworkin offers an elaborate substantive conception of the rule of law. This enables us 
to account for the role of principles as standards for evaluating existing law, for this testing 
of established law requires a particular conception of law which gives principles a place 
alongside the legal rules established by legal authorities. Once the importance of principles 
in the body of law is clarified, we can explain that tax laws need to meet the requirements of 
the principle of legal certainty. Part of the explanation is the fact that one of the central 
concerns of law is certainty, i.e., legal certainty. Legal certainty is an ideal that law aims to 
realize. This idea implies that law which does not fulfill certain requirements of certainty 
cannot be labeled law.54
Dworkin opposes the view that in a true associative community people assume that 
the content of the established legal rules exhausts their obligations. Members of a genuine 
political community view rules as negotiated out of commitment to underlying principles 
that are themselves a source of further obligation. They ‘accept that they are governed by 
common principles, not just by rules hammered out in political compromise.’55 According 
to Dworkin, the rule of law is a discourse about values which have already deeply informed 
the community’s understanding of itself as a community of principle. This community acts 
in a unified and principled manner. Rights and obligations in such a society of principle are 
not exhausted by ‘the particular decisions the political institutions have reached but 
depend, more generally, on the scheme of principles those decisions presuppose and 
endorse.’56 Before it is a set of particular rules, therefore, the rule of law is a set of values that 
shape and characterize the community in which people live. The principles are not necessar-
ily themselves explicit; they are rather the underlying justification for the explicit rules. 
Dworkin applies this ideal of integrity, i.e., the requirement of principled consistency, to the 
legislature who should be guided by the principle of integrity in legislation. This form of 
integrity ‘restricts what our legislators and other lawmakers may properly do in expanding 
or changing our public standards’, such as legal rules.57 Laws which entail on arbitrary dis-
tinctions which are the result of political compromise which ignore the relevant principles 
(‘checkerboard statutes), for example, violate the principle of integrity in legislation. Thus, 
according to Dworkin’s substantive theory of law, there is some limit to the arbitrariness of 
the distinctions which the legislature may make in its pursuit of a collective goal.58 
Following Dworkin, a principle can be defined as a standard which is to be observed 
because it is ‘a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.’59 
53.	 Tamanaha,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	102-113.
54.	 Radbruch	argues	that	there	is	a	clear	minimum	with	regard	to	lawmaking.	Rules	or	decisions	that	do	not	aim	at	
justice	and	its	component	equality,	or	for	that	matter	legal	certainty,	lack	the	very	nature	of	law;	G.	Radbruch,	
‘Gesetzliches	Unrecht	und	übergesetzliches	Recht’	[1946],	in:	Idem,	Rechtsphilosophie;	eds.	E.	Wolf	&	H.-P.	Schnei-
der,	(Stuttgart:	K.F.	Koehler	Verlag,	1983),	p.	345.	Cf.	S.L.Paulson,	‘Lon	L.	Fuller,	Gustav	Radbruch,	and	the	‘Positivist’	
Theses’,	Law	and	Philosophy	13	(1994),	at	pp.	313-359.	
55.	 R.	Dworkin,	Law’s	Empire	(Cambridge	(Mass.)	/London:	Harvard	University	Press,	1986),	at	p.	211.
56.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	55,	at	p.	211.
57.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	55,	at	p.	217.
58.	 R.	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(London:	Duckworth,	1977),	at	p.	114.
59.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	22.
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Principles may also be viewed as ideals. 60 These ideals are ‘in their realization dependent on 
what is factually possible and on the legal possibilities as defined by other principles.’61 
However, I would like to stress the distinction between legal principles which serve legal 
values and moral principles which serve moral values. Therefore, a legal principle is to be 
observed as a standard because it is a requirement of the ‘internal morality of law’ (see infra, 
section 2.1.5), not so much the external, non-legal, dimension of morality. Legal principles 
are standards which are specific for the law (they are not purely moral principles).62 They 
can go beyond rules, they can resolve conflicts between the rules, and they offer guidance 
for the interpretation of rules.
Since fundamental legal principles constitute the legal expressions of the basic values 
of a society, lawmaking should conform to legal principles. The body of laws – statute law, 
case law, and the decisions and regulations of the administration – should be, ‘consistent in 
principle.’63 This implies that law is not legitimized only because it is issued by authorized 
institutions. Rather, legal principles function as essential criteria of evaluation, in the sense 
that the legislator is bound by legal principles. Of course, legal rules should be created by 
authoritative bodies. At the same time, however, they ought to be consonant with the inte-
grated whole of fundamental legal principles. Legitimacy of positive law is guaranteed by 
its conformity to general legal principles. Equally, the executive, implementing the – written 
– laws is not only bound by the law promulgated by the legislature but also by legal princi-
ples. In other words, the executive is bound by the principle of legality and by other legal 
principles which are sometimes (e.g. in Belgium and the Netherlands) called principles of 
proper administration. The latter principles may protect legitimate expectations of citizens. 
Here, legal certainty is seen as the trust or certainty of people that ‘law will be chosen, 
changed and developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way.’64 This also goes for 
taxation. Taxes, therefore, should be levied in accordance with fundamental legal principles 
and by existing laws.
However, principles may collide, for example legal certainty and legal equality may 
point in different directions. Colliding principles make visible which values are really at 
stake on a deeper level.65 In the case of abuse or improper use of tax rules, for example, legal 
certainty, conceived as a principle, may constitute an argument not to change the law, and 
legal equality and the ability-to-pay principle may constitute an argument to change the 
law. Because principles do not dictate a decision or outcome but provide an argument 
pointing in a certain direction, the competing principles at hand ought to be balanced. 
According to Dworkin, to resolve the conflict between colliding principles one has to take 
into account the relative weight of each.66 
60.	 Principles	are	pure	statements	of	something	good	one	wants	to	achieve	or	an	evil	one	wants	to	avert.	Even	though	
principles	might	seem	to	be	stated	as	being	absolute	they	do	not	function	as	being	absolute	within	a	normative	
legal	system;	E.	Burg,	The	Model	of	Principles	(Amsterdam:	Universiteit	van	Amsterdam,	2000),	at	pp.	98ff.
61.	 R.	Alexy,	‘Zum	Begriff	des	Rechtprinzips’	[1979],	in:	R.	Alexy,	Recht,	Vernunft,	Diskurs	(Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhr-
kamp,	1995),	at	p.	205.	See	also	R.	Alexy,	‘On	the	Structure	of	Legal	Principles’,	Ratio	Juris	13	(2000)	2,	at	pp.	294-
304.	Here,	I	will	not	discuss	the	differences	between	Dworkin’s	theory	and	Alexy’s	optimization	theory	of	principles.
62.	 Actual	moral	principles	will	(co-)determine	the	actual	content	of	general	legal	principles.	See	Gribnau,	supra	note	7,	
at	p.	22.
63.	 R.	Dworkin,	supra	note	55,	at	pp.	225-275.
64.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	55,	at	p.	214.	At	p.	227	he	argues	that	government	should	treat	citizens	with	equal	concern	and	
respect	(this	right	is	more	fundamental	than	the	right	to	equal	treatment).
65.	 Cf.	J.	Pontier	&	E.	Burg,	EU	Principles	on	Jurisdiction	and	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Judgments	in	Civil	and	
Commercial	Matters	according	to	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(The	Hague:	T.M.C.	Asser	Press,	
2004),	at	pp.	12ff.
66.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	58,	at	pp.	26-27.
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Government changing its goals and its policies may involve changing (legal) regulations. 
This change of regulations and of the law and transition policies should not be based on a 
traditional command and control approach. Taking citizens seriously, a (good) governance 
approach is needed, instead of hierarchical top-down legislation and enforcement with a 
‘traditional focus on the core institutions of ‘government’, namely parliament, executive, 
administration and party politics.’67 Van Gerven links good governance explicitly to a gov-
ernment’s capacity to achieve citizens’ goals. The idea of good governance, therefore, refers 
to ‘the exercise of public power to pursue objectives and attain results in the interest of the 
people through a variety of regulative and executive processes.’68 This also goes for legisla-
tive change, which involves colliding legal principles. The legislator should pursue his 
objectives within the boundaries set by fundamental principles which represent fundamen-
tal moral values. The democratic majority may favour certain legislative measures, but legal 
principles may set boundaries to the claims of representative politics and rule out certain 
legislative choices. Legislative omnipotence is not the rule of law. The principle of legal 
certainty, for example, may demand the protection of legitimate expectations with regard 
to existing law. Thus, law exists as a frame, legal principles constituting its normative core.69
To conclude, rules are vital to a legal system. General rules solve problems of coordi-
nation, expertise and efficiency. They reduce the uncertainty, error and controversy that 
result when individuals follow their own unconstrained judgement. Rules can be seen as 
authoritative settlements that are ‘more general than the controversies and questions resol-
ved and thus anticipate and resolve controversies and questions that have not yet arisen.’70 
Nonetheless, rules need underlying principles. Fundamental legal principles guide and 
constrain rule-making, rule-application and rule-following. The principle of legal certainty 
is one of these fundamental legal principles.
2.1.5. Legal certainty71
As the German lawyer and legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch has argued, legal certainty 
definitely is one of the most fundamental legal values.72 Legal certainty has a two-fold value: 
one is intrinsic, the other instrumental.73 Legal certainty’s intrinsic value regards the notion 
of personal freedom. First and foremost, this concerns the liberty to do and not do as one 
pleases. This is often called ‘negative liberty’, the liberty to choose between alternative 
courses of action without interference by others.74 People want to be sure about the legal 
consequences of their dealings. Certainty about the law in force enables people to make 
rational choices and to plan their activities at large. Taxation is an interference with the 
67.	 S.	Smismans,	Law,	Legitimacy,	and	European	Governance	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004),	at	pp.	25-26.	See	
also	H.	Gribnau,	‘Improving	the	Legitimacy	of	Soft	Law	in	EU	Tax	Law’	(2007)	35	Intertax	1,	at	pp.	30-31
68.	 W.	van	Gerven,	The	European	Union:	A	Polity	of	States	and	Peoples	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2005),	at	p.	158.
69.	 Ideally,	changing	the	law	may	be	seen	as	a	process	of	better	realizing	those	substantive	values	already	present	in	the	
legal	order;	P.	Kahn,	The	Reign	of	Law:	Marbury	v.	Madison	and	the	Construction	of	America	(New	Haven	and	
London:	Yale	University	Press,	1997),	at	p.	62.
70.	 L.	Alexander	&	E.	Sherwin,	The	Rule	of	Rules.	Morality,	Rules	and	the	Dilemmas	of	Law	(Durham/London:	Duke	
University	Press,	2001),	at	p.	18;	cf.	F.	Schauer,	Playing	by	the	Rules:	A	Philosophical	Examination	of	Rule-Based	
Decision-Making	in	Law	and	in	Life	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1991).
71.	 For	an	extensive	treatment	of	legal	certainty,	see	Arnauld,	supra	note	23.
72.	 Radbruch,	supra	note	36,	at	pp.	107-111.	See	Pauwels,	supra	note	51.
73.	 See	J.L.M.	Gribnau,	‘Rechtszekerheid	en	overgangsrecht’,	in:	A.O.	Lubbers,	H.	Vording	&	M.	Schuver-Bravenboer,	eds.	
Opstellen	fiscaal	overgangsbeleid	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2005),	at	pp.	82-83.
74.	 I.	Berlin,	‘Two	Concepts	of	Liberty’	[1958],	in:	I.	Berlin,	Four	Essays	on	Liberty,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
1969),	at	p.	122.	Traditionally,	the	principle	of	legality	has	limited	the	scope	of	this	interference,	demanding	a	legal	
basis	for	government	action,	such	as	the	levying	of	taxes.
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right to enjoyment of property. In tax law, therefore, this certainty regards the ‘reach’ of tax 
law and the inroads upon taxpayer’s property right and economic freedom, i.e. certainty 
with regard to his tax burden. 
Here, Adam Smith’s second maxim regarding taxation in general springs to mind: 
‘The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.’75 For 
Smith, arbitrariness is the greatest threat to liberty. Individuals have freedom in proportion 
to the degree to which they can predict government action. The way government will treat 
them should be enshrined as much as possible in general laws. Thus, established laws which 
offer certainty are a great security for the liberty of the taxpayers for it is known in what 
manner the tax administration is to proceed. Smith continues: ‘The time of payment, the 
manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contribu-
tor, and to every other person.’76 Lack of certainty in tax legislation may leave people in the 
dark with regard to their fiscal rights and obligations. 
The (negative) freedom of taxpayers is defined by the law; within the limits of the law 
the taxpayer has the right to arrange his circumstances in such a way that he has to pay the 
least possible amount of taxes. The Netherlands Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
this right (e.g., in its decisions of 7 March 1982 and 19 December 1990), but in other coun-
tries it is also acknowledged. ‘Like the courts in the UK and Commonwealth countries, the 
US courts have clearly recognised the right of taxpayers to arrange their affairs to minimise 
tax.’77 Whether taxpayers want to pay the least possible amount of taxes or not, they need to 
plan their fiscal affairs anyway. They want to predict the amount of tax they have to pay, i.e., 
they want to be sure of the extent of the interference with their liberty. Thus, lack of cer-
tainty in tax law does not secure taxpayers’ (negative) liberty. 
Though taxation definitely constitutes an interference with taxpayers’ liberty that is 
not the whole story. Liberty itself depends upon taxation. Smith, for example, does not see 
in taxation a threat to liberty – except for a very exorbitant tax. He believes that ‘every tax … 
is to the person who pays it a badge, not of slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is sub-
ject to government … not the property of a master.’78 Governments expand everyone’s free-
dom, ‘protecting us against other people’s love of domination.’79 Therefore, according to 
Smith, the fact that we pay taxes to support the government is but a sign and a consequence 
of the freedom we thereby receive. Liberty thus presupposes a legal system and taxpayer 
funding of a supervisory machinery for monitoring and enforcement of rights. Therefore, 
‘property rights depend on the state that is willing to tax and to spend.’80 Thus, taxation 
protects us against interference by others, i.e., protects citizens’ negative liberty. Further-
more, taxation also enhances another aspect of liberty, for government uses tax revenue to 
finance public goods, such as education, which contributes to people’s self-determination 
and self-development. This aspect of liberty is commonly called ‘positive liberty.’ The ‘posi-
tive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ relates to ‘the wish on the part of the individual to be his own 
master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever 
75.	 A.	Smith,	The	Wealth	of	Nations	[1776],	Book	V,	Ch.	II,	Part	II,	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	1981),	at	p.	825.	S.	Fleis-
chacker,	On	Adam	Smith’s	Wealth	of	Nations:	A	Philosophical	Companion,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	
2004),	at	pp.	242-244.
76.	 Smith,	supra	note	75,	at	p.	825.
77.	 B.	Arnold,	‘A	comparison	of	statutory	general	anti-avoidance	rules	and	judicial	general	anti-avoidance	doctrines	as	a	
means	of	controlling	tax	avoidance:	Which	is	better?	(What	would	John	Tiley	think?)’,	in:	J.	Avery	Jones,	ed.,	Com-
parative	Perspective	on	Revenue	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	at	pp.	16-17.
78.	 Smith,	supra	note	75,	at	p.	857.	
79.	 Fleischacker,	supra	note	75,	at	p.	195.
80.	 S.	Holmes	&	C.	Sunstein,	The	Cost	of	Rights.	Why	Liberty	Depends	on	Taxes	(New	York/London:	Norton,	1999),	at	
p.	61.
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kind.’81 Positive liberty – or, referring to the capacity to make choices upon reflection, auton-
omy – can be conceived broadly as the possibility to self-development and to participation 
in shaping society and the state.82 Tax revenues make liberty valuable and meaningful by 
financing public goods such as government-managed social services and employment 
designed to improve collective and individual well-being; without these public goods for 
many people liberty would remain an empty shell. Taxation makes public goods possible, 
thus an encroachment on property, and, therefore, (negative) liberty enhances (positive) 
liberty. In this way, taxation adds to the government’s legitimacy, for as Dworkin argues, a 
legitimate government must display equal concern for each individual under its sway. At 
the same time government must recognize the right and responsibility of all individuals to 
choose how to make good lives for themselves. Taxation, therefore, may constitute a legiti-
mate interference with taxpayers’ liberty. ‘The structure and level of taxation in force may 
invade liberty if it is unjust – if it does not show equal concern and respect for all.’83
Legal certainty also has an instrumental aspect, for tax legislation not only is a con-
straint, but often also an opportunity for taxpayers. Nowadays, the use of tax legislation for 
non-fiscal goals is an integral part of government policy: the instrumentalist tax legislator 
seduces taxpayers to behave according to his ends.84 Consequently, tax law contains all 
kinds of instrumentalist incentives mostly in the form of tax reductions, e.g., in the Nether-
lands for commuting by bike, employee’s training, day-care centres, production of Dutch 
movies, research and development, ecologically sound investments or the letting of rooms 
by private persons. Partly due to this instrumentalist use of tax legislation, taxation regards 
almost every aspect of human life. As a result, tax often has an important and long-term 
financial impact on personal decisions and actions, such as where to live, to work, how to 
travel and when to retire. Citizens, therefore, have to take into account the fiscal conse-
quences of their actions and decisions, as taxes function as a budget constraint. In one way 
or another, taxpayers have to plan their fiscal affairs as part of the planning of their life.85 No 
wonder taxpayers value legal certainty. However, ever-changing policy goals make it very 
hard for taxpayers to tune their decisions and plans to the ever-changing tax legislation. 
This uncertainty hampers taxpayers in acting as autonomous persons, i.e., to set their own 
ends according to which they want to live and plan their future (see supra, section 2.1.3.2). 
Of course, the instrumentalist legislation itself may already endanger this ideal of self-gov-
ernance, guiding citizens to all kinds of behaviour and ends which they possibly would not 
have chosen themselves – without this legislation (incentives) being in force. 
However, the law never offers absolute legal certainty. It is only capable of providing 
limited certainty. Legal rules involve classifying particular cases as instances of general 
terms, bringing particular situations under general rules. These rules are expressed in 
words, but words have a penumbra of uncertainty. General terms have ‘a core of certainty 
and a penumbra of doubt.’86 Therefore, some uncertainty about the meaning of the law is 
inevitable.
81.	 Berlin,	supra	note	74,	at	p.	131.	Cf.	J.	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	[1971]	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	at	
pp.	176ff.
82.	 H.	Gribnau,	‘Legitimacy	in	Fiscal	Relationships:	Rule	of	Law	and	Good	Governance’,	in:	M.A.	Plaza	Vega	et	al.	eds.,	
From	Financial	Law	to	Tax	Law:	Essays	in	Honour	of	prof.	Amatucci	(Naples:	Jovene	and	Temis	editions,	2011),	§	2.
83.	 R.	Dworkin,	Justice	for	Hedgehogs	(Cambridge	Mass/London:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	2011),	
at	p.	375.
84.	 J.L.M.	Gribnau,	‘Equality,	Consistency,	and	Impartiality	in	Tax	Legislation’,	in:	J.L.M.	Gribnau	(ed.),	Legal	Protection	
against	Discriminatory	Tax	Legislation	(The	Hague/	London/Boston:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	pp.	7-32,	at	
pp.	25-27.
85.	 See	also	J.	Hey,	Steuerplanungssicherheit	als	Rechtsproblem	(Cologne:	Verlag	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt,	2002),	at	pp.	9ff.
86.	 H.L.A.	Hart,	The	Concept	of	Law	[1970],	Second	Edition	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1994),	at	p.	123.
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To be sure, if we regard legal certainty as an absolute value or ideal it becomes meaningless. 
The value of certainty may collide with another value, for example, with equality. This colli-
sion of values is essential to values. There is no perfect, ultimate solution in which the funda-
mental human values are harmonized. ‘We are doomed to choose, and every choice may 
entail an irreparable loss.’87 Absolute legal certainty, therefore, does not exist. Absolute legal 
certainty would mean that law and society at large would come to a halt. However, stagna-
tion means decline as the saying goes. In this way, the end of legal certainty would be con-
ceived in a purely static and conservative way. This cannot be, for law would become obso-
lete. On the contrary, time has an pervasive impact on law. The law has to give an answer to 
technical, social, economic and cultural changes, modifications in behaviour, needs and 
interests and changing values and norms. In making clear the legal consequences of these 
changes, the law provides legal certainty.88 This new law, to keep attuned to all kind of soci-
etal changes, however, is therefore, in itself a source of (new) uncertainty. This tension is 
inevitable, for not reacting to societal changes would also create uncertainty. The need to 
adapt and, therefore, to change, is part and parcel of law. Laws are liable to change. How-
ever, there are limits to change, for legal certainty is a value to be respected. ‘A system of law 
can be permanent only if it constrains novelty.’89 Consequently, the demands for change and 
legal certainty have to be balanced.
2.1.6. Aspects of legal certainty
2.1.6.1. Introduction
The concept of legal certainty is not an easy one. ‘Legal certainty is by its nature diffuse, 
perhaps more so than any other general principle, and its precise content is difficult to pin 
down.’90 It is required, therefore, to have a look at legal literature for something to hold on 
to. Here, distinguishing aspects of legal certainty may serve as a two-edged sword. On the 
one hand, to demonstrate the normative value of legal certainty I will flesh out several of its 
aspects. On the other hand, these aspects not only constitute normative aspects, but may be 
seen as criteria to evaluate lawmaking. Thus, legal certainty becomes operational as a legal 
tool to fight uncertainty in the legal order. However, the transformation of the principle of 
legal certainty into a legal tool should not lead to unrealistic expectations. As Popelier 
points out, realism does not mean that we are entirely in scepticism’s hands. For scepticism 
concerning legal certainty is often due to the mistaken idea that this is a static conception 
requiring absolute certainty. A dynamic conception of legal certainty, however, ‘preserves 
the required flexibility of the law while acknowledging the individual’s personal freedom to 
decide and to develop oneself, which presupposes predictability of the legal framework.’91
Legal certainty may be promoted in several ways. Here, the well-known desiderata 
formulated by Lon Fuller spring to mind. 
According to Fuller, law is the enterprise of subjecting human behaviour to rules.92 
With regard to taxation, these rules concern the individual’s fair share of taxes to pay for the 
costs of society. Although he deals with requirements in the light of the principle of legality, 
87.	 I.	Berlin,	‘The	Pursuit	of	the	Ideal’,	in:	I.	Berlin,	The	Crooked	Timber	of	Humanity	(London:	John	Murray,	1990),	at	
p.	13.
88.	 For	the	distinction	between	certainty	through	law	and	certainty	of	law,	see	Arnauld,	supra	note	23,	at	pp.	89-97.
89.	 Kahn,	supra	note	69,	at	p.	68.	Cf.	Pauwels,	supra	note	4,	p.	97.
90.	 T.	Tridimas,	The	General	Principles	of	EU	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	at	p.	243.
91.	 P.	Popelier,	‘Five	Paradoxes	on	Legal	Certainty	and	the	Lawmaker’,	2	Legisprudence	(2008)	1,	pp.	47-66,	at	p.	49.
92.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	pp.	124-125.	Cf.	P.	Popelier,	Rechtszekerheid	als	begin	sel	van	behoorlij	ke	regelge	ving	(Antwerp/
Groningen:	Intersentia,	1997),	at	pp.	194ff.
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these are all also aspects of legal certainty.93 Actually, in my view these aspects are primarily 
principles which serve legal certainty, for the principle of legality is instrumental to the 
principle of legal certainty (and equality, for that matter).94 Here, Fuller’s point of departure 
is that ‘every exercise of the lawmaking function is accompanied by certain tacit assump-
tions, or implicit expectations, about the kind of product that will emerge from the legisla-
tor’s efforts and the form he will give to that product.’ Consequently, the content of legisla-
tion and ‘the lawmaking process is itself subject to implicit laws.’95 Thus, Fuller’s desiderata 
constitute the ‘internal morality of law’, the morality that makes law possible. Serious viola-
tions of these ‘canons’ threaten statutes with ineffectiveness and seriously impede its 
acceptance as a law.96 Fuller’s appeal to the legislator to respect the ‘internal morality of law’ 
is still relevant, even more so since increasingly, ‘legislation ‘is not-self conscious of its lim-
its.’97 
I will now deal with seven of Fuller’s demands, which may be labeled principles of 
proper lawmaking.98 These are all requirements with regard to legislation.99 Here, it is 
important to note that legal certainty is not a monolith. Moreover, aspects of legal certainty 
may put forward competing demands. The various principles which make up legal certainty 
often provide arguments which point in divergent directions. This accounts for the fact that 
lawmaking is a ‘principled’ balancing act: competing principles ought to be balanced time 
and again. The tension between the principle of clarity and the principle of constancy may 
serve as an example. On the one hand, laws should not be opaque and unintelligible; on the 
other hand, laws should not be changed too frequently. Clarity may demand a hard and fast 
rule which, however, may prove unworkable due to rapidly changing societal norms and 
other developments and circumstances. In order to prevent a clear rule getting out of date it 
should be changed in time, but this conflicts with the demand for constancy of law. These 
two competing principles should be reconciled, i.e., balanced.
2.1.6.2. Generality
First, Fuller mentions the generality of law, i.e., ‘there must be rules.’100 Without the princi-
ple of generality, as a precept of political morality, a system of law would not be a system of 
law at all. Generality, therefore, should be part of its normative structure.101 General rules 
promote legal certainty. In a state under the rule of law it is hardly possible to control and 
direct human conduct without rules applying to general classes of people. The law must act 
impersonally; legal rules must apply to general classes and should not contain proper 
names. Consequently, the legislator, laying down a rule, has to determine the limits on its 
field of application. Thus, a normative classification is inherent in the concept of legislation: 
93.	 For	legal	certainty	conceptualized	as	an	‘aspects	concept’,	see	Pauwels,	supra	note	51.
94.	 See	J.L.M.	Gribnau,	Rechtsbetrekking	en	rechtsbeginselen	in	het	belastingrecht	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	1998),	at	
pp.	177-179.
95.	 L.L.	Fuller,	The	Anatomy	of	Law	[1968]	(Westport:	Greenwood	Press,	1976),	at	pp.	60-61.	See	also	G.J.	Postema,	
‘Implicit	Law’,	in:	Witteveen	&	Van	der	Burg,	supra	note	49,	at	pp.	255-275.
96.	 See	W.J.	Witteveen,	‘Laws	of	Lawmaking’,	in:	Witteveen	&	Van	der	Burg,	supra	note	49,	at	pp.	312-345.
97.	 R.A.	Macdonald,	‘Legislation	and	Governance’,	in:	Witteveen	&	Van	der	Burg,	supra	note	49,	at	p.	279.
98.	 P.	Popelier,	‘Legal	Certainty	and	Principles	of	Proper	Law	Making’,	2	European	Journal	of	Law	Reform	(2000),	at	
p.	325.	
99.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	pp.	81-91,	deals	with	another	aspect	of	legal	certainty,	the	congruence	between	the	declared	
rules	and	the	acts	of	the	administration.	This	aspect	regards	the	application	of	legislation,	not	the	quality	of	legisla-
tion	itself.
100.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	46.	In	this	section	all	quotations	without	further	reference	are	from	The	Morality	of	Law,	at	
pp.	46-80.
101.	 M.H.	Kramer,	Objectivity	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(New	York	[etc.]:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	at	pp.	114-150.
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the classification always refers to the definition of the group to whom the legislative rule 
applies.102 The principle of generality should be distinguished from the idea that laws 
should be fair, the idea being that at the very minimum there must be some general rules, 
‘however fair or unfair they may be.’ Nonetheless, the precept of the generality of law is itself 
a bulwark against arbitrariness.103
2.1.6.3. Promulgation
A second requirement is the promulgation of laws. Legal rules ought to be published. 
Already Hobbes was well aware of the importance of this demand. ‘Knowledge of the laws 
depends on the legislator, who has a duty to promulgate them, for otherwise they are not 
laws’. In other words, ‘there is no law therefore if the will of the legislator has not been 
declared, and this is done by promulgation.’104 This declaration may consist in ‘by voyce, 
writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same.’105 
A regime of law has to disclose to the people its norms. Otherwise it cannot guide and 
direct human behaviour. The legal system has to render ‘its mandates and other norms 
ascertainable by the people to whose conduct they apply.’106 Citizens are entitled to know in 
advance the law, which enables them to predict the legal consequences of their behaviour, 
and also allows public criticism. Thus, on the one hand, citizens are given the opportunity to 
conform their behaviour to the terms of the laws and, on the other hand, legal rules are 
open to debate and challenge. A legal system which does not comply with the principle of 
promulgation would be inefficacious in channelling people’s behaviour. 
Hobbes argues that the legislator’s will may be declared in various ways (e.g. by voyce, 
writing). But there are other variations conceivable. The legislator, for example, may 
announce what he intends to be his will in the near future. Of course, such an announce-
ment of an intended legislative change does not guarantee that this legislative change will 
come about. Does such an announcement offer the taxpayers guidance and legal certainty? 
Thus, the demand that citizens are entitled to know in advance the law is not identical with 
the principle of promulgation, as press releases show. A press release does not qualify as a 
promulgation of law, and may be used to change taxpayers’ expectations with regard to 
future law. Such announcements can be used in the implementation of new tax rules, for 
example tax incentives, to guide or induce the (intended) behaviour even before the legisla-
tive procedure is concluded (or even started, for that matter) and the new law is promulgat-
ed.107 In this way, a press release is an announcement of an expected change in the law 
which ideally will be confirmed by the promulgation; that is, if the legislator finds sufficient 
political support for proposed the change.
102.	 J.	Tussman	and	J.	ten	Broek,	‘The	Equal	Protection	of	the	Laws’,	California	Law	Review,	Vol.	37,	September	1949,	No.	3,	
at	p.	344	and	Gribnau,	supra	note	84,	at	pp.	29-30.
103.	 Underlying	this	principle	of	generality	is	the	moral	demand	of	generalization.	Cf.	K.	Tipke,	‘Steuerrecht	als	Wissen-
schaft’,	in:	Gestaltung	der	Steuerrechtsordnung,	supra	note	10,	at	pp.	21-56,	at	pp.	35-39.
104.	 Thomas	Hobbes,	On	the	Citizen	[1641/1651],	eds.	R.	Tuck	&	M.	Silverthorne,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	1998),	XIV,	13,	at	p.	160	(Hobbes	makes	an	exception	for	unwritten	law,	‘which	needs	no	promulgation	but	the	
voice	of	nature,	or	natural	reason,	such	as	natural	laws’,	at	p.	161),	cf.	Hobbes,	supra	note	38,	XXVII,	at	p.	203,	and	
XXVIII,	at	p.	216.
105.	 Hobbes,	supra	note	38,	XXVI,	at	p.	187.
106.	 Kramer,	supra	note	101,	at	p.	113.	Cf.	Arnauld,	supra	note	23,	at	pp.	168ff.
107.	 See	J.	Hey,	‘Legislation	‘by’	Press	Release’,	in	this	volume.
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2.1.6.4. Non-retroactivity
Thirdly, Fuller deals with the problem of retroactivity. In itself ‘a retroactive law is truly a 
monstrosity’, making the governance of human conduct obsolete. To be sure, Fuller has a 
remarkably limited view on the meaning of the governance of human conduct. ‘A tax law 
first enacted, let us say, in 1963 imposing a tax on financial gains realized in 1960 at a time 
when such gains were not yet subject to tax. Such a statute may be grossly unjust, but it 
cannot be said that it is, strictly speaking, retroactive.’108 Thus, he does not account for the 
fact that an obligation to pay taxes cannot be reduced to the actual (moment of) payment of 
taxes, for, the obligation to pay taxes depends on the (preceding) occurrence of particular 
facts which may involve human behaviour. It is exactly this behaviour which is in need of 
guidance with regard to future fiscal obligations, for taxpayers should be able to plan their 
lives. Therefore, the fiscal consequences of their actions should be foreseeable. From this 
perspective, the actual payment of taxes is a mere consequence of a taxpayer’s past behav-
iour. Retroactive tax laws seriously endanger the predictability of taxpayers’ obligations.
In the context of a system of rules that are generally prospective nonetheless, situa-
tions may arise in which granting retroactive effect to legal rules, ‘not only becomes tolera-
ble, but may actually be essential to advance the cause of legality.’109 As Fuller argues, when 
things go wrong a retroactive statute often becomes indispensable as a ‘curative measure.’ 
Nevertheless, as Kirchhof points out, the constitutional ‘safeguard of continuity’ forbids the 
legislator to act at variance with existing regulations and to betray citizens’ confidence in 
the law by abruptly embarking on a new course.110 Thus, unjustified retroactivity evidently 
conflicts with the demand for continuity in law. I will return to the principle of constancy of 
the law, or temporal consistency (section 2.1.6.7, infra).
Here, I will not elaborate on the principle of non-retroactivity, for this issue will be 
addressed with regard to tax legislation in many ways in this book. But for one thing, it is 
important to note that the principle of non-retroactivity is not a hard and fast rule. (Even in 
countries where retroactive tax laws are forbidden this goes for the concept of retrospectiv-
ity – or ‘material retroactivity’; see section 1.1 of the General report, in this volume). It is 
really a principle, so it does not dictate a decision or outcome but provides an argument 
pointing in a certain direction. Colliding principles may provide arguments which out-
weigh the principle of non-retroactivity.111 Furthermore, the principle of non-retroactivity 
enhances the legal certainty of taxpayers, but it is could be argued that sometimes a degree 
of legal certainty is guaranteed despite legislation having retroactive effect. As shown in the 
last section, the legislator may announce an intended change of tax legislation, thus offer-
ing the taxpayers guidance and legal certainty. Ideally, subsequent legislation having retro-
108.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	59:	‘Contrast	with	the	ex	post	facto	criminal	statute	a	tax	law	first	enacted,	let	us	say,	in	
1963	imposing	a	tax	on	financial	gains	realized	in	1960	at	a	time	when	such	gains	were	not	yet	subject	to	tax.	Such	a	
statute	may	be	grossly	unjust,	but	it	cannot	be	said	that	it	is,	strictly	speaking,	retroactive.	To	be	sure,	it	places	the	
amount	of	the	tax	on	something	that	has	happened	in	the	past.	But	the	only	act	that	it	requires	of	its	addressee	is	a	
very	simple	one,	namely,	that	he	pay	the	tax	demanded.	This	requirement	operates	prospectively.	We	do	not,	in	
other	words,	enact	tax	laws	today	that	order	a	man	to	have	paid	taxes	yesterday.’
109.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	53.
110.	 P.	Kirchhof,	‘Rückwirkung	von	Steuergesetzen’,	Steuer	und	Wirtschaft,	3/2000,	at	p.	224	(cf.	Kirchhof,	supra	note	
162,	at	p.	83),	and	Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	189-194.	Cf.	Kahn,	supra	note	69,	at	p.	92:	‘Law’s	task	is	to	maintain	the	
past	in	the	present	and	so	to	construct	a	future	that	is	continuous	with	the	past.’
111.	 For	limitations	to	retroactivity	of	tax	statutes	and	the	standards	used	by	courts	to	test	retroactivity,	see	sections	2	
and	4	of	the	General	report	(in	this	volume).	Recently	the	Hungarian	Constitutional	Court	even	characterized	
retroactive	tax	legislation	which	was	unfavourable	for	taxpayers	as	an	infringement	of	the	right	to	human	dignity;	
see	D.	Deak,	‘Pioneering	Decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	Hungary	to	Invoke	the	Protection	of	Human	Dignity	
in	Tax	Matters’,	(2011)	39	Intertax	11,	pp.	534-542.	
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active effect till the moment of announcement does not infringe on the expectations of 
taxpayers. But the question is whether reality lives up to the ideal.112
2.1.6.5. Clarity
Fourthly, Fuller argues that the clarity of laws is essential to control and direct human con-
duct. Laws should be clear and understandable. Analogous to the second desideratum, this 
not only goes for external rules, but also for the rules and practices governing internal pro-
cedures of deliberation and consultation rules. Montesquieu already argued that ‘the style 
of the laws should be simple’ for it ‘is essential for the words of the law to awaken the same 
ideas in all men.’113 Fuller maintains that clarity of laws may sometimes be achieved by 
incorporating into the law common sense standards ‘which have grown up in the ordinary 
outside legislative halls.’114 Clarity of the law is not to be reduced to a limited quantity of 
rules. In some situations, having a detailed set of rules could make things simpler and add 
to clarity, ‘if it clears up grey areas in the tax law.’115 Legislators can craft laws with different 
levels of specificity to guide human behaviour, incorporating detailed rules or more general 
standards in the laws they write. Precision increases predictability. However, regulation 
through precise, specific rules does not always deliver optimal legal certainty. A prolix code 
of very specific rules has its drawback: it can be so difficult ‘to apply that it produces lack of 
coordination and inefficient decision-making that determinate rules are supposed to reme-
dy.’116 Precision also involves costs, for example, ‘information barriers for the layman, who is 
more likely to understand general standards than specific rules, which employ technical 
standards.’117 The possibility and necessity of clearly stated laws also depends on the nature 
of the problem the law deals with. Lack of clarity may be inevitable with regard to very com-
plex matters which affect only a minority of taxpayers.118 Some tax law is extremely com-
plex, and so, however clearly the propositions about it are expressed, users, taxpayers and 
officials alike, ‘may still take some time to understand how it works.’119 The courts and the 
administration may mend this lack of legislative clarity. The busy legislator, however, 
should not easily delegate the task of establishing clearly-stated rules to the courts or the 
112.	 Of	course,	the	ideal	of	the	separation	of	powers	is	also	at	stake	here;	see	Hey,	supra	note	107.
113.	 Montesquieu,	supra	note	39,	XXIX,	16,	at	pp.	612-3.	See	Arnauld,	supra	note	23,	at	pp.	226-240.	Cf.	Tridimas,	supra	
note	90,	at	pp.	244-246	and	Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	547	ff.
114.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	64.
115.	 J.	Slemrod	&	J.	Bakija,	Taxing	Ourselves:	A	Citizen’s	Guide	to	the	Debate	over	Taxes,	4th	Edition	(Cambridge,	Mass.	/
London:	The	MIT	Press,	2008),	at	p.	159.	For	an	introductory	exposition	of	techniques	of	legislative	drafting,	see,	for	
example.	A.P.	Dourado,	‘General	Report	–	In	Search	of	Validity	in	Tax	Law:	The	Boundaries	between	Creation	and	
Application	in	a	Rule-of-Law	State’,	in:	A.P.	Dourado	(ed.),	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law	(Amsterdam:	IBFD,	
2010),	pp.	27-55,	at	pp.	42-44.
116.	 Alexander	&	Sherwin,	supra	note	70,	at	p.	31.	Cf.	J.	Braithwaite,	‘Rules	and	Principles:	A	Theory	of	Legal	Certainty’,	
Australian	Journal	of	Legal	Philosophy	(2002)	27,	pp.	47-82	who	seeks	an	empirical	understanding	of	the	question:	
‘What	are	the	conditions	where	rules	will	deliver	us	more	legal	certainty	and	what	are	the	conditions	where	princi-
ples	will	do	so?’	(at	p.	49).
117.	 F.	Parisi	&	V.	Fon,	The	Economics	of	Lawmaking	(New	York/Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York	[etc.],	2009),	
at	p.	4	They	also	point	at	the	costs	of	the	over-	and	under-inclusive	effects	of	legal	rules.	For	a	discussion	of	over-	and	
under-inclusiveness,	see	H.	Gribnau,	‘Separation	of	Powers	in	Taxation:	The	Quest	for	Balance	in	the	Netherlands’,	
in:	Dourado,	supra	note	115,	at	pp.	145-175,	at	p.	155.
118.	 Cf.	Slemrod	&	Bakija,	supra	note	115,	at	p.	163	who	point	out	that	complexity	should	be	a	matter	of	concern,	for	many	
taxpayers	with	fairly	simple	tax	returns	believe	that	other,	more	sophisticated,	taxpayers	take	advantage	of	the	
complexity	to	find	loopholes.
119.	 H.	Rogers,	‘Drafting	Legislation	at	the	Tax	Law	Rewrite	Project’,	in:	C.	Stefanou	&	H.	Xanthaki,	eds.,	Drafting	Legisla-
tion	A	Modern	Approach	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2008),	pp.	77-90,	at	pp.	80-81	Cf.	A.	Sawyer,	‘New	Zealand’s	Tax	
Rewrite	Programme	–	In	Pursuit	of	the	(Elusive)	Goal	of	Simplicity’,	103	(2007)	4	British	Tax	Review,	at	pp.	405-427.
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administration. The democratically legitimized legislature has priority in lawmaking. This 
primacy of the legislature is a result of the distribution of power in a democratic system. The 
legislator should not shirk its responsibility and delegate its lawmaking power. 
However, it is not always possible to formulate the subject matter that the law deals 
with in neatly tailored clear rules, or to mould it into precise concepts. Thus, the legislator 
may deliberately formulate rules (too) broadly, leaving it up to the courts or the tax authori-
ties to tailor the rule more precisely.120 Sometimes the legislator even deliberately formu-
lates rules too broadly to put off taxpayers (chilling effect). Some anti-avoidance provisions 
to prevent tax evasion or abuse or undesirable use of tax legislation are a case in point. The 
result is uncertainty for taxpayers, leaving the courts large latitude to determine the appli-
cation of the law. In the case of tax minimization schemes, it has been argued that uncer-
tainty as to when the rule will be applied has an ‘in terrorem effect that dampens the enthu-
siasm of some would-be tax manipulators but permits others to take a chance where little is 
at risk if the scheme fails.’ All the same, there is a trade off with complexity, for such a result 
might ‘in some areas be preferable to an ever-growing crop of detailed statutory enactments 
tailored to stop specific minimisation schemes.’121
The demand for clarity may be met with retroactive legislation. The legislator may 
wish to repair a lack of clarity in a certain law with retroactive effect. In some countries the 
legislator makes use of interpretative statutes to this end. These statutes clarify existing 
statutes, imposing upon courts and administration the exact interpretation of these other 
statutes.122 As shown above, reconciling these two competing principles (clarity versus 
non-retroactivity) demands a balancing act. 
2.1.6.6. Non-contradiction
A fifth desideratum is rather obvious: rules must not require contradictory actions. Alexan-
der Hamilton already wrote that it ‘not uncommonly happens that there are two statutes 
existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other and neither of them con-
taining any repealing clause or expression.’123 Having said this, it is of course not always easy 
to know when a contradiction exists or how in abstract terms one should define a contradic-
tion. Thus, a contradictory enactment occurs, when there is ‘a repugnance between the 
words of the enactment and those of another relevant enactment, whether in the same Act 
or somewhere else.’124 To obey or follow both is a logical impossibility.125 In themselves 
enactments may be clear and unambiguous, but if they contradict each other they cannot 
be applied literally. Contradictions between fundamental rules go at the expense of the 
coherence – and justice – of the system as a whole.126 Conflict may occur between legal 
120.	 Cf.	Montesquieu,	supra	note	39,	XXIX,	16,	at	p.	613.
121.	 Chirelstein	quoted	in	J.	Tiley,	‘Judicial	Anti-avoidance	Doctrines’,	British	Tax	Review	1988,	4,	pp.	108-145,	at	p.	136.	Cf.	
Braithwaite,	supra	note	116,	at	p.	57:	‘A	smorgasbord	of	rules	engenders	a	cat-and-mouse	legal	drafting	culture	–	of	
loophole	closing	and	reopening	by	creative	compliance.’	In	the	same	vein:	J.	Braithwaite,	Markets	in	Vice,	Markets	in	
Virtue	(Oxford/New	York:	Oxford	University	Press	2005),	at	p.	147.
122.	 Cf.	B.	Peeters	&	P.	Popelier,	‘Retroactive	Interpretative	Statutes	and	Validation	Statutes	in	Tax	Law’,	in	this	volume.	
Again,	the	ideal	of	the	separation	of	powers	may	be	at	stake.	
123.	 J.	Madison,	A.	Hamilton	&	J.	Jay,	The	Federalist	Papers	[1788]	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1987),	No.	78,	at	p.	439.
124.	 F.	Bennion,	Understanding	Common	Law	Legislation:	Drafting	and	Interpretation	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2001),	at	pp.	53-54.
125.	 Hobbes	even	argued	that:	‘when	the	sovereign	commandeth	anything	to	be	done	against	his	own	former	law,	the	
command,	as	to	that	particular	fact,	is	an	abrogation	of	the	law’	(Hobbes,	supra	note	38,	XXVII,	at	p.	209).	On	
Hobbes’	view,	see	J.L.M.	Gribnau,	Soevereiniteit	en	legitimiteit:	Grenzen	aan	(fiscale)	regelgeving	(Amersfoort:	
SDU	Uitgevers,	2009),	at	pp.	48-50.
126.	 Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	563-564.
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norms having different legal status. The decision of European Court of Human Rights in 
Shchokin v. Ukraine shows such an example of clearly conflicting legal norms, a Ministerial 
Decree having the force of a parliamentary law, the other being an Instruction issued by the 
Ukrainian Tax Inspectorate.127 The Court ‘notes that the legal relevant acts have been mani-
festly inconsistent with each other. As a result, the domestic authorities applied on their 
own discretion.’128 In the Court’s opinion, the lack of the required clarity and precision of 
the domestic law, offering divergent interpretations on such an important fiscal issue, did 
not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference. Conflicting legal norms, 
therefore, are in breach of the rule of law. Baker concludes that the case reflects a general 
principle: ‘tax laws must satisfy the basic minimum requirements of the quality of law in 
that they must be accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application.’129 
One might distinguish between ‘contradiction’ – the presence of a proposition and its 
negation – and ‘incompatibility’, for besides a contradiction due to purely formal (logic) 
reasons, there is the possibility of two provisions between which a choice must be made, 
unless one rejects one or the other. The explanation of this incompatibility depends ‘either 
on the nature of things or on a human decision.’130 Here, one of the two wordings or rules 
must be sacrificed, which entails a compromise. Consistent use of words may preclude con-
tradictory legislation. Moreover, the same word should be intended to have the same mean-
ing throughout an act or connected set of acts.131 Here, the principle of non-contradiction 
touches the principle of clarity. With regard to the question how to deal with a contradic-
tion Fuller argues that when a court is confronted with statutes which contradict one 
another it ‘must of necessity take its guidance from some principle not expressed in the 
statutes themselves.’132 
The legislator may want to solve a contradiction by annulling an enactment with 
contradicts another. In this way, he enhances the guidance offered by the system of tax laws 
and legal certainty. The legislator might even want to do this by annulling an enactment 
retroactively. However, this may be at the detriment of taxpayers who acted upon the enact-
ment which will be annulled. Their legitimate expectations may be violated, especially when 
they acted in good faith.
The demand for non-contradictory legal norms and rules and the consistent use of 
words should be distinguished from the ideal of integrity, i.e., the requirement of principled 
consistency. The legislature should consistently make operational or work out (substantive 
and procedural) values and principles in legislative rules, for he should be guided by the 
principle of integrity in legislation.133 Principles, therefore, but also policies, should be 
127.	 The	Ukrainian	Revenue	Officers	followed	the	Instruction	in	preference	to	the	Ministerial	Decree	having	the	force	of	
law.
128.	 Application	Nos.	23759/03	and	37943/06,	Judgment	of	14	October	2010,	Para.	56.
129.	 Ph.	Baker,	‘Some	Recent	Tax	Decisions	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	European	Taxation,	December	2010,	
pp.	568-569,	at	p.	569.	He	continues:	‘How	many	tax	systems	of	countries	that	are	members	of	the	Council	of	Europe	
can	be	said	to	be,	in	every	respect,	based	on	laws	that	are	accessible,	precise	and	foreseeable	in	their	application?’
130.	 Ch.	Perèlman	&	L.	Olbrechts-Tyteca,	The	New	Rhetoric:	A	Treatise	on	Argumentation	[1958]	(Notre	Dame/London:	
Notre	Dame	University	Press,	1969),	at	p.	196.	
131.	 See	I.	McLeod,	Principles	of	Legislative	and	Regulatory	Drafting	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2009),	at	p.	73.
132.	 Fuller,	supra	note	44,	at	pp.	59-60.	Eliminating	contradictions	motivated	by	a	pursuit	of	certainty	through	more	and	
more	precise,	specific	rules	should	not	be	taken	for	granted,	as	Braithwaite,	supra	note	116,	at	pp.	63-64	points	out:	
‘The	classic	process	of	writing	more	and	more	specific	rules	over	time	to	cover	newly	discovered	loopholes	and	
apparent	inconsistencies	makes	the	body	of	rules	as	a	package	less	capable	of	consistent	assessment.’	The	greater	
the	smorgasbord	of	rules,	‘the	greater	the	discretion	of	regulators	to	pick	and	choose	an	enforcement	cocktail	
tailored	to	meet	their	own	objective.’
133.	 J.L.M.	Gribnau,	‘Rechtsbeginselen	en	evaluatie	van	belastingwetgeving’,	in:	A.C.	Rijkers	&	H.	Vording,	eds.,	Vijf	jaar	
Wet	IB	2001	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2006),	at	p.	55.
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consistently applied throughout the whole tax system.134 This not only goes for the tax sys-
tem in itself, but for the legal system as a whole. Different parts of the legal system should 
not contradict each other.135
2.1.6.7. Compliability 
A further desideratum is that laws should no require the impossible. As an operative mecha-
nism for guiding human conduct, a regime of law has to consist mainly of laws that can be 
followed. A legal directive, therefore, may not demand behaviour which lies beyond the 
capabilities of all or most citizens. Of course, several of Fuller’s principles of legality, for 
example clarity of the law, require that it be possible for people to comply with legal rules, 
but the demand for compliability plays a distinctive role. This demand also regards the 
application of the law by officials. A law which the tax administration cannot possibly, or at 
disproportional cost only, apply and enforce violates the principle of compliability. The 
principle of compliability is associated with the ‘ought’-implies-‘can’ tenet, ‘can’ taken here 
to mean ‘be able to achieve as a matter of physical possibility.’136 It generally warns against 
the imposition of legal penalties on ‘people having failed to do things that are starkly 
beyond the physical abilities of every human being.’137 
Judging whether a law requires the impossible, we may take ‘the reasonable man’ as 
an objective standard. This reasonable man is ‘a notional person, a fictional individual who 
embodies the standards and by reference to which a particular legal actor can be mea-
sured.’138 This standard is subject to historical change, for as Fuller observes ‘our notions of 
what in fact is impossible may be determined by presuppositions about the nature of man 
and universe.’ These presuppositions change in the course of time. And even amongst legal 
systems and cultures standards will vary. 
The legislator who wants to offer taxpayers more guidance may consider to enhance 
compliability by changing an enactment retroactively. Again, however, this may involve a 
violation of legitimate expectations of taxpayers who acted upon the enactment which will 
be changed or even annulled. 
2.1.6.8. Constancy
A last requirement with regard to legislation holds that laws should not be changed too 
frequently. Frequent changes make it harder for people to gear their activities to the law. 
Constancy of the law, temporal consistency, offers the taxpayers a reliable legal basis for 
their future actions. Consequently, the (tax) legislator should take into account possible 
future taxpayers’ actions in order to enhance temporal generality or consistency of the tax 
laws.139 As shown above, Smith argued that individuals have freedom in proportion to the 
degree to which they can predict how the government will treat them. Rapidly fluctuating 
laws often are unpredictable, at the cost of taxpayers’ liberty.140 This demand for the con-
134.	 For	some	concrete	examples	of	value	contradictions	in	German	taxation,	see	Tipke,	supra	note	103,	at	p.	42.
135.	 P.	Kirchhof,	Der	Staat	als	Garant	und	Gegner	der	Freiheit	(Paderborn	[etc.]:	Ferdinand	Schöningh,	2004),	at	
pp.	103-108.	Kirchhof,	supra	note	162,	at	p.	203.
136.	 Kramer,	supra	note	101,	at	p.	169.
137.	 Kramer,	supra	note	101,	at	p.	169.
138.	 J.	Cartwright,	‘The	Fiction	of	the	‘Reasonable	Man”,	in:	Ex	Libris	Hans	Nieuwenhuis	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2009),	at	
p.	143.	Note	that	this	reference-point	of	‘the	reasonable	man’	embodies	a	legal	standard,	not	simply	a	moral	stand-
ard.
139.	 See,	for	example,	Kirchhof,	supra	note	162,	p.	3.	See	also	Arnauld,	supra	note	23,	at	pp.	273ff.
140.	 Cf.	Fleischacker,	supra	note	75,	at	p.	244.	Cf.	Hayek,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	208:	‘The	general,	abstract	rules	[…]	are	[…]	
essentially	long-term	measures’.
91
Gribnau Part 2.  2.1. Legal certainty: a matter of principle – 2.1.7. 
stancy of the law directly serves the predictability of legislation and the legislator’s reliabil-
ity. 
The sixteenth-century French philosopher Montaigne elucidates this point. He clearly 
valued continuity in rules and laws to reduce uncertainty. This is not to say that he was 
unworldly. Montaigne belonged to a parliamentary milieu and he withdrew from public life 
by giving up his parliamentary office to write the Essays. His activity at the Bordeaux parlia-
ment concerned litigation. Hence, he was well aware of the existence of many bad laws. 
Nonetheless, although ‘of our laws and customs there are many that are barbarous and 
monstrous’ the worst thing in a state is the instability of the laws. Therefore, he would love 
‘to stop the wheel … by reason of the difficulty of reformation, and the danger of stirring 
things.’141 Thus, he expressed ‘a marked preference for continuity in laws and institutions 
over change and novelty.’142 Unlike fashion in clothing, stable rules which promote certainty 
may fix themselves in the legal consciousness of the people.143 It takes some time to internal-
ize new rules. Therefore, one ‘must not make a change in a law without sufficient reason’, as 
Montesquieu in the same vein argued.144 As Fuller points out, there is a close affinity 
between the harms resulting from too frequent changes in the law and those done by retro-
active legislation. Both are caused by legislative inconstancy. Retroactive legislation, how-
ever, stretches the temporal inconsistency out to the past, changing the legal effects of past 
taxpayers’ actions. Again, different principles (aspects) of legal certainty may provide com-
peting arguments pointing in diverging directions. Constancy demands that laws should 
not be changed too easily, but a lack of clarity may demand the tax legislator to tailor the 
rule more precisely, and thus to change the rule. Here, the necessary balancing act may 
result in a legislative change making it easier for people to gear their activities to the law. 
Thus, clarity prevails over temporal consistency.
The tax legislator seems not to hold the principle of constancy in high regard. Anti-
abuse measures, for example, are a major cause of frequent changes in tax law. Tax law is 
also seen as a political instrument, which accounts for a constant flux of tax laws.145 Conse-
quently, tax laws nowadays look like throw-away articles and tax legislation is unstable.146 
This lack of stability has another drawback, for it seriously affects other principles of cer-
tainty. To mention but one example, the goal of achieving simplicity, improving the read-
ability of tax legislation, is hampered. Continual change to the underlying legislation 
through remedial legislation and new initiatives undermines the effort to achieve simplicity 
and diverts resources.147
2.1.7. Taking legal certainty seriously
Legal certainty is a quintessential norm in the state under the rule of law. Of course, it does 
not and cannot demand absolute certainty. Lawmakers should respect this fundamental 
legal principle. Lawmaking should be assessed against the principle of legal certainty, being 
141.	 M.	de	Montaigne,	‘Of	Presumption’,	in:	Montaigne,	The	Essays	[1580]	(Chicago	[etc.]:	Encyclopaedia	Britannica,	Inc.,	
1952),	II.	17,	at	p.	319.	
142.	 B.	Fontana,	Montaigne’s	Politics:	Authority	and	Governance	in	the	Essais	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	
2007),	at	p.	40.	She	points	out	that	France	at	the	time	had	‘a	hundred	thousand	laws	…	many	of	these	laws	were	
obsolete	or	redundant,	some	contradicted	one	another,	and	all	were	expressed	in	characteristically	cryptic	jargon’,	
at	p.	27.
143.	 Cf.	W.	Brugger,	Liberalismus,	Pluralismus,	Kommunitarismus.	Studien	zur	Legitimation	des	Grundgesetzes	(Baden-
Baden:	Nomos	Verlagsgesellschaft,	1999),	at	p.	46.
144.	 Montesquieu,	supra	note	39,	XXIX,	16,	at	p.	614.
145.	 Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	69ff.	
146.	 Cf.	Kirchhof,	supra	note	8,	at	p.	546.
147.	 Sawyer,	supra	note	119,	at	p.	424.
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one of the foremost principles of proper lawmaking. However, we should not forget there is 
no simple harmony between principles. This also goes for the different aspects of legal cer-
tainty, which may be characterized as sub-principles. For example, legal certainty, i.e., the 
demand for clarity, may constitute an argument to change an unclear or outdated legal 
provision. On the other hand, legal certainty, demanding constancy of law, may also consti-
tute an argument not to change the law. Therefore, case by case the arguments pro and con 
have to be balanced. 
This balancing act is partly a cultural affair. Values and principles in law are likes 
rules, procedures and legal modes of reasoning related to a given culture. This also goes for 
the principle of legal certainty, which is deeply embedded in the institutional, doctrinal, 
social and cultural contexts of each country (a fact confirmed by the country reports in this 
volume).148 Legal certainty is part and parcel of a legal culture, which may be defined as 
‘ideas, attitudes, expectations and opinions about law, held by people in some given socie-
ty.’149 Cultures differ in their view on relations that law must regulate; this applies to both 
social relations and relations between state and citizens. Tax law regards the latter kind of 
relations. Thus, (legal) culture partly determines the relative weight of values and principles 
to be observed when changing the tax laws, such as legal certainty, equality, human auton-
omy, public interest and the sovereignty of parliament.150
As shown above, the law never offers absolute legal certainty. Equally, legal certainty 
is not an absolute value or ideal. Nonetheless, the legislator should take legal certainty 
seriously. Nowadays tax legislation is very complex, often unclear and ever changing. Thus, 
tax law often falls short of the principle of legal certainty. The tax legislator frequently 
neglects legal certainty. Consequently, the lawgiver threatens the bond of relatively stable 
reciprocity between government and the citizen. This may seriously undermine taxpayers’ 
cooperative attitude. Moreover, uncertainty increases transaction costs, such as the cost of 
the advice needed to ‘comply with the law, including the cost of negotiating or litigating 
with the Revenue.’151 Consequently, tax morale and compliance are at risk.152
Moreover, the need for weighing principles is not limited to the different aspects of 
legal certainty. It also goes for the principle of legal certainty itself in relationship to other 
principles, for example in order to determine the appropriateness of the use of retroactive 
legislation. Retroactivity of legislation can be framed as a balancing of the principle of legal 
certainty, on the one hand, and the interests that are served by retroactivity, on the other 
hand.153 This balancing should be done taking into account the circumstances of the legisla-
tive case, for example the use of loopholes and the abuse or improper use of tax rules by 
taxpayers.154 Taxpayers may deliberately search the law for uncertainty which they might 
take advantage of. These taxpayers apparently prefer gaming the uncertainty inherent to the 
148.	 M.	Tushnet,	Weak	Courts,	Strong	Rights	(Princeton	/	Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press,	2008),	at	p.	10.
149.	 L.M.	Friedmann,	The	Republic	of	Choice.	Law,	Authority	and	Culture	[1990]	(Cambridge	(Mass.)/London:	Harvard	
University	Press	1994),	p.	213.	Cf.	R.	Cotterell,	Law,	Culture	and	Society:	Legal	Ideas	in	the	Mirror	of	Society	(Alder-
shot:	Ashgate,	2006),	at	pp.	81-97.
150.	 Cf.	Tridimas,	supra	note	90,	at	p.	244:	‘Continental	public	lawyers	are	more	receptive	to	arguments	based	on	legal	
certainty	than	English	lawyers.’	For	the	concept	of	‘the	public	interest’,	see	M.	Feintuck,	‘The	Public	Interest’	in	
Regulation	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004).
151.	 Tiley,	supra	note	121,	at	p.	135.	He	also	points	at	another	problem	of	cost:	‘the	inefficiencies	that	can	result	from	
structuring	one’s	business	decisions	in	a	particular	way	in	order	to	avoid	areas	of	uncertainty.’
152.	 Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	101-102.	Cf.	B.	Torgler,	Tax	Compliance	and	Tax	Morale:	A	Theoretical	and	Empirical	Analy-
sis	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2007).
153.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	119-144.
154.	 See	the	national	reports	in	this	volume,	and	Hey,	supra	note	107,	and	Pauwels,	supra	note	51.
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law to the certainty which is also present in the same law.155 They deliberately leave a pass-
able road, where a toll is levied, to enter a marsh, where they think they do not have to pay 
that levy. But what if the legislator forces these taxpayers to take a (new) passable road – 
where a toll is levied? Thus, the legislator changes the rules because (some) taxpayers bend 
the rules. Should the legislator honour these taxpayers’ expectations to travel the marsh 
without paying any toll? In my opinion, deliberately entering a marsh expecting to avoid 
paying tax does not easily establish a claim for protection of their expectations, for they are 
ceteris paribus not legitimate expectations.156 Therefore, in my view the principle of equality 
prevails.
2.1.8. Conclusion
In this contribution, retroactive tax legislation is viewed from a wider perspective, viz., the 
change of the body of (tax) laws in the light of the human need for (legal) certainty. The 
main problem addressed was the question: which norms should guide the legislator willing 
to change the body of tax laws? These norms regard the legislator’s use of rules, i.e., intro-
duction, amendment and abolishment of legal rules. Rules, legal rules included, play a 
quintessential role in the human need for certainty. Law is one of the domains in societies 
through which we try to defend ourselves against uncertainties in the behavior of others, 
government included. Legislative rules attaching legal consequences to taxpayers’ actions 
guide and direct taxpayers’ behaviour. Thus, taxpayers can calculate their tax liability and 
predict the tax administration’s collecting behaviour. Taxes constitute an interference with 
taxpayers’ liberty. The more taxes are levied and the higher the tax burden, the more taxpay-
ers need to plan their fiscal obligations.157 Established laws which offer certainty are a great 
security for the liberty of the taxpayers, for lack of certainty in tax legislation may leave 
them in the dark with regard to their fiscal rights and obligations. 
Thus, legal rules enable taxpayers to cope with uncertainties involved in the levying 
of taxes. Here, it is argued that the tax legislator’s (retroactive) change of rules should be 
guided by legal principles. The legislature should consistently balance principles in order to 
achieve integrity in legislation. Legal principles offer guidance as to the boundaries of legis-
lative changes, the principle of legal certainty – and its aspects, all conceptualized as (sub)
principles – being one of the major principles. The principles of legal certainty each entail 
specific demands on the use of legal rules, which may point in divergent directions. Then, 
the competing principles at hand ought to be balanced. Thus, all of these different aspects 
of the principle of legal certainty are to be used as principles of proper lawmaking. By using 
these legal principles, the legislator takes the ideal of integrity in law seriously. 
155.	 Cf.	Braithwaite,	supra	note	116,	at	p.	58:	wealthy	taxpayers	may	opt	for	game-playing	with	rules	by	exploiting	
change	and	complexity.	New	products	never	conceived	by	the	law	may	be	created.	Braithwaite	argues	that	for	
multinational	corporations	this	kind	of	financial	engineering	is	‘a	newer	modality	of	a	more	longstanding	tradition	
of	contriving	complexity	in	their	books,	organizational	complexity	and	jurisdictional	complexity.’
156.	 For	a	theoretical	model	to	assess	expectations,	see	Pauwels,	supra	note	51.
157.	 Hey,	supra	note	85,	at	pp.	133ff.	
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2.2.
Retroactive and retrospective tax 
legislation: a principle-based approach; a 
theory of ‘priority principles of transitional 
law’ and ‘the method of the catalogue of 
circumstances’
Melvin Pauwels
2.2.1. Introduction
The principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of law. Citizens, taxpayers, should 
in general be allowed to rely on the legislation in force to plan their conduct and trans-
actions. The government, including the legislator, should respect the principle of legal 
certainty. However, it is beyond discussion that the legislator should be able to change its 
legislation, including tax legislation. There are various justified reasons to change tax legis-
lation, such as a change of tax policy and social and technical developments. A change in 
legislation could, however, infringe taxpayers’ expectations raised by the existing legisla-
tion. This could especially be the case if the legislator decides that the amended legislation 
is applicable to past tax periods (the change has ‘retroactive effect’). But also if the amended 
legislation has ‘immediate effect’ and therefore only applies to future taxable events or tax 
periods, taxpayers’ expectations could be at stake. This would be the case if the legislator 
does not provide for grandfathering. Then, the changed legislation also applies to future 
effects of a situation that arose under the old legislation (the change has ‘retrospective 
effect’). 
The above in a nutshell is the problem which the tax legislator has to deal with when 
changing legislation. How should the tax legislator act, taking into account the colliding 
interests? Which method should the legislature apply in determining to what extent retro-
activity and retrospectivity are acceptable when enacting tax legislation? In my PhD disser-
tation I dealt with this issue and I developed a framework for the tax legislator grounded on 
a principle-based approach.1 This contribution presents the main lines and results of my 
research. It should be noted that this contribution only deals with retroactive and retrospec-
tive substantive tax legislation that is disadvantageous for taxpayers. Thus, issues like advan-
tageous retroactivity and retrospectivity, procedural tax legislation and retroactivity of case 
law are not specifically addressed. 
Lastly, for various reasons, the contribution does not deal with limits in the Constitu-
tion to transitional law, and thus not with such limits to retroactivity. First of all, countries 
have different constitutional limits (including no limits to the sovereignty of the legislator 
1.	 M.R.T.	Pauwels,	Terugwerkende	kracht	van	belastingwetgeving:	gewikt	en	gewogen	(Retroactivity	of	tax	legislation:	
weighing	and	balancing)	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Uitgevers,	2009).
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in this respect), while this contribution seeks to offer a general approach to deal with transi-
tional law. Notwithstanding this, the framework I advocate in this contribution can be com-
bined with constitutional limits. Secondly, even if there are constitutional limits, these 
limits usually leave room for the legislator. In general, within the constitutional boundaries, 
the legislator should in my view aim to make the most optimal law, thereby including the 
most optimal transitional law. In terms of the legal theorist Lon Fuller: there is not only a 
moralitiy of duty but also a morality of aspiration.2 Therefore, a framework offers the legislator 
useful guidance.
2.2.2. Overview
This contribution deals in particular with two theoretical issues in the field of transitional 
law that are of special interest. The first concerns the two principles of transitional law that 
are generally accepted. These principles are (i) that a change in legislation should not have 
retroactive effect and (ii) that a change in legislation has immediate effect, without grandfa-
thering, which implies that the legislation could be ‘retrospective’. As I discuss below (sec-
tion 2.2.4), from a legal certainty point of view, the distinction between retroactive effect 
and immediate effect (which could imply a ‘retrospective effect’) is not strict, but only grad-
ual. Taking this point into account, the question arises what the justification is of the 
above-mentioned principles of transitional law that are generally accepted. This is the first 
main issue I address in this contribution.
The second main issue relates to a related subject. It is generally accepted that under 
certain circumstances the legislator is allowed, or even should, deviate from the above-men-
tioned principles of transitional law. The concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has a key role 
in this respect. On the one hand, if no legitimate expectations are infringed, retroactivity 
may be permissible. On the other hand, if the immediate effect (retrospectivity) would 
infringe legitimate expectations, the legislator should provide for grandfathering or 
another transitional provision. However, the question is when expectations can be charac-
terized as ‘legitimate’ and how this should be assessed. This is the second main issue I scruti-
nize in this contribution.
The discussion of these two issues makes up the core of this contribution. However, 
before these issues can be dealt with, it is necessary to outline in brief which theory of law I 
use as the theoretical framework. Subsequently I deal with the principle of legal certainty. I 
then go on to analyse the two main subjects.
2.2.3. Theoretical framework: a principle-based approach3
2.2.3.1. Introduction
The answer to the question which method the legislature ought to apply in determining to 
what extent retroactivity and retrospectivity is acceptable when enacting tax legislation 
depends on the legal theory that is adopted. A law and economics view will provide a differ-
ent answer, or at least a different approach, than a more traditional legal view.4 Law and 
2.	 L.L.	Fuller,	The	Morality	of	Law	(New	Haven/London:	Yale	University	Press,	1977),	at	pp.	9-15.
3.	 See	in	detail	Pauwels,	supra	note	1,	chapter	3.
4.	 See	for	law	and	economics	approaches	on	(tax)	transitional	law	especially	M.J.	Graetz,	‘Legal	Transitions:	The	Case	of	
Retroactivity	in	Income	Tax	Revision‘,	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	(1977),	at	pp.	47-87,	M.J.	Graetz,	‘Retro-
activity	Revisited’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1985),	at	pp.	1820-1841,	L.	Kaplow,	‘An	Economic	Analysis	of	Legal	Transi-
tions‘,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1986),	at	pp.	509-617	and	D.N.	Shaviro,	When	Rules	Change:	An	Economic	and	Political	
Analysis	of	Transition	Relief	and	Retroactivity	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000).	Note	that	there	are	
some	differences	between	these	approaches.
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economics scholars strongly emphasize the objective of an increase in prosperity (utilitari-
anism) and seem not to attach independent value to legal certainty.5 In the more traditional 
legal view – called the ‘old view’ by law and economics scholars6 – legal certainty has an 
independent value, being a key value of law. This difference already provides an indication 
that the evaluation of retroactivity and retrospectivity will differ. 
This contribution takes, for empirical as well as normative reasons, the traditional 
legal view. I do not elaborate on these reasons in this contribution,7 but in essence the rea-
sons are that (empirically:) the practice of law (legislation, case law, an important part of 
the legal literature) shows that legal certainty is considered a key value of law and that 
( normatively:) law and the legal system should aspire to the enhancement of legal certainty, 
since legitimate law without legal certainty is hardly conceivable (compare Fuller’s idea of 
the morality of law, to be discussed in section 2.2.4.2). 
Furthermore, I note with respect to the law and economics view and its apparent 
undervaluation of the value of legal certainty that, interestingly, some economists do criti-
cize the traditional economic standards of measurement. For example, in his recent book, 
the famous economist Stiglitz – winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics – argues that 
the traditional measurement in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is not adequate, for it fails to 
take into account values that are important for social welfare. In this respect, Stiglitz explic-
itly refers to the values of security and certainty.8 Moreover, continuously in this book, Sti-
glitz criticizes assumptions on which the neo-capitalist theory (‘market fundamentalism’) is 
based, especially the theory of rational markets, of which one element is the assumption 
that people behave rationally. The latter idea is interesting with respect to the law and eco-
nomics view on transitional law, since this view is, amongst other things, based on the – thus 
criticized – assumption that people have rational expectations.9
Notwithstanding the above, in my view, the law and economics literature on transi-
tional law offers valuable insights in addition to insights of the more traditional legal litera-
ture on transitional law. I use these added value elements to improve the traditional legal 
theory on transitional law.
2.2.3.2. From Radbruch to Dworkin and Alexy
The starting point for the development of my theoretical framework is Radbruch’s abstract 
legal theory. In short, his theory is that law ought to be directed towards the realization of 
the idea of law, that is Gerechtigkeit, and that three elements, values, can be discerned there-
in.10 These values are equality (Gleichheit), purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), and legal cer-
tainty (Rechtssicherheit). Between these values there is a tension and none of these values 
5.	 Hans	Gribnau	and	Melvin	Pauwels,	‘Retroactivity	and	Tax	Legislation	in	the	Netherlands.	A	theoretical	approach	and	
assessment’,	International	Tax	Law	Review	(2009),	at	pp.	144-145.
6.	 See	in	that	respect	K.D.	Logue,	‘Tax	Transitions,	Opportunistic	Retroactivity,	and	the	Benefits	of	Government	Precom-
mitment’,	Michigan	Law	Review	(1996),	at	p.	1136	and	Shaviro,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	2-3.
7.	 See	Pauwels,	supra	note	1	and	Gribnau	and	Pauwels,	supra	note	5.
8.	 Joseph	E.	Stiglitz,	Freefall:	America,	Free	Markets,	and	the	Sinking	of	the	World	Economy	(New	York/London:	
W.	W.	Norton	&	Company,	2010),	chapter	10.
9.	 See	Graetz,	Legal	Transitions,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	75,	Kaplow,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	523-524	and	Shaviro,	supra	note	4,	
at	p.	19.	K.D.	Logue,	‘Legal	Transitions,	Rational	Expectations,	and	Legal	Progress’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	Legal	
Issues	(2003),	at	p.	221	notes	that	the	‘rational	expectations	assumption’	is	essential	in	the	normative	economic	
analysis	of	legal	rules	in	general.
10.	 G.	Radbruch,	Rechtsphilosophie.	Studienausgabe,	herausgegeben	von	Ralf	Dreier	und	Stanley	L.	Paulson	(Heidel-
berg:	C.F.	Müller	Verlag,	2003),	at	pp.	34-41,	54-62	and	at	pp.	73-78.	See	for	a	summary	and	discussion	of	Radbruch’s	
theory	for	example	S.	Taekema,	The	Concept	of	Ideals	in	LegalTheory	(2000)	PhD	dissertation,	Tilburg	University,	at	
pp.	50-74.
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
98
ought to be made absolute.11 ‘Die Drei Bestandteile der Rechtsidee fordern einander – aber 
sie widersprechen zugleich einander.’12 Here, on this abstract level, a difference from the 
approach of law and economics becomes clear. As the latter approach emphasizes the pur-
pose of increase in prosperity, this approach can be seen as a theory in which the realization 
of the value of purposiveness takes priority over realization of the value of legal certainty. 
Such an a priori ranking between values does not exist in Radbruch’s approach.
Radbruch’s theory of law can be elaborated at a less abstract level by following Dwor-
kin’s theory.13 Dworkin considers law to be not a ‘bunch of rules’, but the integrity of rules 
and principles. Dworkin describes a legal principle as ‘a standard to be observed, not 
because it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desira-
ble, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morali-
ty.’14 Also Alexy emphasizes the normative value of legal principles. He describes legal prin-
ciples as ‘optimization commands’; they are ‘norms commanding that something be real-
ized to the highest degree that is actually and legally possible.’15 Legal principles are not 
purely moral principles; they are standards which are specific for the law.16 Since fundamen-
tal legal principles constitute the legal expressions of the basic values of a society, lawmak-
ing should conform to legal principles. The body of laws – statute law, case law, and the 
decisions and regulations of the administration – should be ‘consistent in principle.’17 
An important feature of a principle of law is its argumentative character and its 
dimension of weight.18 A principle of law does not dictate a decision or outcome but pro-
vides an argument pointing in a certain direction. If there is a principle that provides an 
argument in another direction in the case concerned, the competing principles ought to be 
balanced.
The process of balancing of principles is an argumentative process; the relative 
weight of the arguments should be assessed in order to assess which principle gets priority 
in the case at hand. In this respect Alexy’s law of balancing is relevant: ‘The greater the 
degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right or principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other’.19 Notwithstanding that this law of balancing is a helpful 
conceptual guideline, in my opinion it cannot always be fully justified as to why one result 
of balancing is better than the other. This phenomenon is connected with the issue of 
incommensurability of principles. For example, if the principle of legal certainty and the 
principle of equality collide in a certain case and the judge (or the legislator) rules that the 
first principle supersedes the second principle in the case at hand, it is not always possible 
to fully justify in rational terms why the principle of legal certainty wins in that case. Often, 
there is ultimately an ‘unguided jump’.20 This is caused by the absence of a common unit of 
11.	 Radbruch,	supra	note	10,	at	pp.	74ff.
12.	 Radbruch,	supra	note	10,	at	p.	74.
13.	 Dworkin	himself	does	not	explicitly	base	his	theory	on	Radbruch’s	theory.	However,	both	theories	can	be	theoreti-
cally	connected	in	the	sense	that	a	legal	principle-based	theory,	such	as	Dworkin’s	theory,	is	compatible	with	the	
legal	value	theory	of	Radbruch.	See	in	this	respect	Taekema,	supra	note	10,	at	pp.	78-83.
14.	 R.	Dworkin,	Taking	Rights	Seriously	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1978),	at	p.	22.
15.	 R.	Alexy,	‘On	the	Structure	of	Legal	Principles’,	Ratio	Juris	(2000),	at	p.	295.
16.	 Actual	moral	principles	will	be	among	the	influences	on	the	actual	content	of	general	legal	principles.	See	H.	Grib-
nau,	‘General	Introduction’,	in:	G.T.K.	Meussen,	ed.,	The	Principle	of	Equality	in	European	Taxation	(The	Hague/
London/Boston:	Kluwer	Law	International,	1999).
17.	 R.	Dworkin,	Law’s	Empire	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1986),	at	pp.	225-275.
18.	 Dworkin,	supra	note	14,	at	pp.	22-28.	Compare	also	Alexy,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	295ff,	and	E.	Burg,	The	Model	of	
Principles	(2000),	PhD	dissertation,	University	of	Amsterdam,	at	pp.	79-86.
19.	 R.	Alexy,	‘On	Balancing	and	Subsumption.	A	Structural	Comparison’,	Ratio	Juris	(2003),	at	p.	436.
20.	 Burg,	supra	note	18,	at	pp.	69	and	113.
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measurement for weighing principles – principles are incommensurable.21 Nevertheless, it 
can be demanded of the authority (the legislator, the judge, etc.) who balances principles 
that he or it be consistent in that activity.22 Thus, the results of balancing in comparable 
situations should be the same, or at least should not deviate without justification.
2.2.3.3. The case of retroactivity and retrospectivity: a balancing act
What is the meaning of the above for the subject at hand? First of all, a main implication is 
that the government is bound by principles of law. After all, principles are ‘standards to be 
observed’ (Dworkin); they are optimization commands (Alexy). This also applies to the 
legislature when it comes to lawmaking, including the making of transitional law. Secondly, 
principles are not absolute. Hence, notwithstanding that the principle of legal certainty, 
including the principle of honouring legitimate expectations, provides strong arguments 
contra retroactivity, this does not imply that there is an absolute ban on retroactivity. In a 
certain case, certain interests could be served if the legislator were to grant retroactive effect 
to legislation. In that case the competing interests and principles should be weighed. The 
same applies mutatis mutandis for the subject of retrospectivity. Thus, the case of retroactiv-
ity and retrospectivity is a balancing act for the legislator. Thirdly, it should be accepted that 
the result of the balancing cannot always be fully accounted for. This relates to the issue of 
incommensurability of principles. Nevertheless, the demand for consistency of the legisla-
tor when balancing implies that if legislative situations are comparable23 the transitional 
law should in principle be comparable.
2.2.4. Retroactivity and retrospectivity in view of legal certainty
2.2.4.1. Introduction
Legal certainty has a two-fold value, one is intrinsic, the other instrumental.24 Legal certain-
ty’s intrinsic value regards the notion of personal freedom. First and foremost, this concerns 
the liberty to do and not do as one pleases. This is often called ‘negative liberty’, the liberty 
to choose between alternative courses of action without interference by others.25 People 
want to be sure about the legal consequences of their dealings. In tax law this certainty 
regards the ‘reach’ of tax law and the inroad upon taxpayer’s economic freedom, i.e. his tax 
burden. 
Secondly, legal certainty has an instrumental aspect. Tax legislation is not only a con-
straint, but may also be an opportunity for taxpayers. Nowadays, the use of tax legislation 
for non-fiscal goals is an integral part of government policy: the instrumentalist tax legisla-
21.	 See	with	respect	to	the	issue	of	incommensurability	in	law	for	example	J.	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom	(Oxford:	
Clarendon	Press,	1986),	at	pp.	321-366,	T.A.	Aleinikoff,	‘Constitutional	Law	in	the	Age	of	Balancing’,	The	Yale	Law	
Journal	(1987),	at	pp.	972-976,	Burg,	supra	note	19,	at	pp.	116-119	and	T.A.O.	Endicott,	Vagueness	in	Law	(Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	at	pp.	41-45	en	148-155.
22.	 Compare	Dworkin’s	requirement	of	integrity	of	the	law,	Dworkin,	supra	note	17,	at	pp.	165,	189	and	217-218.	See	for	
the	requirement	of	consistency	also	Burg,	supra	note	18,	at	pp.	70-73	and	at	pp.	151-152.
23.	 This	should	be	assessed	on	the	basis	of	the	principles	and	interests	involved	and	the	relevant	circumstances	of	the	
legislative	cases	concerned.
24.	 See	Gribnau	and	Pauwels,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.	143-144.
25.	 I.	Berlin,	‘Two	Concepts	of	Liberty’	[1958],	in:	I.	Berlin,	ed.,	Four	Essays	on	Liberty	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
1969).
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tor seduces taxpayers to behave according to his ends.26 Consequently, Netherlands tax law 
contains all kinds of instrumentalist incentives mostly in the form of tax reductions. 
Both the intrinsic and the instrumental values imply that certainty about the law 
enables people to make rational choices and to plan their activities at large. Thus, it is clear 
why legal certainty is important and what it should enable, but what does ‘legal certainty’ 
actually involve?
2.2.4.2. The concept of legal certainty: an aspects concept
The concept of legal certainty is not an easy one. Tridimas is right when he states: ‘Legal 
certainty is by its nature diffuse, perhaps more so than any other general principle, and its 
precise content is difficult to pin down.’27 As soon as one tries to make the concept concrete 
or describe what ‘legal certainty’ involves, one easily starts to sum up requirements: the law 
should be published, it should be clear, etc. In my view, the concept of legal certainty should 
be regarded as an ‘aspects concept’: a concept that consists of various aspects.28
Here, the well-known desiderata formulated by Lon Fuller for the sake of the ‘inner 
morality of law’ spring to mind.29 Although Fuller deals with the desiderata in the light of 
the principle of legality, they are all also aspects of legal certainty.30 These desiderata consti-
tute the ‘internal morality of law’, the morality that makes law possible. Fuller’s desiderata 
are nowadays still important. Fuller’s theory is often used as a starting point for further 
elaboration, discussion and refinement of the principle of legal certainty.31
First, Fuller mentions the generality of law, i.e., ‘there must be rules.’ General rules 
promote legal certainty. In a state under the rule of law it is hardly possible to control and 
direct human conduct without rules applying to general classes of people. A second 
demand is the promulgation of laws. Legal rules ought to be published. Citizens are entitled 
to know the law in advance, which enables them to predict the legal consequences of their 
behaviour and it also allows for public criticism. Thirdly, Fuller criticizes retroactivity: in 
itself ‘a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity’. Note, however, that also in Fuller’s view there 
is no absolute ban on retroactivity. According to Fuller, situations may arise in which grant-
ing retroactive effect to legal rules, ‘not only becomes tolerable, but may actually be essen-
tial to advance the cause of legality.’ Fourth, Fuller argues that the clarity of laws is essential 
to control and direct human conduct. A fifth desideratum is rather obvious: rules must not 
require contradictory actions. A further desideratum is that laws should not require the 
impossible. A last requirement which regards the law itself holds that laws should not be 
changed too frequently. Frequent changes make it harder for people to gear their activities 
to the law. This demand for the constancy of the law directly serves the predictability of 
legislation and the legislator’s reliability. As Fuller points out, there is a close affinity 
between the harm resulting from too frequent changes in the law and that done by retroac-
26.	 J.L.M.	Gribnau,	‘Equality,	Consistency,	and	Impartiality	in	Tax	Legislation‘,	in	J.L.M.	Gribnau,	ed.,	Legal	Protection	
against	Discriminatory	Tax	Legislation:	The	Struggle	for	Equality	in	European	Tax	Law	(The	Hague/London/Boston:	
Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	pp.	25-27.
27.	 T.	Tridimas,	The	General	Principles	of	EU	Law,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	at	p.	243.
28.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	1,	chapter	4.	Compare	J.	Raitio,	The	Principle	of	Legal	Certainty	in	EC	law,	(Dordrecht/Boston/
London:	Kluwer	Academic	Publishers,	2003),	at	p.	125,	who	considers	the	principle	of	legal	certainty	as	a	‘multi-fac-
eted	principle’	and	J.	Temple	Lang,	‘Legal	certainty	and	legitimate	expectations	as	general	principles	of	law’,	in:	U.	
Bernitz	et	al.,	eds.,	General	Principles	of	European	Community	Law,	(Den	Haag:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2000),	at	
p.	164	who	uses	the	term	‘umbrella	principle’.
29.	 Fuller	supra	note	2,	at	pp.	46-91.	
30.	 Gribnau	and	Pauwels,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.	145-149.
31.	 See,	for	example,	the	important	and	comprehensive	study	by	Popelier	on	the	principle	of	legal	certainty:	P.	Popelier,	
Rechtszekerheid	als	beginsel	voor	behoorlijke	regelgeving,	(Antwerpen:	Intersentia,	1997).
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tive legislation. Both are caused by legislative inconstancy. The last demand of Fuller is for 
congruence between the declared rules and the acts of the administration. This aspect 
regards the application of legislation, not – as the other desiderata do – the quality of legisla-
tion itself. 
In addition to Fuller’s desiderata, the principle of honouring legitimate expectations 
raised by the law could be addressed as an aspect of legal certainty. This principle is implic-
itly covered by some of the desiderata, such as the standard of non-retroactivity, the 
demand that the laws should not be changed too frequently, and the requirement of con-
gruence between the declared rules and the acts of the administration. However, the princi-
ple of honouring legitimate expectations raised by the law deserves explicit acknowledg-
ment as an aspect of legal certainty.
2.2.4.3. Retroactivity in view of legal certainty
As mentioned above, the demand of non-retroactivity is an aspect of legal certainty. The 
principle of non-retroactivity has in my opinion a very solid basis in the principle of legal 
certainty. Even if the principle of non-retroactivity were not to be explicitly distinguished 
and characterized as an aspect of legal certainty, the other aspects of legal certainty would 
entail that laws should as a matter of principle not be retroactive. 
First of all, the other desiderata of Fuller would imply that laws should not be retroac-
tive. In essence, these desiderata serve the aim that the law is knowable. Knowable law 
enables citizens to predict the legal consequences of their actions and therefore to plan 
their conduct and actions. It is clear that a retroactive law is inherently not capable of doing 
that. After all, a citizen cannot predict the legal consequences of an action on the basis of 
the law that only enters into force after the action occurred.
Secondly, a retroactive law is not only incapable of enabling citizens to predict the 
legal consequences of their actions. A retroactive law also infringes the expectations that 
were raised by the former law, i.e. the law that was applicable at the moment the action was 
executed. A citizen expected – based on the then applicable law A – that his action would 
have legal consequence ‘a’, but at the end the legal consequences appear to be ‘b’, based on 
the retroactive law B.
2.2.4.4. Immediate effect without grandfathering (retrospectivity) in view of legal 
certainty
How should a law be assessed from the viewpoint of legal certainty if that law is granted 
immediate effect, without grandfathering? This immediate effect, without grandfathering, 
entails that the new law applies to all events that occur after the entering into force of the 
law, including the events that have their origin in actions prior to that moment. For exam-
ple, suppose that a new tax rule is introduced to the effect that mortgage interest is not 
deductible for income tax purposes, while under the old tax rule the mortgage interest was 
tax deductible. Suppose further that the legislator grants immediate effect to that new rule 
and that he does not provide for grandfathering of existing mortgage loans. Then, the new 
rule is applicable to all mortgage interest that is paid after the date of entry into force, so 
also to interest paid on mortgage loans that were concluded prior to that date. The term 
‘retrospective’ is used for this phenomenon.
If the above analysis with respect to retroactivity is applied to retrospectivity, it 
appears that the same issues arise. First of all, the ‘knowability’ and predictability of the law 
are at stake in the sense that a part of the legal consequences of an action are governed by a 
law that was not yet in force at the moment of that action and which the citizen could there-
fore not take into consideration when planning that action. I refer in this respect also to the 
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above-mentioned remark by Fuller on the close affinity between the demand for the con-
stancy and the demand of non-retroactivity. 
Secondly, the new law infringes the expectations which the citizen had based on the 
law that applied when the action was carried out. The citizen expected that mortgage inter-
est would be deductible when he concluded the mortgage loan agreement, but that expec-
tation is not honoured.
Thus, the principle of legal certainty offers arguments contra retrospectivity. In posi-
tive terms: the principle of legal certainty offers arguments pro grandfathering.
2.2.4.5. The difference between retroactivity and retrospectivity: only gradual
The above analysis shows that the arguments contra retroactivity are also arguments contra 
immediate effect without grandfathering (retrospectivity). It can be concluded that the 
distinction between retroactivity, on the one hand, and immediate effect without grandfa-
thering (retrospectivity), on the other hand, loses relevance from the perspective of legal 
certainty. There is no strict distinction but only a gradual distinction. This is nowadays gen-
erally accepted in the legal literature.32
I note that the conclusion that the difference between retroactivity and immediate 
effect without grandfathering is only gradual is also supported – even strongly – in law and 
economics literature on transitional law, which looks at the impact of both.33 For example, 
Graetz concludes that ‘the distinctions commonly drawn between retroactive and prospec-
tive effective dates are illusory.’34
2.2.5. Principles of transitional law: priority principles
2.2.5.1. Introduction: research question
There are two principles of transitional law that are generally accepted. As far as I am aware, 
these principles are accepted by the legislator, by the court when it judges the legislator’s 
transitional law, as well as in the literature. The first principle is that a change in legislation 
has immediate effect, without grandfathering. Hence, retrospectivity of legislation is gener-
ally accepted. The second principle of transitional law is that that a change in legislation 
should, as a matter of principle, not have retroactive effect. 
These principles of transitional law thus involve a relatively sharp distinction 
between retroactive effect (in principle not permissible) and immediate effect (in principle 
permissible). However, section 2.2.4 of this contribution reveals that, from the perspective 
32.	 See	in	particular	Popelier,	supra	note	31,	at	p.	572	and	P.	Popelier,	Toepassing	van	de	wet	in	de	tijd.	Vaststelling	en	
beoordeling	van	temporele	functies,	(Brussel:	Story-Scientia,	1999),	at	pp.	48	and	178,	as	well	as	Pauwels,	supra	
note	1,	chapter	5,	with	references	to	amongst	others	J.E.	Fisch,	‘Retroactivity	and	legal	change:	an	equilibrium	
approach’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1997),	at	pp.	1067-1070	and	1087,	C.	Sampford,	Retrospectivity	and	the	Rule	of	Law,	
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	press,	2006),	at	pp.	9-37	and	B.	Juratowitch,	Retroactivity	and	the	Common	Law,	(Oxford:	
Hart	Publishing,	2008),	at	pp.	5-13.	Sampford	–	who	uses	a	broad	definition	of	retrospectivity	that	also	covers	what	
is	called	retroactivity	in	this	contribution	–	concludes	that	‘retrospectivity	does	not	appear	to	be	an	all-or-nothing	
characteristic	of	laws	but	rather	is	a	matter	of	degree’	and	mentions	‘the	idea	of	retrospectivity	as	a	continuum	
concept.’
33.	 In	this	contribution	I	do	not	elaborate	on	this.	See	Pauwels,	supra	note	1,	section	5.3.4.,	with	references	to	Graetz,	
Legal	Transitions,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	54-60,	Kaplow,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	515-519,	Logue,	supra	note	6,	at	p.	1133,	
Fisch,	supra	note	32,	at	p.	1067	and	Shaviro,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	106-108.
34.	 Graetz,	Retroactivity	Revisited,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	1822.	More	nuanced	Graetz,	Legal	Transitions,	supra	note	4,	at	
p.	63:	‘the	difference	in	impact	between	a	nominally	retroactive	change	and	one	which	is	nominally	prospective	is	
often	slight.’
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of legal certainty and from a law and economics perspective, the difference between a 
change with retroactive effect and a change with immediate effect is only gradual. The ques-
tion therefore arises what the justification is of the above-mentioned principles of transi-
tional law. This section deals with this question.
2.2.5.2. Framework for transitional law: principle of legal certainty, the objective of 
the law, and principle of equality
In my view, the issue of principles of transitional law in tax law should be understood from 
an abstract framework that is formed by three major principles or, as the case may be, inter-
ests. For this triad of interests I am inspired by the above-mentioned theory of Radbruch.
The first principle has already been discussed above. It is the principle of legal cer-
tainty. Looked at from the point of view of legal certainty, a law should not only have no 
retroactive effect, but should also have no immediate effect without grandfathering. The 
principle of legal certainty advocates providing for grandfathering to avoid retrospectivity.
However, if the legislator provides for grandfathering, the new law does not become 
effective with respect to the cases that are grandfathered. Thus, the objective that is served 
by the new law cannot be reached to the extent that grandfathering is provided. Suppose a 
new law is introduced that involves extra taxes on flights by airplanes and that this law has 
an environmental objective. It is obvious that if existing airplanes were grandfathered, this 
would not serve that environmental objective. The environmental objective would be better 
served if the new law were to apply to all flights, including flights by existing airplanes. The 
second interest is therefore ‘the objective of the law’. In particular, the law and economics 
literature – in my view: correctly – emphasizes that grandfathering has social costs as it 
entails delay and reduction of the benefits of the new law.35
So from the perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ a new law should have immediate 
effect without grandfathering. The objective of the law involves an argument contra grand-
fathering and pro retrospectivity. 
With respect to the issue of retroactivity, the perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ 
does not provide an argument pro retroactivity. After all, as discussed above (sec-
tion 2.2.4.3), a retroactive law itself is not able to guide behaviour.36 Nonetheless, in certain 
situations, ‘the objective of the law’ could advocate retroactivity. An example is the situation 
in which a loophole exists in a law. If a new law is introduced to cure this loophole, the 
‘objective of the law’ provides an argument pro retroactivity of that law. After all, to the 
extent taxpayers exploit the loophole, the original law fails to meet its own objective.
The third principle is the principle of equality. For the viewpoint of the principle of 
equality on transitional law, I consider to be equal those facts that ratione materiae fall 
within the scope of the new law and that occur in the same period. This definition taken into 
account, the principle of equality advocates against grandfathering. The reason is that 
grandfathering leads to unequal treatment of facts that fall within the scope of the new law 
and which occur in the same period. After all, in the case of grandfathering, the new law 
does not apply to certain facts that occur after the entry into force and that would ratione 
materiae fall within the scope of the new law. Applied to the example above: grandfathering 
35.	 Compare	Graetz,	Legal	Transitions,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	71,	S.	Levmore,	‘The	Case	for	Retroactive	Taxation’,	Journal	of	
Legal	Studies	(1993),	at	p.	290	and	L.	Kaplow,	‘Transition	Policy:	A	Conceptual	Framework’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	
Legal	Issues	(2003),	at	p.	173.
36.	 Note	that	the	expectation	that	a	new	law	may	be	retroactive	obviously	may	influence	behaviour.	Based	on	this	
notion,	some	law	and	economic	authors	plea	for	retroactivity	in	certain	situations.	For	example,	if	taxpayers	know	
that	the	tax	legislator	has	the	transitional	law	policy	of	curing	loopholes	in	the	law	with	retroactive	effect,	there	is	
an	incentive	for	taxpayers	not	to	exploit	new	loopholes;	compare	Kaplow,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	551,	587	and	607-610,	
Kaplow,	supra	note	35,	at	pp.	181-184	and	Logue,	supra	note	9,	at	pp.	231-235	and	257-259.
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of existing airplanes would imply that flights by new airplanes are taxed higher than flights 
by existing airplanes in the same period. It should be emphasized that this does not imply 
that the principle of equality requires that there should never be grandfathering. My reason-
ing is only that the principle of equality provides an argument contra grandfathering as well 
as that, from the perspective of the principle of equality, grandfathering needs a justifica-
tion. 
From the above-mentioned viewpoint of the principle of equality on transitional law, 
the principle of equality does not provide an argument pro or contra retroactivity. Based on 
another viewpoint, it could however be argued that the principle of equality may provide an 
argument against retroactivity. The basic idea is then that retroactivity implies that unequal 
cases are treated equally, as all facts that arose prior to the promulgation of the new law are 
treated as equal to facts arisen after the promulgation. However, in my view, this argument is 
in essence strongly interrelated with the argument of legal certainty. After all, the reason for 
considering these facts as unequal is that in the former case the law was not yet in force when 
the facts arose, while in the latter case the law is in force when the facts arise.
It should be noted that in a concrete legislative case of transitional law other princi-
ples or interests could also be involved in addition to the three just discussed. Such other 
principles are for example the principle of legality, the principle of equality of arms (which 
could be infringed if a retroactive law influences pending proceedings for the judiciary) and 
the ability-to-pay-principle. Nonetheless, these principles and interests are in my view the 
most important, as they are involved in almost all legislative cases of transitional law. This 
does not imply that other principles are not relevant. After all, these principles should 
indeed be taken into account in the balancing process insofar they are involved in the legis-
lative case at hand.
With respect to the issue of retroactivity, the above shows that (i) the principle of 
legal certainty provides strong arguments contra retroactivity, (ii) the principle of equality 
does not provide an (additional) argument pro or contra retroactivity and (iii) from the 
perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ there may be an argument pro retroactivity in cer-
tain situations.
With respect to the issue of immediate effect without grandfathering, the conclusion 
is that (i) the principle of legal certainty advocates grandfathering, (ii) the principle of 
equality provides an argument contra grandfathering and (iii) from the perspective of ‘the 
objective of the law’ there should be no grandfathering.
2.2.5.3. The principles of transitional law should be conceptualized as ‘priority 
principles’
On the basis of the above, a theoretical foundation can be given for the generally accepted 
principles of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering 
and the principle of no retroactivity. In my view, these principles of transitional law should 
be conceptualized as – what I call – ‘priority principles’. 
The ‘priority’ element relates to the idea that the principles of transitional law should 
be regarded as the result of a process of balancing which results in the priority of one inter-
est or principle over the other. As the analysis in the previous section shows, the three prin-
ciples and interests involved provide arguments in different directions with respect to an 
adequate transitional law. Hence, a balancing of these principles or interests is necessary.
The principle of non-retroactivity is the result of the balancing of these principles and 
interests in the sense that the principle of legal certainty – that provides an argument contra 
retroactivity – prevails and has priority over any other interests. As to the principle of 
 immediate effect without grandfathering, the objective of the law and the principle of 
equality – which provide arguments against grandfathering – outweigh the principle of 
legal certainty – which advocates grandfathering.
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The ‘principle’ element of ‘priority principles’ refers to the fact the two results of balancing 
the three principles and interests are only prima facie results. The results – immediate effect 
without grandfathering and no retroactivity – are not rules: they do not dictate – as rules do 
– but indicate a direction, as principles do. The results should therefore not be characterized 
as priority rules but as priority principles. The balancing results are the results of an abstract 
balancing of the three principles or interests. In a concrete legislative case of transitional 
law, the results of balancing may differ. On the one hand, due to the circumstances of the 
case, one or more of the three principles or interests could have more or less weight than 
the weight taken into account in the abstract balancing. On the other hand, in a concrete 
legislative case, there could also be other principles or interests involved that should be 
taken into account when balancing and making transitional law.
Finally, it should be noted that the above provides a theoretical foundation for the 
generally accepted principles of transitional law. Based on the framework that is constituted 
by the principle of legal certainty, ‘the objective of the law’, and the principle of equality, the 
principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity 
can be justified in terms of balancing results. It is, however, not possible to fully substantiate 
why these are the abstract balancing results and why for example grandfathering for one 
year is not a more optimal balancing result. This relates to the more general issue of incom-
mensurability of principles, referred to in section 2.2.3.2.
2.2.6. Legitimate expectations? An approach based on ‘the method of the 
catalogue of circumstances’
2.2.6.1. Introduction: the problem and research question
The legislator can rely on two principles of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate 
effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity. The above confirms 
that these principles are indeed principles and not rules. Therefore, in a concrete legislative 
case, there could be reasons for the legislator to deviate from these principles. 
To answer the question as to whether in a concrete case there is reason to deviate from 
the principles of transitional law, the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has an important 
role. If taxpayers are deemed not to have legitimate expectations in the legislative case at hand, 
the principle of legal certainty has less weight and there may thus be reason to grant retroac-
tive effect. The other way around, if immediate effect without grandfathering were to infringe 
upon legitimate expectations of taxpayers in the legislative case at hand, the principle of legal 
certainty has more weight and there is more reason to provide for grandfathering. Accord-
ingly, the question as to whether or not taxpayers have ‘legitimate expectations’ plays an 
important role when the principles of transitional law are applied. 
However, the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is generally problematic. In the first 
place, the term ‘legitimate expectations’ is often used to indicate that expectations are at 
stake that partially or completely should be honoured. If used in this way, an important step 
has already been passed. This is the step in which the principle of honouring legitimate 
expectations is balanced against any interests that advocate contra honouring the expecta-
tions (‘counter-interests’). The adjective ‘legitimate’ then points in particular to the final 
result, and is useless for the answer to the question as to under which circumstances expec-
tations should be honoured. In the second place: even if the term ‘legitimate expectations’ is 
only used for stating that it concerns expectations that are reasonable and could qualify to 
be honoured, the term remains a vague one. For when are expectations ‘legitimate’? The 
latter question is the research question I deal with in this section. Though the usage does 
not have my preference I avoid confusion by following the usual legal terminology indi-
cated above with regard to the term ‘legitimate expectations’. Hence, ‘legitimate expecta-
tions’ are expectations that should be honoured.
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2.2.6.2. An initial theoretical framework to approach the concept ‘legitimate 
expectations’
The above indicates that the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is vague and somewhat 
problematic. The question is whether it is possible to provide some support to the legislator 
for assessing when the expectations at hand can be characterized as ‘legitimate’. In this 
section an initial theoretical framework to approach the concept ‘legitimate expectations’ is 
developed. 
In my view, conceptually, two steps can be discerned when it comes to the assessment 
of whether in a concrete case expectations are ‘legitimate’. The first step concerns the ques-
tion as to whether the subjective expectations in the case at hand are reasonable. If the 
answer is affirmative, the second step is to answer the question whether the reasonable 
expectations are legitimate expectations. If the answer to the latter question is also affirma-
tive, the expectations should be honoured.
Sometimes, there is still a third step. That step concerns the question to what extent 
expectations ought to be honoured. The conclusion that the expectations at hand are legiti-
mate does not automatically mean that the expectations ought to be fully honoured. For 
example, if the existence of legitimate expectations entails that the legislator should pro-
vide for grandfathering, this does not necessarily imply that the grandfathering should be 
unlimited in time. Grandfathering for a couple of years could be more appropriate.
The first step – from subjective expectations to reasonable expectations – concerns a 
process of filtering by objectification. The process of objectification takes place by taking 
the view of a reasonable person.37 The second step concerns a balancing of the expectations 
with the ‘counter-interests’ (the interest that would be infringed if the expectations were to 
be honoured). The factors that are significant for the first step are also significant for the 
balancing involved in the second step. They are of influence for answering the question how 
important it is that the expectations are honoured. Thus, notwithstanding that the two 
steps can conceptually be distinguished, in practice the two steps are actually hard to dis-
cern. The third step is interrelated with the second step. After all, the question to what 
extent expectations ought to be honoured also concerns a process of balancing with 
‘ counter-interests’.
This framework gives the legislator something to hold on to, but it has its limits. For 
example, the idea of objectification is helpful, but the question as to whether expectations 
are reasonable cannot be answered without information about the circumstances of the 
case. Further, the question as to whether expectations are legitimate cannot be considered 
apart from the weight of the ‘counter-interests’. Which counter-interests are involved and 
the weight of these counter-interests also depends on the circumstances of the case. The 
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ therefore remains a concept that is difficult to grasp in 
abstracto. Ultimately, the circumstances of the case are decisive.
However, is it possible to offer the legislator more than the answer ‘that depends 
upon the circumstances of the case’ with respect to his assessment of the legitimacy of 
expectations? To answer this question, in the next section, the Netherlands case law with 
respect to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as a general principle of 
proper administration in tax law is examined.
37.	 Compare	the	‘prudent	and	circumspect	trader’	in	the	case	law	of	the	ECJ,	for	example	ECJ	C-37-38/02,	15	July	2004,	
Case	Di	Lenardo	en	Dilexport,	para.	70.	See	also	Raitio,	supra	note	28,	at	p.	218,	as	well	as	S.J.	Schønberg,	Legitimate	
Expectations	in	Administrative	Law,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	at	p.	6:	‘An	expectation	is	reasonable	if	
a	reasonable	person	acting	with	diligence	would	hold	it	in	the	relevant	circumstances.’
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2.2.6.3. Method of priority rules?
Obviously, the question how to approach the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is relevant 
in more areas than the field of transitional law only. For example, in the doctrine of the 
principle of honouring legitimate expectations as a general principle of proper administra-
tion in tax law, the judiciary has also to deal with the concept ‘legitimate expectations’. Also 
in that field the question is when expectations should be honoured. It concerns the issue in 
which circumstances the principle of honouring of legitimate expectations justifies a devia-
tion from the strict application of the legislation. In terms of balancing principles, it con-
cerns balancing the principle of legality and the principle of honouring of legitimate expec-
tations. Interestingly for this subject, the Netherlands Supreme Court has succeeded in 
developing a certain method that offers clear guidelines. This method is the method of 
‘priority rules’.38 The question arises whether this method could be useful to approach the 
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the field of transitional law.
The Supreme Court has distinguished several particular types of situations (‘standard 
situations’) in which the tax administration could cause taxpayers to develop expectations. 
The distinction is based on the origin of the expectations. Such standard situations are 
amongst other ones expectations raised by a policy rule of the tax administration, expecta-
tions raised by a promise of the tax inspector, and expectations raised by general informa-
tion of the tax administration. For each of the standard situations, the Supreme Court has 
developed rules for the balancing of principles, resulting in ‘priority rules’. Such a priority 
rule indicates under which circumstances the principle of honouring of legitimate expecta-
tions outweighs – and therefore gets priority above – the principle of legality. 
To illustrate this, I refer to the priority rule for promises. This priority rule prescribes 
that the expectations raised by a promise are honoured (which thus implies an application 
that deviates from the legislation) in case (i) the taxpayer has the impression that the tax 
inspector takes a certain position concerning his application of the tax law, (ii) the taxpayer 
has told the tax inspector all relevant facts and circumstances of his case, (iii) the taxpayer 
may reasonably think the promise is in the spirit of the law, and (iv) the tax inspector is 
competent to deal with the taxpayer.
A characteristic of a priority rule is that it has the same structure as a statutory provi-
sion. Just like a statutory provision, a priority rule sets out criteria. In a concrete case, it 
should be verified whether all the criteria are met. If the criteria are all met, the rule applies. 
In that case the expectations concerned are considered legitimate and are honoured. In 
other words, the principle of honouring legitimate expectations then has priority above the 
principle of legality. If one of the criteria is not met in the case at hand, the priority rule is 
not applied. In that case, the principle of legality gets priority and the expectations are not 
honoured.
From the perspective of the question how to approach the concept of legitimate 
expectations, it is interesting to note that, first of all, a priority rule, in particular its criteria, 
provides a selection of the circumstances that are relevant for the standard situation con-
cerned. The judiciary only has to investigate whether these circumstances are present in the 
case at hand. The judiciary does not to need to examine the presence of other circumstances. 
Secondly, a priority rule in fact determines which circumstances on their own are a necessary 
condition to assume ‘legitimate expectations’. If one of the circumstances included in the 
priority rule is not present in the case at hand, the principle of legality prevails and the 
38.	 See	Richard	Happé	and	Melvin	Pauwels,	‘Balancing	of	powers	in	Dutch	tax	law:	General	overview	and	recent	devel-
opments’,	in:	C.	Evans,	J.	Freedman,	&	R.	Krever,	ed,	The	delicate	balance:	Tax,	discretion	and	the	rule	of	law	(Amster-
dam:	IBFD,	2011),	and,	in	depth,	R.H.	Happé,	Drie	beginselen	van	fiscale	rechtsbescherming,	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	
1998).
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expectations at hand are not honoured. Thirdly, a priority rule determines which circum-
stances together are a sufficient condition to assume ‘legitimate expectations’. If all circum-
stances that are included in the priority rule are present in the case at hand, the expecta-
tions are considered legitimate and are honoured. Thus, other circumstances are not rele-
vant.
The above shows that the method of priority rules has important benefits. Notwith-
standing these benefits, in my opinion, the method of priority rules is not suitable as gen-
eral method in the field of transitional tax law. It may be possible to provide a priority rule 
for one or more specific types of situation. But as a general method, it is in my opinion too 
rigid in the field of transitional tax law. The situations that may arise are too varied to cover 
the whole field with priority rules. More flexibility is needed. This is, amongst other things, 
caused by the fact that in the field of transitional law the ‘counter-interests’ vary in number 
and weight depending on the circumstances of the case. 
2.2.6.4. Method of the catalogue of circumstances
In the previous section I discussed the method of rules of priority to approach the concept 
of ‘legitimate expectations’. I concluded that this method has important benefits, but that it 
is not suitable as a general method in the field of transitional law. This does not mean, how-
ever, that as to the question when expectations may be called legitimate, we are completely 
thrown back on the ‘open’ answer ‘that depends upon the circumstances of the case’.
An appropriate method for approaching the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in 
the field of transitional law, in my opinion, is the method of the catalogue of circumstances. 
This method takes an intermediate position between only a non-specified reference to the 
circumstances of the case (an ‘open group of circumstances’), on the one hand, and the 
method of priority rules, on the other hand. In the context of making transitional law, the 
method of the catalogue of circumstances means that the legislature ought to assess 
whether the circumstances listed in the catalogue are present in the legislative case at hand 
and that it must take these circumstances into consideration when balancing the various 
principles and interests involved. An open catalogue of circumstances is preferable to an 
exhaustive one because it cannot be ruled out that in a concrete case of law-making a spe-
cial circumstance is present that also deserves to be taken into consideration but that is not 
included in the catalogue. 
A difference from, and an advantage in comparison to, an ‘open group of circum-
stances’ is that the method of the catalogue of circumstances determines which circum-
stances ought to be taken into consideration (as far as they are present in the legislative case 
at hand). The method has this feature in common with the method of priority rules. A differ-
ence with that latter method is, however, that it still leaves open what the impact is of the 
circumstances. Other than in the method of priority rules, neither which circumstances are 
necessary conditions nor which circumstances together are a sufficient condition for expecta-
tions to be honoured has been determined. This is also caused by the fact that the weight of 
the ‘counter-interests’ is unknown. 
An advantage of the method of the catalogue of circumstances is that it provides the 
legislator a foothold for balancing, because it is clear which circumstances the legislator in 
any case should take into account when balancing the colliding interests. The method also 
has the advantage that, to a certain extent, it urges the authority who submits a bill to par-
liament to provide reasons for his proposal with respect to the transitional law that is pro-
posed in the bill. This may contribute to the transparency of the legislative proposal and 
may add to the quality of the balancing. The quality of the balancing may be improved 
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because parliament can verify whether or not the authority who submitted the bill39 has 
ignored any relevant circumstances. Thus, the risk may be diminished that a particular 
circumstance that should be taken into account in the balancing process is ignored. Further, 
the quality of the balancing may be improved, because if the authority that submits the bill 
is urged to explain which circumstances it has taken into consideration, parliament can 
verify whether each of the circumstances adduced is actually present and whether each of 
the circumstances has indeed the impact that the authority claims it has.
2.2.6.5. The interaction between the method of the catalogue of circumstances and 
the priority principles of transition
Hence, in my opinion, the method of the catalogue of circumstances is an appropriate 
method for the legislator to approach the concept of legitimate expectations in the field of 
transitional law. In section 2.2.5, I argued that the legislator should apply the priority prin-
ciples of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and 
the principle of non-retroactivity. I would like to emphasize that these two conclusions are 
neither contradictory nor inconsistent. To the contrary, they complement each other. 
First of all, the priority principles of transitional law gain more significance through 
the catalogue of circumstances. Due to the catalogue of circumstances, it is clear which 
circumstances the legislator should take into account when the principles of priority are 
applied. Secondly, there is an interaction. As far as retroactivity is concerned, the point of 
departure in a concrete case of transitional law-making is that granting retroactive effect 
would lead to a breach of legitimate expectations. The method of the catalogue of circum-
stances is then used to scrutinize whether or not the circumstances of the legislative case 
nevertheless justify the conclusion that the expectations at hand have less weight than the 
‘counter-interests’. Further, conversely, as far as immediate effect without grandfathering is 
concerned, the point of departure in a concrete case of transitional law-making is that 
immediate effect without grandfathering does not lead to a breach of legitimate expecta-
tions. The method of the catalogue of circumstances is then used to scrutinize whether the 
circumstances of the legislative case nevertheless justify the conclusion that the expecta-
tions should be honoured by providing for grandfathering. 
2.2.7. The catalogue of circumstances for making of transition law
2.2.7.1. The contents of the catalogue of circumstances
In the previous section, I advocated the method of the catalogue of circumstances to 
approach the concept of legitimate expectations, which concept is relevant for the applica-
tion of the priority principles of transitional law. This plea for the method of the catalogue 
of circumstances (in combination with the priority principles of transitional law) was based 
on a theoretical investigation of ways to deal with the concept of legitimate expectations. 
The question, however, arises whether the method can actually be applied in practice. Is it 
possible to draft a catalogue of circumstances that the legislator should take into account in 
balancing the colliding interests when making transitional law? And if so, which circum-
stances should be included in the catalogue of circumstances, and what is the impact of 
each of these circumstances?
39.	 In	the	Netherlands,	it	usually	is	the	State	Secretary	of	Finance	who	draft	bills	and	submits	bills	to	parliament;	see	for	
example	Hans	Gribnau,	‘Separation	of	Powers	in	Taxation:	The	Quest	for	Balance	in	the	Netherlands’,	in:	Ana	Paula	
Dourado,	ed.,	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law,	EATLP	International	Tax	Series	volume	7	(Amsterdam:	IBFD,	2010)	
and	Happé	and	Pauwels,	supra	note	38.
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To answer these questions I scrutinized various legal sources. These sources are actual transi-
tional law enacted by the Netherlands legislator and the related legislative history (such as 
Explanatory Notes to the bill, parliamentary advisory opinions on draft legislation by the 
Netherlands Council of State, and reports of the parliamentary debate), case law (Nether-
lands case law, case law of the European Court of Justice and case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights) and the literature (Netherlands as well as foreign). I systematically anal-
ysed these legal sources on the issue of which circumstances were considered relevant for 
the balancing to be made in the transitional law at hand (or – with respect to case law – for 
the judgment by the court with respect to the transitional law enacted). For convenience of 
comparison, I reasoned from a balancing of two interests: on the one hand – contra retroac-
tivity and retrospectivity – the principle of legal certainty and, on the other hand, the inter-
ests that may be served by retroactivity or retrospectivity (‘counter-interests’). Thus, for each 
circumstance that appeared to be relevant the relevance was assessed: does the circum-
stance positively or negatively influence the weight of the principle of legal certainty or of 
the counter-interest? 
Based on this investigation and analysis I conclude that the first question can be 
answered in the affirmative: yes, it is possible to draft a catalogue of circumstances for 
 making of transition law. The analysis shows that certain circumstances continuously play a 
role in discussions and reasoning with respect to making of transition law in the field of 
taxation. These circumstances should be included in the catalogue of circumstances for 
making of transition law. Also the second question (which circumstances?, and what is the 
impact of each of them?) can be answered on the basis of the research. I present the results 
in the table below.
Table 2-1. 
Circumstance Remarks Impact on the 
weight of
Legal 
certainty
Counter-
interests
Area	of	law:	tax	law –	 ‘Affects	the	balancing’
–	 Type	of	tax	also	relevant
–	 Always	a	counter-interest	in	the	administration’s	
financial	interest
–	 Asymmetrical	legal	relationship
–	 Negative	effect	on	financial	position	of	citizens
–	 Administration	directly	concerned
Positive
–	 Variability	tax	legislation Negative
Announcement	effects	to	be	
expected
Positive
Predictability	of	amendment Negative
–	 Question	of	gradation
–	 Circumstances	of	the	case
Types	of	situation:
–	 ‘Legislation	by	press	release’
–	 ‘Evident	omission’
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Circumstance Remarks Impact on the 
weight of
Legal 
certainty
Counter-
interests
Factors:
–	 Notion:	relying	on	invariability	of	law	not	allowed:	
–	 Length	of	time	horizon
–	 New	developments
–	 Taxpayer’s	status
–	 Place	of	provision	in	legal	system
–	 Statements	by	Deputy	Minister	for	Finance
–	 Illegal	context
–	 Imbalance	or	injustice
Taxpayers’	behaviour:	
	disposition
Positive
–	 Question	of	gradation
–	 Weight	depending	also	on	the	nature	of	the	trans-
action	and	the	nature	of	the	rule	to	be	amended
–	 Connection	with	damage
Taxpayers’	behaviour:	tax	
avoidance
Negative Positive
–	 Criteria	defining	‘tax	avoidance’	difficult
Behaviour	of	the	government:	
legislature’s	duty	of	care	
Particularly	relevant	as	counter	circumstance	related	
to:
–	 Tax	avoidance
–	 Interference	by	legislature	in	response	to	case	law	
–	 Evident	omission
–	 Infringement	of	proactive	or	reactive	duty	of	care Positive	impact	on	
relative	weight	legal	
certainty
–	 General	counter	circumstance:	reason	of	amend-
ment	at	the	legislature’s	risk	
Positive	impact	on	
relative	weight	legal	
certainty
Behaviour	of	the	government:	
statements	by	the	govern-
ment
–	 Statement	that	legislation	will	not	be	amended Positive
–	 Statement	that	legislation	will	be	amended Negative
Behaviour	of	the	administra-
tion:	consistency
–	 Circumstance	that	a	comparable	transitional	
situation	exists	for	which	previously	transitional	
law	had	been	made
Impact	on	the	balanc-
ing	of	interests	
depends	on	previous	
transitional	law
Particulars	of	legislative	
changes
–	 Policy-related	provision Positive
–	 Provision	in	area	where	long-term	planning	is	
important
Positive
–	 Express	statement	(e.g.	exemption) Positive
–	 Time	frames	in	statute Positive
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Circumstance Remarks Impact on the 
weight of
Legal 
certainty
Counter-
interests
–	 Appropriate	transitional	regime	of	future	changes	
laid	down	by	statute
Positive
–	 Evident	omission	in	legislation Negative Positive
–	 Obscurity	in	legislation Negative Positive
Allocation	possible	to	period	
before	entry	into	force
Types	of	situations:
–	 Inextricable	connection	with	legal	fact	from	the	
past
–	 Recapture	of	past	event
–	 Compartmentalization	(tax	basis	partly	accrued	in	
the	past)	
Positive
Formalized	legal	status Positive
Possibility	for	adjustment –	 Adjustment	possible	(impossible) Negative	
(Positive)
Uncompleted	complex	of	
transactions
Positive
Damage/detriment –	 Damage	due	to	amendment Positive
–	 Nature	of	damage:	damage	due	to	disposition Positive
–	 Nature	of	damage:	removing	‘windfall	profit’ Less	
positive
–	 Compensation	for	damage	 Negative
In this contribution, it is not possible to discuss this table and each of the mentioned cir-
cumstances in detail.40 This would not only take too much room it is also not necessary for 
the purpose of this contribution. After all, the main goal of this contribution is to show that 
the method of the catalogue of circumstances is a suitable method, in combination with the 
priority principles of transitional law, for making of transition law.
It is nonetheless helpful to exemplify the table. Therefore, I briefly discuss two circum-
stances in the next section. These circumstances are (i) ‘taxpayers’ behaviour: tax avoidance’, 
and (ii) ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’, in particular in the situa-
tion of tax avoidance.
2.2.7.2. Two circumstances discussed
One of the circumstances that should be taken into account by the legislator when making 
transitional law is the circumstance that ‘tax avoidance’ occurs under the existing legisla-
tion. The table indicates that this circumstance, on the one hand, has a negative effect on the 
weight of the principle of legal certainty and, on the other hand, a positive effect on the 
weight of the counter interests. The table indicates that it is difficult to sharply define the 
40.	 In	my	PhD.-dissertation	I	discussed	each	circumstance	in	more	detail	in	about	150	pages	in	total.
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concept of ‘tax avoidance’. I note that in any case the concept includes ‘tax abuse’, but I will 
not expand further on this conceptual issue. I focus on the above-mentioned effects.
The negative effect on the weight of the principle of legal certainty, on the one hand, 
and the positive effect on the weight of the counter interests, on the other hand, thus 
implies that when ‘tax avoidance’ is present, this lowers the relative weight of the principle 
of legal certainty. In relation to the principles of transitional law this means that if 
anti-avoidance legislation is introduced (i) there is less reason to provide for grandfathering 
and (ii) there is more reason to grant retroactive effect (for example, till the moment of an 
announcement by the government that it will propose introducing anti-avoidance legisla-
tion; the technique of ‘legislating by press release’).
However, the above does not yet provide arguments for the above-mentioned effects. 
In my opinion, these effects have a solid theoretical basis. With respect to the principle of 
legal certainty, it should be noted that taxpayers who seek out the boundaries of the law 
and who exploit loopholes can reasonably expect that eventually the legislator will target 
the tax avoidance concerned. Moreover, the question can be raised whether expectations 
based on a loophole can fairly be regarded as ‘reasonable’, let alone ‘legitimate’. With 
respect to the ‘counter interests’, it should be noted that there are interests that are espe-
cially served in case the anti-avoidance rule has a broad reach. First, as the purpose of the 
existing tax rules is undermined by the avoidance of these rules, a broad reach of the 
anti-avoidance rule serves that purpose. Secondly, a broad reach could enhance equality of 
taxpayers.41 After all, taxpayers who are in fact in a comparable economic position could 
have a different tax burden depending on whether or not the taxpayer exploits the loophole 
in the legislation. Further, from a more extensive point of view on the principle of equality, 
the principle of equality is at stake, because tax avoidance comes at the expense of the other 
taxpayers.
Analysis of various legal sources shows that it is generally accepted that the existence 
of tax avoidance, or at least of tax abuse, has a negative impact on the relative weight of the 
principle of legal certainty. In the Netherlands, the legislative practice indicates that in the 
case of anti-abuse legislation the legislator usually does not provide for grandfathering and 
that it sometimes provides for retroactive effect. Not only in Netherlands legislative prac-
tice, but also in the legislative practice of other countries the view is apparently that retroac-
tivity may be justified in the case of tax avoidance.42 Furthermore, also in the academic liter-
ature it is recognized that retroactivity could be appropriate in the case of abuse or 
improper use of legislation.43 Moreover, support can be found in judgments of international 
courts. Several decisions of the ECtHR44 suggest that this court will not consider retroactivity 
of tax legislation contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR in case the legislation at stake 
targets tax avoidance.45 Furthermore, the Gemeente Leusden / Holin Groep (C-487/01 and 
C-7/02) case of the ECJ is interesting. That case did not concern retroactivity but retrospec-
tivity of a Netherlands anti-abuse measure in the field of VAT. The ECJ considered (paragraph 
79): ‘as regards tax avoidance, although, under the law of a Member State, a taxpayer cannot 
be censured for taking advantage of a provision or a lacuna in the legislation which, with-
41.	 E.g.	in	the	M.A.	case	(ECtHR	no.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,)	the	ECtHR	upheld	the	retroactive	tax	legislation	at	stake	
taking	into	account	the	legislator’s	‘aim	of	ensuring	equal	treatment	of	taxpayers.’
42.	 See	for	example	the	Report	of	the	Tax	Law	Session	of	the	17th	Congress	of	the	International	Academy	of	Comparative	
Law,	2006:	H.	Ordower,	‘General	report’,	Michigan	State	Journal	of	International	Law	(2007),	at	p.	186.
43.	 See	e.g.	V.	Thuronyi,	Comparative	Tax	Law	(Den	Haag:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	p.	76,	A.	Harper,	‘Tax	post	
facto’,	British	Tax	Review	(2006),	pp.	395-399	and	Sampford,	supra	note	32,	at	pp.	92-93	and	147-151.
44.	 Case	No.	8531/79,	10	March	1981,	A.B.C.	en	D.,	Nos.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93,	23	October	1997,	National	&	
Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.,	and	No.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,	(M.A.).
45.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	1,	at	pp.	253	and	423,	cf.	P.	Baker,	‘Retroactive	Tax	Legislation	and	the	European	Convention	on	
Human	Rights’,	British	Tax	Review	(2005),	at	p.	8.
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
114
out constituting an abuse, has allowed him to pay less tax, the repeal of legislation from 
which a person (…) has derived an advantage cannot, as such, breach a legitimate expecta-
tion based on Community law.’
The second circumstance that I would like discuss for the purpose of illustration is 
the circumstance ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’. This circum-
stance is amongst other ones relevant in the situation of tax avoidance. Notwithstanding 
the above, it is important that the legislator does react with sufficient speed to tax avoid-
ance. In case the legislator neglects to combat a certain form of tax avoidance that it has 
known about for a long time, this has an impact on the balancing of interests with respect 
to retroactivity or retrospectivity. If the legislator infringes its ‘duty of care’ to react with 
sufficient speed, this has a positive impact on the relative weight of the principle of legal 
certainty. This can be substantiated as follows. 
As mentioned above, if taxpayers seek out the boundaries of the law and exploit 
loopholes, they can reasonably expect that the legislator will target the tax avoidance 
involved. However, if the legislator does not respond by introducing legislation that targets 
the tax avoidance, one may argue that the weight of the principle of legal certainty increases 
again. The idea is that taxpayers may start to wonder whether or not the loophole concerned 
is indeed a loophole, as the legislator has not reacted. 
A second element is that in case the legislator neglects to react with sufficient speed, 
it is harder to maintain that the interest that is served by retroactivity is really very weighty. 
After all, one could reason that the legislator definitely would have responded earlier if the 
interest indeed had been very weighty. A slow legislator, therefore, suggests a lack of 
urgency. An example is the Stichting Goed Wonen II judgment of the ECJ (C-376/02), concern-
ing a case in which the instrument of ‘legislation by press release’ (retroactive effect until 
the moment of the earlier announcement by press release) was used by the Netherlands 
government when introducing an anti-abuse rule. Advocate General Tizzano stated that ‘the 
retroactive effect of the amending law was not ‘necessary’ to achieve the aim, stated by the 
Netherlands Government, of combating an ‘unintended use’ of the tax legislation (…). 
Indeed, it is difficult to argue that, in a situation such as the present one, the aim of putting 
a stop to actions which were in themselves lawful and had been continuing for some years 
could be usefully pursued only by means of a law having retroactive effect. Indeed, given 
that in this case there was no sudden discovery of an unforeseen and unforeseeable situa-
tion, a law prohibiting ‘undesirable’ devices for the future alone would have made it possi-
ble to put a stop to them, whilst causing only slight economic damage (being limited in 
time and in any event linked to behaviour that had long been tolerated) and without seri-
ously undermining the principle of legal certainty.’ I note that it is true that the ECJ did not 
follow the final conclusion of the Advocate General, but this does not mean that the ECJ 
rejected Tizzano’s reasoning. After all, when the ECJ ruled that the ‘necessary’-requirement 
may have been met, it did not refer to the argument of combating the unintended use, but 
held that the aim to prevent an announcement effect might justify the retroactive effect in 
question.
The above shows why the table indicates that the circumstances ‘behaviour of the 
government: legislature’s duty of care’ is a ‘counter circumstance’ if that duty of care is 
infringed. The circumstance ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’ is 
mainly a correction to the impact of another circumstance. Applied to the above: the cir-
cumstance ‘tax avoidance’ has a negative impact on the relative weight of the principle of 
legal certainty, but the circumstance that the legislator infringed his duty of care calls for a 
correction to that impact, making the impact at least less negative. It is, however, not possi-
ble to state in general what the final impact of both circumstances is. In a concrete case both 
circumstances should be balanced.
A fine example of this balancing in a concrete case can be found in the Netherlands 
legislative practice regarding a bill that was submitted to target a particular type of tax 
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avoidance. In the Explanatory Memorandum the State Secretary of Finance explained why 
the bill provided for grandfathering (limiting the retrospectivity) although the bill con-
cerned was an anti-abuse rule: ‘With respect to the application field of a new rule, in general 
a new rule has immediate effect, in especial in case the new rule has an anti-abuse character. 
(…) On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a pure immediate effect would have unde-
sirable consequences in the case at hand. (…) Therefore, it is proposed to provide for grand-
fathering to a certain extent (…). The reason is that (…) the legislator has neglected to pro-
vide for a proper regulation for years.’46
2.2.8. Conclusion
In the introduction I raised the question how the tax legislator should deal with the various 
colliding interests when making transitional law. In this contribution, I advocate a frame-
work for the tax legislator, based on a principle-based approach. This framework consists of 
two parts. 
The first part concerns the principles of transitional law. These principles are the 
principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity. 
These principles are generally accepted. In this contribution, I argued that these principles 
should be conceptualized as ‘priority principles’. With respect to the theoretical foundation 
of these principles, I showed that they can be regarded as the result of the abstract balanc-
ing of the three main principles (or interests) involved when making transitional law. These 
are the principle of legal certainty, the principle of equality and ‘the objective of the law’. 
From this perspective, the transitional law principle of non-retroactivity is the result of the 
balancing in the sense the principle of legal certainty prevails and has priority over any 
other interests. As to the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering, the objec-
tive of the law and the principle of equality – which provide arguments against grandfather-
ing – outweigh the principle of legal certainty – which advocates grandfathering. 
The second part of the framework consists of the method of the catalogue of circum-
stances. In a concrete legislative case there may be reasons to deviate from the principles of 
transitional law. In that respect the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is important. On the 
one hand, if no legitimate expectations are infringed, retroactivity may permissible. On the 
other hand, if the immediate effect (retrospectivity) were to infringe legitimate expecta-
tions, the legislator should provide for grandfathering. The question is, however, when 
expectations can be considered ‘legitimate’. It is argued that several steps could be distin-
guished. The first step – from subjective expectations to reasonable expectations – concerns 
a process of filtering by objectification of the expectations. This implies that the view of a 
reasonable person is taken. The second step concerns a balancing of the expectations with 
the interests that would be infringed if the expectations were to be honoured. Although 
these steps provide something to hold on, in the end the question cannot be answered in 
abstracto, but depends on the circumstances of the case. I argued that the method of the 
catalogue of circumstances is helpful in this respect. Such a catalogue consists of the cir-
cumstances which the legislator should take into account when balancing the colliding 
interests (as far as the circumstances are present in the legislative case at hand). This method 
not only provides the legislator a foothold for balancing, it may also contribute to the trans-
parency and quality of the balancing during the legislative process. Finally, I showed that 
the method of catalogue of circumstances is not a mere theoretical idea. Based on an inves-
tigation and analysis of various legal sources, I showed that it is actually possible to draft a 
catalogue of circumstances that the legislator should take into account in balancing the 
colliding interests when making transitional law.
46.	 Kamerstukken	II	(Parliamentary	Proceedings	of	the	House	of	Representatives)	2004/05,	30	117,	no.	3,	at	pp.	3	en	8.
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Lastly, I note the following with respect to the normative and empirical support for the 
framework that I advocate. The combination of the priority principles of transitional law, on 
the one hand, and the method of the catalogue of circumstances, on the other hand, is not 
directly traceable in parliamentary proceedings, case law and the literature.47 However, this 
combination does find strongly support in these sources. In any of these sources it becomes 
apparent, explicitly or implicitly, (a) that immediate effect without grandfathering and 
non-retroactivity are considered the starting points for making of transition law, (b) that 
‘legitimate expectations’ do function as a correction mechanism with regard to these points 
of departure and (c) that certain circumstances can be pointed out that should be taken 
into account when balancing the colliding interests when making transitional law. Hence, 
the framework that I advocate is not only normative but also descriptive.
47.	 Note,	however,	that	my	approach	has	in	its	outline	many	similarities	with	the	approach	of	Popelier,	supra	note	32.
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2.3.
Retroactive interpretative statutes and 
validation statutes in tax law: an assessment 
in the light of legal certainty, separation of 
powers, and the right to a fair trial
Bruno Peeters and Patricia Popelier
2.3.1. Introduction
Within the debate on retroactivity of statutes, two categories of retroactive law draw specific 
attention. The first category consists of interpretative statutes, the latter of validation stat-
utes. Both categories have some characteristics in common and raise similar constitutional 
questions (section 2.3.2). The assessment of these statutes in the light of the constitutional 
principles and values at stake, however, differs for each category (section 2.3.3.). This paper 
will analyse the merits and drawbacks of both categories. First, however, we need to define 
the exact meaning of interpretative and validation statutes (section 2.3.1), as these terms 
are sometimes used in an equivocal way, especially in countries where these concepts are 
not recognized as such by law or in the literature.
2.3.2. Definition of interpretative statutes and validation statutes
2.3.2.1. Interpretative statutes
Interpretative statutes clarify existing statutes, imposing upon courts and administration 
the exact interpretation of these other statutes. In this broad sense interpretative statutes 
are generally known in the various legal orders. They are conceived as problematic only in 
case these statutes do not only clarify an existing statute, but also have retroactive effect. 
In countries which recognize interpretative statutes as a special legal category,1 ret-
roactivity is inherent to the interpretative statute. Usually2 the interpretative statute takes 
effect from the day of enactment of the original statute. In Belgium and France interpreta-
tive statutes have an additional characteristic, which distinguishes them from other retroac-
tive statutes. In these countries the courts of cassation (supreme courts), when ruling on a 
decision of a court of appeal, are obliged to apply the interpretative statute, whereas they 
1.	 According	to	the	national	reports:	Belgium,	France,	Greece,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	Portugal	and	the	UK;	a	special	case	is	
Spain	where	interpretative	ministerial	orders	exist.
2.	 An	exception	is	Greece,	where	interpretative	statutes	are	subject	to	a	constitutional	time	constraint	on	retroactivity	
in	the	case	of	tax	charges,	see	E.	Theocharopoulou	and	K.	Remelis,	national	report	for	Greece.
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cannot apply an ordinary retroactive statute if this statute had not taken effect at the time of 
pronouncement of the decision of the court of appeal.3
Because of this retroactive effect, statutes will only be recognized as interpretative if 
they comply with certain conditions. In France, Belgium and Greece, two criteria have to be 
met. 
In the first place, the original statute has to be obscure or controversial.4 If the mean-
ing of a statute is clear, there is no need for an interpretative statute. 
In the second place, the interpretative statute must have a declaratory character.5 In 
Belgium the Constitutional Court originally gave a rather restrictive definition of interpre-
tative statutes, accepting a statute as interpretative only if the original act from the begin-
ning could reasonably not have been interpreted in any other way than in the meaning 
given to it by the interpretative statute.6 The interpretative statute is truly declaratory with-
out adding something new, only when that condition is met. This, however, would empty 
the interpretative statute of its purpose because, if the original act could reasonably not 
have been interpreted in any other way, there would have been no need for a clarification. 
Since June 2006 the Constitutional Court, however, changed its position. It accepts a statute 
as interpretative if it gives to the original act a meaning that the legislator intended from 
the beginning and that reasonably could have been inferred from that act.7
Thus, in clarifying an original act, interpretative statutes do add new content to the 
legal order. To cite Backer: ‘Any interpretation can be characterized as a change in law. The effects 
of almost every interpretative act are to change the understanding of the underlying act.’8 An 
interpretative statute, however, does not give an unexpected turn to the meaning of the 
original act; it merely confirms an interpretation that could reasonably have been derived 
from the original act.
2.3.2.2. Validation statutes
Validation statutes or ‘consolidation’ statutes intend to support the legal consequences of 
an irregular act enacted by government or decentralized authorities. In the literature valida-
tion has been defined as a technique, which enables the legislator to promote or even impose the 
application of a unilateral administrative act, notwithstanding its potential or claimed irregulari-
ty.9 This is especially useful in legal systems in which acts of parliament are not or in a lesser 
degree subject to judicial control. Validation statutes have the effect of neutralizing legality 
control of the administrative act by the courts. 
3.	 For	Belgium:	Article	7	of	the	Judicial	Code;	Cass.	24	November	1936,	Pas.	1936,	I,	428;	Cass.	4	November	1996,	Pas.	
1996,	I,	411;	Cass.	28	February	2000,	Pas.	2000,	I,	145.	For	France:	see	French	report;	Cass.	Com.	28	February	1961,	
Bull.	Civ.	N°	52.
4.	 For	Belgium:	Cass.	7	October	1919,	Pas.	1919,	I,	218;	Cass.	4	November	1996,	Pas.	1996,	I,	411.	For	France:	Cass.	Civ.	2,	
20	February	1963,	Bull	2,	nr.	174;	Cass.	Com.	2	October	2001,	Bull.	4,	n°	156,	No.	98-19681.	For	Greece:	see	E.	Theocha-
ropoulou	and	K.	Remelis,	national	report	for	Greece.
5.	 For	Belgium:	Cass.	21	September	1956,	Pas.	1957,	I,	33;	Cass.	4	November	1996,	Pas.	1996,	I,	411.	For	France:	Cass.	Civ.	
2,	20	February	1963,	Bull	2,	No.	174;	Cass.	Com.	2	October	2001,	Bull.	4,	n°	156,	No.	98-19681.	For	Greece:	see	E.	
Theocharopoulou	and	K.	Remelis,	national	report	for	Greece.	See	also	for	this	requirement:	T.Ehrke-Rabel,	national	
report	for	Austria.
6.	 Belgian	Constitutional	Court	No.	189/2002,	19	December	2002;	No.	25/2005,	2	February	2005;	No.	20/2006,	1	
February	2006;	No.	192/2009,	26	November	2009.
7.	 Belgian	Constitutional	Court	No.	102/2006,	21	June	2006.
8.	 L.C.	Backer,	‘Race,	‘the	Race’,	and	the	Republic:	Reconceiving	Judicial	Authority	after	Bush	and	Gore’	51	Cath.	Univ.	L.	
Rev.	1074	(2002).
9.	 D.	Renders,	La	consolidation	legislative	de	l’acte	administrative	unilateral	(Brussels:	Bruylant,	2003)	at	p.	55.
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The legislator can intervene at various moments: before the administrative act has been 
challenged before court; after the irregularity of the act has been pronounced by a court 
during a legal dispute; during a procedure in which the legality of the administrative act is 
challenged directly; after the suspension or even the annulment of the act by an administra-
tive court. It can use various techniques to this effect.10 It can enact: 
– a statute declaring a certain irregular administrative act to be valid (validation sensu stricto);
– a statute ratifying an administrative act, thereby giving it the force of an act of parliament;
– a statute replicating the content of a certain irregular administrative act;
– a statute providing for a legal basis for the enactment of the administrative act;
– a statute authorizing the executive to enact with retroactive effect a new administrative 
act with the same content as the act which has been declared unlawful. 
These validation acts usually have retroactive effect, in order to maintain all legal 
effects, which have already been produced by the administrative act.
Although interpretative acts and validation acts are sometimes confused, there is a 
clear distinction. Interpretative acts interpret existing acts enacted by the same legislator. 
Validation acts are acts enacted by parliament, upholding an administrative act or its con-
tent. However, both categories overlap in case the legislator ensures, by an interpretative 
statute, that the administrative act rests upon a sound legal basis.11 Another example of 
overlap can be found in the French case law. The French Constitutional Court accepted an 
interpretative statute, which confirmed the interpretation given to the original tax code by 
a ministerial order abrogated by the Council of State.12
2.3.3. Interpretative and validation statutes: what they have in common
2.3.3.1. In general
Although the definitions in section 2.3.1 mark the differences between interpretative and 
validation statutes, both categories are similar in many ways. They have some characteristics 
in common and they raise similar constitutional questions.
2.3.3.2. Characteristics
Both categories constitute specific types of retroactive law. However, they differ in the same 
way from ordinary retroactive laws, because of their declaratory nature. 
This declaratory nature defines interpretative statutes. It would be misleading to 
state, as has been the case in the literature and case law, that in converging with the original 
act, the interpretative statute is deprived of any retroactive effect.13 The imposition of a 
10.	 See	B.	Mathieu,	Les	«	validations	»	législatives	(Paris:	Economica,	1987),	at	pp.	38-158	;	D.	Renders,	La	consolidation	
legislative	de	l’acte	administrative	unilateral	(Brussels:	Bruylant,	2003)	at	pp.	137-270.
11.	 D.	Renders,	La	consolidation	legislative	de	l’acte	administrative	unilateral	(Brussels:	Bruylant,	2003)	at	pp.	21-22;	
149-152.
12.	 C.C.	(fr.)	84-186	DC,	29	December	1984,	Rec.	107.
13.	 P.	Roubier,	Le	droit	transitoire.	Conflits	des	lois	dans	le	temps	2nd	ed.	(Paris:	Dalloz/Sirey,	1960)	at	p.	245.	This	
appears	to	be	the	position	taken	in	Luxembourg,	see	A.	Steichen,	national	report	on	Luxembourg.	It	used	to	be	the	
position	taken	in	Belgium:	Cass.	7	October	1919,	Pas.	1919,	I,	218	;	Cass.	7	May	1996,	Pas.	1996,	I-155;	Council	of	State	
Lommaert,	No.	43.884,	31	August	1993;	G.	Closset-Marchal,	L’application	dans	le	temps	des	lois	de	droit	judiciaire	
civil	(Bruylant:	Brussels,	1983)	at	pp.	43-45.	See	also	J.	Malherbe	and	P.	Daenen,	‘Retroactivity	of	Domestic	Tax	Laws	
and	Tax	Judgments	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice’	(National	report),	Conference	on	‘Prohibition	of	tax	retroactiv-
ity:	national	and	community	new	tendencies’,	Naples,	10	November	2009,	(1),	at	p.	9.	The	Belgian	Constitutional	
Court	has	corrected	this	position,	recognizing	explicitly	the	retroactive	nature	of	an	interpretative	statute	and	the	
need	for	justification	in	light	of	the	principle	of	legal	certainty,	Const.	Court	No.	192/2009,	26	November	2009.
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certain interpretation does add new content if alternative interpretations are equally possi-
ble. Recognition of the retroactive nature of the act has the advantage that interpretative 
acts are subject to constitutional restraints. In Greece, for example, interpretative statutes 
despite being recognized by the Constitution are subject to the constitutional provision 
which restricts the retroactivity of tax charges to one financial year.14 The content of an 
interpretative statute, however, being implied in the wording of the original act, does not 
change the legal consequences of the original statute
Validation statutes likewise have declaratory effect. Instead of changing legal conse-
quences, they attempt to uphold the legal consequences of existing administrative acts.
In both cases the declaratory nature has as a consequence that the retroactivity of the 
statutes in principle does not affect legitimate expectations. This aspect will be discussed 
below in more detail.
Both categories of statutes are intended to cure deficiencies caused by a public 
authority. As far as interpretative statutes are concerned, the original act was obscure or 
ambiguous. In the case of validation statutes the executive enacted an irregular act. In both 
cases, the question arises whether the burden of this kind of deficiency should be passed on 
to individual persons (in our case the taxpayers). 
Finally, both interpretative and validation acts often bear witness to the interaction 
between institutions. The legislator may react by way of an interpretative statute to a turn in 
the case law. Likewise, judicial decisions, pronounced or expected, lead to a need for the 
legislator to intervene by way of validation acts. This interplay between lawmaker and 
courts puts at stake important constitutional values such as the separation of powers and 
the right to a fair trial.
2.3.3.3. Constitutional questions
a. In general
Interpretative and validation statutes raise various constitutional questions. The most 
important ones relate to the principle of legal certainty, due to their retroactive nature, and 
to the principle of separation of powers as well as the fundamental right to a fair trial, 
including the right of access to the court, due to their effect on judicial procedures.
b. Legal certainty and legitimate expectations
While retroactive laws are generally distrusted because they violate the principle of legal 
certainty, this principle is not so much at stake in the case of interpretative and validation 
statutes. For this reason, the retroactive effect of these statutes is more easily justified. More-
over, in the case of EU laws, the Court of Justice stated in Nakajima All Precision Co. that a 
retroactive clarifying provision, unlike ordinary retroactive provisions, does not require a 
specific statement of reasons to the extent that it cannot be regarded as a substantial alter-
ation of the previous provision.15 The Belgian Constitutional Court in settled case law dis-
misses objections against retroactive validation acts based upon the principle of legal cer-
tainty, arguing that the validation act merely consolidates an administrative act, the content 
of which was known to the persons concerned.16 
Interpretative and validation statutes, instead of violating the principle of legal cer-
tainty, are often justified precisely for creating legal certainty or protecting legitimate 
expectations or vested rights. When the interpretations of the courts contradict each other, 
14.	 See	E.	Theocharopoulou	and	K.	Remelis,	national	report	for	Greece.
15.	 ECJ	C-69/89,	7	May	1991,	Case	Nakajima	All	Precision	Co.	Ltd	v	Council	of	the	European	Communities,	[1991]	
ECR	I-2069.
16.	 Belgian	Const.	Court	No.	139/2006,	14	September	2006;	No.	44/2010,	29	April	2010.
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an interpretative statute can bring clarity. This is especially the case in legal systems, such as 
the Belgian one, where ultimate interpretations can be pronounced by several highest 
courts (e.g. a supreme court or court of cassation, an administrative court and a constitu-
tional court). Validation statutes in turn are often intended to secure legitimate expecta-
tions or vested rights based upon an administrative act the irregularity of which relates to a 
formal aspect rather than content.17
Nevertheless, in some cases, interpretative and validation acts are problematic from 
the perspective of legal certainty. As stated above, interpretative statutes, by imposing one 
specific interpretation in ambiguous or controversial cases, may ignore expectations that an 
alternative interpretation would be followed. These expectations are not legitimate if the 
original act was ambiguous or obscure.18 However, coherent and transparent case law can 
make the legal consequences of an ambiguous act foreseeable. In this situation, one could 
argue that this case law creates legitimate expectations against which an interpretative act 
runs counter.19 Hence, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) does not accept that 
interpretative acts interfere in pendant litigation if the new interpretation is not endorsed 
by a majority in the case law20 or even contradicts established case law.21
Validation acts while consolidating administrative acts interfere in judicial proceed-
ings, the outcome of which may have been predictable beforehand. An illustration is to be 
found in the Belgian case law. Following a decision of the Court of Cassation declaring that 
municipality surtaxes to the federal personal income tax, introduced during the assessment 
year to which they apply, are retroactive and therefore, irregular, the federal legislator vali-
dated this kind of municipality tax regulations for the years 2001 until 2007. The decision of 
the Court of Cassation, however, could not have come as a surprise in the light of earlier case 
law and legal doctrine.22 One could, therefore, argue that taxpayers could rely on the court 
to invalidate the municipality taxes in so far as they were retroactive so that the validation 
statute violated legitimate expectations. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
followed a similar reasoning in the Pressos Compania Naviera case, condemning the retro-
activity of a Belgian curative statute which reacted to a so-called turn in the case law of the 
Court of Cassation which, however, according to the ECtHR, should have been foreseen.23
c. Separation of powers 
As mentioned above, in so far as interpretative and validation statutes interfere in judicial 
proceedings, they put at stake the principle of the separation of powers. Validation acts 
usually intervene in pending judicial proceedings. This may also be the case for interpreta-
tive statutes. Moreover, there is an assumption that the legislator has the power to make the 
law, while the judiciary has the power to interpret it.24 
17.	 See	for	Belgium:	Const.	Court	No.	55/2006,	19	April	2006;	
18.	 This	has	been	held	by	the	German	Constitutional	Court	for	many	years,	e.g.	BVerfGE	50,	177	(193,	194).
19.	 W.	Schön,	“Rückwirkende	Klarstellungen’	des	Steuergesetzsgebers	als	Verfassungsproblem’	in:	K.	Tipke	et	al,	eds.,	
Gestaltung	der	Steuerrechtsordnung	(Köln:	Verlag	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt,	2010),	at	pp.	228-229	seems	to	side	with	this	
opinion	in	his	objections	to	the	case	law	of	the	German	Supreme	Finance	Court.
20.	 ECtHR,	31	May	2011,	Maggio	v.	Italy.
21.	 ECtHR,	7	Juni	2011,	Agrati	v.	Italy.
22.	 M.	De	Jonckheere,	‘Aanvullende	gemeentebelasting	op	de	personenbelasting,	cassatie	bevestigt,	maar	de	wetgever	
‘neutraliseert”	in	Nederlands	Tijdschrift	voor	Fiscaal	Recht	355	(2009),	pp.111-119;	W.	Vandenbruwaene,	case	note,	
‘Retroactief	ingrijpen	na	een	ommekeer	in	de	rechtspraak’,	Rechtskundig	Weekblad	(2009-2010)	pp.	1429-1430.
23.	 ECtHR,	20	November	1995,	Pressos	Compania	Naviera	v.	Belgium.
24.	 See	for	the	USA:	J.R.	Siegel,	‘The	Use	of	Legislative	History	in	a	System	of	Separated	Powers’,	53	Vand.	L.	Rev.	(2000)	
at	p.	1501;	A.W.	Kiracofe,	‘The	Codified	Canons	of	Statutory	Construction:	A	Response	and	Proposal	to	Nicholas	
Rosenkranz	Federal	Rules	of	Statutory	Interpretation’,	84	B.U.L.Rev.	(2004)	at	p.	592.	See	for	Belgium:	G.	Clos-
set-Marchal,	L’application	dans	le	temps	des	lois	de	droit	judiciaire	civil	(Brussels:	Bruylant,	1983)	at	p.	41.
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The problem primarily concerns intervention of the legislator in pending cases. In most 
legal systems, in conformity with the case law of the ECtHR, statutes are not permitted to 
interfere in judicial decisions which have become final. 
The separation of powers argument takes an institutional perspective which is closely 
linked to a particular legal system. 
Anglo-Saxon legal systems use a rather strict concept of separation of legislative and 
judicial powers. In the UK, interpretative and validation statutes are not perceived as problem-
atic in this sense, because of the sovereignty of Parliament. As a result if Parliament decides to 
reverse the effect of a decision of the courts, this is perceived as merely a ‘policy decision’.25 In 
the USA, Congress has the power to change laws with the intention to affect the outcome of a 
pending case, as long as it does not determine the exact decision in a specific case.26 This con-
straint also relates to retroactive legislative interpretation when applied in a specific case.27 In 
the end, however, the legal system in the USA turns out being rather indulgent regarding both 
validation acts and interpretative statutes.28 The distinction between a permissible retroactive 
changing of the rules, on the one hand, and directing a judicial decision on the other, turns 
out to be rather vague, allowing the legislature much room for intervention.29 On the other 
side of the spectrum lies the Turkish legal system. Here, the principle of separation of powers 
prohibits the very notion of interpretative acts.30
If conceived as a system of checks and balances, however, the separation of powers 
principle leaves room for a balance of interests. This brings a perspective of fundamental 
rights, centred upon the right to a fair trial, including the right of access to a court.
In some legal systems, the separation of powers principle also relates to a clear dis-
tinction between the legislative and the executive function. This is especially relevant for 
validation statutes. In Germany, e.g., usurpation of executive power by the legislative 
branches violates the principle of separation of powers, unless there are good reasons 
required by the public interest.31 However, as observed in the case law of both the Belgian 
and French constitutional courts, validation is not problematic in this respect if the irregu-
larity of the administrative act consists precisely in the fact that according to the legality 
principle the matter should have been regulated by an act of parliament. 
Finally, the separation of powers principle may relate to a vertical division of author-
ity. In this respect, the hypothesis in which the legislator validates irregular tax acts enacted 
by local authorities merits some specific attention.32 In some legal systems, the constitution 
explicitly protects the autonomy of local authorities. The Belgian Constitution assigns local 
fiscal powers to the local authorities, allowing the federal authority to interfere only in 
order to revoke the local taxes or to make exceptions.33 Validation of the federal legislator, 
25.	 D.	Williams,	national	report	on	the	UK.
26.	 A.	Jasiak,	Constitutional	Constraints	on	Ad	Hoc	Legislation	(Nijmegen:	Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	2010)	at	pp.	69-70.
27.	 See	for	interpretative	acts:	J.R.	Siegel,	‘The	Use	of	Legislative	in	a	System	of	Separated	Powers’,	53	Vand.	L.	Rev.	
(2000)	at	p.	1501;	A.W.	Kiracofe,	‘The	Codified	Canons	of	Statutory	Construction:	A	Response	and	Proposal	to	
Nicholas	Rosenkranz	Federal	Rules	of	Statutory	Interpretation’,	84	B.U.L.Rev.	(2004)	at	p.	592.
28.	 C.	Crane, national	report	on	the	USA.	See	also	W.D.	Araiza,	‘The	Trouble	with	Robertson:	Equal	Protection,	the	
Separation	of	Powers,	and	the	Line	between	Statutory	Amendment	and	Statutory	Interpretation’,	48	Cath.	U.	L.	Rev.	
(1999)	at	p.	1058:	‘Congress	has	often	enacted	laws	overturning	judicial	interpretations	of	previously-enacted	
statutes	that	it	believes	the	courts	have	misinterpreted’.
29.	 A.	Jasiak,	Constitutional	Constraints	on	Ad	Hoc	Legislation	(Nijmegen:	Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	2010)	at	p.	296.
30.	 B.	Yalti,	national	report	on	Turkey.
31.	 See	A.	Jasiak,	Constitutional	Constraints	on	Ad	Hoc	Legislation	(Nijmegen:	Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	2010)	at	
pp.	117-121.
32.	 See	D.	Renders,	La	consolidation	legislative	de	l’acte	administrative	unilateral	(Brussels:	Bruylant,	2003)	at	
pp.	313-321.
33.	 Article	170,	para.	3	Belgian	Constitution.
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however, comes down to a substitution, which is not envisaged by the Constitution. How-
ever, in these cases, validations are usually intended to confirm the will of the local authori-
ties when they have no power to remedy the negative consequences of an annulment of the 
administrative act. In this respect, they acknowledge the ratio legis behind the constitutional 
provisions. 
d. The right of access to the court
Retroactive statutes which affect the outcome of a judicial case may deny effective legal protec-
tion to the parties in this case. This is especially true if the state itself is party to the proceedings 
or has an interest in the outcome of the case. According to standing case law of the ECtHR, 
legislative intervention intended to influence the outcome of a pending judicial procedure 
violates Article 6 of the ECHR, unless this is justified by demands of general interest.34 
This concern relates to interpretative acts,35 especially when, as discussed above, case 
law and legal doctrine have created legitimate expectations that the original statute would 
have been interpreted in an alternative way. Thus, in Papageorgiou, the ECtHR held that a 
Greek interpretative statute violated Article 6 of the ECHR, considering that, at the time of 
its enactment, ‘it was certainly foreseeable that the Court of Cassation would follow its recent 
case-law, in which it had already clarified the meaning of section 20 of Law no. 1483/1984 and 
which was favourable to the applicant.’36
This concern relates, in particular, to validation statutes when the regime of legal 
protection differs depending on whether the act is enacted by the legislative branch or by 
the executive. In some legal systems, e.g. the UK and the Netherlands, acts of parliament 
cannot be challenged or can only be tested against international or EU rules. In other legal 
systems, constitutional review of acts of parliament is assigned to a special constitutional 
court. In those cases, however, the legal protection offered by the constitutional court is 
often less extensive than in the case of administrative decisions.37 In Belgium, the Constitu-
tional Court’s recent stance towards validation acts is rather permissive, since according to 
the court, there is no loss of judicial protection as the validation act can be subjected to 
legal review by the constitutional court.38 In reality, however, the legal protection offered by 
the judicial and administrative courts is more extensive, because unlike the Constitutional 
Court, they review acts for procedural guarantees, including procedural due process 
requirements.
2.3.4. Evaluation
2.3.4.1. In general
Interpretative and validation statutes raise similar constitutional objections from the per-
spective of legal certainty, separation of powers and the right to a fair trial and access to an 
independent court. The severity of the objections differs in each legal system, depending on 
the concept and constitutional value of the principles at stake. In general, however, valida-
34.	 Amongst	others,	ECtHR	(Grand	Chamber),	28	October	1999,	Zielinski	en	Pradal	and	Gonzalez	v.	France;	ECtHR,	
27	April	2004,	Gorraiz	Lizarraga	v.	Spain;	ECtHR,	14	February	2006,	Lecarpentier	v.	France;	ECtHR	(Grand	Chamber),	
29	March	2006,	Scordino	v.	Italy;	ECtHR,	17	July	2008,	Sarnelli	v.	Italy.
35.	 ECtHR,	9	December	1994,	Greek	refineries	Stan	and	Stratis	Andreadis	v.	Greece,	Publ.E.C.H.R.	Series	A,	No.	301-B;	
ECtHR,	22	October	1997,	Papageorgiou	v.	Greece,	Rep.1997-VI.	
36.	 E.g.	ECtHR,	22	October	1997,	Papageorgiou	v.	Greece,	Rep.1997-VI.
37.	 See	for	Germany:	A.	Jasiak,	Constitutional	Constraints	on	Ad	Hoc	Legislation	(Nijmegen:	Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	
2010)	at	pp.	121.	
38.	 Belgian	Const.	Court,	2	July	2003,	No.	94/2003;	26	November	2003,	No.	151/2003;	4	February	2010,	No.	6/2010;	
12	May	2010,	Const.	Court	No.	55/2010.
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tion statutes appear to be more controversial because the legislator using executive powers 
intervenes in legal proceedings in order to uphold an irregular act. Conversely, in several 
legal systems, interpretative acts are recognized as a concept. In the Belgian, Luxembourg 
and Greek Constitutions, the power to enact interpretative acts is explicitly assigned to the 
legislator; in Italy and Portugal they have a basis in the civil code.39 Because the balance 
operating in the case of interpretative statutes differs from the one operating in the case of 
validation statutes, each category will be analysed separately in the following sections. 
2.3.4.2. Interpretative statutes
As mentioned above, in Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece, interpretative statutes are explic-
itly recognized by the Constitution.40 This is regarded as the application of the principle ejus 
est interpretari legem cujus est condere: only the author of the law can provide an authentic 
interpretation which is binding upon all citizens. In Belgium the insertion of interpretative 
statutes in the Constitution has been explained in the literature as an explicit departure 
from the old system of référé législatif.41 According to this system, introduced in previous 
French Constitutions, in the case of a judicial conflict concerning the interpretation of a 
statute and under specific conditions, the case was to be referred to the legislator for a deci-
sion. In the case of interpretative statutes, the legislator no longer decides in a particular 
case. Instead he interferes by way of a generally binding interpretation. In the literature, this 
is seen as a way to guarantee the priority of the legislator to make policy decisions when 
some uncertainty arises about the legislative intent due to obscure phrasing of the original 
act, while respecting the principle of separation of powers.42 
Nevertheless, as explained in the previous paragraph, interpretative statutes do raise 
some constitutional questions from the perspective of legal certainty, the separation of 
powers and the right to a fair trial. However, even when the interpretative statute is to the 
disadvantage of the taxpayer, various arguments may support the enactment of interpreta-
tive statutes. 
In the first place, as already mentioned, the retroactive effect of interpretative statutes 
does not, in principle, infringe upon the principle of legal certainty, because the obscure or 
controversial nature of the original act prevented establishing legitimate expectations. 
Once the legislator has clearly expressed its original intention, it is difficult to conceive that, 
even if the interpretative statute does not have retroactive effect, the court would choose 
another interpretation. 
Moreover, general interests can justify interpretative statutes. This is especially the 
case when equivocal phrasing creates a flaw abused, in particular, by taxpayers and detri-
mental to the financial interests of the state. Furthermore, the legislator may intend to cre-
ate legal certainty in the case of a minority tendency in case law deviating from the original 
intention of the legislator. Finally, interpretative statutes may bring legal certainty where 
the validity of the original statute is put to doubt. Thus, for example, it can help to convince 
supranational authorities in the case of a dispute concerning the operation of the original 
act. 
An illustration derived from Belgian practice demonstrates that this can operate in 
favour of the taxpayer. A Belgian bill provides an interpretation of Article 275(3) Income Tax 
39.	 See	the	national	reports.
40.	 Articles	85	and	133	of	the	Belgian	Constitution;	Article.	46	of	the	Luxembourg	Constitution	and	Articles	77	and	78	of	
the	Greek	Constitution.
41.	 A.	Eylenbosch	et	al.,	‘De	pensioenleeftijd:	een	kwestie	van	interpretatie’,	Tijdschrift	voor	Sociaal	Recht	(1996)	at	
pp.	345-346.
42.	 Eylenbosch	et	al.,supra	note	41,	at	p.	347.
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Code, which concerns the professional withholding tax on earned income.43 According to 
Article 275(3), certain research institutions, including universities, are partially exempt 
from transferring to the Treasury the professional tax withheld on the salaries of their 
researchers. The ratio legis of this provision was to provide additional overall financing for 
those institutions that pay salaries to scientific researchers employed in Belgium. It was, 
however, unclear whether or not the institutions were under the obligation to reinvest the 
exempted funds in new research projects. According to the legislator, it had always been the 
legislator’s intention that the exempted funds had to be used for additional investments in 
scientific research and not for reducing the economic cost of the existing research pro-
gramme that gave rise to the aforementioned exemption. The problem was raised by the EU 
authorities granting research funds in order to finance certain research projects. The Euro-
pean Commission issued the opinion that the part of the professional withholding tax that 
was exempt from payment to the Treasury was not an eligible cost of the project which 
therefore could not be financed by European funds. The European Commission argued that 
the original Belgian legislation was unclear in that respect. It argued that it was impossible 
to grant subsidies for the amount exempt from transfer to the Treasury, because this exemp-
tion lowered the cost of the current research programme. The interpretative statute made 
clear that the funds of the exempted withholding tax could not be used to reduce the eco-
nomic cost of the current research programme. The European authorities accepted the 
retroactive effect of the interpretative statute. As a consequence, they withdrew their claims 
vis-à-vis the Belgian research institutions. 
We conclude that interpretative statutes despite their retroactive effect generally do 
not cause fundamental constitutional objections. It is, however, important to build in safe-
guards against possible abuse. For this reason, it is important that courts do not accept the 
legislator’s labelling of a statute as interpretative without further inquiry.44 If interpretative 
statutes do not really have an interpretative character or if established case law has already 
clarified an obscure original statute, the retroactive effect of the statute should be submit-
ted to the same test as applied to ordinary retroactive laws. 
In the end, the question remains whether the burden of a deficiency caused by the 
legislator should be passed on to the taxpayer. This question does not arise when the 
obscure or controversial nature of the statute was not present from the beginning, but was 
created by subsequent events. It does arise, however, when the original statute was obscure 
from the beginning. Paradoxically, the legal uncertainty resulting from an obscure statute 
weakens the judicial protection offered by the principle of legal certainty, because it does 
not enable the creation of legitimate expectations.45 It is the responsibility of the legislator 
to enact clear and unequivocal laws from the start.
2.3.4.3. Validation statutes
It was stated above that validation acts are controversial because the legislator interferes 
with both the judiciary and the executive branch, in order to uphold an irregular act. The 
legislator, however, can have a legitimate purpose for the validation of the act. Sometimes 
the executive is not able to remedy the illegal situation without violating vested rights of 
individuals or without disturbing the continuity of public services. Also, the annulment of 
an illegal administrative act by administrative courts, usually with retroactive effect, may 
cause more damage to social and commercial life than the validation of the administrative 
43.	 Articles	12-14	Law	of	21	December	2009	containing	fiscal	and	miscellaneous	provisions.
44.	 As	seems	to	be	the	approach	of	the	Council	of	State	in	France,	see	E.	de	Crouy	Chanel,	national	report	on	France.
45.	 See	P.	Popelier,	‘Legal	Certainty	and	Principles	of	Proper	Law	Making’,	2	Eur.	J.	L.	Reform	3	(2000),	at	p.	340.
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act. This is especially the case when the illegal administrative act concerns a non-quantifi-
able number of cases or concerns quantifiable but irreversible situations.
However, considering the impact of validation acts on judicial control, some guaran-
tees against arbitrariness should be built in. As in most European legal systems, the ECtHR 
has (directly or indirectly) become a standard for judicial review, the test set by the ECtHR 
concerning legislative intervention in pending judicial proceedings is of particular interest 
in the case of validation statutes. In legal systems where constitutional courts have the 
power to review acts of parliament, the courts usually accept that legislators can use this 
technique only in exceptional circumstances or in the case of overriding compelling 
motives of public interest. 
The Belgian and the French constitutional courts46 accept validations, within some 
constitutional restraints,47 in the following circumstances:
– retroactive regularization of a technical matter when the administrative authority does 
not have the power to correct this shortcoming itself, e.g. because it is not able to take 
measures with retroactive effect;
– validation of an administrative act that was nullified by an administrative court when 
the motives of the nullification – e.g. disrespect of a formal requirement – are respected. 
In this respect, by validating the nullified act, the legislator restores the equal treatment 
of all citizens concerned;
– validation when no vested rights are violated and the retroactive effect is motivated by 
the necessity, in view of the severe financial consequences, to guarantee the continuity of 
public service;
– validation in order to put an end to uncertainty caused by contradictory court decisions;
– validation by the legislator when the claimed irregularity consists in the fact that only 
parliament is competent to regulate a matter so that this power could not lawfully have 
been delegated to or exerted by the executive;
– validation of irregular administrative regulations favourable to the taxpayer, provided 
there is no violation of the equality principle;
– validation intended to neutralize the devastating effect of a Supreme Court’s decision 
accepting an overall unexpected new interpretation of a certain administrative act and 
putting the rights of the Treasury at stake.
While this case law generally demonstrates a sound balance of general and individual 
interests, two observations merit, however, some attention. The first one concerns the argu-
ment of financial interests as a compelling general interest. The other concerns procedural 
requirements of due process. 
When accepting the budgetary impact as a justification for retroactive laws, courts 
usually also invoke other grounds for justification.48 Nevertheless, national courts tend to 
accept quite readily that financial interests of the state justify legislative intervention.49 The 
financial rights of the Treasury should not, however, be a sufficient motive for the validation 
of an irregular administrative act. According to the ECtHR, financial considerations as such 
do not justify retroactive legislation aiming at influencing the outcome of pending cases.50 
46.	 See	for	France:	Jurisprudence	du	Conseil	constitutionnel.	Tables	d’analyses	au	18	juin	2010,	www.conseil-constitu-
tionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/Tables/tables_analytiques.pdf,	at	pp.	487-497.
47.	 E.g.	prohibition	of	retroactivity	in	penal	cases;	prohibition	of	infringement	on	judicial	decisions	which	have	become	
final;	in	France	also	the	strict	interpretation	of	the	validation	act.
48.	 J.	Malherbe	and	P.	Daenen,	‘Retroactivity	of	Domestic	Tax	Laws	and	Tax	Judgments	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice’,	
(National report),	Conference	on	‘Prohibition	of	tax	retroactivity:	national	and	community	new	tendencies’,	Naples,	
10	November	2009,	(1),	at	p.	7.
49.	 Regarding	the	Belgian	Constitutional	Court	vis	à	vis	the	ECtHR:	P.	Popelier,	‘Legitimate	Expectations	and	the	Law-
Maker	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	Eur.	Human	Rights	L.	Rev.	1	(2006),	at	p.	24.
50.	 ECtHR,	28	October	1999,	Zielinski,	Pradal	and	Gonzalez	v	France.
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Instead, they need supporting motivation, taking into account e.g. the legitimacy of expec-
tations as well as the good faith of both the authorities and the taxpayer. So, for example, in 
National & Provincial Building Society, the ECtHR took into consideration that ‘public-interest 
considerations in removing any uncertainty as to the lawfulness of the revenue collected’ out-
weighed individual interests of the applicant, considering its attempt to circumvent parlia-
ment’s original intention.51 
Finally, the legislator, when intervening in pending legal proceedings, should act as a 
prudent lawmaker. Thus, the ECtHR requires that laws interfering in legal proceedings are 
prepared in a scrupulous legislative process.52 When validating an administrative act, e.g. to 
uphold local taxes against a potential series of proceedings taking into account the severe 
financial consequences, the lawmaker should rely on sound facts and figures which illus-
trate the risk and extent of these financial consequences. In Joubert, the ECtHR held that the 
mere fear that taxpayers would initiate a large number of legal proceedings was too hypo-
thetical to justify retroactive validation.53 In Lecarpentier, the ECtHR criticized the French 
government for not providing parliament with precise information concerning the poten-
tial costs of pending and future proceedings, which were said to endanger the banking 
sector and economic activities, in order to justify retroactive legislative intervention.54 
National courts tend to overlook these procedural requirements. The Belgian Constitutional 
Court readily accepts financial and political arguments invoked by the government even if 
they are not supported by evidence in the course of the law-making procedure.55
2.3.5. Conclusion
Although there is a clear distinction between interpretative acts and validation acts (see above 
2.3.1.2. in fine), both categories correspond in many ways and raise similar constitutional 
questions, especially from the perspective of legal certainty, separation of powers and the right 
to a fair trial and access to an independent court (see above 2.3.2). The severity of the (constitu-
tional) objections, however, differs from one legal system to another, depending on the con-
cept and constitutional value of the principles at stake (see above 2.3.2.2.1-2.3). 
Having a declaratory nature, both interpretative acts and validations acts are specific 
types of retroactive law, which are intended to cure deficiencies caused by a public author-
ity. They do not in principle affect legitimate expectations (see above 2.3.2.2.4.). 
Concerning interpretative acts, we mentioned, however, the importance of building 
in safeguards against possible abuse. If interpretative statutes do not really have an inter-
pretative character or if established case law has already clarified an obscure original stat-
ute, the retroactive effect of the statute should be submitted to the same test as applied to 
ordinary retroactive laws. We also mentioned the fact that the legal uncertainty resulting 
from an obscure statute paradoxically weakens the judicial protection offered by the princi-
ple of legal certainty, because it does not enable the creation of legitimate expectations. It is 
therefore up to the legislator to enact clear and unequivocal laws from the start.
Concerning validation statutes, we stressed that in accepting those statutes as justi-
fied, the case law generally demonstrates a sound balance between general and individual 
interests (see above 2.3.3.2.). The financial rights of the Treasury should, however, not be a 
sufficient motive for the validation of an irregular administrative act. They need supplemen-
51.	 ECtHR,	23	October	1997,	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	v.	UK.
52.	 A.	Jasiak,	Constitutional	Constraints	on	Ad	Hoc	Legislation	(Nijmegen,	Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	2010)	at	p.	242.
53.	 ECtHR,	23	July	2009,	Joubert	v.	France.
54.	 ECtHR,	14	February	2006,	Lecarpentier	v.	France.
55.	 See	Const.	Court	(B),	26	November	2009,	No.	186/2009	and	W.	Vandenbruwaene,	case	note,	‘Retroactief	ingrijpen	
na	een	ommekeer	in	de	rechtspraak’,	Rechtskundig	Weekblad	(2009-2010)	at	p.	1430.
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tary justification, such as the legitimacy of expectations as well as the good faith of both the 
authorities and the taxpayers. The legislator, when intervening in pending legal proceed-
ings, should also act as a prudent lawmaker, following a scrupulous legislative process 
based on sound facts and figures which illustrate the risks and financial consequences were 
the act to not be validated. 
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2.4.
Legislation ‘by’ press release: the role of 
announcements in the debate about 
retroactive tax legislation
Johanna Hey
2.4.1. What is meant by the term ‘legislation by press release’?
Legal restrictions on retroactive tax legislation are based on the rule of law1 and the princi-
ple of legal certainty and predictability of the tax burden. From a normative perspective the 
tax burden is predictable if the underlying tax statutes are published in the official law 
gazette. However, this is only the last step in the law-making process. The change of the tax 
legislation starts to be visible during the first discussions and resolutions in cabinet or even 
earlier during a public debate about the need of a reform of the law. From that moment an 
alert taxpayer can sense that the law may change. Is it then ‘fair’ to insist that the new law 
may be applied only to transactions which take place after the law-making process is for-
mally completed by the promulgation of the new law? 
Enactment of tax increases from the date of their prior announcement is a very com-
mon practice of retroactive tax legislation. It is noted in all national reports. However, the 
concrete way in which ‘legislation by press release’ is carried out and the (scientific) 
appraisal of this practice differ significantly2.
The question discussed below is whether announcements of forthcoming amend-
ments are able to destroy the taxpayer’s confidence in the prevailing legal situation, and 
whether the tax legislator is justified in going back to the date of the announcement the 
application of new tax laws. 
Hence, the problem addressed by the term ‘legislation by press release’ is not a 
replacement of the formal legislative procedure. There is no doubt that the law needs to be 
promulgated in the required means of publication in order to come into force. However, if 
the tax legislator is allowed to apply a new tax statute from the date of its (first) announce-
ment the announcement has the effect of replacing the existing law.
I will deal only with announcements in the case of an aggravation of the tax burden, 
excluding the practice of announcements of changes in favour of the taxpayer, as is used for 
example in France3. Announcements can be utilized in the implementation of new tax 
incentives to induce the intended behaviour even before the legislative procedure is con-
cluded and the new law is promulgated. One might object to such a procedure in respect of 
the principle of equal treatment, because only a well-informed taxpayer is able to make use 
1.	 See	F.	Vanistendael,	in:	V.	Thuronyi,	ed.,	Tax	Law	Design	and	Drafting,	Vol.	1	(Washington:	IMF,	1996),	Chapter	2,	at	
p.	25;	and	at	length	C.	Sampford,	Retrospectivity	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006).
2.	 See	general	report,	section	3.1.
3.	 See	national	report	of	France,	section	3.1.
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
130
of the incentive in advance of the legislative procedure. However, with regard to legal cer-
tainty and the protection of the taxpayer’s confidence in the existing legal situation this 
category of ‘legislation by press release’ does not raise significant concerns4. 
2.4.2. Interdependency between the distinction between retroactivity and 
retrospectivity and the announcement 
I will not deal with the concept and the distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity 
and with the controversy between the ‘tax-period related’ and the ‘taxable-event related’ 
distinction between the two categories of retroactive legislation either5. This issue has to 
be discussed apart from the question whether an announcement can lessen the confidence 
of the taxpayer and gives the legislator legitimate reasons for making statutes retroactive to 
the date of their announcement. 
However, there is an interdependency between the kind (intensity) of retroactivity 
and the question whether the tax legislator can lower the taxpayer’s confidence by 
announcement. Announcements cause visible insecurity. If the line between retroactivity 
and retrospectivity is drawn mainly at the point whether the taxable event is already fully 
realized before the change takes place, it implies that in cases of retroactivity the taxpayer 
has no chance to react to the change of the law, whilst in cases of restrospectivity he might 
be able to at least partially adjust his behaviour. 
For example, a taxpayer who only concluded a contract under the former law might 
be able to either insert right from the beginning a clause protecting himself from changes 
of the law or at least he can try to renegotiate the contract as soon as a change of the tax 
conditions is announced. In contrast, once the transaction is executed there is no longer any 
chance to deal with the insecurity and to react to an announcement.
Furthermore, the taxpayer might be tempted to secure advantages which are 
announced as going to be abolished just by signing contracts in the expectation that the tax 
legislator will issue a grandfathering rule for all contracts concluded and transactions 
started, but not finished, before a certain date. Often it will not be possible to carry out the 
whole transaction before the expected change. In this situation the legislator might be 
justified setting as cut-off date not the date of the promulgation but the date of an earlier 
announcement. This explains why announcement and grandfathering are closely related. 
However, regarding both categories of retroactivity the concerns are based on the 
protection of the taxpayer’s confidence. The only difference is that such confidence might 
deserve a higher protection from retroactive than from retrospective changes. Therefore, the 
relevance of the category of retroactivity for the assessment of the effect of announcements 
is only gradual but not categorical. 
2.4.3. What is meant by ‘press release’? 
A change of the law can announce itself in many different ways. Early signs of a reform can 
be a change of a constant jurisprudence, a court demanding a reform6 or a public debate 
on the need for a change in the law. However, from these signs it will be very difficult to 
judge, if, when, and how the law will change. More certainty is given by an official press 
release which can be published either by the parliament (the legislator itself) or by any 
4.	 Similarly	C.	Sampford,	Retrospectivity	and	the	Rule	of	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006)	at	p.	118.
5.	 See	general	report,	section	1.2.
6.	 E.g.	judgment	of	the	Bundesfinanzhof	(German	Supreme	Fiscal	Court)	of	June	30,	2010,	reference	number	
II	R	60/08,	www.bundesfinanzhof.de,	claiming	the	need	of	a	reform	of	the	German	land	tax	which	was	held	to	be	
unconstitutional	from	years	later	than	2006.	
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other party involved in the law-making process, as, for example, the State Secretary of 
Finance in the Netherlands 7. However, since not all legal systems know such an instru-
ment of announcement by formal press releases, below I will look at the topic from a 
broader perspective and will deal with all kinds of announcements not only official press 
releases. 
2.4.4. Role of Publication
The characteristic of retroactivity until the date of announcement is an enactment of the law 
prior to its publication, ‘replacing’ the publication as date of effectiveness by a date of 
announcement. Therefore it is necessary to deal with the role of the publication of laws.
Publication of laws is an indispensable element of legal systems governed by the rule 
of law. Legitimacy of the law and legal certainty can only be guaranteed if the law applied is 
published in a way accessible to everyone. Publication means the opposite of an arcane 
society where the citizen does not know in advance as to which event the state will threaten 
him. 
Observing the – usually constitutionally provided – legislative procedure, including 
the promulgation as a final act, is also a question of the separation of powers8. An 
announcement of the tax authorities can never overrule the prevailing tax legislation 
enacted by the parliament. If an announcement of the tax authorities already has far-reach-
ing legal consequences, the legislator is in the position of just confirming what the execu-
tive proposed without the option of deciding differently after the parliamentary debate9. 
Despite this normative concept of publication, one could argue that the taxpayer 
usually does not study the official law gazette, but gets his information about changes of the 
law from all kinds of other sources, namely from the press and media. It might be an over-
stated formalism to insist on the publication in the official law gazette. 
Nevertheless, in my view there are quite a few important arguments why the promul-
gation in the relevant law gazette has to be the demarcation line for the protection against a 
worsening of the tax burden. 
Insisting on the promulgation in the required way is not a mere formalism, because 
the official law gazette is the only reliable source for getting information about what the 
law at present asks of the citizen. No other source can claim the same reliability. 
Moreover, every taxpayer has equal access to the official law gazette, whereas it is 
unclear in which way an announcement will be disseminated. There is no legal obligation to 
read a certain newspaper or to contact internet resources. Therefore, it is also a matter of 
equal treatment to refer only to the official law gazette. Otherwise there will always be some 
taxpayers who are better informed than others. The tax planning industry in particular is 
usually equipped with best contacts to the law-making institutions. They may be warned at 
an early stage of an upcoming abolishment of a tax incentive, which gives them the ability 
to adjust their strategies, whilst the ‘normal’ taxpayer will be caught off guard. This begs the 
question of whose capacity to take note is relevant. The German Constitutional Court 
pointed out that the taxpayer – at least in matters of substantial economic effect – normally 
would have recourse to professional advice anyhow, and that professionals also have to 
carefully follow upcoming legislative initiatives10. However, in my view one should take the 
7.	 See	general	report,	section	3.1	and	national	report	of	the	Netherlands,	section	2.2	and	3.1.
8.	 Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	158	and	p.	160,	furthermore	see	with	regard	to	the	importance	of	the	separation	of	
powers	Vanistendael,	supra	note	1,	Chapter	2,	at	p.	16.
9.	 Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	158	and	at	p.	161.
10.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	7	July	2010,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03,	www.bverfg.de/entschei-
dungen/ls20100707_2bvl000103.html,	at	marginal	no.74.
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normal taxpayer’s chances to get information into account. He is the addressee of the tax 
obligation, and there is no obligation for everyone to have a tax advisor.
Finally, until the promulgation the taxpayer has no guarantee that the change will 
actually take place in the way it is announced. Depending on the legislative procedure of the 
particular country, even at a late stage of the legislative proceedings the bill can fail to 
obtain the necessary consent. In case the change does not take place as announced the tax-
payer is not protected, and he cannot claim damages. His confidence in the draft bill is not 
protected.
Consequently, from the constitutional role of the promulgation follows the normative 
statement that the taxpayer’s expectations to be burdened only in accordance to the law and 
how it is published in the official law gazette, is always legitimate. Allowing the legislator to 
go back to a date before promulgation without justification would undermine the role of 
publication.
2.4.5. The need for justification of retroactive enforcement until 
announcement
Consequently, no matter what the quality of the specific announcement the tax legislator 
always needs a justification for making tax statutes retroactive to the date of their 
announcement.
In the balancing process of the justification one has to distinguish two aspects:
– the means and legal quality of the announcement and
– the reasons of the tax legislator for going back to the announcement date.
Both aspects are interdependent with each other. The more vague the announcement 
is the stronger the reasons needed by the tax legislator. On the other hand, if the taxpayer 
knows for sure not only that the law will change but also how it will change, the legislator 
might need less strong reasons for the retroactivity. 
In some countries, it is getting to the point where the legislator does not need any 
further justification to go back to the date of announcement if the announcement meets 
certain requirements. 
The Swedish constitutional statute ‘Instrument of Government’11for example explic-
itly provides for a ban on retroactive tax legislation. At the same time it provides for an 
exception to this ban if either the government or a committee of the parliament submitted 
a proposal to the parliament, or even earlier, if the government sends a written communica-
tion to the parliament announcing the forthcoming introduction of such a proposal12. In 
this concept, application of a law from the date of the governmental communication is 
considered real/formal retroactivity, but not a prohibited one. 
Similarly, the German Constitutional Court in its settled case law denies a need for a 
special justification for the period between adoption of a bill in parliament and promulga-
tion13. The tax legislator therefore frequently makes amendments applicable from the date 
of their adoption in parliament. After adoption in parliament, one could argue that the 
democratic procedure has taken place. Nevertheless, the court’s practice has been criti-
cized14, because in the field of taxation adoption in parliament is just an intermediate 
11.	 Regeringsformen	(1974:152).
12.	 See	in	detail	the	Swedish	report,	A.1a	and	B.8.
13.	 See	e.g.	Federal	Constitutional	Court	Judgment	of	14	May	1986,	reference	number	2	BvL	2/83,	BVerfGE	72,	at	pp.	200.
14.	 J.	Jekewitz,	‘Der	Zeitpunkt	wirksamer	Zerstörung	des	Vertrauensschutzes	bei	rückwirkenden	Rechtsnormen’,	Neue	
Juristische	Wochenschrift	(NJW)	1990,	at	p.	3114ff,	at	p.	3118ff);	F.	Henseler,	‘Vergütung	von	Vorsteuerbeträgen	an	
nicht	im	Gemeinschaftsgebiet	ansässige	Unternehmer	unter	Berücksichtigung	des	Jahressteuergesetzes	1996’,	Der	
Betrieb	(DB)	1996,	p.	2152ff,	at	p.2153);	J.	Lang,	‘Verfassungsrechtliche	Zulässigkeit	rückwirkender	Steuergesetze’,	
Die	Wirtschaftsprüfung	(Wpg.)	1998,	at	p.	163.
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stage. For most tax laws the Federal Council has to agree; otherwise the new law fails. Thus, 
also after adoption in parliament it is not sufficiently clear whether and how the amend-
ment will finally be enacted. Despite this criticism, in a recent decision the Constitutional 
Court has taken into consideration an even earlier date: From the moment of the tabling of 
a bill in parliament the taxpayer may not any longer count on the prevailing legal situation; 
he may not rely on the fact that the law will remain unchanged15. 
Yet, in my opinion, even if it does not need any other legislative act, the date of adop-
tion in parliament cannot replace the official promulgation because it might be difficult or 
at least less easy to get to know the actual content of the adopted bill other than from the 
law gazette. In these cases as well an exception to the justification requirement cannot be 
accepted. The legislator may need less weighty reasons for the retroactive application. How-
ever, there is also no reason to give the legislator dispensation from the general rule that the 
earliest date of application of a new law is the date of promulgation. Otherwise the promul-
gation loses its guarantee function.
2.4.6. The weighting process
2.4.6.1. Quality of the announcement
a. Categorization by originator and content 
The quality of the announcement can be categorized from the viewpoint of the separation 
of powers, taking into account the originator of the announcement, which can be a private 
institution (e.g. private media, scientific organizations), a member of the executive (e.g. the 
cabinet, ministry of finance, tax administration) or a legislative organ (parliament, Federal 
Council/Senate). From the viewpoint of the separation of powers an announcement by the 
parliament should rank higher than one from the executive. One could make an objection 
because in most countries due to the high technicality of tax statutes the parliamentary 
law-making process is greatly influenced by the tax administration, one could almost say 
they ‘make’ the law16. Therefore, the executive – unlike a private institution – is a reliable 
and competent source of information about upcoming changes in the tax law. However, 
from the viewpoint of the separation of powers it does make a difference whether a member 
of the executive or the legislator announces an envisaged change of the legislation. 
Another way to categorize the announcement can be more content-wise, based on 
the criteria whether the change of the law and the retroactive effect is announced in a way 
that the economic operators are ‘enabled to understand the consequences of the legislative 
amendment planned for the transactions they carry out’17. In Stichting Goed Wonen II the 
European Court of Justice emphasized that the announcement (in the case at hand a press 
release) needs to be clear, and that there were no substantial changes and amendments 
during the passage of the legislation. In this context one should be distinguish between 
announcements which only involve the envisaged change of the law, and announcements 
which also already announce the retroactive application of the new law. 
Especially if the announcement is published at an early stage of the reform process, 
its content will normally be quite vague. It will just say that the law will change but not what 
the new law will look like, or at least will not render the exact content of the new law, or the 
15.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	7	July	2010,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03,	www.bverfg.de/entschei-
dungen/ls20100707_2bvl000103.html,	at	marginal	no.	74.
16.	 See	in	detail	to	the	interdependences	in	the	legislative	process	between	the	legislative	and	the	executive	A.	Dourado,	
General	report,	in:	A.	Dourado,	ed.,	EATLP	International	Tax	Series.	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law,	Vol.	7,	2010,	at	
pp.	29-37	and	the	national	reports.	
17.	 See	ECJ,	26	April	2005,	Case	C-376/02	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II,	[2005]	ECR-I-03445	summary	No.	2	and	at	p.	45.	
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exact date of its first application18. Vague announcements condemn the taxpayer to inactiv-
ity19. He can act neither on the grounds of the prevailing law, nor on the grounds of the new 
law. The law is not longer capable of guiding the taxpayer’s behaviour. Published insecurity 
may not be confused with legal certainty as guaranteed by the rule of law. Only after the bill 
is drafted and the draft has been published will the taxpayer get a sufficient base to deter-
mine the tax consequences of his economic activities under the new law – as already men-
tioned, always with the risk that the proposed change might substantially change during 
the legislative procedure or even fail totally.
The national reports show that it is not possible to generalize at what stage of the 
legislative procedure announcements have the capability of weakening the taxpayer’s confi-
dence significantly or even destroying it, because it depends on the structure of the legisla-
tive procedure. Apparently in some countries there is an almost official procedure of 
announcement by press releases and communiqués of the tax authorities20. In other coun-
tries it is less clear which pre-legislative step will be regarded as having an announcement 
effect. Certainly, the adoption of the bill in parliament is an important step. However, its 
recognition depends on the specific parliamentarian system; it has less weight if the bill 
needs to be adopted not only in parliament but also in a second chamber (Federal Council/
Senate).
But even beyond the differences in the constitutional legislative procedure, the politi-
cal culture of tax legislation can also differ quite a bit from country to country21. There are 
apparently countries where bills drafted by the executive will normally pass the legislative 
procedure without significant amendments. In such a country, after publication of the final 
draft of the bill, the taxpayer knows not only that the law may change, but furthermore he 
also gets quite reliable information as to how the change will take place. If he carries out 
transactions according to the draft bill the risk that the change might not take place as 
proposed is reasonably low. In contrast, in a country like Germany with a two-house system, 
especially in situations of diverging political majorities between the two houses it is quite 
unclear how the draft bill will come out of the procedure. The more groups involved in the 
legislative process, the more likely it is that there might be major changes of the amend-
ment during its passage through parliament. 
It may also depend on the tax policy style of the governmental branch that is propos-
ing the first draft of the bill, most often the ministry of finance. The ministry may come up 
right away with a reasonable and balanced proposal, which increases the chance that the 
draft will be accepted without major amendments. However, in a tense atmosphere 
between the ministry and the taxpayer the first draft may be unreasonably strict just to give 
the legislator a bargaining chip in the following discussions with all kinds of lobby groups. 
b. Relevance of possible adjustments of behaviour to the changed legal circumstances
One important aspect in the approach of the German Constitutional Court towards retroac-
tivity until the date of announcement is the idea of transferring the legal insecurity to the 
level of the parties to the transaction. In a recent decision on the abolishment of the favour-
able tax treatment for redundancy pay-outs the Constitutional Court suggests that from the 
moment the parties to the contract know about the risk of a change (in the decided case: the 
18.	 Regarding	the	problem	of	a	‘lack	of	precision’	of	the	announcement	see	also	Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	158.
19.	 Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	158	seems	to	have	no	problem	with	the	fact	that	in	these	cases	the	taxpayer	has	to	be	
cautious.
20.	 See	national	report	of	the	Netherlands,	section	3.1.
21.	 See	the	comparative	analysis	by	Gordon/Thuronyi,	Tax	Legislative	Process,	in:	V.	Thuronyi,	ed.,	Tax	Law	Design	and	
Drafting,	Vol.	1	(Washington:	IMF,	1996),	at	pp.	1-14.
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tabling of the draft bill in parliament) they should negotiate revision clauses22. The Court 
specified, that especially in long-term contracts, the parties should negotiate clauses to 
share the risk of future tax aggravations. However, the taxpayer will only negotiate such 
clauses if he is aware of the change, which again is linked to the quality of the announce-
ment and the question whether it is disseminated in a way that a broad public is able to 
notice it. 
c. Announcements in connection with a change in the case law 
A special problem with announcements can be found in cases of a ‘non-validation’ law, if 
the tax legislator wants to react to a change of the case law by ‘overruling’ the court deci-
sion23. In this situation the tax authorities often announce right away that the new (advan-
tageous) case law will not be applied in other cases and that the former (disadvantageous) 
case law will be (re-)enforced by a legislative act. The retroactivity in this situation is 
defended on the grounds that the taxpayer is not able to build up trust in the new legal 
situation created by the tax courts if parallel to or shortly after the publication of the new 
court decision the restoration of the status quo ante is announced24. 
The categorization of this kind of announcement is closely related to the concept and 
function of the judicial decision making: Is it creating new law or just interpreting what the 
law always was? In the latter case it cannot be argued, that the taxpayer cannot built up 
confidence by relying on the new court practice because actually he is not relying on the 
court practice but on the law as it it always was, and only now has been understood cor-
rectly by the courts. If one takes the opposite position, that the new court decision has 
law-creating effect and is changing the legal situation, one could argue that the announce-
ment is only continuing the legal situation as it was before the change in the court practice. 
In this case there are indeed no grounds for confidence in the new advantageous rule if the 
restoration of the former practice is announced right away. However, also taking this view, it 
should be pointed out that the announced change has to exactly resemble the former case 
law, and may not contain any more burdensome beyond the former court practice. 
2.4.6.2. Reasons for the retroactivity
Looking at the reasons of justification we have to distinguish between the legitimacy of the 
given reason of justification as such, its weightiness, and the question whether the retroac-
tivity is suitable to meet the aims of the tax legislator. In the following I will deal only with 
reasons of justification connected to the fact that the change was announced which means 
that the taxpayer had the chance to adjust his behaviour to the forthcoming worsening of 
the tax burden. 
The announcement as such cannot be equated with the justification of retroactiv-
ity25. Basically there is only one serious reason for enactment back to the date of announce-
ment: That is the avoidance of announcement effects, whereas it is far from clear what is 
meant by an ‘announcement effect’. Almost every change of the legal situation affects the 
taxpayer’s behaviour, and any reaction to a proposed aggravation of the tax burden has an 
effect on the tax revenue. If the tax legislator manages to blind-side the taxpayer, he will 
22.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	7	July	2010,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03,	www.bverfg.de/entschei-
dungen/ls20100707_2bvl000103.html,	at	marginal	no.	74.
23.	 See	general	report,	section	1.7.
24.	 See	judgment	of	the	German	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(BVerfG)	of	23	January	1990,	reference	number	1	BvL	4/87,	
BVerfGE	81,	at	p.	228	(239).
25.	 See	above	5.
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enjoy the full tax plus from the moment of enactment. Nevertheless, mere budget effects 
cannot be considered to be an announcement effect justifying retroactivity26.
However, particular announcement effects might occur especially in fields of tax 
minimization:
– by making use of tax expenditures or
– by making use of loopholes of the law. 
On the one hand, if an investment’s economic success relies on a tax subsidy or the 
exploitation of a loophole the tax planning industry will aggressively try to safeguard its 
advantages before the new law comes into force. The announcement might induce a heavy 
rush for the tax incentive. Especially where tax avoidance is concerned the announcement 
can act like an ‘invitation’ to exploit the loophole as long as it is still possible. From the 
perspective of the fairness of the tax system it is difficult to accept that a group of taxpayers 
makes use of unjustified tax advantages and might even keep them for the future; nonethe-
less, the tax legislator changes the law. 
Furthermore, announcement effects can result in economic distortions. The German 
Constitutional Court – in a judgment regarding the retroactive abolishment of shipbuilding 
subsidies27 – considered the risk of overcapacities in the shipping area because of last-min-
ute investments to be a sufficient reason for setting the cutoff date even earlier than at first 
announced28. The reasoning of the Court was not fully convincing because the German 
legislator knew for years about the overcapacities, but delayed starting the legislative proce-
dure. It also was questionable whether denying the incentive to shipbuilding contracts 
concluded before the promulgation could really solve the overcapacity problem, at least not 
if they were carried out the way they were concluded. By including such contracts the tax 
legislator counted on the expectation that the parties would either renegotiate the already 
concluded shipbuilding contracts or would fail to fulfil them. 
In the case of the retroactive closing of loopholes there are two different aspects of 
justification: One is that the confidence in a loophole might be considered not worthy of 
being protected. However, this argument does not necessarily corresponding to the 
announcement and would justify even a retroactive period further back than the announce-
ment. The other aspect related to the announcement is that loopholes are often exploited by 
the contractual design of a transaction and that taxpayers who make use of the loophole 
react especially sensitively, one could even say aggressively, if their business models are 
jeopardized by a possible change of the tax law. Therefore, they might try to preserve their 
former tax advantages by last minute contracts on a grand scale.
On the other hand, the legislator is responsible for abolishing tax subsidies, avoiding 
loopholes, and closing existing loopholes as soon as possible. The longer it waits to start the 
legislative procedure the less plausible the need of retroactive legislation becomes. But even 
if he starts the legislative initiative right away, the procedure to bring the bill through the 
legislative organs can be quite time-consuming especially if the change is controversial. This 
may motivate the legislator to take a short cut by enacting the law with effect from the 
26.	 See	also	judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	7	July	2010,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03,	www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/ls20100707_2bvl000103.html,	marginal	no.	82.
27.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	3	December	1997,	reference	number	2	BvR	882/97,	BVerfGE	97,	at	
pp.	67;	see	the	detailed	review	of	this	decision	J.	Hey,	‘Die	rückwirkende	Abschaffung	der	Sonderabschreibung	auf	
Schiffsbeteiligungen’,	Betriebs-Berater	(BB)	1998,	at	pp.	1444.
28.	 In	the	case	at	hand,	the	tax	legislator	really	aimed	to	blind-side	the	taxpayer.	The	Cabinet	decided	to	abolish	the	tax	
incentive	for	the	shipping	industry	on	25	Apri	1996	and	announced	in	a	press	release	of	the	same	day	that	this	
should	apply	for	all	contracts	concluded	after	30	April	1996.	In	the	final	bill	the	cut-off	date	was	25	April	1996.	The	
Constitutional	Court	did	not	grant	protection	of	the	confidence	in	the	announced	cutoff	date,	because	within	these	
five	days	between	the	25th	and	the	30th	a	real	rush	for	ship	building	contracts	took	place.	
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beginning of the procedure29. However, if a tax change does not tolerate any delay, then the 
legislator has to accelerate the procedure within the constitutional boundaries. If it exces-
sively delays the procedure the need for retroactive enactment from the announcement 
becomes less reasonable30.
In my opinion, economic distortions, which can justify a retroactive enactment from 
the date of announcement, have to be seen apart from the lost tax revenue, which is due to 
last-minute transactions if the transaction as such has no immediate negative effect on the 
economy. For example, a looming increase in the inheritance tax usually gives rise to a flood 
of anticipated successions. As a result of such transfers the increase of revenue will be lower 
after the increase of the inheritance tax than without these transactions. However, I cannot 
see a distortive effect which would harm the national economy apart from the budget 
effects. If we do not clearly limit the justification to avoid announcement effects to distor-
tions other than the loss of revenue, retroactive enactment from the date of announcement 
would become the rule instead of a rare exception.
29.	 Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	157.
30.	 Sampford,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	158	and	at	p.	161.
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2.5.
The law and economics approaches to 
retroactive tax legislation
Charlotte Crane
2.5.1. Introduction
In an influential article published in 1977 Michael Graetz examined the arguments against 
the retroactive application of tax law revisions and found them wanting.1 He rejected the 
traditional legal arguments that centred on whether “rights” had “vested” in such a way that 
“reliance” should not be frustrated. He instead used the then-relatively-new tools of law and 
economics to argue that a strict prohibition on retroactive tax changes not only served to 
limit desirable legislative action, but also inappropriately encouraged taxpayers to rely on 
the assumption that tax treatments would not change. 
The “reliance” argument dominant in the traditional view was, in Graetz’ formula-
tion, circular. With a strong prohibition on retroactive taxation, even a taxpayer who knows 
that existing law contains undesirable features, and therefore who should know that 
change is likely, could position himself to take advantage of these features assured that he 
would not suffer should the legislature in fact act to change or remove them.2 Graetz 
asserted that taxpayers themselves should be required to internalize the risk that the tax 
treatment might be changed. In Graetz’ view, with no prohibition on retroactive changes to 
tax treatments, a taxpayer would discount the benefit he anticipated from the current tax 
treatment of any economic position to take into account the risk that the tax treatment will 
be changed. This discount would result in a lower cost to the taxpayer for the position at the 
time he commits to the position in the first place. Thus, in the example most often invoked, 
if the exemption from interest paid by municipal borrowers were understood to be suscep-
tible to change even for interest paid on already issued bonds, a taxpayer would pay less for 
the bonds and might even be far less likely to buy them at any price. Indeed, a taxpayer 
ought to be expected to evaluate the desirability of any tax treatment, and, if a change is 
likely because the treatment is undesirable, his reluctance to commit will produce an socie-
tal benefit that approaches that of the anticipated change. 
In making these arguments, Graetz was invoking an aspect of the method of law and 
economics that was then most often referred as an “ex ante” perspective, rather than the 
“ex post” perspective traditionally used by legal analysis. From this perspective, taxpayers 
1.	 Michael	J.	Graetz,	‘Legal	Transitions:	The	Case	of	Retroactivity	in	Income	Tax	Revision’	126	U.	Pa.	L.	Rev.	47	(1977).
2.	 This	behaviour	is	labelled	“moral	hazard”	in	the	law	and	economics	literature	more	generally.	It	generally	refers	to	
the	fact	that	a	person	is	may	expose	himself	to	greater	risk	(for	instance,	by	building	a	home	on	a	flood	plain)	when	
he	will	not	have	to	bear	the	costs	involved	should	those	risks	be	realized.	Another	frequently	invoked	market	failure,	
adverse	selection,	can	occur	when	those	seeking	protection	from	risk	know	that	they	are	exposed	to	risks	that	others	
cannot	easily	see.	In	the	case	of	tax	changes,	those	who	know	that	they	are	exposed	to	risk	may	seek	to	insure	
themselves	from	such	risk	by	lobbying	for	an	anti-retroactivity	transition	norm	before	the	tax	change	is	salient	on	
the	political	agenda.	
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are expected to act not only with full knowledge of the law, but also with full knowledge of 
the fact that the law may change. At the beginning, ex ante, the taxpayer will pay less for the 
municipal bond because the interest might become taxable. Having paid less at the time he 
made took the position by buying the bond because the exemption might be removed, he 
hardly can complain when the exemption is removed. Graetz was also assuming a premise 
of law and economics that has since become known as “rational expectations,” that is, that 
people know their own best interests and make their economic choices consistently with 
these interests.
From this ex ante perspective, the extent of the loss resulting from the change is 
almost irrelevant, so long as the loss is of the type that the taxpayer should have anticipated, 
and can be presumed to have been taken into account in the price he paid at the outset 
under the prevailing transition policy.3 This same ex ante perspective allowed Graetz to 
demonstrate the arbitrariness of the lines that are most frequently drawn when prohibi-
tions on retroactivity are implemented, since a nominally prospective change can result in 
far greater losses than many nominally retroactive changes do. Consider the buyer of a 
20-year bond, the interest on which is exempt under the treatment in place at the time the 
bond is issued in year 1. Suppose the tax treatment is changed in year 4, so that interest paid 
beginning in year 5 and continuing through year 20 is subject to tax. Suppose, alternatively, 
that the tax treatment is changed in year 20, so that the interest for the last two years, which 
has already been received, is no longer exempt and an unexpected tax must be paid on this 
past income. Many approaches to tax law transitions would treat the first change as a per-
missible nominally prospective change, while the second change would be an impermissi-
ble nominally retroactive change. This distinction seems arbitrary, given that the first 
change would virtually always involve a far greater loss in the overall return actually real-
ized by the buyer of the bond.4 Finally, a limitation on a retroactive change (traditionally 
meaning limiting the change to bonds issued after the date of its enactment) could not be 
justified in terms of avoiding arbitrary losses, since such a transition date gives no relief to 
the other parties (including issuing municipalities) whose behaviour in the past depended 
upon the future availability of the exemptions). 
One of the stronger claims made for this approach to tax transitions is that it can lead 
to results that enhance overall social welfare because the greatest possible effect is given to 
the tax change sought by the legislature. This improvement in overall social welfare can be 
far greater than – and is likely to outweigh – the harm resulting to the individual taxpayer in 
the form of a lowered return on previous commitments as a result of the tax law change. In 
this sense Graetz’ approach, like that of virtually every other contribution to the debate in 
the academic literature in the United States is “welfarist.” This approach implies not that the 
rights and interests of those disadvantaged are disregarded, but instead that the possible 
disadvantage to any particular individual will be taken into account in the overall assess-
3.	 This	internalization	of	the	anticipated	tax	change	into	price	could	be	referred	to	as	the	“capitalization”	of	the	antici-
pated	taxes.	Its	effect	on	prices	is	essentially	the	same	as	the	anticipation	of	taxes	already	in	place	that	reduce	the	
after-tax	cash	flows	from	an	asset.	See	generally	Charlotte	Crane,	‘Some	Explicit	Thinking	about	Implicit	Taxes’,	52	
SMU	L.	Rev.	339	(1999).	
4.	 Some	implementations	of	a	prohibition	on	retroactive	tax	changes	might	forbid	the	first	change	as	well	as	the	
second;	that	is,	they	might	allow	the	retroactive	removal	of	the	exemption	to	have	an	effect	only	on	bonds	issued	
after	the	date	of	the	change.	Legislative	practice	in	the	United	States	tends	to	use	such	an	approach.	
	 The	point	of	the	example	holds	if,	for	instance,	the	purchase	of	the	bond	is	replaced	with	the	purchase	of	an	asset	
with	an	unlimited	useful	life	of	a	type	for	which	a	special	rate	(like	the	capital	gains	preference	in	the	United	States)	
is	changed,	or	with	the	acquisition	of	an	education	in	anticipation	of	a	lower	rate	on	wage	than	investment	income.	
Regardless	where	the	line	is	drawn	at	which	one	concedes	that	there	is	no	longer	an	impermissible	degree	of	
retroactivity,	there	will	be	a	relatively	high	degree	of	arbitrariness	involved	in	defending	that	line.
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ment of the welfare of society as a whole.5 Furthermore, under the appropriate assump-
tions, the disadvantaged individual is understood to have already anticipated the possibility 
of being disadvantaged at some time in the future. Therefore the disadvantaged taxpayer 
will have internalized this possibility at the earlier time when the commitment was made. 
No further adjustment for any disadvantage that is actually realized later as a result of the 
tax change is necessary.6 As long as the possibility of this loss from a change in tax treat-
ment was understood, there can be no claim that “vested rights” have been destroyed or 
that anything “unfair” has occurred. 
Graetz was writing largely to demonstrate the futility of the traditional attempts to 
distinguish “vested rights” and “reliance interests” which could not be legitimately dis-
turbed from other economic positions which could be disturbed.7 But he was also writing 
in reaction to those who – using the same tools of ex ante perspective and assessment of 
effects on overall welfare – insisted that retroactive tax reforms would require compensa-
tion to those adversely affected.8 The contribution Graetz made was not so much about the 
importance of taking an ex ante view of the effect of the possibility of retroactive tax 
changes, but about whether the effects of the mechanisms predicted by the ex ante view 
would be beneficial. These other, “old view,” writers had started with the premise that any 
uncertainty produces economic inefficiency, and that this uncertainty resulting from the 
possibility of uncompensated tax changes would generate an unwillingness to make other-
wise desirable investments. Graetz’ “new view” argued that a reluctance to rely on current 
tax law was just as likely to have a beneficial effect as a deleterious effect, if it meant that 
taxpayers avoided making the investments the legislature was likely to later view with disfa-
vour. 
2.5.2. The cost of inducing desired behaviour in the presence of risk of 
change 
In his initial exposition, Graetz was willing to accept that by introducing more uncertainty 
with respect to the tax consequences offered to induce desired taxpayer behaviour, the 
5.	 This	consequentialist	move,	from	an	ex	post	perspective	focusing	on	notions	of	fairness	to	an	ex	ante	perspective	
focusing	on	incentives,	is	not	unique	to	the	analysis	of	tax	transitions,	or	even	to	the	legal	analysis	of	legal	transi-
tions.	See	Barbara	Fried,	‘Ex	Ante/	Ex	Post’,	13	J.	Contemp.	L.	Issues	123	(2003),	for	a	discussion	of	similar	moves	in	
other	disciplinary	approaches	to	legal	transitions.	
6.	 The	most	common	articulations	of	this	mechanism	in	the	tax	transitions	literature	ignore	the	fact	that	the	cost	
borne	by	the	taxpayer	upon	the	realization	of	the	risk	will	only	on	average	be	equal	to	the	benefit	received	upfront.	
Thus,	only	if	each	taxpayer	is	“fully	diversified,”	will	the	costs	to	each	of	them	of	the	internalization	of	the	risk	of	
change	approximate	the	benefits.	This	suggests	that	the	Graetz/Kaplow	approach	should	not	be	used	for	those	
changes	which	inflict	particularly	large	losses	on	discrete	groups	of	taxpayers.	Perhaps	because	the	literature	has	
focused	on	changes	in	the	treatment	of	municipal	bond	interest	–	a	relatively	limited	investment	that	may	be	made	
primarily	by	those	with	relatively	large	and	diversified	portfolios	–	the	literature	has	not	focused	on	this	limitation	
of	the	Graetz/Kaplow	approach.	
7.	 Among	the	more	prominent	statements	of	the	traditional	view	in	the	period	immediately	before	Graetz’	contribu-
tion	were	Tax	Section	of	the	New	York	State	Bar	Association,	‘Retroactivity	of	Tax	Legislation’,	29	Tax	Law.	21	(1975);	
Note,	‘Setting	Effective	Dates	for	Tax	Legislation:	A	Rule	of	Prospectivity’,	84	Harv.	L.	Rev.	436,	(1970);	Alan	S.	Novick	
and	Ralph	I.	Petersberger,	‘Retroactivity	in	Federal	Taxation’,	37	Taxes	407	(1959).	
	 Other	more	nuanced	defences	of	the	traditional	view	regarding	the	need	for	compensation	for	legal	change	have	
emerged,	see	Frank	I	Michelman,.	‘Property,	Utility,	and	Fairness:	Comments	on	the	Ethical	Foundations	of	“Just	
Compensation”	Law’,	80	Harv.	L.	Rev.	1165	(1967).
8.	 Martin	Feldstein,	‘On	the	Theory	of	Tax	Reform’,	6	J.	Pub.	Econ.	77	(1976).	Among	the	premises	of	Feldstein	was	the	
lack	of	horizontal	equity	that	would	be	involved	with	changing	after-tax	returns	of	only	a	particular	set	of	prior	
commitments;	this	argument	has	little	purchase	if	those	holding	those	prior	commitments	understood	the	greater	
vulnerability	of	their	positions.	Feldstein	relented	a	bit	in	‘Compensation	in	Tax	Reform’,	29	Nat’l.	Tax	J.	123	(1976).
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anticipated rewards offered for such behaviour would have to be increased. In effect, the 
government would have to pay a premium relative to the price of inducing taxpayer 
behaviour when that price would be paid with certainty. But, Graetz argued, there is no 
reason to believe that the overall cost of this premium would be greater than the efficiency 
gains to be had from the earlier implementation of the reform.9 
Much of the later literature has attempted to evaluate the cost (and the mechanisms 
that might reduce this cost in specific cases) to the legislature of leaving the risk of change 
with the affected taxpayers. Some writers predicted that the premium would be demanded 
in the form of relatively generous benefits that would be enjoyed “upfront.” Taxpayers 
would insist, for instance, on inducements through refundable credits rather than through 
enhanced cost recovery that could be claimed over time, even when (assuming the provi-
sion remained in effect) the two would otherwise have identical present value, since in this 
case the legislature was less likely to remove the inducement before it could be fully 
enjoyed.10 Obviously this amount of this premium will depend not only on the fact that the 
risk of change lies with the taxpayer (that is, that there will be no transitional relief), but 
also on perceptions about the likelihood that adverse changes will actually be enacted. 
It may be useful to note that the issues involved in this debate are now more often 
framed in terms of whether “transitional relief” must be provided, rather than whether “a 
retroactive change” would be permitted. At the level of generality usually involved in discus-
sions of transition policy, there is no difference between these two articulations. The later 
phrase could simply be restated as whether “an uncompensated retroactive change” should 
be permitted. The choice of transition policy can be seen as a choice about whether there 
should be “ex post” compensation for the loss resulting from the change. In a jurisdiction 
with a robust limitation on retroactivity, when a legislative change in fact creates a loss, an 
actual payment at the time the loss is realized would render the loss “compensated” and full 
“transitional relief” would have been provided.11 In a jurisdiction with no such limitation 
on tax transitions, the effective compensation for the loss occurs at the much earlier time when the 
position is first acquired. The position will be available at a far lower cost than would be avail-
able were there no risk of future loss through legislative action. If the risk of legal change 
was properly anticipated, this reduction in cost will serve as the equivalent of a future com-
pensating payment. (More on the likelihood that this risk can in reality be properly antici-
pated and internalized in the price of the initial position below.) 
Viewing the issue as whether “transitional relief” is appropriate also finesses some of 
the difficulties involved in articulating just what is meant by “retroactive” or “retrospective” 
changes. As long as one can imagine identifying the person(s) entitled to “relief,” one need 
not worry about precisely classifying degree of retroactivity that would otherwise be 
involved. And, somewhat more usefully in the real world of legislative change, degrees of 
retroactive effect can be adjusted by the nature of the transitional relief provided. Prior 
positions can be “grandfathered” by using effective dates (and dates of applicability) that 
9.	 Graetz,	supra	note	1,	at	pp.	69-71.	The	inconsistency	between	the	government’s	assertion	of	full	sovereignty	(here	an	
assertion	of	the	power	to	expropriate,	mediated	only	by	the	political	and	institutional	limitations	involved	in	
defining	and	collecting	a	tax)	and	its	need	to	make	credible	commitments	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	“sover-
eign’s	paradox”	of	the	“sovereign’s	dilemma.”	E.g.,	David	Haddock,	‘Foreseeing	Confiscation	by	the	Sovereign:	
Lessons	from	the	American	West’,	in:	Terry	L.	Anderson	and	Peter	J.	Hill,	eds.,	The	Political	Economy	of	the	American	
West,	(Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	1994),	at	pp.	129–145.
10.	 Daniel	S.	Goldberg,	‘Government	Precommitment	to	Tax	Incentive	Subsidies:	The	Impact	of	United	States	v.	Winstar	
Corp.	on	Retroactive	Tax	Legislation’,	14	Am.	J.	of	Tax	Pol.	1	(1997).
11.	 This	description	fits	the	situation	in	which	the	retroactive	change	amounts	to	what	in	the	United	States	would	be	
called	a	“taking.”	It	may	not,	however,	describe	any	real	life	situation.	In	a	jurisdiction	in	which	changes	in	tax	
treatments	were	similarly	forbidden,	rarely	would	a	retroactive	change	in	tax	treatment	actually	be	enacted	and	
given	effect	such	that	a	compensatory	payment	would	actually	be	due.	
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result in minimal impact on the value of these commitments. For instance, suppose the 
exemption for bond interest is removed only for bonds issued after the effective date of the 
legislation. If this is seen as creating inappropriate losses, for instance, because many issuers 
had planned their financing expecting to be able to issue exempt bonds, the “grandfather-
ing” can be extended by a postponed applicability date. If even this postponement is still 
viewed as creating undesirably harsh losses, perhaps because the issuer’s entire existence 
depended upon the exemption, all (or some, or only one) issuer could be “grandfathered” 
and remain entitled to issue exempt bonds even after the legislative change.12
2.5.3. Kaplow’s generalized expansion on Graetz 
In 1986, Louis Kaplow generalized the Graetz approach to apply it to all government 
actions: Transitional relief for any sort of government action interferes with the ability of 
markets to properly assess and respond to risk and uncertainty brought about by the possi-
bility of legal change.13 The most efficient level of investment will occur when investors are 
required to take into account all of the risks and uncertainties, not when they are insured by 
the government against those risks through transition policies that either forbid retroactiv-
ity completely or require compensation. Kaplow’s elaboration emphasized the inconsis-
tency between the traditional cries to compensate transition losses without a willingness to 
mute transition gains, in support of the proposition that the older “reliance” view could not 
simply be about fairness. What is fair, Kaplow demanded, about a transition policy that 
ordinarily compensates transition losses, but systematically ignores the windfalls resulting 
from transition gains?14 
2.5.4. The equation of market risk with risk of legislative change
Graetz had simply asserted that protection by law of those who invest in a product or 
 process which is subsequently disdained in the marketplace is not required, nor even sug-
gested by efficiency criteria. Why should efficiency demand a different result when losses 
12.	 Eric	Chason,	in	‘The	Economic	Ambiguity	(and	Possible	Irrelevance)	of	Tax	Transition	Rules’,	22	Va.	Tax	L.	Rev.	615	
(2003)	rather	cleverly	extends	this	analysis	to	conclude	that	as	an	a	priori	matter,	the	stated	transition	policy	may	
make	no	difference	in	the	overall	welfare	gains	associated	with	tax	changes.	
13.	 L.	Kaplow,	‘An	Economic	Analysis	of	Legal	Transitions’,	99	Harv.	L.	Rev.	509	(1986),	at	p.	552.	Graetz	himself	had	
amplified	his	analysis	in	two	intervening	contributions,	‘Implementing	a	Progressive	Consumption	Tax’,	92	Harv.	L.	
Rev.	1575	(1979)	and	‘The	1982	Minimum	Tax	Amendments	as	a	First	Step	in	the	Transition	to	a	‘Flat-Rate’	Tax’,	56	S.	
Cal.	L.	Rev.	527	(1983)	(emphasizing	the	extent	to	which	the	minimum	tax	provisions	put	taxpayers	on	notice	
regarding	the	possibility	of	change).	Much	of	the	other	debate	regarding	transition	policy	in	the	intervening	years	
considered	whether	the	transition	issues	associated	with	moving	from	an	income	to	a	consumption	tax	(and	
therefore	subjecting	consumption	from	after-tax	savings	to	tax,	when	such	consumption	would	have	been	exempt	
from	additional	income	tax)	were	qualitatively	different	than	changes	in	tax	treatments	of	various	income	streams	
under	an	income	tax.	An	important	U.S.	Treasury	Department	study	of	tax	reform	options	had	assumed	that	they	
were,	Blueprints	for	Basic	Tax	Reform,	(1977),	at	p.	181.	For	a	later	more	explicit	account	of	this	issue,	see	Louis	
Kaplow,	‘Recovery	of	Pre-Enactment	Basis	under	a	Consumption	Tax:	The	USA	Tax’,	68	Tax	Notes	1109	(1995).	
Included	in	this	branch	of	the	debate	were	issues	regarding	the	perspectives	from	which	transition	gains	and	losses	
should	be	measured	and	the	relevance	of	various	indirect	effects.	Howard	Abrams,	‘Rethinking	Tax	Transitions:	A	
Reply	to	Dr.	Shachar’,	98	Harv.	L.	Rev.	1809	(1985);	Michael	J.	Graetz,	‘Retroactivity	Revisited’,	98	Harv.	L.	Rev.	1820	
(1985);	Avishai	Shachar,	‘The	Importance	of	Considering	Liabilities	in	Tax	Transitions’,	98	Harv.	L.	Rev.	1842	(1985).
14.	 Saul	Levmore,	in	‘Changes,	Anticipations,	and	Reparations’,	99	Colum.	L.Rev.	1657,	1662	(1999),	suggested	that	
various	ordinary	features	of	a	legal	system	actually	do	the	work	of	denying	winners	gains	when	they	truly	would	be	
“windfalls.”	In	ordinary	tort	litigation,	for	instance,	a	plaintiff	who	persists	in	seeking	legal	reform	is	likely	to	be	
rewarded	by	his	damages,	but	only	named	plaintiffs,	or	only	those	who	have	acted	before	a	statute	of	limitations	can	
run,	will	realize	the	full	extent	of	the	transition	gain	involved.	
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occur because a change in tastes or societal conditions is reflected through the political 
process, rather than in the market? 15 
Kaplow examined this premise with considerable care, but in the end simply put the 
burden of demonstrating the difference on his critics.16 Thus, the equation of the risk of 
government action with market risks generally may be the most intuitively vulnerable step 
in the Kaplow explication of transition policy. On the one hand, the theory relies on provid-
ing incentives for anticipating and internalizing risk by placing the cost on those who fail to 
anticipate such risks. But, in general, such costs are properly imposed only on those parties 
who have better information, that is, parties who are well situated to identify those risks 
and act in anticipation of them. Taxpayers may have an advantage in their ability to identify 
their exposure, but it is not at all clear that they are well situated to act in anticipation of 
them, or that they are better suited than the legislature to anticipate the actions of the legis-
lature. Under what circumstances do taxpayers actually have better information about tax 
changes and actually place bets based on that better information? Perhaps when they have 
very industry-specific information about an incentive provision that is being abused, but 
that is probably not the ordinary case.
2.5.5. The ‘heroic’ assumption of desirable legislative change 
As noted above, Graetz’ original contribution appeared at a time when prohibitions on 
retroactivity seemed likely to threaten what he viewed as desirable tax reform.17 Graetz was 
clearly frustrated by those who, although ostensibly favouring reform, acknowledged that 
expectations based on bad prior law should be honoured even if these expectations pre-
sented obstacles to reform. Although he did expect that observers would take into account 
the need for a change when assessing the likelihood of a change, he did not explicitly rely 
on an assumption that tax changes would always be for the good. His critics have neverthe-
less suggested that his approach fails entirely without this assumption. Although his rea-
sons for promoting a greater tolerance for retroactive tax changes relied on this assump-
tion, the mechanism he described does not.
How should the possibility of undesirable18 tax changes affect transition policy anal-
ysis? One answer might be simply that, although there is a good possibility that any isolated 
change may be undesirable, over time the general trend should be toward improvement, 
simply because over time there is more information available in the political process, which 
should result in evolution toward more efficient solutions of social problems, even if in 
those solutions present themselves in fits and starts. 19 
15.	 Graetz,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	65.
16.	 For	a	careful	analysis	of	the	possibly	relevant	differences	between	market	changes	and	legal	changes,	see	David	
Hasen,‘Legal	Transitions	and	the	Problem	of	Reliance’,	2	Colum.	J.	of	Tax	Law	(2010).	To	summarize	somewhat	
crudely,	Hasen	points	out	that	market	changes,	unlike	legal	rules,	have	no	temporal	content;	they	have	effect	when	
they	occur	and	need	not	be	“applied”	or	“given	effect”	in	the	sense	legal	changes	must.	Hasen	goes	on	to	suggest	
that	the	Graetz/Kaplow	approach	must	fail	because	it	relies	on	the	existence	of	market	mechanisms	which	in	turn	
rely	on	the	approach	to	legal	change	that	they	reject.	
17.	 The	catalyst	both	for	the	reforms	Graetz	sought	to	defend	and	for	the	possible	approaches	to	transition	may	well	
have	been	David	Bradford	and	Staff,	U.S.	Treas.	Dept.,	Blueprints	for	Tax	Reform	(1977).	Chapter	6	includes	a	discus-
sion	of	the	possible	transition	to	both	a	truly	comprehensive	income	tax	and	to	a	cash-flow	consumption	tax.	
18.	 The	description	of	the	impact	of	legislative	change	has	varied	in	the	literature,	depending	both	on	the	position	
ultimately	taken	and	the	extent	to	which	the	focus	has	been	on	the	trend	in	legislation	instead	of	on	particular	
pieces	of	legislation.	
19.	 The	origins	of	the	designation	as	“heroic”	for	the	assumption	that	“new	law	is	more	often	good	than	bad	law	may	lie	
with	Saul	Levmore,	note	11	above.	
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A more complete answer requires analysis of the political process more generally, an analy-
sis that Kaplow began but arguably did not finish. As Kaplow made clear, the risk of legal 
change may be no different from the risk of any other change in the economic environment 
in which commitments are made. Therefore, it is possible that something like a market 
mechanism for internalizing the risk of legal change is superior to what is effectively gov-
ernment insurance against legal change, regardless of the “direction” of that change. The 
taxpayer should be required to take into account the possibility of legal change when first 
making commitments, and that the government should not be required to indemnify all 
losses resulting from legal change. So long as legislative legal change will at least be no 
worse than random in its effect, mechanisms that place the burden of the risk of legal 
change on those affected, and not on the government itself, may be superior than the mar-
ket interference that government insurance against legal change would involve. Thus, 
regardless of whether one can make any assumptions at all about whether legislative 
change is likely to be “desirable,” retroactive legal change must be permitted in order to 
allow the market mechanism for internalizing risk of legal change to operate.
In sum, a presumption of desirable change may not be necessary to the technical 
arguments about why an ex ante approach to legal change could be at least no worse than to 
the traditional reliance approach. But some of the possible consequences of such an 
approach are indeed perverse without such a presumption. To put it simply, to the extent 
that possible undesirable changes can be retroactive, if the internalization-of-risk mecha-
nism works as claimed, that undesirable change will be amplified and accelerated as a result 
of the possibly retroactive rule, just as a desirable change would have been. The legislature 
need not actually impose the tax in order to achieve much of its intended result, a result 
which will be enhanced by the possibility of retroactivity, regardless of whether that result 
is overall welfare-enhancing. For some, the compounded undesirability of the results of 
relaxing the “desirable change” assumption suggests that the incentive-based approach of 
Graetz and Kaplow is at best incomplete.20
2.5.6. The incentives of the legislature and the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour 
What about the fact that, without a retroactivity constraint, the government itself is free to 
behave opportunistically? Graetz seemed to have been willing to assume that legislative 
change would be desirable. Kaplow acknowledged the possibility that this might not be 
true, but seemed willing to conclude that legal change will at least be neutral in terms of 
enhancing social welfare – a government that did otherwise would not endure for long. 
Others contributing to the debate have found it difficult to be even this optimistic about the 
legislative process, and have suggested that the behaviour of the legislature would change 
in undesirable ways if there were no prohibition on retroactive changes. The analytical tools 
of the political economy wing of law and economics (sometimes called “public choice”) 
include the premise that members of legislatures are more likely to act in their own self-in-
terest than they are to act in an effort to further the public good.21 Under this premise, an 
unconstrained legislature might extort from those with substantial precommitments by 
20.	 Kyle	D.	Logue,	‘Legal	Transitions,	Rational	Expectations,	and	Legal	Process:	Is	There	an	Ideal	Way	to	Deal	with	the	
Non-Ideal	World	of	Legal	Change’,	13	J.	Contemp.	L.	Issues	211	(2003).
21.	 Richard	Doernberg	&	Fred	McChesney,	‘Doing	Good	or	Doing	Well?:	Congress	and	the	Tax	Reform	Act	of	1986’,	62	
N.Y.U.	L.	Rev.	891	(1987);	Richard	Doernberg	&	Fred	McChesney,	‘On	the	Accelerating	Rate	and	Decreasing	Durability	
of	Tax	Reform’,	71	Minn.	L.	Rev.	913	(1987).
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threatening to use its power to retroactively tax.22 And those with substantial precommit-
ments that could be vulnerable to such retroactive taxes would find it in their interest to 
devote substantial resources, in lobbying efforts if not in more direct payments to legisla-
tors, to avoid this result.23 These efforts would, in turn, produce transitional relief that 
could only be described as contorted and perhaps even corrupt.24 The possibility of such 
results have led some – even though for the most part accepting the descriptions of the 
Graetz/Kaplow analysis of the dynamics involved in tax changes – to call for mechanisms 
whereby a legislature can commit to not enacting legislation with strong retroactive 
effect.25 
2.5.7. One size fits all? 
Many of the contributions to this literature in the United States seem to have implicitly 
accepted the idea that there can be only one “transition policy” for tax changes. In his 2000 
book, When Rules Change,26 Daniel Shaviro attempted to outline a middle path, a transition 
policy that was less monolithic and more nuanced. He attempted to account for the intui-
tively negative response that usually accompanies legal changes that are substantially retro-
active, and conceded that a prohibition on nominal retroactivity can sometimes serve as a 
useful limitation on legislative power. 
Shaviro more systematically took into account the predictable failings of the legisla-
tive process, neither brushing them aside as irrelevant nor using them as an excuse to return 
to an old-view set of arbitrary rules-of thumb. He nevertheless endorsed the Graetz/Kaplow 
approach for an identifiable subset of legislative changes. Those changes for which no tran-
sitional relief should be allowed include any change that moved the income tax closer to a 
22.	 J	Mark	Ramseyer	&	Minoru	Nakazato,	‘Tax	Transitions	and	the	Protection	Racket:	A	Reply	to	Professors	Graetz	and	
Kaplow’,	75	Va.	L.	Rev.	1155	(1989).
23.	 Franklin	A.	Green,	‘The	Folly	of	Long-Term	Tax	Planning:	Comments	on	the	Instability	of	the	Tax	Law’,	74	Tax	Notes,	
481	(1997);	Eric	Chason,	‘The	Economic	Ambiguity	(and	Possible	Irrelevance)	of	Tax	Transition	Rules’,	22	Va.	Tax.	Rev.	
615	(2002)(urging	an	analysis	that	treats	all	benefits	and	costs	as	mere	cash	flows,	but	includes	possibility	that	
moves	from	bad	tax	policy	may	actually	be	more	likely	if	transition	relief	is	promised,	since	those	enjoying	benefit	
have	nothing	to	gain	from	opposing	the	change,	and	may	even	be	more	willing	to	reveal	the	true	situation)	
24.	 For	instance,	“rifleshots”	grandfather	only	a	very	limited	–	perhaps	even	clearly	identifiable	single	taxpayer	–	and	
their	existence	tends	to	support	the	idea	that	the	threat	of	retroactivity	will	not	only	intensify	lobbying	against	
reform,	but	produce	such	incomplete	reforms	that	there	is	no	reason	to	believe	that,	even	if	the	reform	were	clearly	
desirable,	the	“second	best”	incomplete	reform	is.	See	generally	Lawrence	Zelenak,	‘Are	Rifle	Shot	Transition	Rules	
and	Other	Ad	Hoc	Tax	Legislation	Constitutional?’,	44	Tax	L.	Rev.	563	(1989).
	 Heather	Field,	in	‘Taxpayer	Choice	in	Legal	Transitions’,	29	Va.Tax	Rev.	505	(2009)	explores	the	less	common	situa-
tion	in	which	the	taxpayer	is	given	a	choice	about	whether	to	apply	old	law	or	new	law;	in	some	past	examples	this	
choice	has	been	available	only	to	a	limited	group	of	taxpayers	and	has	operated	very	similarly	to	an	ordinary	“grand-
fathering	rule,”	in	other	situations,	the	choice	is	not	tied	to	the	same	type	of	criteria	(for	instance,	contracts	already	
binding	or	payouts	that	have	already	begun)	usually	involved	in	grandfathering.	The	suggestion	is	that	such	devices	
may	allow	the	legislative	process	to	diffuse	the	energy	of	those	most	politically	powerful	who	would	be	losers	
without	transitional	relief.	It	stops	short,	however,	of	providing	a	justification	for	assuring	that	transition	gains	are	
as	great	as	possible.	
25.	 E.g.,	Kyle	Logue,	‘Tax	Transitions,	Opportunistic	Retroactivity,	and	the	Benefits	of	Government	Precommitment’,	94	
Mich.	L.	Rev.	1129	(1995-1996),	suggesting	that	certain	changes	introduced	to	induce	particular	behaviours	should	
be	handled	as	contracts,	rather	than	as	ordinary	legislation.	
26.	 D.N.	Shaviro,	When	Rules	Change:	An	Economic	and	Political	Analysis	of	Transition	Relief	and	Retroactivity	
(	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000).	Shaviro’s	principle	points	can	be	gleaned	from	a	critical	review,	Kyle	
D.	Logue,	‘If	Taxpayers	Can’t	Be	Fooled,	Maybe	Congress	Can:	A	Public	Choice	Perspective	on	the	Tax	Transition	
Debate’,	67	U.Chi.	L.	Rev.	1507	(2000).
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comprehensive tax base.27 Thus Shaviro’s elaboration of a tax transition policy relies on an 
independent criterion for determining when a tax change is “good,” and would allow retro-
active changes when those criteria are met. Echoing the environment in which Graetz made 
his original argument, Shaviro distinguishes those changes that move toward a more com-
prehensive tax base (which should be allowed extensive retroactive effect) from those that 
do not (for which far less uncompensated retroactivity should be allowed). (Although this 
stipulation admittedly clears out some ground, ambiguities about what moving to a com-
prehensive tax base might actually mean creates its own limits. For instance, imagine a 
change to the tax treatment of tax lawyers that imposed a surtax on their prior earnings, 
justified by the asserted need to retroactively capture the imputed value of the psychic 
income tax lawyers clearly enjoy.)
Shaviro acknowledges that there are some changes that simply should not be allowed 
retroactive effect because there is no possibility that the substantive reasons for the change 
would be furthered by their retroactive application. These “accounting changes” should be 
distinguished from “substantive policy changes,”28 which, hopefully for the better, are 
enhanced by at least a limited degree of retroactivity.
2.5.8. Conclusion
It should be pointed out that the Graetz/Kaplow view was probably only possible given the 
constitutional environment in which the US Congress had been operating for most of the 
twentieth century. Although the Supreme Court had early in the century clearly signalled 
that some types of retroactivity (in particular, the introduction of an entirely new tax on 
discretionary activities completed in the past) would not be permitted, it also had signalled 
that it was unlikely to second-guess Congress in situations in which the problems Congress 
created involved only mild forms of retroactivity and did not contain other more nefarious 
legislative motives. Thus the task accomplished by Graetz and Kaplow was not so much to 
totally replace a clearly articulated and rigorously enforced prior norm, but instead to 
describe the space in which the actual outcomes of the political process in the United States 
seemed to operate, to legitimate that space, and to modestly increase it.29 
What remains unexplained is why, despite the acceptance of the expectations 
approach in the academic literature, there is still such limited retroactivity by the United 
States Congress. The answer may provide proof that the mechanisms describe by Graetz and 
Kaplow are in fact at work, but operate to limit, not expand retroactivity. While the losses on 
27.	 The	phrase	“comprehensive	tax	base”	is	a	term	of	art	in	tax	policy	debates	in	the	United	States.	See,	e.g.,	Stanley	
Surrey,	Pathways	to	Tax	Reform	(Harvard:	University	Press,	1973);	Boris	Bittker,	‘A	“Comprehensive	Tax	Base”	as	a	
Goal	of	Income	Tax	Reform’,	80	Harv.	L.	Rev.	925	(1967).	One	need	not	agree	with	every	aspect	of	this	debate	in	order	
to	find	Shaviro’s	classification	here	useful.	He,	like	Graetz	twenty-five	years	earlier,	meant	to	invoke	the	notion	of	
base-broadening	and	loophole	closing	changes.	Such	changes	can	be	assumed	to	be	welfare-enhancing,	since	they	
remove	the	misallocation	of	resources	that	inevitably	accompanies	special	tax	treatments.	As	Shaviro	openly	
acknowledges,	the	notion	of	“comprehensive”	invoked	here	applies	equally	to	a	broad-based	consumption	tax	as	to	
the	income	tax,	supra	note	26,	at	pp.	93-98.	
28.	 Neither	Shaviro	nor	Kaplow	and	the	Treasury	Department	Bluebook	(in	which	the	origins	of	this	distinction	can	be	
found	in	the	latter’s	treatment	of	taxable	period	changes	and	the	base	change	from	income	to	consumption)	pro-
vide	more	than	an	essentially	tautological	description	of	the	distinction	made	here:	accounting	method	changes	
(including	timing	and	nominal	incidence)	are	defined	as	those	changes	that	it	makes	little	sense	to	apply	retroac-
tively.	The	contribution	Shaviro	makes	here,	therefore	is	identifying	more	situations	in(including	chances	in	inci-
dence)	in	which	retroactivity	is	undesirable.	
29.	 For	a	description	of	this	practice	from	a	more	traditional	legal	point	of	view,	see	generally	Charlotte	Crane,	‘Consti-
tutional	Limits	on	the	Power	to	Impose	a	Retroactive	Tax’,	in:	Blessings	of	Liberty:	The	Constitution	and	the	Practice	
of	Law	(Philadelphia:	ALI-ABA,	1988).
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nominally retroactive laws may be no larger than the losses experienced as a result of nomi-
nally prospective laws, there is a far greater likelihood that those who will be harmed by the 
latter can be identified. And, even if the legislature did not intend to single these losers out 
(as it clearly would with acts that would violate the existing anti-reactivity provisions in the 
United States Constitution), these potential losers are likely to be able to organize and pro-
tect themselves against much of the threatened loss. In short, although tax transition policy 
may affect the bargaining positions available in the political process, it may not affect the 
overall amount of retroactivity, at least in the absence of absolute enforcement of relatively 
arbitrary prohibitions that can be imposed by processes outside the legislative process.30 
2.5.9. Postscript: optimal tax theory: the other law and economics-derived 
argument for retroactive taxes
The Graetz-Kaplow arguments endorse the denial of transitional relief for changes in the tax 
treatments of existing economic positions. There is another argument that invokes similar 
analytical tools to positively endorse uncompensated retroactive taxes, but only when those 
taxes can truly be “bolts from the blue.” Under this argument, potential taxpayers, oblivious 
to the possibility of taxes that might be imposed in the future, commit to positions in the 
market that, by definition, are efficient in the sense that they maximize the welfare of those 
participating. Subsequent to this productive activity, an unanticipated retroactive tax effec-
tively expropriates some of the wealth generated, but, if it is in fact unanticipated, it will not 
interfere with the resource allocations previously determined by the market activity. 31 The 
“dead-weight” cost of taxes (that is, the loss of utility associated with the price change trig-
gered by a tax anticipated at the time of the market transaction) is eliminated. The force of 
this argument, of course, depends upon the extent to which the government can make a 
credible commitment that this bolt-from-the-blue is in fact a one-time occurrence. The 
possibility of such a commitment depends in large part upon the nature of the transition: a 
clear one-time shift to a totally new tax base with retroactive effect would clearly be per-
ceived differently from a shift that denied a rather routine type of preferential treatment. 
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2.6.
It’s the outcomes, not the rules: transition 
issues in the process of tax reform
Henk Vording, Koos Boer and Allard Lubbers
2.6.1. Introduction
The standard case in the tax transitions literature is the abolishment of an income tax 
exemption for interest on government bonds.1 Apart from focusing on a single-rule 
change, this case is also fairly simple in its effects – or at least, the literature tends to deal 
with the simple effects only.2 As a consequence, the nature and size of transition losses 
seem almost self-evident. In this stylized setting, the academic debate can focus on ques-
tions such as: are the holders of these bonds entitled to rely on exemption, or should they 
reckon with legal change as a normal risk of life? Should a fixed rule be used (and be made 
known to taxpayers) for all comparable cases of tax transitions?
In this contribution, it is argued that the process of identifying losses due to legal 
change is political in nature. Instead of looking at changes in rules, the focus should be 
– and usually is – on outcomes. Politics generates a continuous flow of legal changes which 
affect people’s lives. What matters is not whether taxpayers should be able to rely upon 
rules, but whether the outcomes of changes in rules reflect political judgments.
An obvious illustration is the case of major tax reform.3 Tax reforms often assume a 
specific pattern: deductions and exemptions are reduced, and the additional revenue is 
used to reduce the tax rates as well.4 The outcome will often be that the average taxpayer 
suffers no overall loss, while many of the remaining losses (and gains) reflect political pur-
poses (e.g., improving economic incentives). But the point raised here is broader. It is a 
political decision how to frame the effects of legal change in terms of gains and losses; 
whether or not to connect separate legal changes into a package; how to balance short-run 
1.	 The	characterization	is	from	Michael	Doran,	‘Legislative	Compromise	and	Tax	Transition	Policy’,	University	of	
Chicago	Law	Review	2007,	pp.	545-600,	at	p.	548;	see	Michael	J.	Graetz,	‘Legal	Transitions:	the	Case	of	Retroactivity	
in	Income	Tax	Revision’,	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	(126)	1977,	pp.	47-87,	at	p.	57-58;	Louis	Kaplow,	‘An	
Economic	Analysis	of	Legal	Transitions’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(99)	1986,	pp.	509-617,	at	p.	516.	Doran	offers	a	good	
recent	overview	of	the	literature,	as	does	Daniel	Shaviro,	When	Rules	Change:	an	Economic	and	Political	Analysis	of	
Transition	Relief	and	Retroactivity	(Chicago:	Chicago	University	Press,	2000);	see	also	the	contribution	by	Crane	in	
this	volume.	
2.	 The	literature	deals	mainly	with	taxpayer	losses;	the	second-order	effect	in	related	investment	markets	is	usually	
ignored,	though	the	seminal	article	by	Graetz,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	57,	discusses	it.	See	also	Doran,	supra	note	1,	at	
p.	549,	for	further	discussion.
3.	 The	word	‘tax	reform’	is	used	here	in	a	descriptive	sense	to	refer	to	changes	in	tax	rules	which	are	presented	as	
coherent	in	the	political	process.	
4.	 Although	there	are	large	differences	in	tax	policies	between	OECD	countries,	almost	all	the	reforms	of	personal	
income	tax	in	the	last	two	decades	can	be	characterized	as	rate	reducing	and	base	broadening.	OECD	Tax	Policy	
Studies	No.	13:	Fundamental	Reform	of	Personal	Income	Tax,	Paris,	2006.
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losses against long-term gains. Transitional rules are just one type of instrument in the 
political wheeling and dealing needed to achieve legal change. Their relevance may be lim-
ited to those situations where the legislative process is unable to develop sufficient explana-
tion for large individual losses.
In fact, the literature on tax transition relief has been moving from the paradigmatic 
simple case into wider perspectives. One clear illustration is the debate on a shift from 
income taxation to a personal consumption tax. The US discussion on this issue is exten-
sive,5 focusing on an overall change from income taxation to alternative models of con-
sumption tax – yet to be adopted (in Europe, there is no comparable debate, as the focus is 
on a gradual shift from income taxes to the existing VAT). The US literature has tended to 
stick to the ‘single rule change’ approach. If the issue were one of substituting a pure con-
sumption tax for a pure income tax, the single rule change would be a radically different tax 
treatment of savings.6 In that case, techniques can be designed for offering relief. But in 
fact, existing income taxes treat savings inconsistently, as would a politically feasible con-
sumption tax probably do. With that in mind, thinking on transitional relief has become 
more pragmatic. One more step would bring us to the conclusion that the very conceptual-
ization of transition issues is largely a political process.
Section 2.6.2 discusses the transition problems in the shift from a pure system of 
income taxation to an equally pure consumption tax. It is shown that the transition prob-
lem depends on the type of consumption tax chosen. In section 2.6.3, hybridity enters the 
stage: the point of departure is not a pure income tax, nor will the point of arrival be a pure 
consumption tax. Transition issues consequentially become much more complicated. In 
section 2.6.4, the question is raised how the ‘tax reform’ setting can be distinguished from 
the paradigmatic ‘single rule change’ case. It is argued that the distinction is very much a 
matter of political construction. 
2.6.2. A shift from a pure income tax to a pure consumption tax
2.6.2.1. The models of income tax and consumption tax
Income tax is a direct tax: an individual’s yearly income is assessed and taxed. Consumption 
tax is usually an indirect tax: goods and services are (effectively) being taxed at the retail 
stage.7 A direct consumption tax would assess an individual’s yearly income and allow a 
general deduction for either savings and investments or the return to savings and invest-
ments. The idea can be explained using table 2-2.
5.	 A	good	(and	critical)	overview	is	John	K.	McNulty,	‘Flat	Tax,	Consumption	Tax,	Consumption-Type	Income	Tax	Pro-
posals	in	the	United	States:	A	Tax	Policy	Discussion	of	Fundamental	Tax	Reform’,	California	Law	Review	(88)	2000,	
pp.	2095-2185;	for	a	fundamental	critique	of	the	discussion:	Liam	Murphy	and	Thomas	Nagel,	The	Myth	of	Owner-
ship,	Taxes	and	Justice	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	Chapter	5	(the	Tax	Base).
6.	 In	line	with	the	literature,	the	concept	of	‘savings’	is	used	throughout	this	contribution	in	a	wide	sense,	including	
investments,	assets,	etc.	In	other	words,	it	refers	to	all	spending	power	not	used	for	current	consumption.
7.	 The	VAT	works	out	as	a	retail	sales	tax	because	for	(almost)	all	business-to-business	transactions,	VAT	is	deductible.	
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Table 2-2. Alternative personal tax systems: tax treatment of savings and consumption
income tax
(1)
consumption tax
(2)
return exempt
(3)
savings exempt
period 1:
savings
return
T
T
T
U
U
U
period 2:
consumption U U T
T	=	taxed;	U	=	untaxed
Under the ‘model’ personal income tax (column 1), the investor saves out of his net income 
(hence the T on savings), and includes his portfolio income in his taxable income. The net 
result can be consumed in period 2, without further income tax consequences.
Under a ‘model’ personal consumption tax, there are two options. One is to tax 
income but exempt the return to savings and investments (column 2); savings will still be 
made out of after-tax income, and future consumption remains untaxed. The second option 
is to tax income but exempt savings (column 3). In that case, the investor postpones paying 
tax (over the consumption of his accrued savings) to period 2.
Under the exemption for return approach (column 2), the tax comes immediately; 
under the exemption for savings approach (column 3), it is postponed. The equivalence 
between these different consumption tax approaches relies on a net present value argu-
ment. If the value of tax postponement (under the exemption for savings approach) is cap-
tured by the return to savings, investors will be indifferent between these two models for 
personal consumption taxation. This will indeed be the case if the investor’s discount rate 
equals the before-tax rate of return on his savings and investments. The gist of a consump-
tion tax (of either type) is that the reward for postponing consumption (the discount rate) 
is not taxed, as it is under an income tax.8 
Finally, an in rem consumption tax, such as a VAT, equals a personal income tax with 
savings exemption.9 The most important difference is that a personal consumption tax 
may have progressive rates, while a VAT cannot take account of the consumer’s overall 
spending.
Table 2-3 illustrates the effects of a shift to consumption tax in the long run. For sim-
plicity of presentation, the type of consumption tax illustrated here is the one that exempts 
savings from the income tax base. The positions compared are those of a low-paid worker 
who does not save, and a high-paid worker who does. Their lifetime is, for simplicity, 
assumed to exist of two periods. In the first period, the high-paid worker saves and receives 
a return on these savings; in the second period, he consumes his accrued savings, including 
the return.
8.	 However,	a	consumption	tax	of	the	return	exemption	type	will	also	exempt	any	return	in	excess	of	the	discount	rate.	
A	solution	would	be	to	include	these	rents	in	the	tax	base.	This	is,	in	fact,	what	the	VAT	does	at	the	business	level,	see	
next	footnote.	Under	a	personal	consumption	tax,	an	alternative	approach	would	be	to	tax	returns	but	allow	a	
deduction	for	the	normal	return.
9.	 As	the	VAT	allows	deduction	of	input	tax	to	all	taxable	persons,	the	expected	rate	of	return	is	not	taxed	at	the	busi-
ness	level	either.	This	is	because	the	purchase	value	of	the	marginal	investment	asset	equals	the	net	present	value	of	
its	expected	returns.	As	the	VAT	on	the	purchase	of	the	investment	asset	is	deductible,	by	implication	the	normal	
expected	return	is	free	of	VAT.	
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For the low-paid worker, income tax and consumption tax are perfectly equivalent. For the 
high-paid worker, there is a significant difference between the two types of tax. To be sure, 
his lifetime tax base is the same under both taxes. But under the consumption tax, most of 
his tax base only turns up in period 2 when his savings plus return are being consumed. 
Assuming that the tax rates are equal under both taxes, his advantage is postponement of 
tax, in comparison to income taxation.
Table 2-3. From income tax to consumption tax: stylized impact on low-paid and high-paid 
workers
Low-paid High-paid Low-paid High-paid
income tax consumption tax
(exemption-to-savings type)
period	1
wage
savings
return	to	savings
taxable
period	2
wage
taxable
lifetime	taxable
100
	 	 0
	 	 0
100
100
100
	 	 	
200
	 500
	 200
	 	 20
	 520
	 500
	 500
	 	 	 	
1020
100
	 	 0
	 	 0
100
100
100
	 	 	
200
	 500
	 200
	 	 20
	 300
	 500
	 720
	 	 	 	
1020
In comparison to consumption taxes, the personal income tax distorts the savings decision; 
the reason is that it taxes the return to savings immediately, ignoring the fact that the inves-
tor needs a normal return to be able to equate present and future consumption. In that way, 
the income tax discriminates against future consumption.
2.6.2.2. The transition issue: Double taxation of existing wealth
When an income tax is replaced by a consumption tax, the transition problem depends on 
the type of consumption tax chosen. With a tax of the exemption-to-savings type, the transi-
tion problem is clear: existing wealth has been created on an after-tax basis, and now it will 
be taxed again upon consumption. Under a VAT, the problem is the same but the collection 
technique is different. On the other hand, with a personal consumption tax of the exemp-
tion-to-return type, there is no transition loss to wealthy taxpayers. Under this type of tax, 
future consumption will be tax-free. 
Goldberg10 argues that if the consumption tax is of the exemption-to-savings type, 
transitional relief can be given by extending an income tax approach to old savings and 
assets – only the untaxed accruals would belong to the new consumption tax base. If the 
consumption tax is of the VAT type, he argues that no relief is required for individuals: ‘the 
phenomenon of double taxation at the individual level does not have the appearance of 
being unfair. That is because the legal incidence of a VAT is on the seller. Thus only the very 
sophisticated would clamor for transitional rules with regard to unrecovered basis in invest-
ment assets or savings, even though there would indeed be double taxation of these 
10.	 Daniel	S.	Goldberg,	‘The	Aches	and	Pains	of	Transition	to	a	Consumption	Tax:	Can	We	Get	There	from	Here?’,	Virginia	
Tax	Review	2007(4),	pp.	447-492,	at	p.	474-475.
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amounts.’ On the other hand, he believes that relief would be in place for businesses, which 
can deduct VAT for new purchases – but not for existing assets which used to be depreciable 
under the income tax.
A related consequence of the shift to a consumption tax is that the tax rates will prob-
ably need to be higher, in comparison to the (pure) income tax. As consumption taxation 
exempts the normal return to savings, its tax base is permanently smaller than the income 
tax base11 (unless the dynamic effect of a consumption tax would be to boost investments 
and economic growth). There will also be temporary effects on tax revenue. Under the sav-
ings-exemption consumption tax, paying tax is postponed to the moment of consumption. 
A shift to this form of consumption tax will therefore cause a temporary decline in the tax 
base, compensated by a later increase. To the government, this different timing of tax reve-
nues is in principle neutral (as the later tax base includes the discount rate). But it does 
create a temporary shortfall in revenue, to be solved by extra borrowing or additional taxa-
tion12, for example: the one-time levy on ‘old’ savings if no transitional regime is offered. It 
has been argued that the full efficiency gain of the shift to a consumption tax is due to the 
lump-sum levy over ‘old’ capital: ‘from an efficiency perspective, the tail may be wagging the 
dog in the debate over an income versus an [sic] consumption tax. To the extent that gains 
from shifting to a cash-flow tax come from the implicit lump-sum levy on existing capital, 
one could easily (in theory, if not political reality) achieve those same gains by imposing a 
one-time wealth tax on existing capital in the context of our current income tax system.’13
2.6.2.3. Summary
The shift from a pure income tax to a pure consumption tax of the savings-exemption style 
has clear losers: the owners of assets and savings created under the income tax. They will pay 
twice, while they expected to be able to consume free of tax. That transition problem does 
not arise when the consumption tax is of the exemption-of-revenue type. On the contrary, 
owners of assets may enjoy windfall gains as the returns to their investments will no longer 
be taxable. Under both types of consumption tax, an increase in overall tax rates can be 
expected. 
2.6.3. The real world issue: hybrid taxes, hybrid tax reforms
2.6.3.1. In general 
There are two reasons to believe that this treatment of transition issues is a bit too stylized. 
One is that the exemption for (returns to) savings is already quite extensive under ordinary 
income taxes, and affects many markets and asset values. The second is more intricate: if the 
‘income tax’ blueprint does not exist in the real world, why would a ‘consumption tax’ blue-
print be a credible goal of tax reform?
11.	 This	could	imply	a	redistribution	of	the	tax	burden	from	rich	to	poor;	but	steeper	tax	rate	progressivity	can	be	used	
to	put	the	additional	burden	on	the	rich.	
12.	 Intricate	transitional	regimes	have	been	proposed	to	deal	with	this	temporary	gap	in	tax	revenues,	e.g.,	Mitchell	L.	
Engler	and	Michael	S.	Knoll,	‘Simplifying	the	Transition	to	a	(Progressive)	Consumption	Tax’,	SMU	Law	Review,	2003	
(56),	pp.	53-81.
13.	 Joseph	Bankman	&	Barbara	H.	Fried,	‘Winners	and	Losers	in	the	Shift	to	a	Consumption	Tax’,	Georgetown	Law	
Journal,	January,	1998,	pp.	539-568,	at	p.	566;	see	their	footnotes	68	and	69	for	references	to	the	relevant	economic	
literature.
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2.6.3.2. The hybrid income/consumption tax as the relevant starting point
Existing income taxes are already leaning towards a consumption tax model – income taxes 
tend to allow tax deferral for pensions, for residential investments and for business assets, 
and they typically have other savings incentives as well. One result is that paying income tax 
can often, depending on the type of savings, be postponed to a moment that the income 
becomes available for consumption. The second result is that the effective income tax bur-
den is very different across types of investments, across business sectors and across occupa-
tions. If such a hybrid tax is being replaced by a pure consumption tax, effective tax rates 
would be aligned, creating winners and losers. E.g., if home ownership is taxed more heavily 
under a consumption tax, the value of residential estate will decline, perhaps substantially, 
while other assets may increase in value, benefiting from more beneficial tax treatment and 
a shift in investors’ demand.
In comparison to the transition issues of a ‘blueprint’ shift, the main point is that a 
large part of personal wealth has been created under low- or non-tax conditions. Adoption 
of a consumption tax could mean that this wealth will never be taxed. In particular, a per-
sonal consumption tax of the exemption-for-return type would have that result. ‘The bonus 
to yield exemption arises from taxpayers who own appreciated assets. These taxpayers have 
enjoyed tax deferral under the income tax regime on unrealized appreciation, and will 
never be taxed on those amounts. The effective forgiveness of past-deferred tax gives yield 
exemption a retroactive effect and a bonus to property owners that varies with the amount 
of their built-up appreciation in their property.’14 
The issue is not limited to one type of consumption tax; under both types, capitaliza-
tion (and net present value) effects may be intricate and depend on the type of asset. As 
Sarkar and Zodrow argue, for many individuals gains and losses may be offsetting, making 
the transition problem smaller. But even then, careful analysis would be required to see 
‘whether gains and losses are concentrated among certain individuals even if the net effect 
is small.’ In the end, they believe that a ‘cold turkey’ approach of offering no relief is too 
rude; on the other hand, the traditional paradigm of ‘focusing on each problem in isolation 
and designing a transitional rule to solve it may provide a misleading impression of the 
scope of the problems involved in the transition to a consumption tax.’ Their conclusion is 
that a macro-analysis can provide the proper answer: ‘an approach that estimates the net 
effects of such a reform on individual welfare levels provides the more relevant analysis of 
transitional issues.’15 
It seems that the authors were the first to add this insight to the existing literature on 
transition relief.16 It was developed further by Bankman.17 He argues against full relief for 
pre-existing savings on the ground that this would overcompensate most of the holders of 
these savings. The shift to a consumption tax ‘will on balance advantage some capital hold-
ers and will bring some advantages to nearly all capital holders.’18 They would all suffer 
some loss when their pre-existing savings are brought under a consumption tax; but they 
would also get access to unlimited tax deferral, and have the opportunity to increase their 
14.	 Goldberg,	supra	note	10,	at	p.	477.	
15.	 Shounak	Sarkar	&	George	R.	Zodrow,	‘Transitional	Issues	in	Moving	to	a	Direct	Consumption	Tax’,	National	Tax	
Journal	(46)	1993,	pp.	359-369.	Given	the	hybrid	point	of	departure,	McNulty	argues	that	the	economic	impact	of	a	
shift	to	consumption	taxation	is	‘not	wholly	predictable,	especially	in	transition’,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	2126.	
16.	 See	for	example	Kaplow,	supra	note	1,	who	does	discuss	transition	issues	in	the	setting	of	general	tax	reform,	but	
sticks	to	the	relief	mechanisms	as	identified	by	Graetz	without	noting	that	general	rate	reductions	can	also	offer	
compensation.
17.	 Joseph	Bankman,	‘The	Engler-Knoll	Consumption	Tax	Proposal:	What	Transition	Rule	Does	Fairness	(or	Politics)	
Require?’,	SMU	Law	Review	(56)	2003,	at	pp.	83-98.
18.	 Bankman,	supra	note	17,	at	p.	89.
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savings under more favourable tax conditions. The group that would on balance suffer a 
loss is, according to Bankman, to be identified with the wealthy elderly; their pre-existing 
savings may be large and their opportunity to enjoy the new tax regime for savings is lim-
ited in time, compared to the younger generations. For that specific group, he would advo-
cate a temporary form of relief.
Bankman points at an interesting tradeoff between the size of specific compensation 
(a transition regime) and general compensation (through lower tax rates): the smaller the 
group that will be offered a transition regime, the lower the cost of this regime and hence, 
the lower the consumption tax rate.19 He makes this point in passing, as an additional 
consideration. But it is clear that he accepts the logical priority proposed by Sarkar and 
Zodrow: look at overall outcomes first; subsequently identify remaining problems which 
may (or may not) require specific transition rules. 
2.6.3.3. Successful tax reform requires political tradeoffs 
The second reason to believe that transition issues are not clear-cut is that a ‘model’ con-
sumption tax is not something that we would expect to survive in the political arena. A part 
of the transition literature is particularly naive on this issue. For example, it is argued that 
the income tax is ‘mindnumbingly complex’ and ‘riddled with loopholes’, a ‘hodgepodge of 
conflicting tax rules that well-to-do and well-advised taxpayers can exploit to lessen their 
tax burdens’ and that ‘the benefit of shifting to… a consumption tax, with fewer opportuni-
ties for avoidance and evasion, is obvious.’20 One wonders where all those well-to-do and 
well-advised taxpayers have gone.
The point is that, if current income taxes are based on a multitude of tradeoffs 
between economic interests, policy considerations, etc., it is likely that comparable tradeoffs 
would shape a consumption tax. The relevant issue is not how to move from an ideal income 
tax to an ideal consumption tax nor how to move from a compromised income tax to an 
ideal consumption tax. Instead, a plausible image of tax reform is moving towards more 
preferable rules, making compromises in the process. Transition policy choices may in fact 
be endogenous to the legislative process in the principal matter.21 If politicians want to 
make substantial changes to the tax law, they have to balance interests. This balancing may 
require that they ‘buy’ support either by keeping the changes more modest, or by offering 
forms of transition relief to accompany a more substantial reform. ‘A lawmaker that can 
avoid some of the adverse consequences associated with legal change, or cater to interest 
groups by limiting the transactions that will be subject to a new rule, can adopt rules that 
would be too politically or pragmatically costly under a requirement of full retroactivity.’22
19.	 Bankman,	supra	note	17,	at	p.	94.
20.	 Engler	and	Knoll,	supra	note	11,	at	pp.	53-54.	David	Bradford	does	admit	that	‘in	our	political	process,	complexity	is	a	
likely	outcome	in	any	regulatory	regime	(…).	The	consumption	tax	approach	does	not	promise	nirvana’.	But	he	
thinks	it	‘likely	that	simplicity	relative	to	current	law	would	result’.	David	Bradford,	‘What’s	in	a	Name	–	Income,	
Consumption,	and	the	Sources	of	Tax	Complexity’,	North	Carolina	Law	Review	(76)	1997-1998,	at	pp.	223-228.	To	
substantiate	such	a	claim,	one	would	have	to	show	how	an	alternative	model	of	taxation	reduces	the	incentives	and	
opportunities	for	politicians	to	create	complexity.	The	thing	is,	of	course,	that	a	personal	consumption	tax	requires	a	
definition	of	income	just	like	an	income	tax;	if	it	is	simpler	in	the	field	of	capital	income	(but	note	that	the	consump-
tion/savings	distinction	is	not	self-evident,	e.g.	in	cases	like	consumer	durables,	art	collections,	private	investment	
in	education),	this	simplicity	is	achieved	by	no	longer	taxing	it.	See	McNulty,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.	2139-2142	and	
accompanying	references.
21.	 The	main	point	made	by	Michael	Doran,	supra	note	1;	Shaviro	supra	note	1,	does	offer	an	extensive	discussion	of	the	
political	process	of	tax	policy,	but	does	not	treat	the	choice	of	transitional	rules	as	an	integral	part	of	that	process.
22.	 Jill	E.	Fisch,	‘Retroactivity	and	Legal	Change:	an	Equilibrium	Approach’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(110)	1996-1997,	at	
pp.	1055-1123,	at	p.	1119.	
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2.6.4. The political conceptualization of transition issues
2.6.4.1. Reasonable outcomes as a norm?
As noted in the introduction, the traditional focus in the transition literature has been on 
single-rule change – some authors arguing that whenever taxpayers are entitled to rely on 
the permanence of a rule, and that rule is nevertheless changed, they should get relief for 
their losses instead; others dismissing that argument as being circular (because people rely 
on a rule, they are entitled to rely on that rule). But there may be more to it. 
The very concept of law includes an important element of stability, of legal certain-
ty.23 A closely related consideration – but more purposive – is that legal rules are meant to 
guide people’s choices. And indeed, the idea of ‘law as guidance’ has become a prominent 
objection to retroactivity;24 if the effective tax rate on some type of investment is suddenly 
raised from 20% to 50%, the law has arguably failed to give proper guidance to investors. 
Nobody has argued on such grounds that laws should never change. In areas of law – such as 
the law of taxation – where change occurs frequently, new changes should not come as a 
surprise and people may be expected to anticipate, e.g., by diversifying their risks. In legal 
areas with little change, people cannot be required to be cautious to the same degree. Look-
ing at what the legislator actually does helps people to predict where and when legal 
change may occur.25 
It could be argued that taxpayers are entitled, not to unalterable tax law, but to a 
reasonable treatment when tax laws do change. This implies not that their interests will 
always be protected, but that these interests have been taken into consideration in the legis-
lative process. In that process, it can be decided that some losses do not require compensa-
tion, that other losses are sufficiently being compensated in the overall effects of a reform, 
and that yet other losses can only be addressed by specific measures.
For example, the transition effect that old savings are taxed twice by the shift to a 
consumption tax could be accepted as a second-best solution to institutional problems of 
the welfare state. This effect is, to a large extent, an intergenerational issue, much like 
increasing government debt, unsustainable public pension systems, and the costs of an 
ageing society – but importantly, to the advantage of the younger generations.26 The same 
transition effect can also be given less weight by pointing at a historical perspective of 
declining effective tax rates on savings income.27 Either way, transition losses would get a 
positive (or at least, non-negative) political evaluation.
Evidently, the complexities of real-world tax reforms are miles away from simple 
single-rule changes. In the latter case, reliance on the rule as it used to be may have signifi-
cance; in the former case, the melting pot of legal changes produces outcomes which have 
no straightforward relation to separate elements of those changes. But what about interme-
diate cases?
23.	 David	M.	Hasen,	Legal	Transitions	and	the	Problem	of	Reliance,	Pennsylvania	State	University	Dickinson	School	of	
Law,	Legal	Studies	Research	paper	No.	14-2010;	see	also	the	contributions	by	Gribnau	and	Pauwels	in	this	volume.
24.	 John	Prebble,	Rebecca	Prebble	and	Catherine	Vidler	Smith,	‘Legislation	with	Retrospective	Effect,	with	Particular	
Reference	to	Tax	Loopholes	and	Avoidance’,	New	Zealand	Universities	Law	Review,	22	2006,	at	pp.	17-	49.
25.	 Fisch,	supra	note	22.
26.	 Bankman	and	Fried,	supra	note	13,	at	p.	564.
27.	 Bankman,	at	pp.	88-89.
159
Vording, Boer & Lubbers Part 2.  2.6. It’s the outcomes, not the rules – 2.6.4.2. 
2.6.4.2. The political process of defining transition issues
We argue that much depends on political choice and skill – the presentation of legal 
changes as a coherent package, as well as the identification of transition losses resulting 
from that package. Recently, it has been advocated that tax policy should focus not on the 
transition issues created by changing specific rules, but on the broader outcomes of 
reforms: ‘The framing of tax policy debates can be crucial. Framing the VAT zero-rating of 
children’s clothing in isolation has helped maintain it; framing the estate tax in isolation 
also helped those lobbying for its abolition in the US. Such framing could easily result from 
a lack of public understanding about the interconnectedness of the tax system. However, in 
order to pursue sensible tax policy it is essential to see the tax system as a system rather than 
to consider its different elements in isolation. So disconnected tax debates may be particu-
larly counter-productive for tax policy as compared with other areas of public policy. This 
has a lesson for the Mirrlees Review, which may need to combine tax reforms in different 
areas to provide a broad-based set of reform measures, making clear that there is give and 
take across different population groups.’28
The point raised here is intricate. It includes the political process of defining losses 
and gains in the first place. As tax law is typically complex, and fiscal illusion29 is considera-
ble, ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ are malleable concepts. One example is Goldberg’s argument, 
quoted above, of why a VAT-type consumption tax would not raise transition issues for 
private households, while such a tax is equivalent to a personal consumption tax that does 
raise such issues. The form of tax rules matters, as the Mirrlees Review notes: ‘While a trans-
fer of legal tax liabilities from companies to individuals would not change the ultimate 
incidence at all in the long run, it will certainly look like a simple tax increase to most peo-
ple.’ The implication is that a move in the opposite direction would raise much less voter 
concern with transition losses. A second example is capitalization. If the effective future tax 
rate on an asset is increased by 10%, its current market value may decrease by the same 
percentage (in the case of full capitalization). Tax measures with respect to capital tend to 
be very visible for that reason, triggering demands for transition relief in response. Changes 
in labour income taxation would be a visible transition issue only if human capital were 
tradable (as in a slave society).30 
The important point here is that the definition of transition issues is a political pro-
cess. Perhaps, there will always be single tax measures so specific that they cannot credibly 
be presented as part of some broader package; in such cases, the ‘single rule change’ 
approach is the only one available. In all other cases, politicians have opportunities to claim 
coherence in policies and plausible tradeoffs in outcomes – including even areas beyond tax 
legislation.31
Evidently, such opportunities are not unlimited. For example, politicians may find it 
hard to give any long-term gains of changes in tax rules their proper weight. The impact of 
changes in tax law on people’s economic choices and opportunities may require a long-
term analysis, rather than the ‘snapshot’ of income effects upon introduction: ‘Historically, 
distributional analyses of tax changes have classified people into income groups based on 
their current year’s income. In recent years, a number of economists have argued that this 
28.	 James	Alt,	Ian	Preston,	and	Luke	Sibieta,	‘The	Political	Economy	of	Tax	Policy’,	in	The	Mirrlees	Review,	Dimensions	of	
Tax	Design	(Oxford	University	Press	2010),	pp.	1204-1279,	at	pp.	1272-73.
29.	 The	concept	of	fiscal	illusion	refers	to	misunderstanding	of	the	economic	burden	of	taxes,	due	to,	e.g.,	withholding	
at	source.
30.	 Kaplow,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	516,	notes	that	transition	issues	arise	with	‘any	action	that	has	future	effects’	but	dis-
cusses	only	investments	in	assets,	not	in	human	capital.	
31.	 It	is	noteworthy	that	the	central	recommendations	of	the	Mirrlees	Review,	while	claiming	to	provide	the	‘features	of	
a	good	tax	system’,	cannot	avoid	talking	about	the	‘tax	and	benefit	system’	on	many	occasions.
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annual ‘snapshot’ view of the rich and poor produces an arbitrary and impoverished view of 
the true distributional impact of tax regimes. Legislators ought to be concerned with the 
distributional effects of tax changes on lifetime incomes – that is, on the lifetime rich and 
poor.’32 But it may not be easy for politicians to get around the snapshot approach; for 
taxpayers/voters, the immediate impact of a tax reform is much more visible than any long-
term offsetting effects or economic gains. As the Mirrlees Review puts it: ‘While we may, 
rightly, be concerned primarily with tax burdens on individuals across their lifetimes, any 
change will come in while each individual is at a particular point in their life cycle – and 
they are bound to focus on its immediate impact.’33 Long-term dynamic effects are typically 
not very useful in political debates, as degrees of uncertainty may be very sizeable and vot-
ers may not be too interested in the remote future. Nevertheless, long-term effects do mat-
ter. In that perspective, a focus on short-term transition losses runs a risk of being myopic.
But if we would agree that the definition of losses is not something self-evident, but a 
part of the political processes that produce legal change, the next question would be how 
the political process does identify losses. There are some hints in the literature that the 
demand for transition relief may be driven by interest groups. Levmore, when discussing 
alternative ways of abolishing a tax exemption on local government bonds, suggests that 
‘more retroactivity is associated with more effective interest-group pressure’, adding that ‘a 
positive political theorist could say that grandfathering provisions, delayed effective dates, 
and other familiar features of our legislative reform packages are evidence of the fact that it 
is the workings of interest-group politics that hinders retroactivity.’34 And Doran – indeed – 
offers a positive analysis of the political process to explain the instrumental function of 
transition measures in creating political majorities.35 One could say that the debate on 
moving from an income tax to a consumption tax offers an example of a fierce lobbying 
position. Full relief for ‘old’ savings would be a bonus for wealthy taxpayers – who are the 
only ones to gain from such a reform in the first place.
2.6.4.3. Reasonable outcomes: a restriction on political decision-making?
The idea that, in the political process of creating support for legal changes, transition mea-
sures are just one instrument among others cannot easily be matched with the notion of 
‘reasonable treatment’. In the end, of course, politicians have to face their voters at the bal-
lots. But apart from that, is there any way to institutionalize the idea that legal changes 
should not inflict unreasonable losses?36 The question – we believe – implies that norms 
would be required that can be applied by courts when reviewing the impact of legal 
changes in individual cases.
Without entering into a discussion of relevant case law, we suggest that two such 
norms do exist: plausibility and proportionality.
Plausibility requires that a claim of coherence has some basis in reality; e.g. because a 
set of legal changes has a common purpose, or because it affects overlapping groups of 
people at the same time in different ways which will cancel out on average. Suppose that in 
a court procedure, one taxpayer claims that his right to equal treatment, or to peaceful 
enjoyment of his property, is harmed by a new tax measure. The measure has been intro-
32.	 Bankman	and	Fried,	supra	note	13,	at	p.	547.	
33.	 The	Mirrlees	Review,	Tax	by	Design	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2011),	Chapter	20,	Conclusions	and	Recommen-
dations,	www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview/design.
34.	 Saul	Levmore,	‘The	Case	for	Retroactive	Taxation’,	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	(22)	1993,	pp.	265-307,	at	p.	283.
35.	 Doran	supra	note	1,	especially	at	pp.	581-582.
36.	 This	question	has	raised	quite	some	academic	debate	in	the	Netherlands,	following	a	Cabinet	White	Paper	on	tax	
transition	policy	in	the	1990s.	See	extensively	the	contribution	by	Pauwels	in	this	volume.
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duced without any transition relief, thereby inflicting a loss of EUR 10,000. Digging into the 
legislative history, the court finds that the contested measure has been a part of a much 
larger package of legal changes, creating gains and losses for many taxpayers. For that rea-
son, the legislator has found it unnecessary to develop specific transition measures. Proba-
bly (and without further information on the overall net position of the taxpayer who filed 
complaints), the court will decide to stick to a marginal test of plausibility. 
Proportionality would require that the larger the remaining individual losses are, the 
better justifications are offered in the legislative process.37 To pursue the example: if the 
taxpayer has suffered a loss of EUR 10,000 due to a single rule change without transitional 
relief, the court will face the question whether this loss is excessive, in terms of a proper 
balance of the public interest involved and the private loss inflicted. 
2.6.5. Conclusion
Academic thought about transition issues has focused on single-rule changes. Undeniably, 
there are real-world cases when a single tax rule is altered, and specific taxpayers face a loss. 
But in many others cases, more rules change at the same time. And usually, the overall pack-
age is a political compromise that offers general compensation such as tax rate reductions, 
while ignoring some losses and providing specific relief for others. 
A discussion of the major tax reform discussion in the US, a shift from income tax to 
consumption taxation, shows how the rule-based approach runs into difficulties. Even when 
we compare two blueprints, the ideal income tax and the pure consumption tax, transition 
issues are hardly clear-cut. As soon as we accept real-world hybrid taxes, it becomes much 
more difficult to predict transition effects. The practical approach would no doubt be to 
evaluate the overall effects of such a reform, and see which remaining losses require specific 
measures.
There is no objective way to distinguish between the single-rule case and the tax-re-
form case. The decision to present measures in a package is a political one though it can be 
subjected to tests of plausibility and proportionality.
37.	 The	contribution	by	Pauwels	develops	such	a	proportionality	test.
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Part 3 
National reports
3.1.
Questionnaire
Hans Gribnau and Melvin Pauwels
3.1.1. Preliminary general remarks 
There are different concepts with various meanings when dealing with the phenomenon of 
retroactivity in legislation. Not only are various concepts used for ‘retroactivity’ (e.g., retro-
activity, retrospectivity, formal retroactivity, material retroactivity and true retroactivity) 
but the same concept is often used with different meanings (viz., the concepts of retroactiv-
ity and retrospectivity1). 
In this questionnaire, the term ‘retroactivity’ means that the effective entrance date of 
(one of more provisions of) a statute is set at a date prior to the moment on which the stat-
ute enters into force (in the Dutch tax literature, this is called ‘formal retroactivity’), i.e. (one 
of more provisions of) the statute covers the period before the date of entry into force. For 
example, a statute enters into force on 1 February 2010, and provides that a certain tax 
exemption is repealed as from 1 January 2009.
The term ‘retrospectivity’ means that the statute has ‘immediate effect’ (i.e., the effec-
tive entrance date of a statute is the same date as the date on which the statute enters into 
force) without grandfathering, as a result of which the statute alters or affects the results of 
a past event for the future (in the Dutch tax literature, this is called ‘material retroactivity’). 
For example, a statute enters into force on 1 January 2010, and provides that a certain tax 
exemption is repealed as from that date without grandfathering accrued but unrealized 
gains, as a result of which gains that accrued prior to 1 January 2010 are not tax exempt 
although they accrued in a period when the exemption applied.
Furthermore, if a reference is made in this questionnaire to the introduction of a tax 
statute, this includes the change (amendment) of an existing tax statute, for there is no 
conceptual difference between the two. After all, a change in an existing statute is realized 
by means of the introduction of a statute that provides for the change. 
1.	 See,	e.g.,	the	editors	of	British	Tax	Review,	‘Retroactive	or	Retrospective?	A	Note	on	Terminology’,	British	Tax	Review,	
(2006),	at	pp.	15-18.
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3.1.2. On terminology
1. In Dutch legal discourse, a distinction is usually made between formal retroactivity (here: 
retroactivity) and material retroactivity (here: retrospectivity).
a. Does legal discourse in your country usually employ concepts like ‘retroactivity’ 
and ‘retrospectivity’?
b. Is a clear distinction usually made between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
2. It would appear to be the case that, although the above-mentioned distinction between 
the two kinds of retroactivity (i.e., retroactive effect and retrospective effect) is recognized in 
most countries, there are some additional varieties. A first conceptual variation concerns the 
situation where, during a fiscal year, the income tax rules are changed as from the begin-
ning of the fiscal year. For example, an income tax statute enters into force on 1 July 2009, 
and provides that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from 1 January 2009. In the Nether-
lands this would be regarded as retroactive. It would appear that in some other countries it 
would not be regarded as (actually) retroactive, because – it is argued – the income tax obli-
gation only arises at the end of the year. In these countries a conceptual distinction is made 
between a statute that applies to a previous year (actual retroactivity) and a statute that 
applies as from the beginning of the current year (de facto retroactivity).2
a. Does legal discourse in your country usually employ this conceptual distinction?
b. If the conceptual distinction is employed in your country, please discuss, when 
answering the questions in section 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 and question 20 in sec-
tion 3.1.7 whether this distinction is materially significant, e.g., whether different 
standards apply.
3. A second conceptual variation concerns what are known as interpretative statutes,3 
which are statutes that provide for the interpretation of another statute and are often appli-
cable as from the effective entrance date of that other statute. The Netherlands legal system 
does not explicitly have the phenomenon of ‘interpretative statute’. If the Netherlands legis-
lator introduces a statute with retroactive effect and explains that the statute provides an 
interpretation (i.e., only clarifies the meaning) of another statute, this statute is considered 
‘retroactive’ in Dutch legal discourse.4 It would appear, however, that in some countries 
such a statute would not be called ‘retroactive’ and/or that in some countries, it is even 
explicitly provided in the Constitution or the General Tax Act that interpretative statutes 
apply as from the effective entrance date of that of the statute to which the interpretation 
applies.
a. Does the legal system of your country explicitly have the phenomenon of ‘inter-
pretative statute’?
b. If so:
i. does the retroactive effect of such a statute has a legal basis in the Constitution 
or the General Tax Act?
ii. is there a special term for this kind of ‘retroactivity’?
iii. what standards are used to determine that the ‘interpretative statute’ is actu-
ally ‘interpretative’? Is it regarded as a problem that the statute possibly con-
2.	 V.	Thuronyi,	Comparative	Tax	Law	(The	Hague:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	pp.	79-80.
3.	 Thuronyi,	supra	note	2,	at	p.	76,	mentions	lois	interprétatives	(France),	declaratory	legislation	(United	Kingdom)	
and	legge	di	interpretazione	autentica	(Italy).
4.	 Notwithstanding	this,	when	assessing	(e.g.,	by	parliament	or	by	the	courts)	whether	the	(proposed)	retroactive	
effect	is	justified,	it	could	be	taken	into	account	that	the	statute	‘only’	provides	a	clarification.
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firms the view of the tax authorities, while (some) taxpayers have a defensibly/
justifiably different interpretative view?
iv. when answering the questions in sections 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 and question 
22 in section 3.1.7, please discuss whether different standards are used for 
examining retroactivity of interpretative statutes (in comparison with the 
normal standards used to examine retroactivity).
4. A third conceptual variation concerns what are known as validation statutes. A judicial 
decision may deviate from the legal practice (shared view by taxpayers and tax authorities) 
or the view of the tax authorities. It may happen that the legislator then introduces a statute 
with retroactive effect to ‘validate’ the legal practice or the view of the tax authorities. 
Although it sometimes happens that the Netherlands tax legislator will introduce a statute 
with retroactive effect to ‘overrule’ a judicial decision, the phenomenon ‘validation statute’ 
is not recognized as such.
a. Does your legal system recognize the phenomenon of ‘validation statute’ as such?
b. If so: 
i. which standards are used to determine that the ‘validation statute’ really vali-
dates legal practice (and not only the unilateral view of the tax authorities)?
ii. what is the difference between a ‘validation statute’ and an ‘interpretative 
statute’ (if, in your country, this phenomenon is also separately recognized)?
iii. when answering the questions in section 3.1.3, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 and question 22 
in section 3.1.7, please discuss whether different standards are used for exam-
ining/assessing retroactivity of validation statutes (in comparison with the 
normal standards used to judge retroactivity).
5. In the Netherlands legal system, the date of the entry into force of a statute should be on or 
after the date of publication of the statute in the Government Gazette. A conceptual distinction 
is made between the date of entry into force of a statute and the effective date of a statute. If 
retroactive effect is granted to a statute by the legislator, the date of entry into force is still a 
future date, but the statute’s effective entrance date is a date in the past. This explains why, at 
least in Dutch legal discourse, the relevant moment to use for comparison in order to deter-
mine whether a statute has retroactive effect is the date of the entry into force of the statute.
a. Does legal discourse in your country also employ a difference between the date of 
entry into force of a statute and the effective date of a statute? And is the ‘compari-
son moment’ also the moment of entry into force, or is it the moment of the publi-
cation in the government’s official journal?
6. Although in Dutch legal discourse material retroactivity (‘retrospectivity’) is distin-
guished from formal retroactivity, there is no one definition of material retroactivity that is 
generally accepted and used. Furthermore, it is not clear which situations are ones of ‘mate-
rial retroactivity’. The above-mentioned example of a statute that enters into force on 1 
January 2010, and that provides that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that date 
without grandfathering accrued but unrealized gains, would certainly be regarded as an 
example of ‘material retroactivity’. However, if a statute that enters into force and that stipu-
lates that interest on a certain type of loan is no longer tax-deductible without grandfather-
ing existing loans, many but not all authors would call this ‘material retroactive’.
a. How is the concept of retrospectivity defined in your country?
b. Please provide some examples of situations that would be regarded as retrospec-
tive and – if possible – some examples of situations that would not be regarded as 
retrospective.
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7. With respect to the impact of a statute having ‘immediate effect’, a distinction is usually 
made between substantive statutes and procedural statutes. A substantive statute with 
immediate effect applies to taxable events occurring after the date on which the statute 
enters into force, while a procedural statute with immediate effect is directly applicable on 
pending proceedings (so also to proceedings regarding taxable events that occurred prior 
to the date on which the statute enters into force).5 
a. Is this distinction (with respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect) 
between substantive statutes and procedural statutes also made in your country? 
b. If so, what kind of tax rules are considered procedural rules (e.g., also rules regard-
ing evidence and the burden of proof)?
NB (i) If relevant, please state two differences in the use of the concepts in the tax litera-
ture, case law, and parliamentary history;
 (ii) If the meaning of or the application of concepts differs in your country depending 
on the nature of the tax concerned (e.g., (corporate) income tax, VAT, withholding 
tax, etc), please discuss.
3.1.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
8. In some countries, the Constitution imposes limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes. 
There seem to be three variants: (i) the limitations are derived from a general principle (e.g., 
the principle of legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of 
equality, the principle of the rule of law, and the ability-to-pay principle) that is laid down 
in the Constitution, (ii) the limitations are explicitly laid down in a general6 provision, (iii) 
the limitations are explicitly laid down in a provision that specifically regards taxation.
a. Does your Constitution include a provision that imposes limitations to the retro-
activity of tax statutes? If so, what variant(s)?
9. The Netherlands State Secretary of Finance has published (and discussed with parlia-
ment) a memorandum that incorporates the main lines of his ‘transition policy’ with 
respect to the introduction of tax statutes. The memorandum is not legally binding, but it 
has some influence in the parliamentary debate, for example, in the event that a bill 
includes retroactive effect.
a. Does the government of your country have a transition policy in general and/or in 
the field of tax statutes, and, if so, has the policy been published? 
b. If so, in what form has this been done, e.g., in a kind of memorandum or an Act? To 
what extent is this policy legally binding, e.g., does it only have influence in the 
parliamentary debate or do judges also take the policy into account if they test 
transitional law for compatibility? 
a. If a transition policy in the field of tax statutes has been published, what are the 
policy guidelines with respect to (i) granting retroactive effect to statutes and 
(ii) grandfathering? 
b. Is there also a policy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax statutes that 
are favourable to taxpayers?
5.	 E.g.,	ECJ	C-61/98	(De	Haan),	para.	13:	‘It	should	be	noted	in	this	connection	that,	according	to	settled	case-law,	
procedural	rules	are	generally	held	to	apply	to	all	proceedings	pending	at	the	time	when	they	enter	into	force,	
whereas	substantive	rules	are	usually	interpreted	as	not	applying	to	situations	existing	before	their	entry	into	force.’
6.	 Not	only	regarding	tax	statutes.
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10. In the Netherlands, the Council of State provides advice to the government and parlia-
ment with respect to legislative proposals. The Council of State has laid down criteria with 
respect to the question of when, in its opinion, granting retroactive effect to tax statutes is 
allowed.
a. Does an institution like a Council of State (Conseil d’État) exist in your country? 
NB.: It might be that in your country instead of, or in addition to, the Council of 
State, another institution (e.g., the Supreme Court) could be asked for advice. If so, 
please answer the following questions (also) for that other institution.
b. If so, does it follow certain rules to review proposed retroactivity in tax statutes? 
c. And does it follow certain rules to review whether or not grandfathering is neces-
sary?
d. Is there also a policy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax statutes that 
are favourable to taxpayers?
3.1.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
11. In the Netherlands, the legislator occasionally makes use of the instrument of ‘legislat-
ing by press release’:7 it is announced in a press release that a bill is (or will be) proposed in 
parliament and that the bill provides for retroactivity till the date of the press release. 
a. Is this instrument used in your country? 
b. If so, in which cases? E.g., only in cases of anti-abuse legislation or also in cases of a 
policy change and if the government wants to prevent so-called announcement 
effects?
12. Sometimes the Netherlands tax legislator grants retroactive effect to tax statutes reach-
ing further back in time from the moment of the first announcement (e.g., by press release) 
of the bill in question.
a. Does your legislator grant retroactive effect in cases in which the instrument of 
‘legislating by press release’ is not used? If so, in which cases?
b. And does the retroactive period reach further back in the past than the date of the 
press release? If so, in which cases?
13. If the retroactive period is long, it could be that pending legal proceedings are influ-
enced.
a. Does it happen in your country that retroactive effect is granted to substantive 
statutes as a result of which also pending legal proceedings are influenced? 
b. Or is it common that pending legal proceedings are excluded from the applica-
tion of the new statute?
14. In the Netherlands the legislator sometimes grants retroactive effect to tax statutes that 
are favourable to taxpayers.
a. If that also happens in your country, in which situations does it occur?
7.	 For	an	example,	see	the	disputed	retroactivity	in	the	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II	case	(ECJ	C-376/02).
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3.1.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
Courts may or may not test acts of parliament against the national Constitution. In Nether-
lands law, the courts are not allowed to test acts of parliament for compatibility with the 
Constitution or with general legal principles, because of a constitutional prohibition to do 
so. The courts are, however, permitted to test acts of parliament for compatibility with inter-
national treaties: as far as such an act infringes a treaty provision that has direct effect, the 
courts must not apply the act. Furthermore, the courts are allowed to examine subordinate 
legislation (i.e. not acts of parliament) for compatibility with legal principles.
With respect to the possibilities that a Netherlands court has to review the retro-
activity of tax regulations, the above implies that:
– the retroactivity of an act of parliament on a tax matter cannot be tested against the 
principle of legal certainty (nor against the principle of legality);
– however, if an act of parliament on a tax matter falls within the scope of European Com-
munity law, the retroactivity of such an act can be tested against the general principles of 
European Community law, viz., the protection of legitimate expectations and legal cer-
tainty;
– the retroactivity of an act of parliament on a tax matter can also be tested against Arti-
cle 1 of the First Protocol (‘protection of property’) to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), although the Netherlands Supreme Court has – up till now – 
never found retroactivity incompatible with that provision;
– the retroactivity of subordinate legislation can be tested against the principle of legal 
certainty.
15. In the legal system of your country is it possible for courts to test the retroactivity of a 
tax statute for compatibility with the Constitution and/or with general legal principles such 
as the principle of legal certainty (including the principle of legitimate expectations)?
16. If, in your country, courts can test the retroactivity of a tax statute against the Constitu-
tion and/or with general legal principles, what examination method do courts apply? In 
other words: when would courts rule retroactivity incompatible?
17. Do the courts in your country test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of 
the First Protocol ECHR? If so, have the courts ever found a tax statute containing retroactiv-
ity incompatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR?
18. If the courts in your country test the retroactivity of acts of parliament and/or subordi-
nate legislation against the principle of legal certainty, which examination method do the 
courts apply?
19. Do courts in your country use interpretations that avoid what might be retroactive 
applications, because such applications might raise further questions about legitimacy and 
validity?
20. If courts in your country do not recognize limits on the use of retroactivity, is there a 
reason, e.g., the legislator is regarded as being sufficiently self-disciplined?
NB.: regarding questions 15-20: (i) please discuss justifications that are accepted by the courts in 
your country for granting retroactive effect by the tax legislator, and (ii) if there are examples of 
cases in which the court found retroactivity incompatible, please discuss these cases briefly.
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3.1.6. Retroactivity of case law
The issue of retroactivity of tax law not only arises with respect to the introduction of tax 
statutes, but also with respect to case law when a judgment has an erga omnes effect. The 
topic of retroactivity of case law is worth investigating separately, because it is related to the 
question of the nature of case law: when can case law be regarded as declaratory (‘only 
declaring what the law has ever been’) and when can it be regarded as constitutive (‘new 
law’). We will not deal with this here.8 
Nonetheless, at least in one situation transitional law with respect to case law is very 
comparable with the transitional law question with respect to changes in statutes. In that 
situation, the court explicitly abandons existing case law and formulates a new (general) rule.
21. If the Supreme Court of your country abandons existing case law and formulates a new 
(general) rule, does the Supreme Court provide for a kind of transitional rule to limit the 
retroactive effect of its judgment (e.g., prospective overruling)? If so, does the Supreme 
Court only provide such a rule if the new rule is unfavourable to taxpayers, or also if the new 
rule is favourable to taxpayers (and thus unfavourable to the government)? If the latter is 
the case, does the Supreme Court make an exception for the taxpayer concerned in the legal 
proceedings before the court?
NB.: If there are peculiarities9 in the tax system of your country that are relevant for under-
standing the way the Supreme Court rules in this respect, please state these peculiarities.
3.1.7. Views in the literature
3.1.7.1. In general
22. Is there a general opinion in the tax literature of your country regarding retroactivity of 
tax statutes? Is there, for example, consensus with respect to the type of cases (e.g. anti-
abuse legislation, legislation to abandon gaps in tax law, policy changes, etc.) in which it is 
considered justified (or the other way around: in which it is in any case considered not 
justified) to grant retroactive effect to tax statutes?
3.1.7.2. The law and economics view
The law and economics view is an important theoretical view in the academic literature in 
the US on tax transitions. This view was developed and supported by, in particular, Graetz10 
8.	 Various	items	that	relate	to	the	subject	of	‘retroactivity	of	case	law’	(e.g.	the	item	of	limitation	of	the	effects	of	case	
law	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice)	are	therefore	not	touched	upon	in	this	questionnaire,	either.
9.	 For	example,	if	the	Netherlands	Supreme	Court	changes	its	interpretation	of	a	certain	statute	in	favour	of	the	
taxpayers,	the	retroactive	effect	of	that	judgment	is	de	facto	limited	because	previously	paid	tax	on	a	tax	assessment	
will	not	be	refunded,	unless	an	appeal	against	the	tax	assessment	has	been	made	in	time	(i.e.,	within	six	weeks	after	
the	date	of	the	assessment).	It	might	be,	however,	that	the	tax	system	of	another	country	is	different,	for	example,	in	
the	sense	that,	in	the	situation	described,	a	refund	should	be	made	by	the	tax	authorities	if	it	is	clear	that	tax	has	
been	paid	unnecessarily	(according	to	the	new	interpretation).	Since	the	financial	consequences	for	the	govern-
ment	of	a	change	of	interpretation	may	be	great,	this	might	be	a	reason	for	the	Supreme	Court	for	‘prospective	
overruling’.
10.	 M.J.	Graetz,	‘Legal	Transitions:	The	Case	of	Retroactivity	in	Income	Tax	Revision’,	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	
Review	(1977),	at	pp.	47-87,	and	M.J.	Graetz,	‘Retroactivity	Revisited’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1985),	at	pp.	1820-1841.
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and Kaplow.11 Briefly, the law and economics view on tax transitions argues that changes in 
tax law should have retroactive effect12 because that is ‘efficient’. A very short summary of 
the line of reasoning is provided by, among others, Fisch.
‘Although fairness arguments are typically used to support prospective lawmaking, 
efficiency is generally viewed as favoring retroactivity. Efficient lawmaking can be defined as 
lawmaking that maximizes the net benefits of legal change. The traditional economic con-
ception of rational or efficient legal change is based on the utilitarian conception of a net 
gain in social welfare without regard for distributional issues. This conception explains the 
failure of economic analysis to address the moral concerns of fairness arguments. Retroac-
tivity could produce net social gain and yet impose clearly identifiable costs; there are win-
ners and losers when a law is applied retroactively. Efficiency arguments typically add an 
additional normative factor to the analysis: the assumption that legal change has occurred 
because of a determination that the new rule is an improvement. The view that the new rule 
improves the operative legal principles supports the application of that rule to as broad a 
class of cases as possible.’13
In the meantime, other law and economics scholars (than Graetz and Kaplow) have 
developed views with a different emphasis. Shaviro, for example, argues that policy changes 
should be retroactive (in the terminology used here: should be retrospective), but should 
not be nominally retroactive (in the terminology used here: should not be retroactive).14
23. In the Netherlands the law and economics view has so far provoked very little debate in 
the tax literature and has not been invoked explicitly by the legislator or the Netherlands 
State Secretary of Finance during parliamentary debates.
a. Has the law and economics view on transitional tax law, or other non-traditional 
legal views, provoked a debate in your country? 
b. If so, please provide a brief overview of the debate, and please state especially 
whether and, if so to what extent, the law and economics view (especially the 
dogmatic view of Graetz and Kaplow), or another non-traditional legal view, has 
gained support, e.g., from the legislator or in the tax literature.
11.	 L.	Kaplow,	‘An	Economic	Analysis	of	Legal	Transitions’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1986),	at	pp.	509-617,	and	L.	Kaplow,	
‘Transition	Policy:	A	Conceptual	Framework’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	Legal	Issues	(2003),	at	pp.	161-209.
12.	 The	economic	view	holds	that	there	is	no	fundamental	(but	only	a	gradual)	difference	between	(formal)	retroactiv-
ity	and	retrospectivity.
13.	 J.E.	Fisch,	‘Retroactivity	and	Legal	Change:	An	Equilibrium	Approach’,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1997),	at	p.	1088.
14.	 D.N.	Shaviro,	When	Rules	Change:	An	Economic	and	Political	Analysis	of	Transition	Relief	And	Retroactivity	
(	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000),	at	pp.	98-111.
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3.2.
Austria1
Tina Ehrke-Rabel
3.2.1. On terminology
3.2.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
The legal discourse in Austria usually employs concepts like ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectiv-
ity’. In Austria difference distinction is made between ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ retroactivity.2
The Austrian Constitutional Court distinguishes clearly between retroactivity and 
retrospectivity. However, court decisions are not very clear on the permissibility of retro-
spectivity in Austrian tax law.
3.2.1.2. Relevance of tax period
In Austria this conceptual distinction is not made. The terms ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectiv-
ity’ refer to the relationship between the moment of entry into force of a statute and the 
moment the taxable event is realized. If the statute applies to a taxable event realized prior 
to the entry into force of this statute, there is retroactivity. If a newly enacted statute applies 
to pending situations (situations that ‘started’ prior to and ‘conceal’ the entry into force), 
there is retrospectivity.
3.2.1.3. Interpretative statutes
Austria does not explicitly have ‘interpretative statutes’. 
In fact, interpretative statutes sometimes ‘occur’. The Austrian Constitutional Court 
explicitly allows this kind of statute (e.g. VfGH 10. 10. 1988, G 121/88, VfSlg 11.869). Since 
the Constitutional Court does not apply any specific methods with respect to the legitimacy 
of such statutes, there is no academic debate on the issue.
Interpretations of legal statutes are currently made by formally non-binding and 
generally addressed administrative rulings published in the official journal of the tax 
administration. Nevertheless, in practice questions of retroactivity and retrospectivity occur 
in this field. Generally, the tax administration provides for a grandfathering clause. Since 
these administrative rulings formally do not have any binding effect, academic discussion 
on the topic is rare.
1.	 Editors’	Note:	the	replies	in	this	report	were	provided	to	the	original	questionnaire.	Due	to	circumstances	beyond	
his	control,	the	author	was	not	able	to	finalize	the	draft	of	his	national	report	and	to	use	the	headings	proposed	by	
the	editors.	The	headings	used	in	this	report	have	thus	ben	added	by	the	editors.	See	also	M.	Lang	&	C.	Marchgraber,	
‘Retroactivity	and	Legitimate	Expectations	in	Austrian	Tax	Law’,	B.	Yalti,	ed.,	Non-Retroactivity	in	Tax	Law	(Istanbul:	
Beta,	2011),	at	pp.	15-26.
2.	 W.	Doralt	&	H.G.	Ruppe,	Steuerrecht	II5	(Wien:	Manz,	2006),	Tz	368ff.
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Since interpretative statutes do not have an explicit legal basis in Austria their retroactive 
effect does not have a legal basis, either.
If a new statute does not add anything to an existing statute that is outside the scope 
of this existing statute, we talk about an interpretative statute. Statutes are considered to be 
interpretative if they only clarify what was already the content of the existing statute (e.g. 
VfSlg 13.197/1992).
It is not regarded as a problem that the statute possibly confirms the view of the tax 
authorities, while some taxpayers have a defensibly/justifiably different interpretation. On 
the contrary, if there are different defensible/justifiable interpretations of a statute the 
taxpayer cannot trust a certain interpretation. Consequently, a statute that narrows the 
range of defensible/justifiable views of an existing statute is not considered to create illicit 
retroactivity.
The Austrian Constitutional Court basically applies the same standards to interpreta-
tive statutes as to other kinds of statutes.
3.2.1.4. Validation statutes
The Austrian legal system does not recognize the phenomenon of ‘validation statute’ as 
such. 
3.2.1.5. Comparison moment
Austrian legal discourse does not make a clear distinction between the date of entry into 
force of a statute and its effective date. Generally a statute enters into force the day after its 
publication in the Government Gazette. It can enter into force on a date either prior or 
posterior to its publication in the Government Gazette if this is explicitly stated in the stat-
ute itself. Basically retroactivity within the meaning employed in this paper must be explic-
itly laid down in the statute itself, whereas retrospectivity is normally the consequence of 
the fact that the statute does not provide for any special date of entry into force and there-
fore also applies to ‘pending’ cases.
3.2.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
Apparently the Austrian concept of retrospectivity is similar to the Dutch concept: Unlike 
for retroactivity there is no common opinion on whether a statute creates retrospectivity or 
not.
The selling of shares held by an individual is subject to income tax only if the shares 
were held for less than a year. A legal statute that replaces the term of a year by a term of five 
years without any statement concerning the entry into force of this provision might affect 
the selling of shares performed by a person that bought the shares prior to the date of entry 
into force of this statute. Therefore, this statute is considered to have retrospective effect.
3.2.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
This distinction is also made in Austria. Substantive legal statutes have retroactive effect 
only if this is explicitly stated in the statute itself, whereas procedural statutes automatically 
(without any explicit statement) have retroactive effect.3 
3.	 G.	Stoll,	Bundesabgabenordnung-Kommentar	(Wien:	Orac,	1994),	68;	A.	Mairinger	&	B.	Twardosz,	‘Die	maßgebliche	
Rechtslage	im	Abgabenrecht‘,	ÖStZ	2007,	16ff;	VfGH	22.	6.	2009,	G	5/09ua.
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All rules regarding the filing of tax returns, the collection of taxes, the appeal procedure, 
evidence and the burden of proof are considered procedural rules. Rules regarding evidence 
and the burden of proof would have to contain a grandfathering clause in order not to 
infringe the constitutional principle of legitimate expectations. Periods of limitation are 
generally considered to be substantive tax rules. However, there are some judicial decisions 
and concepts in the academic literature that consider periods of limitation to be procedural 
rules.
3.2.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.2.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
The case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court imposes limitations of retroactivity on tax 
statutes by basically deriving them from the principle of equality and its ‘sub’-principles of 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
3.2.2.2. Transition policy of government 
The Austrian government does not have a declared transition policy either in general or in 
the field of tax statutes. However, there are certain legal situations in which the Austrian 
Government regularly provides for transitional rules.
In Austria there is no policy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax statutes 
that are favourable to taxpayers at all.
3.2.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
In Austria there is no institution which can be asked for advice with respect to legislative 
actions.
3.2.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.2.3.1. ‘Legislating by press release
This instrument has never been used in Austria. It might be a way to reduce the confidence 
in the existing legal situation which is generally protected by the Austrian Constitution and 
therefore legitimate the retroactivity of the new statute. But since Austrian legal practice 
and case law are very reluctant to admit binding effects of ‘explanations’ which do consti-
tute a formal source of law, this instrument would probably not be accepted. Moreover, the 
Austrian Constitutional Court explicitly holds that taxpayers who comply with the legal 
situation in force are protected in their expectations in the validity of this situation and are 
not supposed to orientate their behaviour according to plans, political projects or academic 
discussions.4
3.2.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement 
Since the instrument of press release does not exist in Austria the legislator grants retroac-
tive effect in other cases. A general statement concerning these cases cannot be made. The 
granting of retroactive effect seems to be somehow discretionary. Thus, if retroactivity is 
necessary to comply with the principle of equality, it is granted as a rule.
4.	 VfSlg	15.060/1997.
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3.2.3.3. Pending legal proceedings 
The major cases on retroactive legal statutes decided by the Austrian Constitutional Court 
concerned substantive statutes and also influenced pending legal proceedings.
3.2.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
This happens from time to time in Austria generally for certain policy reasons. 
3.2.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.2.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles 
The Austrian Constitutional Court has the authority to test the retroactivity of a tax statute 
for compatibility with the Constitution and with general principles. Retroactivity is tested 
against the principle of equality and its sub-principles of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations. The Austrian Constitutional Court acts on the request of either an individual 
concerned by the statute himself or on request of the Austrian Federal Administrative Court 
or on request of a certain number of members of parliament. 
3.2.4.2. Examination method
According to the case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court, legal statutes with retroac-
tive effects can infringe the principle of equality in so far as they constitute a belated burden 
for the taxpayer who acted in the expectation of a certain (less burdensome) legal situation. 
In other words: Retroactivity would only be incompatible with the principle of equality if it 
destroyed legitimate expectations. To consider whether these expectations are destroyed the 
Austrian Constitutional Court looks at the clarity of the legal statute being changed and 
unanimous administrative practice. Consequently, retroactivity is incompatible with the 
Austrian Constitution if the taxpayer was deceived in its expectations in a legal statute by its 
retroactive change constituting a substantive increase of his tax burden. Even this situation 
could be legitimate if there is a substantive justification. Whether the principle of legitimate 
expectations is infringed or not depends on the significance of the tax burden created by a 
legal statute and on the gravity of the grounds of justification for introducing this tax bur-
den.5 These criteria have to be weighed case by case.
3.2.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR 
The Austrian Constitutional Court does not test the retroactivity of a tax statute against 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR because the protection of property is a principle inher-
ent in the Austrian Constitution itself. Moreover, retroactivity is not tested against this prin-
ciple.
3.2.4.4. Two cases in which the Austrian Constitutional Court considered a retroactive 
legal statute to infringe the principle of equality 
The ‘Bundesland’ Tirol introduced a procedural provision that allowed tax authorities to 
reverse non-reversible tax assessments if incompatibility with EC law had been held by the 
ECJ. The Austrian Constitutional Court considered this provision incompatible with the 
5.	 E.g.	VfSlg	12.186/1989,	12.416/1990,	13.020/1992,	15.060/1997.
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principle of legitimate expectations: Before the entry into force of this new provision after 
one year taxpayers could trust in the non-reversibility of their tax assessment – without any 
respect to the substantive legality. This new provision was applied to a tax assessment hav-
ing become non-reversible many years before. Therefore, for the Austrian Constitutional 
Court this provision significantly breached the legitimate expectations of the taxpayer. The 
Court did not find a justification for this provision that would have been able to heal the 
infringement of the legitimate expectations principle.6
In Austria corporate entities have to pay a minimum corporate income tax regardless of the 
amount of their income (which can be negative as well). This minimum tax was increased in 
1997. The entryy into force of the respective legal provision was stated at a date prior to the 
publication in the Gazette of the Government. Consequently, it had retroactive effect. 
According to the case law of the Austrian Constitutional Court, legal statutes applying to 
previously effected factual situations and retroactively adulterating the legal position of the 
taxpayer infringe the principle of equality if the taxpayer’s situation is significantly 
impaired and if the taxpayer had the right to trust in a certain legal situation. The Constitu-
tional Court ascertained that these criteria were fulfilled. The retroactivity of the provision 
in question therefore constituted a breach of the principle of equality.7
3.2.5. Retroactivity of case law
Since Austria is a civil law system the question of retroactivity of case law arises only in the 
case of the Constitutional Court. According to the legal statutes regulating the competences 
of and the procedure before this Court, the Constitutional Court’s decisions with respect to 
the compliance of legal statutes with either the Austrian Constitution itself or constitutional 
principles do not have retroactive effect. They apply to factual situations occurring after the 
Court’s decision has been rendered. Nevertheless, there are two exceptions: 
– The decision does have retroactive effect for the person who brought the case before the 
Court. This rule applies regardless of whether the decision is favourable or unfavourable 
to this person.
– The Court itself can delay the effects of its decision to a certain moment later than the 
date of the rendering of the decision. 
As a general rule, the case law of the Austrian Supreme Court, the court which decides 
on the interpretation of legal statutes and not on their compliance with constitutional law 
or principles, is binding in the case brought before the Court and does not have an ‘erga 
omnes’ effect. But in practice this interpretation in a single case is applied to other similar 
cases as well. Consequently, a ‘new’ interpretation of a legal statute can be applied to cases 
pending at the moment of the decision of the Supreme Court (and of course to every other 
situation occurring after the decision was rendered). But such a new interpretation does not 
give the procedural right to adapt non-reversible decisions.
3.2.6. Views in the literature
3.2.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity 
Austrian fiscal literature does not deal with the problem retroactivity in a way that goes 
beyond the case law of the Constitutional Court.
6.	 VfGH	22.	6.	2009,	G	5/09.
7.	 VfSlg	15.060/1997.
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3.2.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law 
The law and economics view on transitional tax law, or other non-traditional legal views, 
has not provoked any debate in Austria. 
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3.3.
Belgium
Bruno Peeters 
Ethel Puncher
3.3.1. Terminology
3.3.1.1. Distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’
In the older Belgian literature, the expressions ‘relative retroactivity’ and ‘absolute retroac-
tivity’ were used to distinguish between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’.1 These expres-
sions correspond to the concepts of ‘formal retroactivity’ and ‘material retroactivity’ as used 
in Dutch legal discourse. However, the terminological distinction between relative and 
absolute retroactivity is nowadays considered confusing in Belgium.2
In the more recent literature (and case law), a clear distinction is usually made 
between three concepts, being ‘immediate effect’, ‘retroactive effect’ and ‘deferred effect’.3 
As a principle, a legal rule is deemed to have ‘immediate’ or ‘retrospective’ effect.4 This 
implies that a new legal rule is applicable both to legal facts that occur after the date of 
entry into force of this new rule, and to legal consequences occurring after the date of entry 
into force, even though these consequences relate to legal facts that took place before this 
date.5 To explain the preference for the concept of immediate effect of legal rules, reference 
is usually made to the principle of unity of the law: in each situation and for each period 
only one legal rule can be applied at a time.6 
A legal rule is considered to be retroactive, however, when it affects legal facts that 
occurred before its date of entry into force.7 In other words: a legal rule is retroactive when it is 
applicable to juridical relations that were already definitively completed before this date.8 
1.	 H.	de	Page,	Traité	élémentaire	de	droit	civil	belge,	I,	No.	230	(Brussel:	Bruylant,	1962),	at	p.	328.
2.	 F.	Amerijckx,	‘Non-retroactiviteit	terzake	rijksbelastingen’	in:	X,	ed.,	Liber	Amicorum	Albert	Tiberghien	(Antwerpen:	
Kluwer,	1984),	p.	1	ff.,	at	p.	10.
3.	 P.	Popelier,	Toepassing	van	de	wet	in	de	tijd:	vaststelling	en	beoordeling	van	temporele	functies	(Antwerpen:	
	Story-Scientia,	1999),	at	pp.	31-33.
4.	 B.	Peeters,	‘Beschouwingen	bij	de	temporele	werking	van	wetten	in	de	inkomstenbelastingen’,	in:	B.	Peeters,	ed.,	
Recht	zonder	omwegen:	fiscale	opstellen	aangeboden	aan	Prof.	Dr.	J.J.	Couturier	ter	gelegenheid	van	zijn	75ste	
verjaardag	(Gent:	Larcier,	1999),	p.83	ff.,	at	p.	90.
5.	 This	wording	can	be	found	in	the	case	law	of	both	the	Constitutional	Court	(e.g.	Arbitragehof	22	December	1993,	
No.	88/93,	www.const-court.be)	and	the	Supreme	Court	(e.g.	Cass.	22	February	1988,	Arr.	Cass.	1987-88,	808;	Cass.	
21	February	2003,	Pas.	2003,	I,	No.	127).	Please	note	that	the	name	of	the	Constitutional	Court	has	recently	been	
changed	from	‘Arbitragehof ’	to	‘Grondwettelijk	Hof ’	(Revision	of	the	Constitution	of	7	May	2007,	B.S.	8	May	2007).	
6.	 B.	Peeters,	‘Het	onderscheid	tussen	de	onmiddellijke	en	de	retroactieve	werking	van	een	wet	inzake	inkomsten-
belastingen’,	(case	note	on	Cass.	25	May	2000),	T.F.R.	2000,	p.	679	ff.,	at	p.	680.
7.	 Popelier,	supra	note	3,	at	p.	32.
8.	 This	wording	can	be	found	in	the	case	law	of	the	Constitutional	Court	(e.g.	Constitutional	Court,	30	March	2010,	
No.	32/2010,	consideration	B.12.2;	Arbitragehof	22	November	1990,	No.	36/90,	www.const-court.be).
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Finally, a legal rule has deferred effect when the former rule is still applied on the future 
consequences of legal facts that took place before the date of entry into force of the new 
rule.9
3.3.1.2. Relevance of tax period
As far as income tax is concerned, a distinction is made between ‘de facto retroactivity’ and 
‘actual retroactivity’ (juridical retroactivity). The income tax obligation is deemed not to 
arise until the end of the tax period. As a consequence, an income tax rule can be changed 
during a tax period and applied as from the beginning of the same tax period, without 
having a prohibited (juridical) retroactive effect.10 Indeed, nothing can prevent the legisla-
tor from conferring an immediate effect to a tax measure when the ‘tax situation’ is not yet 
acquired permanently. Concerning income tax, a tax situation must be considered as 
acquired permanently at the end of the fiscal year.11 This position has been confirmed 
repeatedly in the decisions of the Constitutional Court.12
The Supreme Court has recently adopted the same view as the Constitutional Court.13 
Formerly, however, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a changed income tax rule 
could only be considered retroactive when it was published after the end of the assessment 
year. To grasp the full extent of this opinion, a clear distinction has to be made between the 
tax period (i.e. the period during which income is earned: year x) and the assessment year 
(i.e. year x+1). According to the Supreme Court, the applicable income tax rules for year x 
could not only be changed up to 31 December of year x, but even as late as 31 December of 
year x+1, without being considered (actually) retroactive.14 This interpretation had as a 
result that a taxpayer had to bring his case before the Constitutional Court to enjoy a more 
favourable interpretation of retroactivity.15 Not unsurprisingly, this interpretation was 
severely criticized in the tax literature.16 
It should be noted that the situation discussed above is only applicable to direct 
taxation (such as income tax). For an indirect tax (such as VAT), the taxable event does not 
range over a certain period, but on the contrary, takes place immediately. As a consequence, 
the legal rules in force at that specific moment in time are applicable.17 The same applies for 
9.	 Popelier,	supra	note	3,	at	p.	32.	In	the	English-language	literature	this	is	called	‘grandfathering’.
10.	 M.	Dassesse,	‘Retroactiviteit	in	het	fiscaal	recht	–	Een	stand	van	zaken	in	België	en	in	de	Europese	Gemeenschap’,	
T.F.R.	2001,	p.	879	ff.,	at	p.	880;	Tiberghien	Advocaten,	Handboek	voor	fiscaal	recht	2008	(Mechelen:	Kluwer,	2008),	
at	pp.	23-24.
11.	 J.	Malherbe	and	P.	Daenen,	‘Retroactivity	of	domestic	tax	laws	and	tax	judgments	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	
The	Belgian	perspective	and	the	European	context’,	in:	National	report,	Conference	on	Prohibition	of	tax	retroactiv-
ity:	national	and	community	new	tendencies,	Naples,	10	November	2009,	p.	1	ff.,	at	pp.	4-5.
12.	 Arbitragehof	15	September	1999,	No.	99/99,	Arbitragehof	16	November	2000,	No.	115/2000	and	Arbitragehof	18	
April	2001,	No.	45/2001,	Arbitragehof	23	June	2004,	No.	109/2004,	all	on	http://www.const-court.be.	In	view	of	the	
principle	of	legal	certainty	this	point	of	view	has	been	the	subject	of	criticism	in	the	legal	doctrine	(Peeters,	supra	
note	4,	at	p.	101,	No.	34).
13.	 Cass.	14	March	2008,	Pas.,	2008,	No.	184;	www.juridat.be.
14.	 Cass.	29	July	1998,	F.J.F.	1998,	No.	98/213;	Cass.	11	September	2003,	www.juridat.be.
15.	 O.	Neirynck,	‘Le	principe	de	la	non-rétroactivité	des	lois	en	matière	fiscale’,	in:	T.	Afschrift	et	al.,	eds.,	L’évolution	des	
principes	généraux	du	droit	fiscal.	20e	anniversaire	de	la	maîtrise	en	gestion	fiscale	(Brussel:	Larcier,	2009),	p.	139	
ff.,	at	pp.	144-145.
16.	 Inter	alia,	O.	Bertin,	‘Les	lois	rétroactives	en	matières	d’impôt	sur	les	revenus’,	J.D.F.	2001,	p.	193	ff.,	at	p.	194;	A.	Claes,	
‘Staat	Cassatie	meer	toe	dan	het	Arbitragehof?’,	(case	note	on	Cass.	11	September	2003),	Fisc.	Act.	2003,	vol.	4,	p.	7	
ff.,	at	pp.	7-10.
17.	 Popelier,	supra	note	3,	at	pp.	84-85.
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withholding tax, since the tax debt arises at the moment of the assignment or payment of 
the income on which the withholding tax is due.18
3.3.1.3. Interpretative statutes
Article 85 of the Belgian Constitution states that ‘only the law can give an authentic interpreta-
tion of legislation’.19 An interpretative statute is a statute that provides such an authentic 
interpretation.20
For a recent example of an interpretative provision, reference can be made to Arti-
cles 12-14 of the Bill of 21 December 2009 containing tax and miscellaneous provisions.21 
This bill provides an interpretation of Article 2753 ITC that concerns withholding tax on 
earned income. According to this article, certain research institutions are partially exempt 
from transferring the tax withheld on the earned income to the Treasury. The ratio legis of 
this provision was to stimulate scientific research in Belgium. It was, however, unclear 
whether or not the scientific institutes were under the obligation to reinvest the exempted 
funds. According to the Explanatory Statement of the amendment that inserted Articles 
12-14, it has always been the intent of the legislator that the exempted funds would be used 
for additional investments in scientific research, and not to reduce the economic cost of the 
existing research. The bill adjusts the text of Article 2753 ITC accordingly. 
In Belgium the Constitutional Court originally gave a rather restrictive definition of 
interpretative statutes, accepting a statute as interpretative only if the original act from the 
beginning could reasonably not have been interpreted in any other way than in the mean-
ing given to it by the interpretative statute.22 Only in that case is the interpretative statute 
truly declaratory without adding something new. This, however, would deprive the interpre-
tative statute of its purpose because if the original act could reasonably not have been inter-
preted in any other way, there would have been no need for any clarification. Since June 
2006 the Constitutional Court has changed its position, however. It accepts a statute as 
interpretative if it gives to the original act a meaning which the lawgiver intended from the 
beginning and which reasonably could have been inferred from that act.23 Thus, in clarify-
ing an original act, interpretative statutes do add new content to the legal order. According 
to the Constitutional Court, an interpretative statute attributes to a legal provision the 
meaning the legislator had in mind at the time of its adoption.24 The interpreted provision 
is deemed to always have had the meaning the authentic interpretation provides.25 An inter-
pretative statute does not give an unexpected turn to the meaning of the original act; it 
18.	 Arbitragehof	23	June	2004,	No.	109/2004;	Arbitragehof	17	May	2006,	No.	77/2006,	both	on	www.const-court.be.
19.	 Article	133	of	the	Constitution	provides	mutatis	mutandis	the	same	for	decrees.	
20.	 P.	Peeters,	‘De	fiscale	beginselen	van	gelijkheid,	legaliteit,	rechtszekerheid	en	eenjarigheid	in	de	rechtspraak	van	het	
Arbitragehof ’,	T.B.P.	2005,	vol.	4-5,	p.	334	ff.,	at	p.	347.	In	general,	it	is	not	considered	problematic	if	a	retroactive	
statute	confirms	the	tax	authorities’	position,	while	some	taxpayers	have	a	defensible	different	view,	to	the	extent	
the	interpretative	statute	is	not	a	covert	plain	retroactive	statute.	
21.	 Bill	21	December	2009	containing	tax	and	miscellaneous	provisions,	B.S.	31	December	2009,	Second	edition.	
Articles	12-14	were	inserted	by	an	amendment	of	9	December	2009,	DOC	52,	2310/002.
22.	 Arbitragehof,	19	December	2002,	No.	189/2002;	2	February	2005,	No.	25/2005;	1	February	2006,	No.	20/2006;	
26	November	2009,	No.	192/2009.
23.	 Arbitragehof,	21	June	2006,	No.	102/2006,	B.S.	5	July	2006.
24.	 Arbitragehof	19	December	2002,	No.	189/2002,	www.const-court.be;	Arbitragehof	21	June	2006,	No.	102/2006,	
B.S.	5	July	2006.
25.	 Arbitragehof	29	March	2000,	No.	36/2000,	www.const-court.be;	P.	van	Orshoven,	‘De	kraai	en	de	puid	–	De	retro-
actieve	wet	in	het	licht	van	de	beginselen	van	behoorlijke	wetgeving’,	in:	Jura	Falconis,	ed.,	De	retroactiviteit	van	
rechtsregels	(Leuven:	Jura	Falconis	Libri,	1998),	p.	7	ff.,	at	p.	12.
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merely confirms an interpretation which could reasonably have been derived from the 
original act.
There is, however, a risk that the legislator will wrongfully use an interpretative law in 
order to grant actual retroactive effect to a legal rule, or even to influence the outcome of 
pending litigation. 
The task of the Constitutional Court, therefore, consists in verifying whether the 
interpretative law really has an interpretative character. Otherwise, the alleged interpreta-
tive law may be recharacterized as purely retroactive. In the latter case, the retroactive effect 
can nevertheless be justified.26
From the case law of the Constitutional Court, four characterizations of interpretative 
laws can be deduced: 
– Interpretative statutes are retroactive by nature: they apply as from the date the legal 
provision they interpret became operative;
– The characterization of a statute as interpretative cannot assign to the legislator the 
authority to circumvent the fundamental principle of non-retroactivity;
– Retroactivity of an interpretative statute may be justified if it gives to the original act a 
meaning which the lawgiver intended from the beginning and which reasonably could 
have been inferred from that act;
– In all other circumstances, the same restrictions as for plain retroactive statutes apply.
In conclusion, one can say that it does not make any difference whether or not the 
legislator considers a law to be ‘interpretative’: the examination by the Constitutional Court 
of the justification of the retroactive effect remains the same.27 
3.3.1.4. Validation statutes
In Belgium it often happens that the legislator makes use of the technique of ‘legislative 
validation’. This technique means that the legislator interferes by validating post factum 
irregular administrative acts. 28 
In this respect, the Constitutional Court gives evidence of a pragmatic approach.29 An 
example in a tax case can illustrate this: a local tax regulation of 1988 was declared invalid 
by the Council of State in 1990 because irregularities occurred concerning the convocation 
of the Municipality Council. The issuing of a new local tax regulation with retroactive effect 
was not possible (Article 2 Civil Code). To prevent severe financial consequences for the 
municipality, the legislator validated in a law of 1991 the provisions of the local tax regula-
tion of 1988. The Constitutional Court considered the retroactive effect of this statute to be 
justified since, on the one hand, the statute aimed at preventing severe financial conse-
quences for the municipality and, on the other hand, the decision of the Council of State 
only concerned a matter of procedure.30 
For a recent example, we can refer to two decisions of the Constitutional Court31, 
concerning the Law of 24 July 2008.32 This law validates several local tax regulations that 
26.	 Malherbe	and	Daenen,	supra	note	11,	at	pp.	9-10.	In	this	respect,	we	also	refer	to	point	3.2.
27.	 P.	Popelier,	‘Interpretatieve	wetten	moeten	interpreteren’,	(case	note	on	Arbitragehof	19	December	2002),	R.W.	
2002,	p.	1460	ff.,	at	p.	1463.
28.	 Peeters,	supra	note	20,	at	pp.	348-350.
29.	 Arbitragehof	12	November	1992,	No.	67/1992;	Arbitragehof	21	December	1995,	No.	87/95;	Arbitragehof	13	July	2001,	
No.	98/2001,	all	on	www.const-court.be.
30.	 Arbitragehof	12	November	1992,	No.	67/1992,	www.const-court.be.
31.	 Constitutional	Court	26	November	2009,	No.	186/2009;	Constitutional	Court	17	December	2009,	No.	199/2009,	
both	on	www.const-court.be.
32.	 B.S.	8	August	2008.
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were declared invalid by a decision of the Supreme Court.33 Also in these cases the Constitu-
tional Court decided that the severe financial consequences for the municipality can justify 
the retroactive effect of this statute.34
Such a legislative validation, however, cannot interfere with juridical decisions that 
have authority of res judicata.35
The difference with an ‘interpretative statute’ is that an interpretative statute is 
regarded as a confirmation of the interpretation which the legislator had in mind at the 
time of the adoption of the interpreted legal provision. A ‘validation statute’, on the other 
hand, validates retroactively a local administrative rule that has been declared invalid. 
3.3.1.5. Comparison moment
In Belgium a distinction is made between the effective date of a legal rule, the date of entry 
into force and the date of publication. To determine whether or not a legal rule has retroac-
tive effect, the date of entry into force generally serves as the point of reference.36 According 
to the Constitutional Court, a legal rule is indeed considered retroactive when it is applica-
ble to juridical relations that were already definitively completed before its date of entry 
into force.37 Note that a law can never enter into force before the date of publication in the 
Belgian Official Gazette.38 Unless stipulated otherwise, a law is deemed to enter into force 
ten days after publication.39 
3.3.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
In this respect, we refer to the observations made above under 1.1. A retrospective rule has 
an immediate effect, which implies that a new legal rule is both applicable to legal facts that 
occur after the date of entry into force of this new rule, as well as to legal consequences 
occurring after the date of entry into force, even though these consequences relate to legal 
facts that took place before this date.40 A new legal rule is, for example, applicable to all 
corporate expenses that occur after the date of its entry into force, even though these 
expenses relate to an agreement that was concluded before this date.41 
33.	 Cass.	14	March	2008,	T.F.R.	2008,	vol.	355,	108;	J.	Astaes,	‘Aanvullende	gemeentebelastingen	op	de	personenbelast-
ing	moeten	tijdig	worden	goedgekeurd’,	Fisc.	Act.	2008,	vol.	15,	p.	4	ff.,	at	pp.	4-6;	L.	vanHeeswijck,	‘Wetgever	komt	
gemeenten	te	hulp’,	Fiscale	Kroniek,	De	Standaard,	3	July	2008;	E.	van	de	Velde,	‘Retroactieve	wet	repareert	retroac-
tieve	gemeentelijke	belastingverordeningen’,	(case	note	on	Cass.	14	March	2008),	T.Gem.	2009,	vol.	3,	p.	202	ff.,	at	
pp.	202-203.
34.	 J.	Astaes,	‘Grondwettelijk	Hof	vernietigt	reparatiewet	aanvullende	gemeentebelasting	niet’,	Fisc.	Act.	2009,	vol.	42,	
p.	9	ff.,	at	pp.	9-11.
35.	 Arbitragehof	9	February	2000,	No.	17/2000;	Arbitragehof	13	March	2002,	No.	49/2002.	
36.	 Popelier,	supra	note	3,	at	pp.	31-32;	R.	Ergec,	‘La	rétroactivité	en	droit	fiscal’,	R.G.F.	1997,	p.	4	ff.,	at	p.	6.
37.	 Arbitragehof	22	November	1990,	No.	36/90,	www.const-court.be.
38.	 In	accordance	with	Article	190	of	the	Constitution,	a	legal	rule	cannot	have	binding	effect,	unless	it	has	been	pub-
lished	in	the	manner	described	by	the	law.
39.	 For	other	legal	rules,	for	example	royal	decrees,	similar	rules	apply.	
40.	 This	wording	can	be	found	in	the	case	law	of	both	the	Constitutional	Court	(e.g.	Arbitragehof	22	December	1993,	
No.	88/93,	www.const-court.be)	and	the	Supreme	Court	(e.g.	Cass.	22	February	1988,	Arr.	Cass.	1987-88,	808;	Cass.	
21	February	2003,	Pas.	2003,	I,	No.	127).	
41.	 Peeters,	supra	note	6,	at	p.	680.
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3.3.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes 
a. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect
In Belgium a distinction is made between substantive and procedural statutes. According to 
Article 3 of the Judicial Code, procedural rules are immediately applicable to pending pro-
ceedings, except in the event the relevant law provides differently. 
b. Rules considered to be procedural rules
Rules concerning judicial organization, judicial competence and judicial procedure, as well 
as rules regarding evidence and the burden of proof, are considered procedural rules.42
Rules modifying the period of limitation are also procedural rules. If a period of lim-
itation is still running, the rules are immediately applicable and the period will be extended 
or reduced accordingly. A limitation period that has already been terminated, however, 
cannot be influenced by new procedural rules.43 In this respect reference is made to the 
observations made below under 3.3.3.2.
Finally, the rules concerning administrative sanctions are procedural rules as well. 
According to the ECtHR, such administrative sanctions can be of a criminal nature if certain 
conditions are satisfied.44 This view has also explicitly been confirmed by the Belgian 
Supreme Court.45 Under these circumstances, the criminal provisions regarding retroactiv-
ity have to be applied. In this respect, we refer to 3.3.2.1. 
3.3.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.3.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
The concept of non-retroactivity does not appear in the Belgian Constitution, but is laid 
down in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which is also applicable to tax statutes.46 According to 
this provision, a law only provides for the future and does not have retroactive effect. As a 
result, it is explicitly prohibited to grant retroactive effect to any rule emanating from a 
legislative assembly47 that is hierarchically lower than a law. In principle, nothing hinders a 
law from deviating from Article 2 of the Civil Code.48 Tax law can indeed provide for retroac-
tive effect, when it specifically does so as an exception to the Civil Code.49 This is why, among 
some scholars, the question arose whether non-retroactivity was merely ‘wishful thinking’ 
or ‘soft law’.50 
This is, however, incorrect, since the Constitutional Court attributes constitutional 
value to the principle of non-retroactivity. This is also the general opinion in the literature.51 
In its case law, the Court applies the broader concept of legal certainty, from which the 
principle of non-retroactivity is derived. Since legal certainty is not explicitly embedded in 
42.	 Popelier,	supra	note	3,	at	pp.	72-75.
43.	 Cass.	26	October	1994,	Pas.	1994,	I,	861;	Cass.	20	September	1995,	Arr.Cass.	1995,	803;	Cass.	12	November	1996,	
Arr	Cass.	1996,	1039.
44.	 ECtHR	24	February	1994,	Bendenoun,	J.D.F.	1994,	42;	ECtHR	4	March	2004,	Silvester’s	Horeca	Service,	F.J.F.	2004/157.
45.	 Cass.	25	May	1990,	F.J.F.	99/126.
46.	 J.J.	Couturier,	B.	Peeters	and	N.	Plets,	Belgisch	Belastingrecht,	20th	edition	(Antwerpen:	Maklu,	2013),	at	p.	50,	
No	28;	G.	van	Fraeyenhoven	and	F.	Leurquin-de	Visscher,	‘La	rétroactivité	et	l’effet	d’annonce	en	matière	fiscale’	in:	X,	
ed.,	Protection	des	droits	fondamentaux	du	contribuable	(Brussel:	Bruylant,	1993),	p.	275	ff.,	at	p.	275.
47.	 Please	note	that	there	are,	in	Belgium,	several	legislative	assemblies	on	different	political	levels.	
48.	 Cass.	11	September	2003,	www.juridat.be.
49.	 Cass.	24	February	1977,	Pas.	1977,	I,	672.
50.	 L.P.	Suetens,	‘De	retroactiviteit	van	wetten,	decreten	en	ordonnanties’,	T.F.R.	1993,	p.	218	ff.,	at	p.	219.
51.	 Neirynck,	supra	note	15,	at	pp.	140-141;	Ergec,	supra	note	36,	at	p.	4.	
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the Constitution either, the Constitutional Court bases its decisions on the violation of 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution, which express the principle of equality. In 
other words, in the event of retroactivity of a law undermining legal certainty, the Constitu-
tional Court will, in principle, decide that the law constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and 11 
of the Constitution.52 However, not every retroactive statute constitutes an infringement of 
the principle of legal certainty.53 Moreover, as will be discussed below, retroactivity can be 
justified if certain conditions are satisfied.
The Supreme Court has adopted a different approach regarding the existence of a 
principle of non-retroactivity. The Supreme Court considers the non-retroactivity of laws to 
be a general principle of law that has been concretely embodied, inter alia, in Article 2 of the 
Civil Code.54 In a decision of 2005, the Court held that the non-retroactivity founded on the 
principle of legal certainty, however, does not have constitutional value.55 Yet this decision is 
criticized in literature.56 It should also be noted that, in its annual report of 2002-2003, the 
Supreme Court explicitly mentioned the constitutional value of the principle of legal cer-
tainty. 
Article 2 of the Civil Code is also applicable to royal decrees and other regulations 
emanating from the executive. Article 108 of the Law of 4 August 1986 stipulates that 
decrees implementing tax laws can only apply to future events and, hence, that such decrees 
have no retroactive effect except in the event the relevant law provides for an explicit devia-
tion. 
Finally, it should be noted that retroactivity of more criminal tax provisions is abso-
lutely prohibited.57 If, however, the penalty at the time of the judgment is less severe than at 
the time of the offence, the ‘lex mitior’ has to be applied.58 As mentioned above, these rules 
are also applicable to administrative penalties of a criminal nature. 
3.3.2.2. Transition policy of government
To our knowledge, the Belgian government does not have a specific policy concerning tran-
sition in the field of tax statutes. The Flemish region did, however, play a pioneering role in 
developing a general legislative policy concerning the quality of tax legislation.59 At the 
Walloon side, as well as at the Federal level, the emphasis is instead on administrative sim-
plification.
An extensive Flemish circular letter of 17 July 200960, addressed to all staff members 
of the Flemish government, looks into different aspects of legislative technique. Although a 
52.	 P.	Peeters	‘De	beginselen	van	gelijkheid,	legaliteit,	rechtszekerheid	en	eenjarigheid	in	de	rechtspraak	van	het	
Arbitragehof ’,	T.B.P.	2005,	vol.	4-5,	p.	334	ff.,	at	pp.	346-347;	Arbitragehof	5	July	1990,	No.	25/90;	Arbitragehof	22	
November	1990,	No.	36/90;	Arbitragehof	11	February	1993,	No.	10/93;	Arbitragehof	6	November	1997,	No.	64/97,	(all	
on	www.const-court.be).	
53.	 Arbitragehof	13	July	2001,	No.	98/2001;	Arbitragehof	15	September	1999,	No.	97/99.	All	on	www.const-court.be.
54.	 Cass.	22	October	1970,	Pas.	1971,	I,	144;	Cass.	27	March	1992,	www.juridat.be;	Cass.	22	January	1996,	Pas.	1997,	I,	44.
55.	 Cass.	17	November	2005,	F.J.F.	2006,	2006/153.
56.	 B.	Peeters,	‘La	relation	en	matière	fiscale	entre	le	principe	de	sécurité	juridique	et	le	principe	de	légalité:	un	proces-
sus	d’Echternach?’	in:	Liber	Amicorum	Jacques	Autenne	(Brussel:	Bruylant,	2010),	at	pp.	41-65;	P.	Popelier,	‘Beden-
kingen	bij	de	visie	van	het	Hof	van	Cassatie	op	het	rechtszekerheidsbeginsel	en	het	verbod	van	terugwerkende	
kracht	als	algemene	rechtsbeginselen’,	(case	note	on	Cass.	17	November	2005),	R.W.	2005-06,	p.	1469	ff.,	at	p.	1470.
57.	 Article	2	of	the	Penal	Code,	Article	7	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	Article	15	of	the	International	
Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights.
58.	 Article	2,	§2	of	the	Penal	Code.	It	is	uncertain	whether	this	rule	can	also	be	applied	to	purely	administrative	sanc-
tions.
59.	 Viz.	inter	alia	P.	van	Humbeeck,	‘Betere	Vlaamse	regelgeving:	voorstellen	voor	een	slagvaardig	beleid’,	T.v.W.	2004,	
p.	218	ff.,	at	pp.	218-233	and	www.vlaanderen.be/wetsmatiging.	
60.	 www.wetsmatiging.be.
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circular letter is, strictly speaking, not legally binding, it does give important recommenda-
tions worthy of consideration. Among other issues, this circular letter recapitulates the 
general principles regarding the application ratione temporis of Flemish legal rules. The 
circular letter states inter alia that a legal rule has, in principle, immediate effect and that 
retroactive effect is only granted in exceptional circumstances. Reference is also made to the 
case law of the Constitutional Court. More importantly, the circular letter also states that 
retroactive effect of decrees might be justified if the legal rule grants certain advantages. The 
circular letter also examines the necessity of transitional provisions: if the application of 
new rules is not sufficiently predictable for the parties concerned, it can be expedient for the 
old rules to remain applicable to these situations. In many cases the preservation of vested 
rights needs to be guaranteed. As mentioned above, none of these recommendations specif-
ically concern tax statutes. 
3.3.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
a. Advisory bodies such as the Council of State
In Belgium the legislation department of the Belgian Council of State gives judicial, linguis-
tic and legislative advice about draft decrees, preliminary bills and proposals of law, decrees 
or ordinances as well as amendments concerning these. This advice does not, however, have 
binding force. 
Apart from the Council of State, some consultative committees also play an import-
ant role in the Belgian decision-making procedure, during both the formal and the infor-
mal preparatory phase.61 Depending on the subject matter, a preliminary bill of law has to 
be proposed to the advisory committees or has to be discussed with representatives of the 
trade unions. For tax matters, however, there are in general no specific formal advisory or 
consultative obligations. 
b. Rules to review retroactivity 
The website of the Council of State provides information regarding legislative technique. A 
manual with recommendations in this respect can be downloaded from the website.62 This 
manual also contains observations regarding retroactivity. Yet these observations do not 
specifically concern tax statutes, but are of a general nature.
The manual states that, in general, legislative and administrative rules do not have 
retroactive effect. For retroactivity to be justified, certain conditions have to be met. For 
legislative rules, the manual refers to the case law of the Constitutional Court and states that 
a retroactive measure can only be justified ‘when it is indispensable for achieving a goal of 
public interest, such as the well-functioning or continuation of public service’. For administrative 
rules, reference is made to the advice of the Council of State itself: retroactive effect of 
administrative rules can only be justified in exceptional circumstances, such as the continu-
ation of public service or regularization of a juridical or factual situation, and insofar as the 
requirements concerning legal certainty and individual rights are preserved.63 
c. Rules to review favourable retroactivity
We are not aware of any specific policy in this respect. See also our observations made 
under  3.3.2.1. and 3.3.3.3.
61.	 W.	deWachter,	De	mythe	van	de	parlementaire	democratie	(Leuven:	Acco,	2001),	at	pp.	145-171.
62.	 www.raadvst-consetat.be	(tab	‘wetgevingstechniek’).
63.	 R.v.St.	–	afdeling	wetgeving,	Beginselen	van	de	wetgevingstechniek	–	Handleiding	voor	het	opstellen	van	wet-
gevende	en	reglementaire	teksten,	at	p.	127.
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3.3.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.3.3.1. ‘Legislating by press release’
During the last two decades, the Belgian government has increasingly made use of this 
technique, whereby new tax legislation may enter into force as from the date upon which 
the decision to enact the new legislation was published in the Belgian Official Gazette64, or 
even as from the date of the press release following the session of the Council of Ministers 
that has decided to propose a certain tax measure to be voted by the parliament.65 
It may even happen that the retroactive period reaches further back in time than the 
date of the press release.66
This technique is used in cases where the government wants to prevent an ‘announce-
ment effect’, i.e. the situation where, as soon as they become aware of future changes in 
legislation, taxpayers take certain actions that undermine the effect of this legislation.67 
The Council of State, as well as certain scholars, considers it admissible that a new 
statute is applicable as from the date of announcement in the Belgian Official Gazette.68 An 
announcement with retroactive effect of its own is, however, one bridge too far for the 
Council of State, since the whole purpose of the announcement is to justify the retroactive 
effect of a future legal rule.69 
The Constitutional Court adopted an even stricter position in its judgment of 23 June 
2004.70 At first, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that such an announcement cor-
rects, to a certain extent, the unpredictability of a retroactive measure. Furthermore, the 
Court admitted that the public interest could demand that a tax measure should have effect 
as from the day the draft was made public, to reduce the risk that taxpayers would antici-
pate the effects of that measure. Notwithstanding the apparent acceptance of such 
announcements, the Court is of the opinion that an informative announcement published 
in the Belgian Official Gazette cannot, by its nature, correct the legal uncertainty created by 
the retroactive effect, and therefore, cannot justify the retroactive nature of a legal provi-
sion. This case law seems to condemn the use of the announcement-technique as a sole justi-
fication for the retroactive effect of a tax provision.71
Furthermore, certain scholars are of the opinion that the technique of the announce-
ment is not compatible with the principle of non-retroactivity.72 
64.	 For	examples,	viz.	B.S.	7	July	1993,	B.S.	19	May	1995	and	B.S.	23	April	2002.
65.	 P.A.A.	vanHoute,	Belgium	in	International	Tax	Planning	(Amsterdam:	IBFD	publications,	2008),	at	p.	66;	W.	vanden-
Berghe,	Van	ontbinding	tot	fusie	–	Fiscale	aspecten	(Mechelen:	Kluwer,	2007),	at	p.	173.
66.	 First	example:	Wet	20	March	1996,	B.S.	7	May	1996.	The	announcement	was	published	on	19	May	1995,	and	the	act	
was	granted	retroactive	effect	as	from	7	April	1995.	Second	example:	Wet	24	December	2002,	B.S.	31	December	
2002.	The	announcement	was	published	on	23	April	2002,	and	the	act	was	granted	retroactive	effect	as	from	1	
January	2002.	Since	it	concerned	withholding	tax,	the	act	could	not	be	characterized	as	‘retrospective’	in	the	sense	
of	question	2.	
67.	 Parl.	St.	Kamer,	DOC	50,	1818/006,	pp.	105	and	116.
68.	 Adv.	R.v.St.	9	november	1990,	Parl.	St.	Kamer,	DOC	48,	1366/1,	44-45;	Adv.	R.v.St.,	Parl.	St.	Kamer,	DOC	50,	1918/001,	
106-108;	Suetens,	supra	note	50,	at	p.	222.
69.	 Adv.	R.v.St.,	Parl.	St.	Kamer,	DOC	50,	1918/001,	106-108.
70.	 Arbitragehof,	no.	109/2004,	23	June	2004,	B.S.	13	July	2004.
71.	 Neirynck,	supra	note	15,	at	pp.	158-161.
72.	 Ergec,	supra	note	36,	at	pp.	8-9;	B.	Bouckaert	and	W.	Niemegeers,	‘De	verboden	fiscale	vrucht	blijft	aanlokkelijk!’,	
A.F.T.	2003,	p.	209	ff.,	at	p.	218.
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According to other opinions, the compatibility of the announcement with the principle of 
non-retroactivity must be analysed case by case.73 If certain conditions are met, the 
announcement does not undermine the legitimate expectations of the taxpayers as a result 
of which the technique of the announcement might be able to justify the retroactive effect 
of a legal measure. These conditions are the following:
‘– The announcement has to emanate from the government itself;
– The government needs to have the intention of influencing the behaviour of the 
taxpayers;
– The announcement has to be properly announced;
– The announcement has to indicate clearly to what extent the future legal rule will 
influence the former legislation;
– It has to be sufficiently convincing that the draft measure will be accepted by the 
final decision-making body. In this respect, there has to be an adequate link 
between the body making the announcement and the decision-making body.’74 
Sometimes the Belgian legislator also grants retroactive effect in cases in which the instru-
ment of ‘legislating by release’ is not used. This happens, for example, in cases where the 
legislator wrongfully characterizes statutes that are actually retroactive as interpretative 
statutes. Another example is the legislative validation statutes. 
3.3.3.2. Pending legal proceedings 
In principle, pending legal proceedings are excluded from the scope of a new substantive 
statute. Occasionally, however, it does happen that retroactive substantive statutes have an 
influence on pending legal proceedings. In cases where the retroactivity of an act substan-
tially influences the outcome of pending cases or prevents the courts from handling certain 
issues, the Constitutional Court has adopted a strict approach. Either ‘exceptional circum-
stances’ or ‘compelling motives of public interest’ are required to justify the retroactive 
effect of such a statute.75 In a recent decision regarding a regional tax, the Court considered 
such exceptional circumstances to exist.76 
Another important case relating to the intervention of the legislator in pending liti-
gation was case 177/2005.77 Article 145 RD/ITC provides that the limitation period for direct 
tax amounts to a five-year period as from the date they became due. After this five-year 
period, any tax debtor who has not yet settled his debts with regard to direct taxes can con-
sider himself discharged and the Tax Collector will no longer be entitled to institute legal 
proceedings for recovery of contributions that have not yet been paid, unless the limitation 
period has been interrupted or suspended. It was generally accepted that a summons, i.e. a 
bailiff’s deed by which the debtor receives a payment order under an enforceable title, inter-
rupted the limitation period according to Article 2244 of the Civil Code. However, on 
73.	 J.	Kirkpatrick,	‘La	non-rétroactivité	de	la	loi	en	matière	d’impôts	sur	les	revenus	et	la	sécurité	juridique	depuis	l’arrêt	
de	la	Cour	d’Arbitrage	n°	109/2004’,	in:	X,	ed.,	Liber	Amicorum	Jacques	Malherbe	(Brussel:	Bruylant,	2006),	p.	653	
ff.,	at	pp.	667-669;	M.	Dasesse	and	P.	Minne,	Droit	fiscal	–	Principes	généraux	et	impôts	sur	les	revenus	(Brussel:	
Bruylant,	2001),	at	p.	63.
74.	 Peeters,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	94	and	the	references	in	footnote	38.
75.	 Peeters,	supra	note	20,	at	p.	347;	Grondwettelijk	Hof	4	March	2008,	No.	41/2008;	Arbitragehof	30	November	2004,	
No.	30/2004,	Arbitragehof	19	December	2002,	No.	189/2002,	(all	on	www.const-court.be).
76.	 Grondwettelijk	Hof	4	March	2008,	No.	41/2008,	www.const-court.be.
77.	 Arbitragehof	7	December	2005,	No.	177/2005,	B.S.	28	December	2005.	This	case	is	extensively	expounded	in	L.	de	
Broeck	and	V.	Hovine,	‘De	fiscus	als	slechte	verliezer:	de	ongelijke	strijd	tegen	verjaarde	betwiste	belastingschulden’,	
in:	L.	Maes,	et	al.,	eds.,	Fiscaal	Praktijkboek	2006-2007	–	Directe	belastingen	(Mechelen:	Kluwer,	2007),	p.	53	ff.,	at	
pp.	53-71.
187
Peeters & Puncher  Part 3   3.3. Belgium – 3.3.4.1. 
10 October 2002 the Supreme Court decided that the issue of a summons to pay did not 
interrupt the period of limitation in case the tax had been contested.78 According to this 
jurisprudence, summons to pay only have an interrupting effect on the amount of the tax 
indisputably due. Consequently, the tax authorities were confronted with tax debts for 
which the limitation period had not been interrupted, even though summons to pay had 
been issued. 
A new law of 22 December 2003 substantially modified the rules relating to the lim-
itation period in income tax matters. The new provisions were only applicable to limitations 
that were not yet effective. As a result, the tax claims for which the limitation period had 
already expired were at risk of being permanently lost. In order to remedy this disastrous 
situation – at least from the point of view of the government – another act was passed. On 
9 July 2004 an interpretative statute was introduced that stated the following: ‘the summons 
must be interpreted as also constituting an act of interruption of the limitation period within the 
meaning of Article 2244 of the Civil Code, even when the contested tax debt has no certain or liquid 
nature’.79 According to the Constitutional Court, this provision cannot be considered to be 
interpretative, but should be considered retroactive, aiming at influencing the outcome of 
litigation. The Court, however, found that in this case the retroactive effect could be justi-
fied. On the one hand, the Court accepted the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’: the 
legislator intended to neutralize the devastating effect of the Supreme Court’s decision. On 
the other hand, the Court accepted as ‘imperious motives of public interest’ the fact that the 
rights of the Treasury had to be protected in respect of the contested tax debts.80 
3.3.3.3. Favourable retroactivity 
We are not aware of any cases where a retroactive effect was granted to such a favourable tax 
statute. 
It should, however, be noted that – although administrative decisions, i.e. acts with an 
individual scope cannot, in principle, be applied retroactively – the Council of State decided 
that administrative decisions are considered to have retroactive effect if they are favourable to 
the relevant individual (e.g. the introduction of a fiscal exemption that is more favourable 
than the former exemption).81
3.3.4. Ex-post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.3.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles 
In Belgium only the Constitutional Court may test whether laws, decrees or ordinances are 
compatible with the Constitution. As mentioned above, the Belgian Constitution does not 
include a provision that imposes limitations to the retroactivity of statutes. In its case law, 
the Constitutional Court applies the broader concept of legal certainty from which the 
principle of non-retroactivity is derived. Since legal certainty is not explicitly embedded in 
the Constitution either, the Constitutional Court founds its decisions on the violation of 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution, which provide for the principle of equality. 
Only the Constitutional Court has the authority to acknowledge general principles of 
law and to test laws, decrees and ordinances against these principles. In the past, the 
Supreme Court has also acknowledged general principles of law, but since the establish-
78.	 Cass.	10	October	2002,	www.juridat.be.
79.	 Program	Law	9	July	2004,	B.S.	15	July	2004.
80.	 The	preceding	analysis	can	be	found	in	Malherbe	and	Daenen,	supra	note	11,	at	pp.	10-11.
81.	 R.v.St.	30	April	1992,	No.	39.262,	www.raadvst-consetat.be.
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ment of a separate Constitutional Court, this is no longer admissible.82 This applies all the 
more for hierarchically lower courts. It would indeed be rather inconsistent if regular courts 
were competent to test laws, decrees and ordinances against general principles of law, while 
it is explicitly prohibited for them to test these legal rules against the Constitution itself.83
3.3.4.2. Examination method 
As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court does not consider every retroactive statute to 
constitute an infringement of the principle of legal certainty.84 
First of all, it is possible that retroactive provisions simply confirm legal rules that had 
been published earlier. For example, if a new act repeats and confirms provisions of an 
existing royal decree, the new act only consolidates an existing situation. The retroactive 
effect of such a provision does not constitute a breach of the principle of legal certainty.85
Secondly, the Constitutional Court holds the opinion that retroactivity can be justi-
fied in certain circumstances. Justification is possible when the retroactive effect of a legal 
rule is indispensable to achieve a goal of public interest, such as the well-functioning or 
continuation of public services.86 Although in many cases reference is made to the impact 
on public finances, this justification is generally rejected.87 The Constitutional Court only 
accepts this justification when it is accompanied by other persuasive considerations.88 
Whether grounds for justification are present is examined on a casuistic basis.
As mentioned above, the Court will be more reluctant to accept a justification when 
the retroactive legal rule has an influence on the outcome of pending legal proceedings. In 
this respect, we refer to the observations made above under 3.3.3.2.
3.3.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
All Belgian courts have the authority to test whether (tax) statutes are compatible with 
treaty provisions that have direct effect. However, as from 10 August 2009 onwards, judges 
are obliged to ask the Constitutional Court to give a preliminary ruling if a law, decree or 
ordinance potentially violates a basic right that is totally or partially guaranteed both in the 
Belgian Constitution and in a European or other treaty.89 Since both Article 16 of the Belgian 
Constitution and Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR deal with the protection of property, 
the Constitutional Court should always be asked for a preliminary ruling in this respect. 
In case 177/200590, the Constitutional Court tested the compatibility of a retroactive 
tax statute with Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. For the background of this case, we refer 
to our observations above under 3.2. The Constitutional Court decided, however, that there 
was no disproportionate interference with the right of property. First of all, the taxpayers 
82.	 In	spite	of	this,	the	Supreme	Court	still	seems	to	consider	itself	competent	to	determine	whether	or	not	a	general	
principle	has	‘constitutional	value’.	Viz.	Cass.	17	November	2005,	F.J.F.	2006,	2006/153.
83.	 J.	Vandelanotte	and	G.	Goedertier,	Overzicht	Publiekrecht	(Brugge:	Die	Keure,	2007),	at	pp.	169-175.
84.	 As	mentioned	above,	the	Constitutional	Court	combines	the	principle	of	legal	certainty	with	the	principle	of	equal-
ity	as	laid	down	in	Article	10	and	11	of	the	Constitution.
85.	 Arbitragehof	15	September	1999,	No.	97/99;	Arbitragehof	21	July	2001,	No.	98/2001,	both	on	www.const-court.be.
86.	 Arbitragehof	20	May	998,	No.	49/2008,	www.const-court.be.
87.	 Neirynck,	supra	note	15,	at	p.	156.
88.	 O.	Bertin,	‘Les	lois	rétroactives	en	matière	d’impôt	sur	les	revenus’,	J.D.F.	2001,	p.	193	ff.,	at	p.	215.
89.	 Article	26,	§4	of	the	Extraordinary	Law	of	6	January	1989,	as	inserted	by	Article	2	of	the	Extraordinary	Law	of	12	July	
2009,	B.S.	31	July	2009;	B.	Peeters,	Belgisch	Belastingrecht	in	hoofdlijnen	(Antwerpen:	Maklu,	2009),	at	p.	24;	
P.	Popelier,	‘Prejudiciële	vragen	bij	samenloop	van	grondrechten.	Prioriteit	voor	bescherming	van	grondrechten	of	
voor	bescherming	van	de	wet?’,	R.W.	2009-2010,	vol.	2,	p.	50	ff.,	at	pp.	50-62.
90.	 Arbitragehof	7	December	2005,	No.	177/2005,	B.S.	28	December	2005.
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did not obtain a claim against the State that equalized the amount of the contested tax debt. 
Secondly, even under the assumptions that the period of limitation had expired and that 
the tax payer had a property right to the expired debt, the interference of the legislator 
could be justified based on the second paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. The 
criticized measure was indeed considered to be in accordance with the public interest and 
indispensable in securing the payment of taxes. 
3.3.4.4. Examination method for testing against the principle of legal certainty
Concerning Acts of Parliament, we refer to our observations above under 3.3.4.1. 
Since the principle of non-retroactivity is embedded in Article 2 of the Belgian Civil 
Code and Article 108 of the Law of 4 August 1986, there is no need for courts to test subordi-
nate legislation against the principle of legal certainty. According to Article 159 of the Con-
stitution, judges are obliged to disregard subordinate legislation that interferes with laws, 
decrees and ordinances. As a consequence, if subordinate legislation interferes with Arti-
cle 2 C.C. or Article 108 of the Law of 4 August 1986, it will be set aside by the judge. 
The Constitutional Court has ruled several times that the ‘non-retroactivity of laws is 
a safeguard against legal uncertainty’.91 This is the reason why retroactive applications can 
only be justified in specific circumstances. The fact that retroactive applications might raise 
further questions about legitimacy and validity is not explicitly taken into consideration. 
3.3.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.3.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
Older case law and literature held on to the principle that judgments necessarily have a 
declaratory character, pursuant to which case law was deemed to always have a retroactive 
effect.92 This declaratory character is based on the theory that judges do not create, but 
merely determine and apply the prevailing law.93 As has been demonstrated extensively by 
the Dutch author Haazen, this theory currently tends to have been superseded.94
Furthermore, in the Belgian literature, this view has been strongly criticized. Certain 
authors argue strongly in favour of some sort of judicial transitional rule.95
It should be noted that both the Constitutional Court and the Council of State do 
have the authority to determine and limit the temporal effect of their decisions that nullify 
a legal rule ‘erga omnes’.96 
91.	 Arbitragehof	2	February	2005,	No.	25/2005;	Arbitragehof	24	November	2004,	No.	193/2004;	Arbitragehof	
19	December	2002,	No.	189/2002,	all	on	www.const-court.be.
92.	 Bergen	23	April	1987,	J.L.M.B.	1987,	1249;	Rb.	Gent	10	September	1987,	T.	Not.	1988,	91;Rb.	Luik	2	April	1990,	J.L.M.B.	
1990,	1201;	N.	Coipel,	‘Conflit	transitoire	international,	régime	matrimonial	legal	et	conflit	moble’,	(case	note	on	
Cass.	9	September	1993),	Rev.	Trim.	Dr.	Fam.	1994,	p.	80	ff.,	at	p.	486.	
93.	 C.	Berx,	Rechtsbescherming	van	de	burger	tegen	de	overheid	(Antwerpen:	Intersentia,	2000),	at	pp.	338-342.
94.	 O.A.	Haazen,	Algemeen	deel	van	het	rechterlijk	overgangsrecht	(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2001),	at	p.	699.	For	a	review:	
viz.	N.T.E.R.	2003,	vol.	7,	at	pp.	408-411.
95.	 M.	Adams,	‘De	retroactieve	werking	van	wijzigingen	in	de	rechtspraak.	Naar	een	systeem	van	rechterlijk	overgangs-
recht?’,	in:	X,	ed.,	De	retroactiviteit	van	rechtsregels	(Leuven:	Jura	Falconis	Libri,	1998),	p.	23	ff.,	at	pp.	23-38;	Berx,	
supra	note	93,	at	pp.	338-342;	N.	Geelhand,	‘Over	zekerheid,	rechtszekerheid	en	vertrouwensleer	in	het	huweli-
jksvermogensrecht’,	T.P.R.	1989,	p.	923	ff.,	at	pp.	984-985.
96.	 Article	8	of	the	Extraordinary	Law	on	the	Constitutional	Court	and	Article	14ter	of	the	Coordinated	Laws	on	the	
Council	of	State.	The	Constitutional	Court	does	not	have	this	authority	with	respect	to	preliminary	rulings.	
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The law does not, however, grant the Supreme Court this authority. In a decision of 2005 the 
Constitutional Court refers explicitly to the problematic nature of the fact that the Supreme 
Court is not entitled to limit the temporal effect of its decisions.97 
In a recent decision the Supreme Court obliquely dealt with this matter for the first 
time and seems to have opened the door for a potential temporal modulation of its case 
law.98 Although this decision did not concern its own jurisprudence but, on the contrary, the 
preliminary rulings of the Constitutional Court, it can be argued that this decision has gen-
eral scope and is also applicable to its own case law.99 The Supreme Court seems an advocate 
of the establishment of a broader juridical transitional law.100
Please note that none of the above specifically concerns tax regulations. The conse-
quences for the government of a (retroactive) judgment of the Supreme Court concerning 
tax regulations is, however, de facto limited, as a notice of objection against a tax assessment 
can only be lodged within six months after the date the assessment was sent out.101 Apart 
from this, Article 376 ITC provides for a five-year period in which to claim an ex officio relief 
of overtaxation emerging from new documents or facts. According to the second paragraph 
of this article, changes in jurisprudence are not regarded as a new fact in this respect. 
Despite this, the Constitutional Court has ruled several times that its decisions indeed qual-
ify as a new fact.102 This has been explicitly confirmed in an administrative circular, both for 
erga omnes decisions and preliminary rulings.103 This administrative divergence should, 
however, be interpreted in a restrictive manner and cannot, therefore, be considered appli-
cable to decisions of the Supreme Court. 
3.3.6. Views in the literature
3.3.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
As already mentioned, it may be said that the general view in the Belgian tax literature cor-
responds, to a large extent, to the case law on retroactivity. 
3.3.6.2. Debate on legal and economic view of transitional law
To our knowledge, the legal and economic view has provoked very little debate in Belgium. 
In the (Belgian) literature, the legal and economic view regarding fiscal retroactivity does 
not receive ample treatment. 
97.	 Arbitragehof	No.	177/2005,	7	December	2005,	B.S.	28	December	2005;	P.	Popelier,	‘Het	Arbitragehof	over	interpre-
tatieve	en	retroactieve	wetten	in	het	belastingrecht	en	de	problematiek	van	rechterlijk	overgangsrecht’,	(case	note	
on	Arbitragehof	No.	177/2005),	R.W.	2005-06,	No.	32,	p.	1256	ff.,	at	p.	1259.
98.	 Cass.	20	December	2007,	www.juridat.be.
99.	 E.	Dirix,	‘Rechterlijk	overgangsrecht’,	R.W.	2008-09,	p.	1754	ff.,	at	pp.	1757-1758.
100.	 P.	Popelier,	‘Rechterlijk	overgangsrecht	revisited.	Over	een	juridisch	vacuüm,	een	prejudicieel	arrest	en	de	werking	
van	rechterlijke	uitspraken	in	de	tijd’,	(case	note	on	Cass.	20	December	2007),	R.W.	2007-08,	p.	1370	ff.,	at	p.	1373.
101.	 Article	371	ITC.
102.	 Constitutional	Court	8	November	2006,	no.	160/2006,	www.const-court.be;	Constitutional	Court,	8	March	2005,	
no.	54/2005,	www.const-court.be;	K.	Gheysen,	‘Het	grondwettelijk	Hof	stelt	grenzen	aan	de	uitsluiting	van	‘nieuwe	
rechtsmiddelen	of	wijzigingen	van	de	jurisprudentie’	als	grond	voor	de	procedure	van	ambtshalve	ontheffing’,	T.F.R.	
2008,	vol.	334,	p.	85	ff.,	at	pp.	85-88.
103.	 Circ.	RH.862/536.019,	4	May	2001,	Bull.	Bel.	2001,	No.	816,	1255.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	same	is	valid	for	decisions	
of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	Viz.	M.	Isenbaert,	‘Tempus	fugit:	de	werking	in	de	tijd	van	een	arrest	van	het	Hof	
van	Justitie	inzake	directe	belastingen’,	T.F.R.	2009,	vol.	358,	p.	243	ff.,	at	p.	255.
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A contribution of Kaplow himself can be found in the ‘Encyclopedia of Law and Economics’ 
by Bouckaert and De Geest.104 This contribution, however, has a rather general scope and 
does not discuss the Belgian repercussions of Kaplow’s theory. 
Furthermore, different legal and economic views on fiscal retroactivity are discussed 
briefly in the Liber Amicorum J.J. Couturier. However, the conclusion is that each one of 
these views only clarifies one single aspect of the problem. 
For instance, the view arguing that changes in tax law should have retroactive effect 
because that would result in more efficient law-making is founded on the distributive func-
tion of taxation. This argumentation is only valid when the distributive function of a tax 
rule prevails. However, this is not always the case. In this respect, we can refer to the Belgian 
rules that provide for an increase of tax in case no advance payments are made. Clearly the 
function of this rule is not of a distributive nature. The goal of this rule is to encourage cer-
tain taxpayers to pay the tax they owe during the tax period by means of advance pay-
ments.105
104.	 L.	Kaplow,	‘General	characteristics	of	rules’,	in:	B.	Bouckaert	and.	G.	de	Geest.	eds.,	Encyclopedia	of	Law	and	Econom-
ics,	Vol.	5	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2000),	at	pp.	502-528.
105.	 B.	Peeters,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	95-100.
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3.4.
Canada 
Geoffrey Loomer
3.4.1. Introduction
In Canada, like other countries, tax legislation is always changing. Much of the resulting 
complexity derives from transitional application of enactments: (a) changes to tax legisla-
tion may be made effective immediately; (b) others may be given effect from some future 
date, allowing taxpayers time to adjust their expectations and affairs; (c) historic benefits 
that are being abolished may be ‘grandfathered’ for taxpayers who continue to meet spe-
cific requirements; and (d) other changes may be made effective in the past, deeming the 
law to have been something other than what it was. The last of these temporal categories 
– referred to in Canada as ‘retroactive’ legislation – is frequently seen in Canadian tax law.
It should be noted at the outset that Canada has a federal constitution with tax juris-
diction divided between the federal and provincial governments.1 The most significant 
pieces of legislation are the federal Income Tax Act (‘ITA’),2 which imposes an annual income 
tax on individuals and corporations, and the federal Excise Tax Act,3 Part IX of which imposes 
the goods and services tax. The present discussion focuses on the federal legislative process 
with respect to the ITA, although most of the comments on the use of retroactive tax legisla-
tion apply equally to other federal tax legislation and provincial tax legislation.
3.4.2. Terminology
3.4.2.1. Distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’
Until the 1990s there was confusion in Canada regarding the proper use of the terms ‘retro-
active’ and ‘retrospective’. Retrospective has traditionally been the term of choice for 
describing antedated laws in the legal discourse of the United Kingdom.4 Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, including Canada, followed the British tradition in favouring the term ‘retro-
spective’. This is evident in one of the leading cases on interpreting and applying ‘retrospec-
tive’ legislation, Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue,5 where the 
Supreme Court of Canada employed ‘retrospective’ throughout its analysis. It was possibly 
the influence of American and French legal systems that led to the subsequent adoption in 
1.	 Constitution	Act,	1867	(U.K.),	30	&	31	Vic.,	c.	3,	ss.	91–92.
2.	 R.S.C.	1985,	c.	1	(5th	Supp.).
3.	 R.S.C.	1985,	c.	E-15.
4.	 West	v.	Gwynne	[1911]	2	Ch.	1	(CA)	at	12;	F.A.	Bennion,	Statutory	Interpretation,	4th	ed.	(London:	Butterworths,	
2002),	at	pp.	265–74.
5.	 [1977]	1	S.C.R.	271.
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Canada of the term ‘retroactive’, with most judges and lawyers (until recently) treating the 
terms as interchangeable.6
Fortunately, the modern approach in Canadian legal discourse is to treat retroactivity 
and retrospectivity as distinct concepts. A statute is considered retroactive when it acts in 
the past – being deemed to have come into force prior to its enactment – while it is 
described as retrospective when it merely looks to the past – changing the future legal conse-
quences of transactions or events that have already happened. Both categories of legal 
change are distinguished from enactments that have immediate effect on current rights, 
which are considered to fall into a separate category. This nomenclature was suggested by a 
number of legal scholars writing about principles of statutory interpretation.7 It was subse-
quently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in non-tax cases8 and has been applied in 
tax cases.9
Thus, in Canada it is reasonably clear that the adjective ‘retroactive’ is restricted to 
legislative amendments that, as explained in Gustavson Drilling, ‘reach into the past and 
declare that the law or the rights of parties as of an earlier date shall be taken to be some-
thing other than they were as of that earlier date’.10
3.4.2.2. Conceptual variations
a. In general
One can identify three subcategories of retroactive legislation, at least in the context of 
income tax legislation. The three subcategories suggested here are probably best seen as 
areas on the spectrum of retroactivity, from least to most objectionable; there is no formal 
distinction in Canadian law as to the analysis or evaluation of legislation falling into the 
different subcategories.
It is helpful to explain briefly how taxes become law in Canada. Normal practice is for 
the Minister of Finance to introduce proposed federal tax changes in the presentation of the 
annual Budget, typically in February or March, although some proposals are announced via 
press releases or draft legislation outside of the budget process. It is customary for the 
Department of Finance to produce a document known as a ‘notice of ways and means 
motion’, describing the tax changes that have been proposed. A bill amending the relevant 
tax statute is then introduced in the House of Commons and, in accordance with the normal 
law-making process, becomes law only when it has passed through the House of Commons 
and Senate and has been given Royal Assent. If the government has a majority in the House 
of Commons, there is no uncertainty as to the passing of a tax bill. The default rule is that 
new, amending or repealing legislation (technically, an ‘enactment’) comes into force upon 
Royal Assent.11 This rule is virtually always overridden in tax enactments, where a specific 
commencement date is expressed for each change. The prescribed date may be before or 
6.	 E.g.	Brosseau	v.	Alberta	Securities	Commission	[1989]	1	S.C.R.	301;	D.J.	Sherbaniuk,	‘Retrospectivity	in	Canadian	Tax	
Legislation’	in:	1983	Conference	Report	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1984),	at	p.	727.	Cf.	E.	Edinger,	‘Retro-
spectivity	in	Law’,	29	U.B.C.	Law	Rev.	(1995),	at	p.	5.
7.	 E.A.	Driedger,	‘Statutes:	Retroactive	Retrospective	Reflections’,	56	Canadian	Bar	Rev.	(1978),	at	p.	264;	R.	Sullivan,	
Sullivan	and	Driedger	on	the	Construction	of	Statutes,	4th	ed.	(Markham:	Butterworths,	2002),	at	pp.	542–50;	P-A.	
Côté,	The	Interpretation	of	Legislation	in	Canada,	3rd	ed.	(Toronto:	Carswell,	2000),	at	pp.	133–36.
8.	 Benner	v.	Canada	(Secretary	of	State)	[1997]	1	S.C.R.	358,	paras.	39–40;	British	Columbia	v.	Imperial	Tobacco	Canada	
Ltd.	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	473,	2005	SCC	49,	paras.	69–72.
9.	 Canada	Trustco	Mortgage	Co.	v.	Canada	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	601,	2005	SCC	54,	para.	7;	Kingstreet	Investments	Ltd.	v.	New	
Brunswick	(Finance)	[2007]	1	S.C.R.	3,	2007	SCC	1,	paras.	12,	25.
10.	 Supra	note	5,	at	p.	279.	[As	was	customary	at	the	time,	Dickson	J.	used	the	term	‘retrospective’.]
11.	 Interpretation	Act,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	I-21,	s.	5.
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after Royal Assent. In the latter case, the commencement date is proclaimed by the executive 
branch of government.
The first subcategory of retroactive income tax legislation is that which is made effec-
tive from the beginning of the current tax year. One view would be that this is not retroac-
tivity at all, because income tax is imposed on an annual basis. The Canadian experience is 
that measures made effective from the beginning of the tax year tend to involve annual 
concepts, like income thresholds and personal tax credits, rather than affecting transactions 
that occur at a moment in time. For example, the 2009 Budget increased the personal 
income tax brackets for individuals, effective for the 2009 tax year and later years.12 It also 
enhanced the small business deduction, which reduces the federal corporate income tax 
rate applied to the first CAD 400,000 of qualifying active business income of a Canadi-
an-controlled private corporation, by increasing the income threshold to CAD 500,000, 
effective 1 January 2009.13 There is a paucity of analysis of this kind of ‘retroactivity’ in Can-
ada, presumably because it happens regularly and is considered unobjectionable.
Second, legislative changes may be made effective in respect of transactions or events 
occurring from the date of the Budget announcement, press release, or other Ministerial 
announcement. This can occur whether the announcement was made earlier in the same 
year or in a preceding year. The period between legislative proposal and enactment may be 
lengthy, sometimes eclipsing the next annual Budget. Canada does not have a statute like 
the UK Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1968, giving temporary legal effect to budget pro-
posals, but we overcome the constitutional problem of taxing without authority by giving 
the enacted law retroactive application. For example, the 2009 Budget introduced the 
‘home renovation tax credit’, which applied to expenditures for work performed or goods 
acquired in a one-year period commencing after 27 January 2009 (the date of the 2009 
Budget).14 More recently, the 2010 Budget proposes to amend the definition of ‘taxable 
Canadian property’ to exclude certain shareholdings and other interests that do not derive 
their value principally from real property or resource property situated in Canada. This 
change is being made to improve consistency with international tax norms. The amended 
definition is proposed to be effective after 4 March 2010 (the date of the 2010 Budget). This 
type of retroactivity is sometimes criticized but there is no legal sanction to prevent it.
Less commonly, a tax enactment may be made retroactive to a time earlier than any 
announcement. A notorious example is the 2005 amendment to section 245 of the ITA – 
Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule (‘GAAR’).15 Following certain Tax Court decisions 
which indicated that the GAAR, as written, might not apply to an abuse of the Income Tax 
Regulations or a tax treaty, the rule was amended to ‘clarify’ that the GAAR applies to a mis-
use or abuse of the provisions of the ITA, Income Tax Regulations, Income Tax Application Rules, 
a tax treaty, or any other enactment that is relevant in computing tax or other amount pay-
able by a person. The amendment was made effective with respect to transactions entered 
into after 12 September 1988 (that is, retroactive to the introduction of the GAAR). More 
recently, the 2010 Budget proposes to strengthen the specific anti-avoidance rules in sub-
12.	 Budget	Implementation	Act,	2009,	S.C.	2009,	c.	2,	s.	33	(assented	to	on	12	March	2009).
13.	 Id.,	s.	39.	The	increase	to	the	income	threshold	was	prorated	for	corporations	with	taxation	years	that	do	not	coin-
cide	with	the	calendar	year.
14.	 Economic	Recovery	Act	(stimulus),	S.C.	2009,	c.	31,	s.	4	(assented	to	on	15	December	2009).
15.	 Budget	Implementation	Act,	2004	(No.	2),	S.C.	2005,	c.	19,	s.	52.	The	relevant	notice	of	ways	and	means	motion	
provided:	‘That,	for	greater	certainty,	subsection	245(4)	of	the	Act	has	operated	from	its	inception	to	exclude	a	
transaction	from	the	operation	of	subsection	245(2)	of	the	Act	only	where	it	may	reasonably	be	considered	that	the	
transaction	would	not	result	directly	or	indirectly	in	a	misuse	of	the	provisions	of	the	Income	Tax	Act,	the	Income	Tax	
Regulations,	the	Income	Tax	Application	Rules,	any	enactments	amending	the	Income	Tax	Act,	the	Income	Tax	
Regulations,	the	Income	Tax	Application	Rules	or	a	tax	treaty,	or	in	an	abuse	having	regard	to	those	provisions,	read	
as	a	whole’	[emphasis	added].
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sections 96(8) and (9) of the ITA, which, in general terms, prohibit the importation of for-
eign partnership losses by Canadian taxpayers, effective for partnership fiscal periods that 
begin after 22 June 2000. This type of retroactivity is perhaps more objectionable from a 
rule-of-law perspective than the previously mentioned subcategory, but no conceptual 
distinction between the two is made in Canada’s constitution or case law.16
b. Clear distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
As discussed at 3.4.2.1 above, there was formerly no clear demarcation in Canada, following 
the British tradition. This led to an unfortunate degree of ambiguity in the law. The modern 
approach, dating from 1997 if not before, is to treat retroactivity and retrospectivity as 
distinct concepts. Legislation is considered retroactive only when it changes the past legal 
consequences of past situations: that is, when it is deemed to have come into force prior to 
its enactment. Retrospective legislation is that which alters the future legal consequences of 
past situations.
c. Relevance of tax period 
It was explained above that amendments to annual income tax concepts are often effective 
from the beginning of the current tax year. Arguably, it is not correct to call this sort of 
temporal application ‘retroactivity’ at all. Some amendments to income tax rules or other 
tax rules may be retroactive such that they attach legal consequences to transactions or 
events occurring after the announcement/effective date. Usually, but not always, the 
announcement/effective date is earlier in the same taxation year, particularly with federal 
Budget announcements occurring in February or March. It is less common for legislation to 
be retroactive to a time preceding any announcement of the change.
In any event, the prevailing practice in Canada for at least the last 40 years has been to 
decree specific effective dates for most amendments to tax legislation. Sometimes the effec-
tive date will be prior to the current tax year, perhaps matching the date of announcement 
by Budget or press release, or perhaps coinciding with the date of introduction of some 
related legislation. As evidence of this, the 2010 Budget contains a wide array of effective 
dates. Whether an enactment reaches back to an earlier date in the current year or to an 
earlier year seems to make no difference. The Canadian constitutional tradition is that Par-
liament, acting on the advice of the Department of Finance, is free to make laws effective 
whenever they see fit.
3.4.2.3. Interpretative statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
All Canadian federal legislation is interpreted according to the Interpretation Act unless 
otherwise provided.17 There are provincial interpretation statutes as well. It is worth men-
tioning sections 42 through 45 of the Interpretation Act, which deal with the effects of legis-
lative repeal and amendment. For example, paragraph 43(c) provides: ‘Where an enactment 
is repealed in whole or in part, the repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or 
liability acquired, accrued, accruing or incurred under the enactment so repealed.’ Para-
graph 44(f) states that, where a new enactment is substituted for a former enactment, 
‘except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same 
as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new 
16.	 Tax	lawyers	continue	to	draw	a	distinction.	See:	Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6;	G.T.	Loomer,	‘Taxing	Out	of	Time:	Parlia-
mentary	Supremacy	and	Retroactive	Tax	Legislation’,	British	Tax	Rev.	64	(2006);	T.E.	McDonnell,	‘Retroactivity:	
Policy	and	Practice’	in:	2006	Conference	Report	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	2007),	at	p.	2:1.
17.	 Interpretation	Act,	supra	note	11,	s.	3(1).
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law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law 
as contained in the former enactment’. This list of transitional rules is not exhaustive.
The Interpretation Act and analogous provincial statutes set out only general interpre-
tive rules which are written in a formalistic style. They do not set out principles governing 
the retroactive or retrospective application of legislation. Moreover, the Interpretation Act 
does not have any special status under the Canadian constitution and the interpretive rules 
it contains are always subject to expressed contrary intention in the specific legislation at 
issue.
Perhaps more interesting is the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act,18 which sets 
out rules as to how Canada’s tax treaties, and the statutes implementing those treaties, 
should be interpreted. This short enactment has on a few occasions been amended retroac-
tively. For example, section 6.2 was added in 1991, retroactive to 1983, to ensure that a 
Canadian partner’s share of partnership income is taxable even though the partnership may 
be considered a resident or enterprise of another country under a Canadian tax treaty.19 
Section 4.1 was added in 2005, retroactive to 1988, to provide that the GAAR can apply to a 
benefit obtained under a tax treaty. This change was made to support the 2005 retroactive 
amendment to the GAAR itself.20
Retroactive amendments to such interpretation statutes are not evaluated any differ-
ently than retroactive amendments to other legislation.
3.4.2.4. Validation statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘validation statutes’ known?
Canada does not recognize ‘validation statutes’ as such. Nor could the Interpretation Act or 
Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act be used to retroactively validate some official view 
of how a provision in tax legislation should have been interpreted, following a contrary 
judicial decision, unless the interpretation statute was itself amended to achieve that result.
If a Canadian court interprets a tax provision in a manner that the Canada Revenue 
Agency (‘CRA’) does not agree with, or that the Department of Finance (or provincial equiv-
alent) did not intend, the federal or provincial government simply uses amending legisla-
tion to overrule that interpretation, sometimes retroactively. There are a number of exam-
ples where provincial tax legislation has been held to be ultra vires, that is, inconsistent with 
specific requirements of Canada’s written Constitution, and the provincial legislature has 
subsequently passed legislation to correct the incompatibility and to declare that amounts 
collected under the prior law are deemed to have been validly obtained.21 One might 
describe such legislation as a validation statute.
In the notice of ways and means motion and legislative notes explaining such a 
change, the Department of Finance (or provincial equivalent) invariably states that the 
change is being made to ‘clarify’ the law. While the use of the word ‘clarify’ is often legiti-
mate, on other occasions it is contentious (and arguably shows a misunderstanding of, or 
disrespect for, the role of the judiciary in Canada’s constitutional structure). Nonetheless, 
there appear to be no legal standards to assess or evaluate the legitimacy of ‘clarifying’ tax 
amendments, any more than for other retroactive tax legislation. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada in Kingstreet Investments has effectively encouraged the use of remedial retroactive tax 
18.	 R.S.C.	1985,	c.	I-4.
19.	 This	amendment	was	designed	to	prevent	the	application	in	Canada	of	the	reasoning	in	Padmore	v.	Inland	Revenue	
Commissioners	[1989]	S.T.C.	493	(Eng.	C.A.).
20.	 Supra	note	15.
21.	 See	Air	Canada	v.	British	Columbia	[1989]	1	S.C.R.	1161;	Re	Eurig	Estate	[1998]	2	S.C.R.	565.
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legislation,22 as discussed in 3.4.6.1 below. Criticism of such legislation is limited to the 
academic, political and commercial contexts.
3.4.2.5. Comparison moment
Although the concept of a ‘comparison moment’ is not addressed in Canadian legal dis-
course, it is fair to say that the comparison moment for determining whether or not legisla-
tion is retroactive is the date of enactment, which in Canada is the date of Royal Assent.
A proposed tax change, like any federal legislative change, becomes enacted law only 
when it has passed through the House of Commons and Senate and has been given Royal 
Assent. The Governor General gives Royal Assent, in the Queen’s name, to bills that have 
been passed by both Houses of Parliament. Royal Assent is considered the ‘constitutional 
culmination of the legislative process’.23 The default rule is that legislation comes into force 
upon Royal Assent,24 but the legislation itself may prescribe an earlier or later effective date 
(also known as commencement date). If a tax provision is given an effective date which 
precedes Royal Assent, it is correctly described as retroactive. 
3.4.2.6. Concept of retrospectivity
a. Definition of retrospectivity
As explained previously, modern Canadian legal terminology characterizes legislation as 
retrospective when it alters the future legal consequences of past situations. Retrospective 
legislation is effective only from the moment that it receives Royal Assent, or from a pre-
scribed date following Royal Assent, but it refers in some way to past transactions or events. 
As stated by Professor Côté [translation]:
Retrospective effect implies that the new statute separates the effects of an occurred 
fact at the moment of change: effects prior to the change are governed by the old 
statute while those occurring after are governed by the new statute.25
Côté and other Canadian scholars have observed that it can be exceedingly difficult to dis-
tinguish a retrospective enactment from an enactment that has immediate effect only on 
current, continuing rights.
b. Examples of retrospectivity
In tax law, many changes are nominally retrospective. Current legislation may provide that 
the occurrence or existence of certain facts will confer tax advantages on a taxpayer in sub-
sequent years, or will require a taxpayer to meet tax obligations in subsequent years. If, after 
the relevant facts have occurred, Parliament amends the legislation to repeal such advan-
tages or enlarge such obligations for future periods, then past events are given new legal 
consequences (but only in the future). This is exactly the sort of change that was at issue in 
Gustavson Drilling, where an oil exploration company sought to deduct certain drilling and 
related expenses incurred prior to 1960 by a predecessor company. Legislation enacted in 
1962 had repealed the availability of such deductions for taxation years following 1962. A 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the legisla-
tion was retroactive. The legislation certainly denied for the future a right to deduct 
expenses enjoyed in former years, but it did not ‘reach into the past and declare that the law 
22.	 Kingstreet	Investments,	supra	note	9,	paras.	12,	25.
23.	 Codified	in	the	preamble	to	the	Royal	Assent	Act,	S.C.	2002,	c.	15.
24.	 Interpretation	Act,	supra	note	11,	s.	5.
25.	 Côté,	supra	note	7,	p.	134.
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or the rights of parties as of an earlier date shall be taken to be something other than they 
were’.26 Dickson J. went on to say, in the particular context of tax legislation, that ‘no one has 
a vested right to continuance of the law as it stood in the past’.27
There are numerous more recent examples. One is the enhancement of the lifetime 
capital gains exemption, applicable to dispositions by Canadian residents of qualifying 
small business corporation shares and certain other property. In 2007 Parliament increased 
this exemption from CAD 250,000 to CAD 375,000 of taxable capital gains.28 This change 
applied only to dispositions of qualified property on or after 19 March 2007 (the Budget 
date) but obviously benefited small business owners whose shares had appreciated to that 
extent before that date. Another example is the introduction of the special tax on public-
ly-traded income trusts, discussed at 3.4.4.2 below.
It is instructive to contrast these changes with a series of amendments that were not 
retrospective. Parliament extended the carry-forward period for business losses from seven 
to ten years in the 2004 Budget, effective for losses incurred in tax years ending after March 
2004, and then to 20 years in the 2006 Budget, effective for losses incurred in 2006 and later 
tax years.29 Because of these effective dates, business losses that arose in earlier time periods 
are not ‘refreshed’: that is, they are not given the benefit of the 10-year or 20-year claim 
period going forward.
3.4.2.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
a. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect
The traditional position in Canadian law, following the common law of the United Kingdom, 
is to recognize a distinction between substantive and procedural statutes with respect to their 
temporal effect. It is presumed as a matter of statutory interpretation that changes which are 
purely procedural apply immediately and generally to legal proceedings, including those 
that have commenced but have not been completed at the time of the change.30 This pre-
sumption is codified, at least in part, in the federal Interpretation Act and provincial equiva-
lents.31 The rationale is that changes to matters of legal procedure are expected to be for the 
benefit of litigants and the public, and thus should apply to pending as well as future pro-
ceedings. In some situations this could entail a retrospective application of the procedural 
legislation. The rebuttable interpretive presumption against retroactive and retrospective 
effect (discussed at 3.4.5 below) is considered inapplicable to purely procedural legislation.
The distinction is of virtually no significance in Canadian tax law, however, given the 
modern practice of expressly providing an effective date for all tax law changes, whether 
substantive or procedural.
b. Rules considered procedural rules
There is no clear answer to this in Canadian tax law. The view of the Supreme Court is that 
the classification of a rule as substantive or procedural will depend on the facts of each case. 
A tax law provision would likely be seen as procedural only where it alters the manner of 
26.	 Gustavson	Drilling,	supra	note	5,	p.	279.	The	Court	used	the	term	‘retrospective’	in	the	sense	that	Canada	now	uses	
‘retroactive’.	If	the	judgment	were	rewritten	today,	the	legislation	at	issue	would	most	likely	be	characterized	as	
‘retrospective’.
27.	 Gustavson	Drilling,	supra	note	5,	pp.	282–83.
28.	 Budget	and	Economic	Statement	Implementation	Act,	2007,	S.C.	2007,	c.	35,	s.	31,	amending	the	ITA,	s.	110.6(2).
29.	 Budget	Implementation	Act,	2004	(No.	2),	S.C.	2005,	c.	19,	s.	20	and	Budget	Implementation	Act,	2006,	S.C.	2006,	
c.	4,	s.	57,	both	amending	the	ITA,	s.	111(1)(a).
30.	 Angus	v.	Sun	Alliance	Insurance	Co.	[1988]	2	S.C.R.	256;	Sullivan,	supra	note	7,	at	pp.	582–589;	Côté,	supra	note	7,	at	
pp.	176–189.
31.	 Interpretation	Act,	supra	note	11,	s.	44(c),	44(d).
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making an assessment, instituting an appeal, presenting evidence, and so on. Anything that 
affects the content of an assessment or appeal will be classified as substantive. For example, 
extending a time period for the assessment of taxes or the recovery of tax debts would most 
likely be considered a substantive change, whether the former limitation period was extant 
or expired as of the date of the change.32
Consider two examples. In 1994, following a Federal Court of Appeal decision that 
allowed a large resource company to claim unexpected deductions, the ITA was amended 
such that any ‘large corporation’ (as defined) is required to provide greater details for each 
issue it raises in a Notice of Objection filed with the CRA; failure to do so prevents the corpo-
ration from subsequently raising the undisclosed issue in Tax Court proceedings.33 This 
change might be seen as procedural or substantive. Whatever the case, detailed transitional 
rules provided that the new regime was effective after 26 September 1994 for Notices of 
Objection filed at any time, except where an appeal to the Tax Court was instituted by 
22 June 1995. More recently, in response to a Supreme Court decision which held that 
Crown proceedings legislation prevented the collection of federal tax debts which had been 
dormant for more than six years, the ITA was amended retroactively to create a 10-year 
limitation period.34 The new rules expressly provide that a fresh 10-year limitation period 
begins after 3 March 2004 (the date of the 2004 Budget) in respect of any tax debt that arose 
before that date and remains unpaid. In this sense the amendment is retrospective to the 
dawn of federal taxation in Canada.
3.4.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.4.3.1. In general
Any evaluation of the retroactivity of a proposed federal tax enactment is done by the 
Department of Finance. It is possible, but highly unlikely given the complexity of tax legisla-
tion, that Parliament would disagree with that evaluation. One commentator has noted 
that, given the lack of ex ante constraints on retroactivity of tax legislation in Canada, ‘as a 
practical matter it is legislative self-restraint that determines the frequency and extent of 
such measures’.35
3.4.3.2. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
The dominant view is that there are no constitutional limitations on retroactive taxation in 
Canada.
Canada does have a written Constitution,36 including the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’).37 Legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution is, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. However, nothing in the Constitution 
expressly prohibits or restricts retroactive legislation, save in the area of criminal law. At one 
time it was believed that section 7 of the Charter might be a basis for challenging retroactiv-
ity of non-criminal laws but, as discussed at 3.4.5 below, Canadian courts definitively 
rejected that proposition over 20 years ago.
32.	 Martin	v.	Perrie	[1986]	1	S.C.R.	41;	Angus	v.	Sun	Alliance,	supra	note	30.
33.	 ITA,	ss.	165(1.11)–(1.14)	and	169(2.1),	enacted	in	response	to	Gulf	Canada	Ltd.	v.	The	Queen	[1992]	1	C.T.C.	183	(F.C.A.).
34.	 ITA,	s.	222(1)–(10),	enacted	in	response	to	Markevich	v.	Canada	[2003]	1	S.C.R.	94,	2003	SCC	9.
35.	 Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6,	p.	739.
36.	 Collectively,	the	Constitution	Act,	1867,	supra	note	1,	and	the	Constitution	Act,	1982,	being	Schedule	B	to	the	Canada	
Act	1982	(U.K.),	c.	11.
37.	 Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms,	Part	I	of	the	Constitution	Act,	1982.
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An older statute having quasi-constitutional status is the Canadian Bill of Rights (the ‘Bill of 
Rights’).38 Among other rights, this statute grants limited protection to an individual’s 
enjoyment of property. As with the Charter, Canadian courts have decided that the Bill of 
Rights does not create any impediment to retroactive tax legislation.
Arguments based on constitutional principles that underlie the Canadian legal sys-
tem, in particular the principles of legal certainty and the rule of law, have not been vigor-
ously pursued in this country. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that these 
principles have little, if any, justiciable content.39
3.4.3.3. Transition policy of government
Canada does not have an official tax transition policy as such. There is certainly no statute 
laying out rules as to the use of retroactivity, retrospectivity, grandfathering, or other transi-
tional measures. The default transitional rules contained in the Interpretation Act apply only 
to the interpretation of enacted laws, not to their design or promulgation.
The Department of Finance published a list of self-imposed restrictions on the use of 
retroactive tax legislation in a document issued in 1995 (the ‘Finance Report’).40 The Finance 
Report does not address the typical category of retroactivity, namely, tax laws made effective 
from the date of a Budget announcement or other announcement. Instead it sets guidelines 
for the use of retroactive tax measures to clarify or correct an unintended interpretation of a 
tax provision by a court. The introduction to the Finance Report states that ‘[r]etroactive 
clarifying amendments should only be made in exceptional situations’. The following five 
guidelines are provided:
It may be appropriate to adopt retroactive clarifying changes where:
‘– the amendments reflect a long-standing well-known interpretation of the law by 
the Department of National Revenue [now the CRA];
– the amendments reflect a policy that is clear from the relevant provisions that is 
well-known and understood by taxpayers;
– the amendments are intended to prevent a windfall benefit to certain taxpayers;
– the amendments are necessary to preserve the stability of the Government’s reve-
nue base; and
– the amendments are corrections of ambiguous or deficient provisions that were 
not in accordance with the object of the Act.’41
Further considerations are said to be important where litigation is pending with respect to 
the potentially deficient legislation. These include ‘the amount of tax revenue at risk in the 
objection and appeal process’ and ‘the stage of the judicial process that has been reached by 
a test case dealing with the issue to be dealt with by the change’.42 Thus, no bright line test is 
used to decide whether pending proceedings should be excused from the legislative 
change.
It is unclear whether, in 2010, the Department of Finance continues to feel bound by 
these restrictions. The Finance Report is not available online and apparently no copy is kept 
in the Department of Finance library.43 The use of words such as ‘clarify’ and ‘for greater 
38.	 S.C.	1960,	c.	44.
39.	 British	Columbia	v.	Imperial	Tobacco	Canada	Ltd.	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	473,	2005	SCC	49;	British	Columbia	(Attorney	
General)	v.	Christie	[2007]	1	S.C.R.	873,	2007	SCC	21.
40.	 Canada,	Department	of	Finance,	Comprehensive	Response	of	the	Government	of	Canada	to	the	Seventh	Report	of	
the	Standing	Committee	on	Public	Accounts	(Ottawa:	Department	of	Finance,	September	1995).
41.	 Id.,	at	pp.	15–17.	For	further	discussion	see	McDonnell,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	2:17–2:20.
42.	 Id.,	at	pp.	17–18.
43.	 This	is	based	on	the	author’s	own	investigations	and	communications	with	the	Department	of	Finance.
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certainty’ in proposals for remedial retroactive legislation suggests that the Department 
does have some regard to the guidelines. In any event, according to the overriding constitu-
tional principle of parliamentary sovereignty/supremacy, the lawmakers in Parliament can 
disregard such restrictions where they believe it is warranted.
3.4.3.4. Ex ante control by an independent body
In Canada neither the federal government nor the provincial governments have an advisory 
body such as a Council of State. The Senate, which is the upper house of Parliament, might 
ask the House of Commons to adjust the effective date of a tax amendment, but in practice 
the Senate never does this. It is also possible for the executive to issue a ‘reference’ to the 
Supreme Court of Canada regarding proposed legislation, usually to evaluate its consistency 
with the written Constitution.44 This process never occurs with respect to the proposed 
retroactivity of tax laws.
As such, there is no independent body applying any set of rules on an ex ante basis to 
review negative retroactivity, favourable retroactivity, retrospectivity, or grandfathering in 
Canadian tax legislation.
3.4.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.4.4.1. In general
The use of retroactive legislation in Canada is, of course, not unique to taxation. However, 
no other area of statute law appears to be as rife with backdated provisions. Reasons for this 
phenomenon include the length of the Budget process and the desire of governments to 
protect revenues, particularly when threatened by unforeseen tax avoidance schemes. But 
the paramount reason for the use of retroactivity in the tax area is that Canadian courts, 
guided by the overriding principle of parliamentary sovereignty/supremacy inherited from 
the United Kingdom, continue to affirm that there are no limits on Parliament’s legislative 
authority. It is a practice that taxpayers and lawyers ‘have resigned themselves to with 
dejected pragmatism’.45
3.4.4.2. ‘Legislating by press release’
a. In general 
The constitutional tradition in Canada is to make tax enactments effective from the date of 
the annual Budget announcement. It is also possible for changes to be made effective con-
current with a press release, draft legislation, or other Ministerial announcement.
b. Use of ‘legislating by press release’
Some recent examples of tax enactments made effective from the date of the annual Budget 
announcement are mentioned at 3.4.2.2 above. The benefit of this procedure is that the 
proposed changes are formally introduced in Parliament by a notice of ways and means 
motion and are widely disseminated, allowing taxpayers to adjust expectations and rely 
with reasonable certainty on what the law will be. It is less common for changes to be 
announced by press releases, which do not have the constitutional formality or public expo-
sure of annual Budgets. Nevertheless, press releases are used where it suits the government’s 
needs to do so.
44.	 Supreme	Court	Act,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	S-26,	s.	53.	See,	e.g.,	Reference	re	Secession	of	Quebec	[1998]	2	S.C.R.	217.
45.	 V.	Krishna,	Fundamentals	of	Income	Tax	Law	(Toronto:	Carswell,	2009),	at	p.	25.
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For example, on 31 October 2006, the federal government published a press release giving 
notice of its intention to amend the ITA to impose a new tax on publicly-traded income 
trusts, similar to the tax on corporations.46 It stated that the extensive conversion of large 
public corporations to income trusts was ‘creating an economic distortion that is threaten-
ing Canada’s long-term economic growth and shifting any future tax burden onto hard-
working individuals and families’. The amendments were enacted as part of the statute 
implementing the 2007 Budget.47 In broad terms, the changes are effective 1 January 2007 
for any trust that was not publicly traded on 31 October 2006 (that is, newly formed income 
trusts), and are effective beginning in the 2011 taxation year for trusts that were trading on 
31 October 2006 (that is, existing income trusts). This legislation is in a sense prospective, 
because the new tax is delayed until 2011 for income trusts that existed as of the announce-
ment date, and is in another sense retrospective, because it creates new tax consequences 
for business vehicles that were established precisely to take advantage of existing income 
tax rules (predominantly in the 2000–2006 period).
c. Kind of situations
There are many situations where a tax enactment might be made effective from the date of a 
press release rather than the more customary Budget announcement date. For example, a 
sudden change in general economic circumstances, or the disclosure of some novel tax 
avoidance strategy, might prompt an announcement of proposed tax changes effective as of 
that date, rather than the government going through the more onerous Budget process. In 
short, this method is used whenever the Department of Finance feels it is appropriate.
3.4.4.3. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
It is less common for Canadian tax legislation to be made effective prior to any announce-
ment date.
Generally this type of change is restricted to neutral, corrective amendments, such as 
those that fix numbering, cross-referencing and linguistic errors. For example, the 2010 
Budget proposes to correct an unintended inconsistency between French and English ver-
sions of subsection 15(2) of the ITA, dealing with shareholder benefits in respect of out-
standing loans. This amendment will apply to loans arising in the 1990 and subsequent 
taxation years.
The more troubling category of retroactivity is the phenomenon of remedial retroac-
tive tax legislation, that is, amendments used to ‘clarify’ a tax provision so as to prohibit a 
particular tax avoidance strategy, ‘overrule’ an unfavourable judicial decision, or both. The 
2005 amendment to the GAAR, noted above, is a recent example.
3.4.4.4. Pending legal proceedings
a. Influence of retroactive tax statutes
Legislation that is retroactive to the announcement date will affect pending legal proceed-
ings, assuming that those legal proceedings deal with substantive issues arising in the 
period after the announcement/effective date. Given the time it takes for disputed issues to 
move through the objection and appeal process in Canada, it is unlikely that this problem 
arises very often. However, it can occur where there are long delays between the announce-
46.	 Canada,	Department	of	Finance,	‘Canada’s	New	Government	Announces	Tax	Fairness	Plan’,	News	Release	
no.	2006-061	(31	October	2006).
47.	 Budget	Implementation	Act,	2007,	S.C.	2007,	c.	29,	amending	or	adding	ITA	ss.	104(16),	122(1),	122.1,	and	related	
provisions.
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ment and the enactment of legislation; in such cases the litigants are bound by the 
amended law.48
It is unclear to what extent legislation that is retroactive prior to announcement can 
affect pending legal proceedings that turn on substantive issues which arose years in the 
past (but after the effective date). In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed 
that the 2005 retroactive amendment to the GAAR was valid, yet stated that the amendment 
could not affect the taxpayer’s appeal as it had already proceeded through the Tax Court and 
the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis of the unrevised GAAR.49 The Supreme Court 
avoided discussing this issue any further by observing that it made no difference which 
version of the GAAR was applied in the case.
b. Pending legal proceedings excluded from application of retroactivity?
Generally there is no express exception made for pending legal proceedings when substan-
tive legislation operates retroactively. In the case of remedial legislation designed to address 
an issue raised in litigation, the Department of Finance may consider the guidelines men-
tioned at 3.4.3.3 above when setting the effective date. Where there is a substantial amount 
of revenue at risk and the relevant proceedings are at an early stage, Parliament or the rele-
vant provincial legislature may enact retroactive measures specifically to forestall the liti-
gants’ claims, as the British Columbia legislature did in Air Canada v. British Columbia,50 
discussed at 3.4.5.2. However, the courts may decide (as in Canada Trustco) that it is inappro-
priate to apply the revised law if the proceedings are at an advanced stage. Where the retro-
active rule is itself a procedural rule, the Department of Finance generally takes this into 
consideration and specifies that the rule is effective only for proceedings instituted after a 
certain date. A good example is the introduction of the large corporation objection rules, 
discussed at 3.4.2.7.b above.
It should be noted that, although pending legal proceedings may be affected by a 
retroactive change, completed legal proceedings are generally immune. Canada has a long 
history of excusing successful litigants from retroactive curative legislation, either by 
express exception in the legislation or by unexpressed administrative concession.51 Perhaps 
this is because the Department of Finance recognizes that pursuing proceedings in court 
could be seen by citizens as a futile exercise if retroactive measures could deny them the 
fruits of victory, which would undermine the integrity of the legal system.
3.4.4.5. Favourable retroactivity
There are various examples of favourable retroactive measures in Canadian tax law. For 
example, there was concern that the lifetime capital gains exemption on a disposition of 
qualified small business corporation shares might be denied in circumstances that Parlia-
48.	 E.g.	Huet	v.	Canada	[1995]	1	C.T.C.	367	(F.C.T.D.).
49.	 Canada	Trustco,	supra	note	9,	para.	7.	
50.	 Supra	note	21.
51.	 For	example,	in	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	v.	Sparrow	Electric	Corp.	[1997]	1	S.C.R.	411,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	held	
that	the	Royal	Bank’s	security	interest	in	the	assets	of	an	insolvent	corporation	ranked	ahead	of	the	government’s	
trust	interest	in	certain	unremitted	payroll	deductions.	Parliament	responded	by	amending	the	ITA,	essentially	
providing	that	the	government’s	interest	in	an	employer’s	unremitted	source	deductions	is	superior	to	the	interest	
of	any	secured	creditor.	The	amendments	were	announced	in	1997	and	enacted	in	1998,	retroactive	to	1994,	with	an	
express	exception	for	the	Royal	Bank.	A	similar	example	in	the	provincial	context	arose	from	the	case	of	Re	Eurig	
Estate,	supra	note	21.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	determined	that	an	Ontario	regulation	imposing	probate	fees	
was	invalid	because	it	effectively	imposed	a	tax	without	statutory	authority,	contrary	to	the	Constitution	Act,	1867.	
The	Ontario	legislature	retroactively	neutered	this	decision	by	enacting	the	Estate	Administration	Tax	Act,	1998,	S.O.	
1998,	c.	34,	with	a	specific	exemption	for	the	estate	of	Mr	Eurig.	See	also	Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6,	at	pp.	743–45.
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ment did not intend, based on an unexpected interpretation by the Federal Court of Appeal 
of the rule in subsection 256(9) of the ITA (which deals with the timing of acquisition of 
control of a corporation). The 2009 Budget amended the timing rule to ensure that it does 
not have this result,52 generally retroactive to 2006. More recently, the 2010 Budget pro-
poses to amend paragraph 8(1)(b) of the ITA to allow greater scope for the deduction by 
employees of legal fees paid to collect or establish a right to income, effective for fees paid 
after 2000. Both of these changes will benefit Canadian taxpayers.
3.4.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.4.5.1. In general
Almost all of the Canadian case law, like that of the United Kingdom, deals with retroactiv-
ity as an issue of statutory interpretation and application. There is a common law presump-
tion that legislation operates prospectively and not retroactively (or retrospectively), yet 
this presumption is fully rebuttable where Parliament expresses a contrary intention. The 
leading case is Gustavson Drilling, where Justice Dickson referred to the general rule that 
‘statutes are not to be construed as having retrospective operation unless such a construc-
tion is expressly or by necessary implication required by the language of the Act’.53 In subse-
quent cases the courts have refused to elevate this interpretive presumption to the level of a 
constitutional principle. The only constitutional limitation is in respect of criminal offences. 
Outside of the criminal law context, where Parliament has dictated that an enactment is to 
be considered effective as of a particular date in the past, Canadian courts have no choice 
but to apply the law as expressed. This is an aspect of parliamentary sovereignty/supremacy 
as understood in both British and Canadian constitutional law.54
3.4.5.2. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
In tax legislation the common law rebuttable presumption of non-retroactivity is invariably 
displaced by an express statement of the effective date for the provisions. Some taxpayers 
who perceive that the retroactive effect of a particular tax enactment is unfair have insti-
tuted court proceedings in which they have advanced arguments based on the Charter,55 the 
Bill of Rights,56 and unwritten constitutional principles. All of these challenges have failed.
Let us consider the Charter arguments first. Canada, like many other countries, has 
prohibited retroactive criminal legislation in its written Constitution. Paragraphs 11(g) and 
11(i) of the Charter limit Parliament’s power to enact retroactive criminal offences and 
retroactive increases in criminal penalties, much like Article 7 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’). At one time it was 
believed that section 7 of the Charter might be a basis for challenging retroactivity of 
non-criminal laws, including tax laws.57 Section 7 provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
52.	 Budget	Implementation	Act,	2009,	S.C.	2009,	c.	2,	s.	78,	amending	ITA	s.	256(9)	[enacted	in	response	to	La	Surviv-
ance	v.	The	Queen	[2007]	1	C.T.C.	189,	2006	FCA	129].
53.	 Gustavson	Drilling,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	279.
54.	 Colonial	Sugar	Refining	Co.	Ltd.	v.	Irving	[1906]	A.C.	360	(P.C.),	at	p.	366;	James	v.	Internal	Revenue	Commissioners	
[1977]	S.T.C.	240	(Ch.),	at	p.	244.
55.	 Supra	note	37.
56.	 Supra	note	38.
57.	 Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6,	pp.	736–39.
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Taxpayers have invoked section 7 in various challenges to fiscal legislation, in the belief that 
‘security of the person’ encompasses economic security. That belief was dashed by Canadian 
courts, which have consistently held that section 7 does not protect purely economic 
rights.58
The most relevant case in this area is Air Canada v. British Columbia,59 in which a num-
ber of airlines sought restitution of provincial gasoline taxes they had previously paid. A 
decision of the Privy Council had found a similar tax to be ultra vires the provincial legisla-
ture because it was not a ‘direct tax’ as required by the Constitution Act, 1867. The province 
remedied its gasoline tax statute in 1976 and amended it further in 1981, expressly provid-
ing that amounts collected under the unconstitutional provisions were ‘conclusively 
deemed to have been confiscated by the government without compensation’, retroactive to 
1974. The airlines contended that they were entitled to be reimbursed for moneys paid 
between 1974 and 1976 because the purported retroactivity was unlawful. That argument 
was rejected by the Court. Justice La Forest, agreeing with the courts below, was ‘unable to 
see any constitutional impediment’ to the province enacting the retroactive taxation provi-
sions.60 He held that the Charter right to life, liberty or security of the person was not 
engaged: the retroactive enactment merely required the appellants to pay taxes in the same 
way as other purchasers of gasoline in the province. In subsequent cases where taxpayers 
have challenged the retroactive effects of fiscal legislation, the courts have cited Air Canada 
in concluding that there is no nexus between taxation and a person’s life, liberty or securi-
ty.61
Taxpayers in Canada have also challenged federal tax laws under the Bill of Rights. In 
contrast to section 7 of the Charter, paragraph 1(a) of the Bill of Rights grants limited pro-
tection to an individual’s life, liberty, security and ‘enjoyment of property’, stating that he 
shall not be deprived thereof except ‘by due process of law’. In this respect the Bill of Rights 
is similar to Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. At one time it was thought that argu-
ments based on the Bill of Rights might be sustained in Canada, following American case 
law interpreting the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, at least for very long-term 
retroactivity.62 The taxpayer in Huet raised both section 7 of the Charter and paragraph 1(a) 
of the Bill of Rights in challenging a tax amendment that was retroactive to a time 16 
months before its enactment (the date of the announcement). Justice Noël held that the Bill 
of Rights argument could not succeed because it was impliedly rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Gustavson Drilling and Air Canada.63
Arguments based on constitutional principles that underlie the Canadian legal sys-
tem, in particular the principles of legal certainty and the rule of law, have not been vigor-
ously pursued in this country. The Supreme Court of Canada has on occasion emphasized 
that there are ‘vital unstated assumptions’ that underlie and inform the entire constitu-
tional text, particularly the principles of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.64 
However, attempts by lawyers to invoke these principles when arguing against retroactive 
tax laws, as in Huet, have failed. More recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that 
these principles have little, if any, justiciable content. In Imperial Tobacco (which was not a 
tax case), Justice Major for the Court stated:
58.	 E.g.	Irwin	Toy	Ltd.	v.	Quebec	(Attorney	General)	[1989]	1	S.C.R.	927.
59.	 Supra	note	21.
60.	 Supra	note	21,	at	pp.	1192–93.
61.	 E.g.	Hokhold	v.	Canada	[1993]	2	C.T.C.	99	(F.C.T.D.),	paras.	28–34;	Huet,	supra	note	48,	paras.	23–31.
62.	 Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6,	at	pp.	734–36.
63.	 Huet,	supra	note	48,	paras.	32–35.
64.	 Reference	re	Secession	of	Quebec	[1998]	2	S.C.R.	217,	paras.	32,	49–51;	Reference	re	Remuneration	of	Judges	of	the	
Provincial	Court	of	Prince	Edward	Island	[1997]	3	S.C.R.	3,	paras.	89–92;	Reference	re	Manitoba	Language	Rights	
[1985]	1	S.C.R.	721,	at	pp.	747–52.
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Except for criminal law, the retrospectivity and retroactivity of which is limited by 
s. 11(g) of the Charter, there is no requirement of legislative prospectivity embodied 
in the rule of law or in any provision of our Constitution.65
Some commentators nevertheless argue that a court might rely on the rule of law to curtail 
the retroactive reach of tax legislation if the retroactivity were extreme.66 To date this has not 
happened.
3.4.5.3. Examination method
Examinations of retroactivity are not extensive in Canadian case law. Typically there is a 
brief reference to the common law rebuttable presumption that legislation is not retroac-
tive (or retrospective) unless otherwise expressed, followed by an affirmation that Parlia-
ment has supreme legislative authority.67 The courts that have been presented with argu-
ments based on section 7 of the Charter, paragraph 1(a) of the Bill of Rights, and the rule of 
law principle have done little more than assert that such rules and principles do not limit 
retroactive tax legislation, citing the relevant case precedents.
3.4.5.4. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
The ECHR is, of course, not applicable in Canada. The provision most analogous to Article 1 
of the First Protocol is paragraph 1(a) of the Bill of Rights, which states that an individual 
shall not be deprived of the ‘enjoyment of property’ except ‘by due process of law’. Canadian 
courts have concluded that this provision does not apply to retroactive tax legislation, par-
ticularly in the Huet decision. The analysis leading to that conclusion has been brief.
3.4.5.5. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
There is no such principle recognized in Canada, other than the common law rebuttable 
presumption of non-retroactivity, and similar interpretive rules, which can be seen as reflec-
tions of the principle of legal certainty. However, rebuttable interpretive presumptions do 
not have any constitutional status, as discussed at 3.4.5.2.
3.4.5.6. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
There are some instances where Canadian courts have applied the common law rebuttable 
presumption of prospectivity in order to avoid a retroactive or retrospective effect of legisla-
tion other than tax legislation. This occurs only where the legislation is ambiguous as to its 
intended effective date. The practice of prescribing effective dates and related transitional 
rules for all tax enactments ensures that there is no scope for the presumption to be applied 
to tax legislation.
65.	 Imperial	Tobacco,	supra	note	39,	para.	69.
66.	 See	Edinger,	supra	note	6,	at	pp.	16–23;	Loomer,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	82–89.
67.	 In	addition	to	the	examples	already	provided,	see:	MIL	(Investments)	S.A.	v.	The	Queen	[2006]	5	C.T.C.	2552,	2006	
TCC	460,	affirmed	[2007]	4	C.T.C.	235,	2007	FCA	236	(retroactivity	of	GAAR);	Gibson	v.	The	Queen	[2006]	2	C.T.C.	5,	
2005	FCA	180	(retrospectivity	of	10-year	limitation	period).
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3.4.5.7. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
Canada’s written Constitution does not set any express limits on the temporal effect of 
non-criminal laws. Canadian courts are hesitant to suggest any constitutional limitations 
on the legislative authority of Parliament beyond those that are expressed in the Charter 
and the other provisions of the written Constitution. As noted above, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has stated that the rule of law is one of the ‘vital unstated assumptions’ that under-
lie and inform the Canadian Constitution. However, Canadian courts have not yet been 
willing to regard the rule of law as a principle that can be invoked in order to limit Parlia-
ment’s authority to legislate in the past. This judicial reluctance is perhaps understandable 
given the uncertain boundaries of the ‘rule of law’.
3.4.6. Retroactivity of case law
3.4.6.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
Canada follows the tradition of the United Kingdom in placing great emphasis on the com-
mon law. Developments in the common law are generally considered to have retroactive 
and retrospective effect, on the theory that the courts are interpreting and explaining what 
the law has always been.68
An exception is recognized, however, where the Supreme Court acknowledges that it 
has abandoned or shifted away from prior case law. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop,69 
the Supreme Court observed that where judicial intervention results in a ‘substantial 
change’ in the law (particularly in constitutional adjudication), factors such as good faith 
reliance by governments, fairness to the litigants, and the need to respect the constitutional 
role of legislatures must be considered in order to determine whether it is appropriate to 
limit the retroactive effect of any remedy.70 In Hislop, the judicial recognition in 1999 of the 
equality rights of same-sex couples was held to be such a substantial change; thus the rem-
edy sought was limited to 1999 and later years.
A related exception to the general retroactive and retrospective effect of case law is 
where a court issues a ‘suspended declaration of invalidity’. This is not common, but it can 
occur where a law is found to be inconsistent with the written Constitution and the court 
wishes to allow Parliament (or the relevant provincial legislature) a period of time to enact 
alternative legislation. This may be done where striking down the offending law with imme-
diate and retroactive effect could ‘pose a danger to the public’, ‘threaten the rule of law’, or 
‘result in the deprivation of benefits from deserving persons’.71 Suspended declarations of 
invalidity of tax statutes have been ordered where the court accepted that an immediate 
and retroactive declaration would result in ‘fiscal chaos’, as was ordered in Eurig Estate.72 The 
use of suspended declarations of invalidity by courts has an interesting connection with 
retroactive tax legislation. In Kingstreet Investments, Justice Bastarache for the Court made 
the following comments [emphasis added]:
68.	 Imperial	Tobacco,	supra	note	39,	para.	72,	citing	In	re	Spectrum	Plus	Ltd.	[2005]	2	A.C.	680,	[2005]	UKHL	41,	para.	7.
69.	 [2007]	1	S.C.R.	429,	2007	SCC	10.
70.	 Id.,	paras.	99–107.
71.	 Id.,	para.	121.
72.	 Eurig	Estate,	supra	note	21.
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‘This appeal concerns whether restitution is available for the recovery of monies col-
lected under legislation that is subsequently declared to be ultra vires. For the reasons 
given below, I find that restitution is generally available.’
…
My view is that concerns regarding potential fiscal chaos are best left to Parliament 
and the legislatures to address, should they choose to do so. Where the state leads 
evidence before the court establishing a real concern about fiscal chaos, it is open to 
the court to suspend the declaration of invalidity to enable government to address 
the issue. In Eurig, Major J. suspended a declaration of invalidity for six months. 
Because, in that case, unconstitutionally levied probate fees were used to defray the 
costs of court administration in the Province, he expressed concern that an immedi-
ate deprivation of this source of revenue might have harmful consequences for the 
administration of justice. Moreover, this Court’s decision in Air Canada demonstrates 
that it will be open to Parliament and to the legislatures to enact valid taxes and 
apply them retroactively, so as to limit or deny recovery of ultra vires taxes. Obviously, 
such legislation must also be constitutionally sound.73
Thus, in Canada, the proceeds of an unconstitutional tax can generally be retained if 
Parliament or the provincial legislature chooses to enact a revised retroactive tax.
3.4.7. Views in the literature
3.4.7.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
There is not a great deal of literature regarding retroactive taxation in Canada. Articles 
written by practitioners tend to criticize all forms of retroactive tax laws, asserting that such 
laws are inherently unfair to taxpayers and harmful to the integrity of the Canadian tax 
system.74 Academic lawyers have analysed whether retroactive tax laws (or other retroactive 
laws) are subject to scrutiny under the Charter, the Bill of Rights or unwritten constitutional 
principles. These authors tend to recognize that retroactive legislation is acceptable in areas 
where there has been an official announcement for taxpayers to rely upon, where there is no 
issue of taxpayer reliance, where a benefit is being extended, or where it is necessary to stop 
highly aggressive avoidance schemes that threaten the integrity of the tax system.75 There is 
a consistently held view, however, that tax legislation made retroactive prior to any 
announcement date, possibly to overrule an unfavourable judicial decision, is incompatible 
with the fundamental requirements of the rule of law.76 It is felt that such retroactivity 
should be limited in some way, either ex ante through an official practice in Parliament, or 
ex post through judicial application of the rule of law.
3.4.7.2. Debate on law and economics view on transition law
This debate is not currently happening in Canada, although the law and economics meth-
odology is influential in other areas. Perhaps the debate in the US will begin to have some 
influence in the near future.
73.	 Kingstreet	Investments,	supra	note	9,	paras.	12,	25.
74.	 E.g.	J.	McCart	and	B.	Morris,	‘The	Income	Tax	Conventions	Interpretation	Act	–	Unilateral	Treaty	Amendment?’	
(Parts	I	and	II),	31	Canadian	Tax	Journal	(1983),	at	p.	1022,	32	Canadian	Tax	Journal	(1984),	at	p.	98;	H.J.	Kellough,	
‘The	Legislative	Process:	Legislation	by	Press	Release	and	the	Need	for	a	More	Open	Process’	in:	1998	Conference	
Report	(Toronto:	Canadian	Tax	Foundation,	1999),	p.	3:1.
75.	 Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6;	Loomer,	supra	note	16,	McDonnell,	supra	note	16.
76.	 Sherbaniuk,	supra	note	6;	Loomer,	supra	note	16,	McDonnell,	supra	nota	16.
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It is implicitly recognized by the authors cited at 3.4.7.1, although the word ‘ efficiency’ is 
not used, that it is ‘efficient’ to align a revised law with taxpayer expectations as soon as 
possible, which may justify having tax legislation made effective from the date of a Budget 
announcement or other official announcement. The current author is not  convinced that 
making a law retroactive to a time prior to any announcement, such that it could not have 
been known or relied upon, is welfare-enhancing.
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3.5.
Denmark
Aage Michelsen 
Jacob Graff Nielsen
3.5.1. Terminology
3.5.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
Danish legal theory employs the concept of retroactivity whereas the concept of retrospec-
tivity is not acknowledged as a separate legal concept. However, it seems that the concept of 
retrospectivity more or less corresponds to the concept of non-actual retroactivity in Danish 
legal theory.1 We shall elaborate further on this concept below.
It is important to emphasize that retroactive legislation is not prohibited pursuant to 
the Danish Constitution. At the same time it must be noted that it is a fundamental legisla-
tive principle in Danish law that a statute that toughens the legal status for taxpayers is only 
given retroactive effect if this is found to be absolutely necessary. The assessment of neces-
sity is based on the legislative reasons for and proportionality of the retroactivity. In effect, 
it often comes down to a political assessment whether retroactive legislation is deemed 
necessary. Retroactive tax law statutes occur relatively often in Denmark. 
The legal concept of retroactivity2 corresponds to the Dutch conceptualization: The 
effective entrance date of one or more provisions of a statute precedes the date on which the 
statute enters into force. This definition is developed further in Danish legal theory by dis-
tinguishing between material and formal retroactivity. Material retroactivity concerns a 
situation where (provisions of) a statute has legal effect on dispositions or facts that have 
taken place before the statute enters into force by promulgation. Whereas Dutch legal dis-
course makes use of the terminology of formal retroactivity in this case, the corresponding 
Danish concept is material retroactivity. According to Danish legal theory, formal retroactiv-
ity occurs when (tax) authorities administer or apply (provisions of) a statute before the 
statute enters into force.
Consequently, the terminology of Dutch and Danish legal theory differs on use of the 
terms ‘material’ and ‘formal’ retroactivity.
Recently, several cases of formal retroactivity in connection with tax legislation have 
caused political debate in the Danish parliament (Folketinget). For instance, the Danish 
Government raised the age limit for last date of payment of capital pensions in connection 
1.	 In	Danish:	Uægte	tilbagevirkende	kraft.	It	is	difficult	to	translate	the	concept	to	English.	The	phrase	‘non-actual’	is	
chosen	to	indicate	that	this	type	of	retroactivity	is	in	effect	not	considered	retroactive	according	to	Danish	legal	
theory.
2.	 In	Danish:	Tilbagevirkende	kraft.
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with the recent and comprehensive Danish tax reform.3 Before the statute was put into 
effect the Minister of Taxation contacted the pension institutes and requested that the insti-
tutes administer the new statute by withholding payments of capital pensions regardless of 
the original age limit until the new bill was passed and had entered into force. The request 
thus included capital pensions that exceeded the original age limit for payment of capital 
pensions in the period from the introduction of the bill to the date on which the statute was 
put into force. This procedure was criticized by political parties that are not members of the 
Government and the Tax Minister later recalled the request to the pension institutes. The 
statute includes some quite unusual provisions on the effect of the statute to remedy the 
effect of this very special procedure that can be considered an example of formal retroactiv-
ity.
3.5.1.2. Conceptual variations
a. In general
In Danish legal theory it is debated whether it is correct to use the terminology that a stat-
ute ‘enters into force’ retroactively or that a statute ‘has retroactive effect’.4 However, this 
debate is primarily academic and it is generally accepted that both terms cover the same 
situation.
Furthermore, Danish legal theory distinguishes between actual and non-actual retro-
activity. Whereas actual retroactivity covers the concept of (material) retroactivity as men-
tioned above, non-actual retroactivity more or less corresponds to the Dutch concept of 
retrospectivity or material retroactivity. In Danish legal theory, non-actual retroactive legis-
lation refers to the situation where an amendment to a statute or a law reform has effect on 
past events for the future without grandfathering.
b. Clear distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
The distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity is not acknowledged in Danish 
legal theory, but the Danish concepts of actual and non-actual retroactivity resemble the 
distinction to a great extent. The considerations against actual retroactive legislation are 
also relevant in the case of non-actual retroactivity, but this type of retroactivity is in fact not 
considered retroactive. A closer examination of Danish legislative practice reveals that 
non-actual retroactivity is avoided if at all possible to such an extent that transitional provi-
sions are extensive and very complicated.
Recently, a case of non-actual retroactivity has caused debate in the Danish media.5 
In February 2009 a bill concerning the taxation of stock gains obtained via foreign and 
non-EU investment institutes was passed.6 The effect of this amendment was that taxation 
of gains or losses via foreign and non-EU investment institutes changed from realization 
taxation to yearly taxation of unrealized gains or losses. The relevant provision had effect 
from the income year of 2009 while the statute as such came into force on 13 February 2009. 
This was, of course, actual and material retroactivity. However, the consequence of the 
change from realization taxation to yearly taxation of unrealized gains or losses from 2009 
was that losses accrued before 2009 were not taken into consideration in some instances. 
3.	 Spring	Tax	Reform	2.0	(Forårspakke	2.0),	Bill	200,	2008-2009	passed	as	statute	412	on	May	29,	2009.	The	relevant	
provisions	concerning	the	age	limit	of	payment	of	capital	pension	has	effect	for	capital	pensions	that	have	not	been	
taxed	at	the	date	on	which	the	statute	was	put	into	force	(31	May	2009).
4.	 It	is	difficult	to	translate	the	nuance	difference	between	the	Danish	terms;	enter	into	force	(træde	i	kraft)	and	have	
effect	(have	virkning).	Cf.	Peter	Germer,	Statsforfatningsret	I,	(DJØF	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	2007),	at	p.	143.	
5.	 Cf.	Morgenavisen	Jyllands	Posten,	Erhvervsweekend,	Saturday,	20th	of	June,	2009,	at	p.	1	and	p.	5.
6.	 Bill	23,	2008-2009,	passed	as	Statute	98	on	2	February	2009.
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Thus, the statute did not grandfather accrued but unrealized losses from before the date of 
entry into force of the statute. This effect was only relevant for investments via a company in 
foreign non-EU investment institutes. The second aspect of retroactivity of this statute can 
be compared with the concept of retrospectivity which is called non-actual retroactivity in 
Danish legal theory. It is worth noting that the Danish Minister of Taxation amended the 
transitional provision due to the criticism, hereby ensuring that accrued losses are taken 
into account.7 This example illustrates the effort the Danish Ministry of Taxation makes to 
avoid retrospectivity even though retrospectivity is not prohibited pursuant to the Danish 
Constitution. 
c. Relevance of tax period
In some countries, the situation that, during a fiscal year, the income tax rules are changed 
as from the beginning of the fiscal year is not considered retroactive, the reason being that 
the income tax obligation only arises at the end of the income year (tax period approach). 
In these countries, a conceptual distinction is made between a statute that applies to 
a previous year (actual retroactivity) and a statute that applies as from the beginning of the 
current year (de facto retroactivity).
In Danish legal discourse, the above-mentioned distinction between actual retroac-
tivity and de facto retroactivity is not relevant. For instance, if a tax statute in Denmark 
enters into force on 1 July 2009 with effect from 1 January 2009 this is simply considered 
material retroactivity. As a rule, income taxes in Denmark are also assessed on a yearly basis, 
but the income year for corporations can be staggered. Therefore, income years and fiscal 
assessment years do not necessarily correspond, which would mean that new tax statutes 
would be considered retroactive for some corporations with staggered income years while 
this would not be the case for other corporations. This is assumed to be one of the reasons 
for not acknowledging the tax period approach in Denmark.
3.5.1.3. Interpretative statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
The concept of interpretive statute is not acknowledged in Danish legal theory although 
statutes that amend and thereby in effect interpret another retroactive statute are not 
uncommon. The interpretation of statutes does not always require an amendment by a new 
statute in Denmark and tax law statutes are to a high degree interpreted by the courts or 
even by rulings from administrative tax authorities. As the Danish interpretational tradition 
is relatively pragmatic, vagueness and ambiguity can be solved by practice. The Danish Tax 
Administration (SKAT) issues a large number of administrative notices8 of an interpreta-
tional nature.
If retroactive tax law statutes are amended by another statute with effect from the 
effective entrance date of the original statute, the latest statute is considered retroactive in a 
material respect. The necessity of applying retroactive effect to the amendment is consid-
ered separately, but in many cases the same criteria that gave reason to the retroactivity of 
the first statute are also relevant for the (interpretational) amendment.
A specific principle of authentic interpretation has been acknowledged in earlier 
Danish legal theory, which now is considered obsolete.9 Authentic interpretation meant 
7.	 Statute	1388	promulgated	on	21	December	2009	(Bill	55	2009/2010).,
8.	 In	Danish	these	administrative	notices	are	called:	Styresignaler	og	meddelelser.	These	notices	are	published	on	
SKAT’s	homepage:	www.skat.dk.
9.	 Cf.	Poul	Andersen,	Forvaltningsret,	5.	ed.,	(Gyldendal	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	1965),	at	p.	28	and	Germer,	supra	
note	4,	at	pp.	147-48.
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that a new statute could ascribe retroactivity to itself by containing information about the 
interpretation of a previous statute. According to authentic interpretation, retroactivity was 
not relevant if the meaning of a previous statute could be clarified by common interpreta-
tion principles. 
It is now assumed in current legal discourse that authentic interpretation of a retro-
active nature requires the same assessment of necessity as retroactive legislation. 
Actually, Danish legal discourse does not require a conception of interpretative stat-
utes as retroactivity is not prohibited according to the Danish Constitution. From a Danish 
perspective it seems that the need for a separate notion of interpretative statutes is based on 
restrictions on the use of retroactive legislation. Interpretative statutes become a means to 
allow retroactivity by ascribing an authentic interpretative purpose to the interpretative 
statute, thus reducing the general objections against retroactivity. 
Interpretational problems in connection with tax law statutes are either solved by 
passing amendments, by court rulings or by changing administrative practice or issuing 
administrative notices. The distinction between interpretive statutes and other statutes 
(actual amendments) is not relevant in Danish legal theory. From a Danish perspective it 
seems quite difficult, if not even impossible, to make such a distinction.
Interpretational clarification of a retroactive statute with a date of effect that corre-
sponds to the retroactive effect of the original statute can only be accomplished by a new 
retroactive statute. 
3.5.1.4. Validation statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘validation statutes’ known?
It is essential to emphasize that general retroactive changes to administrative tax law prac-
tice in a way that is unfavourable to taxpayers is not allowed in Denmark. This was estab-
lished by the Danish Supreme Court in 198410 and has been confirmed in subsequent court 
rulings, cf. TfS 1984, 138 Ø, TfS 1986, 615 H.
The concept of validation statutes is not acknowledged in Danish legal discourse. 
Retroactive changes to practice by a validation statute would be considered a worrying 
approach in Danish law, but the Danish Constitution does not prohibit that the legislator 
changes practice retroactively. As a consequence, the problem is of a politico-legal charac-
ter. If the legislator should choose to abandon a favourable practice which has been devel-
oped by the courts of law with retroactive effect, this approach could be contrary to the 
provision on resumption in the Tax Administration Act sec. 25 (1) (7). According to this 
provision, tax assessments can be reopened in favour of the taxpayer if practice has been 
overruled by the courts, the National Danish Tax Tribunal or if the tax administration as 
informed about a change of practice. In these cases, tax assessments concerning the same 
income year which was relevant in case sub judice can be reopened. It is always, however, at 
least possible to request reopening of tax assessment concerning income years three years 
before the passing of the ruling in the first overruling case. 
3.5.1.5. Comparison moment
Pursuant to sec. 22 of the Danish Constitution, all statues have to be promulgated to be 
valid and the procedure of promulgation is regulated in the Danish Law Gazette Act.11 Sec-
tion 3 of the Danish Law Gazette Act stipulates that statutes come into force at the begin-
10.	 Cf.	UfR	1983.8	H	and	Aage	Michelsen	et	al.,	Lærebog	om	indkomstskat,	14.	ed.,	(DJØF	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	2011),	
at	p.	118.
11.	 Cf.	Consolidated	act	on	Law	Gazette	no.	608	issued	on	June	24,	2008	(in	Danish:	Lovtidendeloven).	
215
Michelsen & Graff Nielsen  Part 3   3.5. Denmark – 3.5.1.6. 
ning of the 24-hour period ensuing the 24-hour period in which the statute is published in 
the Gazette. For instance, if a statute is published in the Gazette on 1 October 2009, the 
statute comes into effect the exact moment the clock passes midnight between 1 October 
and 2 October 2009. It is, of course, possible for the parliament to introduce another date 
and time of effect for a statute including a date and time that is retroactive, but this has to 
be expressly stipulated in the statute.
It is considered a basic interpretation principle that statutes – as a rule – only have 
effect on future events and dispositions. As a consequence, it has to be obvious in the provi-
sions concerning the effect of the statute that retroactivity is intended.12 A disputed example 
of this interpretation principle contra retroactivity concerns change of provisions in con-
nection with resumption of tax assessment.
UfR 1999.1480 H: This Supreme Court ruling concerns an amendment to the former 
Tax Administration Act sec. 35. Pursuant to the original phrasing of sec. 35, the Tax Adminis-
tration could reassume the tax assessment no later than three years after the expiration of 
the relevant assessment year. This resumption provision was amended by a statute which 
came into effect on 1 January 1996. According to the new phrasing of sec. 35, the Tax Admin-
istration could reassume tax assessment no later than 1 May, the fourth year after the expi-
ration of year which the tax assessment concerned. On 1 April 1996, the Tax Administration 
gave notice of a resumption of a tax assessment concerning the income year of 1992. This 
was only possible according to the new phrasing of the Tax Administration Act sec. 35 which 
came into effect on 1 January 1996. A majority of the Supreme Court judges (3-2) came to 
the conclusion that the retroactive effect of the amendment was sufficiently indicated in 
legislative material.13 
The relevant moment of comparison when establishing whether a statute is retroac-
tive is the time of promulgation or publication of the relevant statute.14 
3.5.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
a. Definition of retrospectivity
As mentioned above, retrospectivity as a concept does not exist in Danish legal discourse. 
However, the Danish terminology of non-actual retroactivity seems to cover the same situa-
tion as, for instance, the Dutch concept of material retroactivity or retrospectivity. To clarify 
this further, that Danish terminology operates in three different situations:
– Facta praeterita: Legislation with effect on past events and/or transactions and described 
as material and actual retroactive.
– Facta futura: Legislation with effect on future events and/or dispositions. This sort of 
legislation is not considered retroactive in any way. 
– Facta pendentia: Legislation with effect on continuous events and/or transactions. This 
sort of legislation covers events that occur partly before and partly after the point of time 
when the relevant statute comes into effect. 
It is disputed in Danish legal discourse whether the last-mentioned sort of legislation 
can be considered retroactive at all and the literature concerning non-actual retroactivity is 
not extensive. Generally, it is concluded that non-actual retroactive legislation involves 
some of the same challenges for due process protection as (actual) material retroactivity. In 
connection with tax law statutes it can be considered customary to introduce transitional 
rules that take into consideration continuous events. If, for instance, an asset that was 
12.	 Cf.	UfR	1996.68	H	(insufficient	indication	of	retroactivity),	UfR	1996.1474	Ø	(insufficient	indication	of	retroactivity),	
UfR	1999.1480	H	(sufficient	indication	of	retroactivity).
13.	 This	ruling	is	criticized	by	Germer,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	149.
14.	 Cf.	Germer,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	148.
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exempt from taxation before the introduction of a new statute is covered by capital gains 
taxation with effect from 1 January 2009, asset value added before the date of effect will 
normally be exempt from taxation. In this way, non-actual retroactivity is generally avoided.
As actual material retroactivity is allowed by the Danish Constitution, non-actual 
retroactivity can also occur. Generally, non-actual retroactive tax law statutes require the 
same assessment of necessity as actual material retroactivity. 
b. Examples of retrospectivity
Non-actual retroactivity is discussed above in section 3.5.1.2. 
3.5.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
a. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect
A distinction between substantive and procedural statutes is not part of Danish legal dis-
course on retroactivity. However, a case law study indicates that a distinction between pro-
cedural retroactivity and substantive statutes can be registered. The case (UfR 1999.1480 H) 
mentioned in section 3.5.1.5 can be considered an example of a procedural statute with 
immediate effect. The change of the former Tax Administration Act was disadvantageous to 
the taxpayer as the amendment allowed resumption of a tax assessment that was not possi-
ble pursuant to the former phrasing of the provision at hand. Nonetheless, the Danish 
Supreme Court allowed the procedural retroactivity as it was found to be the intention of 
the legislator. The implications of this ruling are disputed.
The Danish High Court came to another conclusion in a case concerning procedural 
rules on debt collection cf. UfR 1998.1086 Ø. The case concerned a demand for payment that 
was made before a statute came into effect that changed the requirements for this type of 
demand. The Danish High Court found that it was unsubstantiated to assume that the 
demand for payment made before the date of effect of the amendment should meet the 
requirements of the new statute to form the grounds for an ensuing execution. Though this 
case does not relate to tax procedure, it might indicate that the Danish interpretational 
principle contra retroactivity also applies in cases concerning procedural retroactivity.
However, this point of view is contradicted by the Danish Supreme Court in a later 
case cf. UfR 2000.1682 H. In this case the Supreme Court concluded that if a statute imple-
menting changes in criminal procedure does not contain transitional provisions the statute 
at hand applies to ongoing criminal cases. It would appear that this case contradicts the 
High Court ruling referred in UfR 1998.1086 Ø, but it is assumed that it is not possible to 
generalize from these two cases.15
These cases indicate that Danish legal theory and case law are not consistent as 
regards procedural retroactivity. 
b. Rules considered procedural rules
As mentioned, the distinction between substantive and procedural statutes in Denmark is 
far from consistent and of dubious value in connection with retroactivity. The Danish under-
standing of procedural rules includes all provisions concerning administrative tax com-
plaints, tax assessment procedure, time limits for filing complaints and resumption, rules 
regarding evidence and burden of proof. etc. 
15.	 Cf.	Germer,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	147.	
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3.5.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.5.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
As mentioned above in section 3.5.1.1, the Danish Constitution does not impose limitations 
on the retroactivity of tax statutes. The interpretation principle contra retroactivity implies 
the existence of a requirement for explicit consent from the legislator to retroactive statutes. 
This principle could be considered constitutional, but is has not been acknowledged as such 
in Danish legal discourse. 
The fundamental reservations concerning retroactivity in Danish legal theory that is 
the reason for the assessment of necessity and the interpretation principle contra retroactiv-
ity are undoubtedly based on the above-mentioned principles including the principle of 
legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of equality and the 
principle of the rule of law. The nature of these principles is probably considered to be pri-
marily politico-legal rather than constitutional when it comes to retroactivity.
3.5.2.2. Transition policy of government
a. Is there a tax transition policy of government?
The Danish Ministry of Justice has issued Guidance on Legislation Quality16 that contains a 
brief account of retroactive legislation.17 Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice has issued a 
circular concerning provision on effect and promulgation.18 None of these two publications 
contain provisions on transition policy. The Danish Ministry of Taxation has no guidelines or 
official policy about transitional provisions that are available to the public.
However, it is evident that the Ministry of Taxation puts a lot of effort into drawing up 
transitional provisions in tax law statutes. As a rule, extra attention is also devoted to transi-
tional provisions in connection with preparatory work on retroactive tax law statutes. 
b. Transition policy laid down in a document or an Act
As no official guidelines or policy on transition exist, this question is to a lesser degree rele-
vant to Denmark. 
The responsibility regarding transitional provisions is primarily handled by the Min-
istry of Taxation with assistance from the Ministry of Justice. Due to the considerable atten-
tion to transition in connection with tax law statutes, the Danish parliament often includes 
transition and retroactivity in debates as part of the parliamentary readings. Furthermore, 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs often includes an assessment on the date of effect and transi-
tional provisions concerning tax statutes.
In 2006 the Danish Law Gazette Act was amended and according to the legislative 
history to the amendment it is common legislative practice for statutes to include provi-
sions on the statute’s date of effect and transitional matters. It was also concluded in the 
preparatory material to the amendment that statutes often deviate from the date of effect 
according to the Danish Law Gazette Act sec. 3.
c. Transition policy with respect to retroactivity and grandfathering
The considerations concerning retroactivity including the assessment of necessity and the 
criteria that form the basis of this assessment are mentioned above in section 3.5.1.1. No 
detailed transition policy or guidelines exist.
16.	 The	guidance	from	June	2005	is	available	at	the	Ministry	of	Justice’s	homepage:	www.jm.dk.	
17.	 Cf.	The	Ministry	of	Justice’s	Guidance	on	Legislation	Quality	section	4.3.3.
18.	 Circular	no.	4,	10	January,	1966.
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d. Transition policy and favourable retroactive effect
According to Danish legal discourse, retroactive statutes that favour the taxpayers are found 
all but unproblematic. As a consequence, the assessment of necessity often does not hinder 
that retroactive tax bills are passed if the bill at hand is favourable to taxpayer. 
3.5.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
In Denmark all ministerial bills pass a consultation process that includes a review by the 
Ministry of Justice.19 This review is partly of a legal-technical nature, but the review by the 
Ministry of Justice also includes constitutional principles, EU law and retroactivity. Ministe-
rial circular 9033 dated 12 November 1998 issued by the Danish Ministry of State contains a 
memorandum concerning the Ministry of Justice’s legal-technical review of bills. It is 
expressly mentioned in the memorandum that the review covers retroactivity. The review 
includes the bill’s compliance with the Danish Constitution, general legal principles, EU 
regulations, the European Convention of Human Rights and various Danish legislation. 
Furthermore, the bill’s wording is examined for precision and potential vagueness and the 
Ministry of Justice also reviews the underlying preparatory work. It is accentuated in the 
Ministry of Justice’s Guidelines on Legislation Quality that bills have to be presented to the 
ministry as soon as possible in the law-making process. 
No clear rules exist concerning the Ministry of Justice’s review of ministerial bills 
besides the Ministry of Justice’s Guidelines on Legislation Quality and these guidelines do 
not contain specific rules to review retroactivity, grandfathering or favourable retroactivity. 
As mentioned above, retroactive effect is considered far less problematic if the effect 
is granted to statutes that are favourable to taxpayers.
3.5.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.5.3.1. Legislating by press release
a. Use of ‘legislating by press release’
Promulgation by press release has occurred in Denmark, but not in connection with tax 
statutes. For instance, statutory intervention by the Government in connection with labour 
disputes has been published by radio and TV. Pursuant to sec. 6 in statute no. 289 which was 
passed on 20 May 1987, the statute came into effect at the beginning of 21 May 1987, 
whereas sec. 5 came into effect immediately. In this instance, the urgency required promul-
gation by special means. The same model was used in a similar situation, where a collective 
labour agreement was put into effect immediately by statute no. 317 dated 21 May 1999.
b. Types of situations
One of the best known cases regarding retroactivity is the Sudden Thaw case, cf. UfR 
1958.955 Ø. The police stopped a transport in the afternoon of 5 March 1956. The restric-
tions on driving in the sudden thaw period appeared from ministerial order no. 45 dated 3 
March 1956, and in which the time of effect was set to be 5 March 1956 at 6 a.m. The con-
tents of the ministerial order were transferred via Ritzau to all daily newspapers while the 
order was published in the Danish Law Gazette on 7 March. The Danish High Court found 
that immediate intervention was required and that this substantiated the ministerial 
order’s provisions with regard to the time of effect and the unusual promulgation as neces-
sary means to take care of vital interests.
19.	 Cf.	Jens	Drejer,	‘Lovgivningsprocessen	på	skatteområdet’,	in:	Festsskrift	til	Ole	Bjørn,	(DJØF	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	
2004),	at	pp.	193-94.
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Retroactivity by press release is very uncommon in Danish legislative practice other than in 
legislation in connection with collective agreement negotiations that break down and 
result in strikes, cf. section 3.1.1. 
3.5.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
a. In general
Retroactive effect that goes back further than the date on which the bill is introduced in the 
parliament is also very uncommon as regards tax statutes. Statute no. 614 dated 19 Decem-
ber 1984 concerning share sale to holding companies had effect on all share sales in 1984. 
However, the statute offered the possibility of dispensation which in practice was very 
lenient when it came to share sales conducted before the date on which the bill was intro-
duced i.e. 4 December 1984.20
The normal procedure in recent legislative practice is that tax statutes that are disad-
vantageous to taxpayers are only given effect from the date of introduction of the bill to the 
Danish parliament. If the assessment of necessity results in a lack of need for retroactivity, 
the statute is given effect from the ensuing income year. 
b. Influence of retroactive tax statutes
To our knowledge, the situation in which retroactive effect granted to substantive statutes 
also influences pending legal cases has not occurred.
c. Pending legal proceedings excluded from application retroactivity?
We refer to section 3.5.1.5 and 3.5.1.7. Danish legal discourse is unclear when it comes to 
procedural retroactivity, but it is commonly accepted that amendment of procedural stat-
utes has effect on pending legal cases unless otherwise stated in the amendment’s transi-
tional provisions. As a rule, procedural legislation will always contain transitional provi-
sions, which means that the question about retroactive effect on legal proceedings seldom 
constitutes a problem. 
3.5.3.3. Favourable retroactivity
Granting retroactive effect to statutes that are favourable do not occur in a specific pattern, 
the decisive factor being a political wish to favour taxpayers retroactively. In recent years, 
favourable retroactivity has been introduced quite often in connection with tax legislation 
as approximately a quarter of tax law bills contain provisions including favourable retroac-
tivity.
3.5.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.5.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
Danish legal theory distinguishes between formal and material constitutionality of parlia-
mentary acts.21 Formal constitutionality concerns the statutes’ compliance with constitu-
tional provisions on the statute creation procedure e.g. sec. 22 of the Danish Constitution 
regarding promulgation of statutes. 
Material constitutionality, on the other hand, occurs when the substance of a statute 
is unconstitutional.
20.	 Cf.	Michelsen	et	al,	supra	note	10,	at	pp.	109-10.
21.	 Cf.	Germer,	supra	note	4,	at	pp.	210-216.
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Whereas there has not been much debate as to whether the Danish courts of law are compe-
tent to test statutes’ formal constitutionality,22 it has been disputed whether the courts were 
competent to test the material constitutionality of statutes. According to recent constitu-
tional law theory, the Danish courts are competent to test the material constitutionality of 
statutes based on solid court practice.23 
Hence, retroactivity is not considered unconstitutional in Danish legal theory and 
this is why the Danish courts of law are not testing whether a statute’s retroactivity is consti-
tutional but instead whether a statute’s retroactivity is sufficiently substantiated by the 
legislator. This means that the Danish principle of interpretation contra retroactivity is 
applied when the Danish courts test whether retroactivity is in effect the intention of the 
Danish parliament (Folketinget). In principle, the Danish courts could also test the compli-
ance of retroactive legislation on the basis of sec. 73 in the Danish Constitution. This provi-
sion concerns the inviolability of property rights, but it is generally presumed that the pro-
vision does not hinder retroactive legislation unless such legislation affects singular taxpay-
ers in a way that constitutes an infringement of property rights. 
3.5.4.2. Examination method
As retroactivity is allowed according to the Danish Constitution, no specific examination 
method can be established. A very disproportionate and singular instance of retroactivity 
could potentially infringe sec. 73 of the Danish Constitution, but this is very unlikely. 
3.5.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
The Danish courts of law are competent to test the compatibility of tax statutes or tax proce-
dure with the ECHR including Article 1 of the First Protocol concerning the protection of 
private property. The courts have never found a retroactive tax statute incompatible with 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR or the Danish Constitution sec. 73, which as men-
tioned concerns the inviolability of property rights.
The ECHR is incorporated in Danish law by statute,24 which means that citizens can 
complain or take legal action against the Tax Administration with direct reference to the 
ECHR.
The Danish high courts have established that tax imposition is not incompatible with 
sec. 73 of the Danish Constitution, cf. UfR 1958.595 V, the reason, on the one hand, being 
that tax imposition is based on general provisions and, on the other hand, that taxes are 
paid in cash instead of cession of concrete assets.25
3.5.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The principle of certainty is not acknowledged as a separate legal principle in Danish legal 
theory, because the understanding of substantive due process of law as a general legal prin-
ciple in Danish legal discourse contains the aspect of legal certainty. A retroactivity test of a 
statute by the Danish courts of law does not constitute a validity test based on constitution-
ality or fundamental legal principles such as the principle of substantive due process. 
22.	 Cf.	e.g.	UfR	1941.1071	H,	UfR	1945.570	Ø,	UfR	1967.22	H,	UfR	1993.321	H	and	UfR	1994.29	H.
23.	 Cf.	Germer,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	210,	Poul	Andersen,	Dansk	Statsforfatningsret,	(Gyldendal	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	
1954),	at	p.	466-69	and	Henrik	Zahle,	Dansk	forfatningsret	2,	3.	ed.,	(Christian	Ejlers	Publishers,	Copenhagen,	
2001),	at	pp.	157-61.
24.	 Cf.	Consolidated	act.	no.	750	dated	October	19,	1998.
25.	 Cf.	Michelsen	et	al.,	supra	note	10,	at	p.	109.
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3.5.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
As a rule, the Danish courts of law enforce a principle of interpretation contra retroactivity 
which is almost the opposite approach than interpretations that avoid possible retroactive 
application. However, when the courts of law test the assessment of necessity for retroactiv-
ity some instances of a tendency towards leniency have been established. The case men-
tioned above in section 3.5.1.5 – UfR 1999.1480 H – has been criticized because insufficient 
substantiation of the amendment’s retroactive effect was present in the legislative material 
to which the court referred. This court ruling is most commonly regarded as an exception 
that does not constitute general leniency. On the contrary, court practice generally demon-
strates that the interpretation principle contra retroactivity is enforced consistently. 
3.5.4.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
As the Danish Constitution generally does not limit the legislator’s possibility of passing 
retroactive tax law bills, no further explanation for the legislator’s competence is consid-
ered necessary. The legislative politico-legal principle demonstrated by the assessment of 
necessity proves that retroactivity is only applied on the basis of careful considerations. 
Furthermore, the Danish courts of law require interpretational clarity to establish that the 
legislator has intended retroactivity.
These instruments do not carry the same legal weight as constitutional provisions, 
but they serve their purpose by limiting the occurrences of retroactive statutes to excep-
tional cases.
In principle, EU law and Article 1 of the ECHR First Protocol can limit the possibility 
to issue tax and VAT statutes with retroactive effect and the Danish courts of law would in 
such a case test the compliance of the relevant Danish legislation with the limits set by these 
sources of law.
3.5.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.5.5.1. In general
The Danish court system is based on a two-instance principle and as a rule legal proceedings in 
tax law cases are filed at the city courts as first instance. As a consequence, city court rulings can 
be appealed to one of the two Danish high courts, but civil law suits including tax cases cannot 
be appealed to the Danish Supreme Court unless the law suit entails issues of principle.26 
Rulings from the Danish Supreme Court are relatively uncommon, which is illus-
trated by the number of cases in 2008. In 2008 16 tax law cases were appealed to the Danish 
Supreme Court whereas the number of cases in 2007 was 72.
Since the Danish court reform in 2007, the Danish high courts must in fact be consid-
ered the final instance in tax law cases.
3.5.5.2. Temporal effect of judicial change of course
The Danish courts do not formulate transitional rules in the case of rulings that abandon 
existing case law. Transitional provisions in connection with a change of practice concerning 
income and property taxation are found in the Tax Administration Act. sec. 27 (1) (7). Pursuant 
26.	 Cf.	The	Administration	of	Justice	Act.	sec.	226.	Before	the	comprehensive	Danish	court	reform	in	2007,	all	law	suits	
in	tax	law	cases	were	filed	at	the	high	courts	as	first	instance	which	meant	that	all	tax	law	cases	could	be	appealed	to	
the	Danish	Supreme	Court.	An	extraordinary	possibility	of	third	instance	dispensation	exists.	
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to this provision, the taxpayer can request a special reopening of a yearly tax statement if exist-
ing practice is abandoned by a final administrative decision from the National Danish Tax 
Tribunal or by a final judgment from the courts of law if the decision is favourable to the taxpayer. 
The provision is also applicable if the Tax Ministry publishes a change of administrative prac-
tice in favour of taxpayers. In these cases, special resumption of an otherwise closed yearly tax 
statement is allowed counting from the income year that the overruling decision concerned. 
Alternately, special resumption is always allowed counting from the income year that began 
but did not end three years before the year in which the first overruling of practice took place.
If the Danish high court delivers judgment favourable to the taxpayer on 5 November 
2009 concerning a tax assessment of the income year of 2003 and the high court judgment 
affirms the previous city court judgment of 3 November 2007, special resumption can be 
requested by taxpayers concerning income years from and including 2003.27
In these cases the Danish Tax Administration publishes an administrative notice con-
taining information on the resumption options for taxpayers.
Unfavourable judgments or changes of administrative practice only have effect on 
future decisions and practice including pending and appealed cases.
In addition, a controversial case law practice has developed in Denmark that involves a 
sort of retroactive effect. In several cases the Danish Tax and Customs Administration has 
refused to accept decisions from the National Danish Tax Tribunal, which is the final adminis-
trative appeals tribunal in Denmark. As a consequence, the Danish Tax and Customs Adminis-
tration does not adjust administrative practice even though this practice is in conflict with the 
decision by the National Danish Tax Tribunal. In these instances, the taxpayers cannot support 
their cases on the basis of the decision by the National Danish Tax Tribunal, which in effect 
results in retroactivity, if the courts of law assent to this approach in an ensuing judgment.28
3.5.6. Views in the literature
3.5.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
The description above in section 3.5.1.1, and subsections corresponds to the general opin-
ion in fiscal and constitutional law literature in Denmark regarding the retroactivity of tax 
statutes.29 Retroactive statutes occur in connection with anti-abuse legislation, to avoid 
hamstering when raising excise duties, but also in connection with legislation to close gaps 
in tax law. Normally, the retroactive effect is granted from the date on which the bill is intro-
duced in the parliament, but in special circumstances retroactive effect may be counted 
from an even earlier point of time. However, this is very rare. 
3.5.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view has not given rise to discussion regarding retroactivity in Dan-
ish law and economics theory. Arguments of an economic nature are included as part of the 
assessment of necessity on which the legislator bases retroactivity. For instance, the risk of 
the economic effects of hamstering can be the reason for granting retroactivity to a statute 
on excise taxes. 
27.	 It	is	a	precondition	that	the	city	court	judgment	overruled	the	decision	by	the	administrative	Danish	National	Tax	
Tribunal.	Otherwise,	special	resumption	is	allowed	counting	from	and	including	the	income	year	in	which	the	
National	Tax	Tribunal	reached	its	decision.
28.	 Cf.	Aage	Michelsen	in	R	&	R	2006/9	SM	at	p.	259	ff.	(‘Begrænset	skattepligt	–	Luftkaptajner	–	Retskildehierarki’)	a	
comment	on	the	Supreme	Court’s	judgment	in	SKM	2006.483	H.
29.	 Cf.	the	reference	to	the	literature	above	in	section	1.1.
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3.6.
Finland
Jukka Mähönen
3.6.1. Terminology
3.6.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
There is no statutory distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity in Finnish law. 
Because there is only one general concept of retroactivity, a clear distinction between ‘retro-
activity’ and ‘retrospectivity’ is not made either in law, travaux preparatoires or in the legal 
literature. When the question is addressed, only one concept is used, namely ‘retroactivity’ 
(Finnish taannehtivuus, Swedish retroaktivitet), covering both ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectiv-
ity’ (as defined in the questionnaire). 
3.6.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
In both the Finnish travaux preparatoires and the legal literature, the concept of retroactivity 
is always used in the meaning of retroactivity proper as retrospectivity is accepted in Finnish 
tax law.
3.6.1.3. Interpretative statutes
The Finnish legal system, ‘’does not recognize the concept of ‘interpretative statute’ either in 
the Constitution of Finland of 1999 (‘Constitution’) or any other general statute. The Consti-
tution does not contain a specific prohibition of interpretative statute, either, as the ques-
tion has not been raised. Statutes enacted by parliament can also be amended by parliament 
can be amended by the parliament by adding conceptual clarifications to them. If this kind 
of amendment has retroactive effect, the amending statute is seen to be retroactive.
3.6.1.4. Validation statutes
The Finnish legal system does not recognize the phenomenon of ‘validation statute’. As the 
judicial powers are exercised by independent courts of law, with the Supreme Court (in 
private and criminal law cases) and the Supreme Administrative Court (in administrative 
and tax law cases) as the highest instances,1 the legislator neither ‘validates’ nor ‘overrules’ 
the judgments of courts by using retroactive legislation. However, retrospective legislation 
(as defined in the questionnaire) is routinely used either to ‘validate’ or to ‘overrule’ the 
Supreme Administrative Court judgments also in tax cases.
1.	 Sec.	3(3)	of	the	Constitution.
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3.6.1.5. Comparison moment
According to sec. 79(3) of the Constitution, a parliamentary statute must indicate the date 
when it will enter into force. For a special reason, it may be stated in an Act that it is to enter 
into force by means of a decree issued by the government. If the statute has not been pub-
lished by the date provided for its entry into force, it enters into force on the date of its 
publication.
However, a distinction is made between the date of entry into force and the effective 
date in Finland as well. The effective date is usually a date after the date of entry into force 
(for instance, the date of entry into force of a statute is 31 December 2010 and statute is 
applied the first time 1 January 2011). If the effective date is prior to the date of entry into 
force, the statute is seen to be retroactive by nature.2
3.6.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
As mentioned above in section 3.6.1.1, there is no definition of retrospectivity in Finland, 
either in the law, the travaux preparatoires or in the legal literature. For this reason, there is 
no reason to give hypothetical examples of retrospectivity.
3.6.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
A doctrinal distinction between substantive and procedural statutes is not made in Finland. 
However, Finnish tax statutes are substantive by nature as they apply only to taxable events 
occurring after the date on which the statute enters into force, not to pending proceedings.
3.6.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.6.2.1. Constitutional limitations to the retroactivity of tax statutes
According to sec. 81(1) of the Constitution, the state tax is governed by a parliamentary 
statute, which contains provisions on the grounds for tax liability and the amount of the 
tax, as well as on the legal remedies available to the persons or entities liable to taxation. 
As stated by the Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish parliament, the highest 
authority in constitutional matters in Finland, there is no general prohibition of retroactive 
tax legislation in the Constitution. However, based on the general principles of legitimate 
expectations and fairness, the Committee recognizes a constitutional duty for the govern-
ment and the parliament to ‘avoid’ retroactive tax legislation.3 However, the rule is not 
strict so that a retroactive tax statute is constitutional unless expressly otherwise stated by 
the Committee. 
Previously, retroactive legislation was not generally accepted but was criticized based 
on especially sec. 15(1) of the Constitution, according to which an individual’s property is 
protected. This line of argumentation was denied by the Supreme Administrative Court in 
19984, as referred to below in section 3.6.2.2.
2.	 See,	as	an	example,	Act	No.	329/2009	Amending	§	20	of	the	Income	Tax	Act,	entry	into	force	22	May	2009.	The	Act	
was	applied	for	the	first	time	for	the	tax	year	2008,	i.e.	from	the	beginning	of	year	2009.	According	to	the	travaux	
preparatoires	(Government	proposal	No.	220/2009),	the	Act	is	retroactive.
3.	 See	the	Statement	of	the	Constitutional	Law	Committee	of	the	Finnish	parliament	No.	1/2009	on	the	Government	
Proposal	for	the	Act	Amending	§	20	of	the	Income	Tax	Act.
4.	 The	Finnish	Supreme	Administrative	Court,	judgment	No.	1998:53.
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3.6.2.2. Transition policy of government
As far as retroactivity is concerned, the government follows in its proposals the guideline set 
by the Constitutional Law Committee referred to in section 3.6.2.1 above, vaguely requiring 
only avoidance of retroactivity but not denying it totally. As far as courts are concerned they 
should review the constitutionality of tax laws independently. Hence, the statements of the 
Constitutional Law Committee are not formally binding in Finnish courts. However, if we 
recall (i) that the Committee’s statements are generally honoured not only by the govern-
ment but also by the courts themselves (see section 3.6.4.2 below), (ii) that according to sec. 
109 of the Constitution, only if, in a matter being tried by a court of law, the application of a 
statute would be in evident conflict with the Constitution, must the court of law give pri-
macy to the provision in the Constitution and (iii) the denial by the Supreme Administrative 
Court in 1998 of the unconstitutionality of retroactive tax legislation,5 the possibility that 
a Finnish court would override a retroactive tax provision as unconstitutional, is purely 
theoretical and not even that.
As far as grandfathering is concerned, this is not an issue since the Supreme Court case 
of 1998,6 denying protection of property against grandfathering. However, there is a pol-
icy with respect to granting retroactive effect to tax statutes that are favourable to taxpayers, 
although it is not expressly stated. This kind of legislation has been favoured in recent times 
(see section 3.6.3.4 below) and no questions of retroactivity are raised from the constitu-
tional point of view after the Supreme Administrative Court case.
3.6.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
According to sec. 99 of the Constitution, the supreme courts, i.e. the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court, may submit proposals to the government for the initiation 
of legislative action but they have not done so as far as retroactive tax legislation is con-
cerned. Sec. 74 of the Constitution is of far greater importance. According to Sec. 74, the 
Constitutional Law Committee must issue statements on the constitutionality of legislative 
proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as well as on their relation to 
international human rights treaties (foremost the European Convention of Human Rights, 
ECHR). 
As far as retroactivity is concerned, the Committee has set out only the ‘avoidance’ of 
retroactivity guideline in its Statement of 2009 referred to above in section 3.6.2.1. The Com-
mittee has given no guidelines on grandfathering or on favourable treatment of tax payers 
so far.
3.6.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.6.3.1. Legislating by press release
The Finnish legislator does not make use of ‘legislating by press release’.
3.6.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
A typical situation of retroactivity is the case in which the parliament grants retroactive 
effect to a statute from the date when the government proposes a bill to the parliament. It is 
also possible that the retroactive reaches back to the beginning of the fiscal year.
5.	 The	Finnish	Supreme	Administrative	Court,	judgment	No.	1998:53.
6.	 The	Finnish	Supreme	Administrative	Court,	judgment	No.	1998:53.
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An example: The proposal is given 1 September 2010, the statute is accepted by the parlia-
ment on 1 December 2010, the statute enters into force 31 December 2010, and the effective 
date is 1 January 2010.
However, it never happens that the government will announces publicly that a bill 
will be proposed in the (near) future and the retroactivity effect is given to the statute from 
the date of this announcement, i.e. from a prior date to the actual bill.
3.6.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
However, as a retroactive effect is granted very seldom and in those cases the government 
and the parliament act fast, the possibility that pending legal proceedings are influenced is 
theoretical. Also, the possibility that retroactive effect is granted to substantive statutes as a 
result of which pending legal proceedings are influenced as well is very theoretical. For 
these reasons, pending legal proceedings are never excluded from the application of the 
new statute.
3.6.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
Finnish law recognizes retroactive effect to tax statutes that are favourable to taxpayers. A 
typical situation of this kind is a tax relief.7
3.6.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.6.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
The Finnish courts test the retroactivity of a tax statute for compatibility with the Constitu-
tion. The leading case is the case mentioned above in section 3.6.2.2, the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court case of 1998, referring also to the principle of equality in sec. 6 of the Constitu-
tion.
3.6.4.2. Examination method
According to Finnish case law, the courts see themselves as being bound in their judicial 
review to the guidelines set by the Constitutional Committee.8 As the Committee has not 
clearly challenged retroactivity on constitutional arguments, it is very unlikely the courts 
will dare to do it independently (see also section 3.6.2.2 above).
3.6.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
The Finnish courts test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of the First Protocol 
ECHR. As far as retroactivity is concerned, in the Supreme Administrative Court case of 1998 
mentioned above in section 3.6.2.2 this provision was also discussed but in that specific case 
the Court rejected the taxpayer’s arguments on this point.
7.	 See	Government	Proposal	No.	2006/2008	(tax	exemption	on	the	sale	of	timber).
8.	 Juha	Lavapuro,	‘Perustuslain	106	§	ilmeisyysvaatimuksen	vaikutuksista	oikeuskäytännössä’	[Effects	of	the	‘evident	
conflict’	requirement	in	section	106	of	the	Finnish	Constitution].	106	Lakimies	4	(2008),	at	pp.	582−611.
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3.6.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
According to sec. 106 of the Constitution, if, in a matter being tried by a court of law, the 
application of a statute would be in evident conflict with the Constitution, the court of law 
must give primacy to the provision in the Constitution. However, this provision is applied 
very rarely.9
3.6.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
The reason why sec. 106 of the Constitution is almost never applied is that, according to 
Finnish constitutional practice, conflicts between the Constitution and statutes must be 
solved foremost by using a ‘constitution-friendly’ interpretation of the statute, thus avoid-
ing an open conflict between the Constitution and the statute.
3.6.4.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
The reason why the courts rarely recognize limits on the use of retroactivity is the very cau-
tious constitutional interpretation referred to above in section 3.6.4.4.
3.6.5. Retroactivity of case law
According to the Finnish law, a precedent has retroactive effect. As the courts do not specifi-
cally discuss the question, the effective date is in many cases unsure, causing legal uncer-
tainty.
3.6.6. Views in the literature
3.6.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
The discussion on the retroactivity of tax statutes is based on the constitutionality of retro-
active tax legislation. Prior to the 1998 Supreme Administrative Court ruling referred to 
above in section 3.6.2.2, there was criticism of retroactivity, based mostly on the protection 
of property principle.10 After 1998, retroactivity has been widely accepted both among 
constitutional and tax scholars.11
3.6.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
Unlike in other fields of law in which law and economics movement has nowadays great 
importance (e.g. company law),12 the Finnish tax literature is methodologically conserva-
tive, based mostly on traditional legal dogmas (excluding usage of regulation theory).13
9.	 Lavapuro,	supra	note	8.	
10.	 Jukka	Mähönen,	‘Taannehtivan	verolain	perustuslainmukaisuudesta’	[On	constitutionality	of	a	retroactive	tax	law],	
91	Lakimies	6	(1993),	at	pp.	845-860.
11.	 See	Kari	S.	Tikka,	‘Verolakien	perustuslainmukaisuuden	tutkimisesta	tuomioistuimissa’	[On	judicial	review	of	tax	
laws	in	courts],	97	Lakimies	6–7	(1999),	at	pp.	982−994.
12.	 See	Jukka	Mähönenand	Seppo	Villa,	Osakeyhtiö	I:	Yleiset	opit	[Company	I:	General	principles]	(Helsinki:	WSOYpro,	
2006).
13.	 See	Kalle	Määttä,	Environmental	Taxes:	From	an	Economic	idea	to	a	Legal	Institution	(Helsinki:	Finnish	Lawyers’	
Publishing,	1997);	Kalle	Määttä,	Veropolitiikka:	Teoria	ja	käytäntö	[Tax	policy:	Theory	and	practice],	(Helsinki:	Edita,	
2007).
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3.7.
France
Emmanuel de Crouy-Chanel
3.7.1. Terminology
3.7.1.1. Distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’
French legal discourse traditionally distinguishes two kinds of retroactivity in tax matters. A 
statute is considered as being retroactive when it applies to taxes whose taxable event is 
prior to the promulgation of the new law. This means a law is not truly retroactive when it 
applies to closed transactions if the taxable event is posterior to the date of promulgation. 
This situation is common with income tax; the taxable event is the date of the accrual of the 
income, at the end of the taxable period (31 December, in most situations) while the budget 
law, modifying the tax law, is frequently promulgated one or two days before. To character-
ize this situation of material retroactivity, French legal discourse use the term of ‘rétroactiv-
ité de fait’ (de facto retroactivity). 
The distinction between the two kinds of retroactivity is not always clearly made, 
notably by non-specialists and most of the general papers on the subject begin by the pre-
sentation of the distinction. This could be the reason why the term of ‘rétrospectivité’ (retro-
spectivity) has begun to be used more frequently since the middle of the 90s1 to qualify the 
material retroactivity. 
3.7.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
As seen above, the key point for determining retroactivity is the date of the taxable event. 
The law (including case law) does not distinguish between a non-retroactive statute apply-
ing to a past fact, an on-going fact, or a future fact. Income tax is only an example. The sig-
nificant point here is the paramount importance given by French law to the notion of tax-
able event (fait générateur). This legal position is not welcomed by taxpayers who demand 
predictability of the tax consequences of their decisions, even if the related taxable event is 
posterior.
3.7.1.3. Interpretative statutes
The category ‘interpretative statute’ (loi interpretative) is well-known in French law-making, 
notably in tax matters. It is an application to tax law of the general principle of retroactivity, 
as construed by the courts. In the interpretative statute, the lawmaker only clarifies what his 
intention has always been. The interpretative statute is supposed therefore to bring nothing 
1.	 Conseil	des	Impôts,	13ème	rapport	au	Président	de	la	République,	Fiscalité	et	vie	des	entreprises,	(Paris:	Imprimerie	
des	journaux	officiels,	1994),	I,	at	p.	346;	F.	Douet,	‘les	lois	fiscales	rétrospectives’,	Les	Petites	Affiches	128	(1996),	at	
p.	5.
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new that was not in the interpreted statute from the beginning, and to be, therefore, not 
retroactive. In a way, it is an empty statute – which, of course, is a kind of juridical fiction. To 
characterize ‘interpretative’ statutes that truly modify the meaning of the initial statute, 
French legal discourse uses the term of ‘falsely interpretative statute’ (loi faussement inter-
prétative). These statutes are retroactive and are therefore subject to constitutional and legal 
limitations.
The courts need therefore to determine whether the ‘interpretative statute’ is actually 
‘interpretative’. An interpretative statute should be only declaratory, i.e. contain no new 
legal content. In practice (because a retroactive statute is more limited than an interpreta-
tive statute), the court will firstly look for the overt intention of the legislator (how did he 
characterize the statute?). This is of course not always sufficient (the legislator may have 
characterized as interpretative what is actually a retroactive statute). So far, the Council of 
State (Conseil d’Etat), the administrative supreme court, does not look further that the dis-
played intention2 and refuses to requalify an ‘interpretative’ statute. But the Court of Cas-
sation (Cour de cassation), the judiciary supreme court, does examine whether the statute is 
really ‘interpretative’; if not, it will be construed as retroactive3.
One of the problems with the interpretative statute is that tax authorities use it (and 
require it from the legislator) in order to confirm their interpretation of the law in a pend-
ing dispute. As such, interpretative statutes are even more useful than true retroactive stat-
utes. Firstly, they are not subject to the same constitutional limitations. Secondly, an inter-
pretative statute is supposed to clarify the law as it has always been, and the interpretation 
such as given will be followed by the juge de cassation, while a retroactive statute does not 
apply to a court decision that has become final on the merits and therefore will not be used 
by the juge de cassation to rule on a decision of a court of appeal. 
3.7.1.4. Validation statutes
Validation statutes responding to a judicial decision are quite common in French law, but a 
distinction has to be made between the true ‘validation statute’ (loi de validation), whose 
explicit aim is to give a legislative basis to an administrative decision (i.e. from the tax 
authorities) which would be, without this basis contrary to the law, and the more insidious 
phenomenon of validation of a legal practice through a retroactive statute (often an inter-
pretative statute).
The true ‘validation statute’ is explicitly intended as such by the legislator, is pursuing 
a general interest and is defining the decision which is validated by obtaining a legislative 
basis4. Indirect validation aims to change the law applicable to a dispute pending before a 
court in order to prevent the annulment of the decision.
3.7.1.5. Comparison moment
The date of entry into force of a statute is normally the day after the publication of the stat-
ute in the Official Gazette (Journal officiel)5, but the legislator may specify a later date of 
entry into force. This date of entry into force (date d’entrée en vigueur), always posterior to 
2.	 CE,	7	July	1989,	Assembly,	avis,	no.	106	284,	Compagnie	financière	et	industrielle	des	autoroutes	(Cofiroute).
3.	 Cass.	com.	7	April	1992,	no.	89-20418,	Mme	Pavie.	In	this	decision,	the	court	held	that	the	statute	was	not	interpreta-
tive	as	it	led	to	new	tax	conditions	being	substituted	for	those	arising	from	the	statute	allegedly	interpreted.
4.	 E.g.	the	institutional	act	validating	property	tax	on	buildings	in	French	Polynesia,	no.	2002-161,	of	11	February	2002,	
gave	a	legal	basis	to	property	taxes	on	buildings	perceived	in	French	Polynesia.	These	taxes	were	illegal	because	
their	assessment	had	been	made	between	1992	and	1999	without	any	legal	basis	and	between	1999	and	2001	
according	to	an	illegal	administrative	statute.
5.	 Civil	Code,	Article	1,	as	modified	by	Ordnance	no.	2004-164	of	20	February	2004.
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the promulgation, must be distinguished from the date of application of the statute which 
may be in the past. A statute is retroactive if its date of application is before its date of entry 
into force.
3.7.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
The concept of retrospectivity is ill-defined in French tax law. A law that applies to past facts 
with future effects would be considered retrospective or ‘de facto retroactive’, but no dis-
tinction is clearly made yet between certain future effects, possible future effects or poten-
tial future effects. Notably, the civil law theory of grandfather rights (droits acquis) has never 
been applied by the courts to substantive tax statutes. 
3.7.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
A distinction is made in France between substantive and procedural statutes, regarding the 
date of application. 
The law founding the right to claim is the law existing at the time of the entry into 
force of the decision to tax (i.e.: if this decision takes the form of a tax claim (rôle), date of 
the tax collection; if the tax is spontaneously paid, date of payment). Therefore, a substan-
tive statute will not be immediately applicable.
A procedural statute is, on the other hand, generally immediately applicable. But if 
the rule has an effect on the consistency of the tax obligation, an immediate application 
would give it a retroactive effect, which is forbidden by the law6. For example, the court, if 
the statute does not formally state otherwise, will not give immediate effect to rules regard-
ing evidence if they are linked to a substantive rule7.
3.7.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.7.2.1. In general
The French Constitution imposes some limitations on the retroactivity of the tax statutes. 
The Conseil constitutionnel has progressively recognized some constitutional limitations to 
the use of retroactive tax statutes. The difficulty is that there is no provision in the Constitu-
tion explicitly prohibiting the retroactivity of law (beside penal law), and especially not in 
tax matters where retroactive legislation is frequently used. Therefore, the law may be retro-
active, notably in tax matters, and the Conseil constitutionnel, initially, had few restrictions, if 
any8. 
But, shortly afterwards, the Conseil constitutionnel reminded the legislator that it was 
free to pass retroactive law, provided that two constitutional limits were respected: the 
principle of non-retroactivity of the punitive law (which we will not develop here, as the tax 
6.	 E.g.	CE	section	13	December	1991,	no.	65.940-66.868,	Société	ASET.	The	problem	was	the	law	applicable	to	the	
procedure	followed	for	establishing	the	decision	to	tax.	To	prevent	the	retroactive	effect,	the	court	decided	that	the	
law	applicable	is	the	law	at	the	date	of	the	decision	to	tax.	But	the	procedure	may	require	prior	formalities,	and	the	
law	may	have	been	modified	between	the	date	of	the	formality	and	the	date	of	the	decision	to	tax.	The	principle	
therefore	has	various	exceptions.
7.	 Cass.	com.	7	November	1989,	88-15282,	Verne;	CE	12	March	1980,	no.	15169.
8.	 Cons.	const.	no.	80-126	DC,	30	December	1980,	Loi	de	finances	pour	1981;	Cons.	const.	no.	84-184	DC,	29	December	
1985,	Loi	de	finances	pour	1985:	no	principle	or	provision	at	the	constitutional	level	prohibits	a	tax	provision	to	be	
retroactive	(‘aucun	principe	ou	règle	de	valeur	constitutionnelle	ne	s’oppose	à	ce	qu’une	disposition	fiscale	ait	un	
caractère	rétroactif ’).
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law, as such, is not a punitive law), and respect for the binding force of a judicial decision9. 
Respecting the binding force of a judicial decision was, afterwards, linked to Article 16 of 
the Declaration of the Human and Civic Rights of 1789 which mentions the necessity of 
‘guaranteeing rights’ and of the ‘separation of powers’. Its interpretation was extended10.
Beside those absolute prohibitions, the Conseil constitutionnel required, from 1986, 
the retroactive act to intervene on grounds of general interest (pour des raisons d’intérêt 
général)11. The admission of a general interest became more and more restrictive, with the 
development of a control of proportionality (intérêt général suffisant12: a financial interest 
alone, no13; threat to the continuation of the tax and justice services, yes14). Three condi-
tions of validity of the retroactive law are connected with this control of proportionality: a) 
the statute must pursue an aim of sufficient general interest; b) the statute may not infringe 
a constitutional rule or principle, if the aim of general interest pursued is not itself of con-
stitutional value; c) the scope of the validation statute must be strictly defined15.
Eventually, the Conseil constitutionnel considered that the requirement of sufficient 
grounds of general interest was also derived from the principle of guarantee of rights of 
Article 16 of the Declaration of the Human and Civic Rights of 178916, prohibiting, accord-
ing to the last case law of the Conseil constitutionnel, infringement of a legally obtained posi-
tion (situation légalement acquise) without sufficient grounds of general interest17. Without 
actually using the term, the case law of the Conseil constitutionnel limited the retroactivity of 
the law by the principle of legal certainty, construed from the ‘guarantee of rights’ of Article 
16 of the Declaration. 
The idea of introducing to the Constitution a new provision prohibiting explicitly the 
retroactivity of the law, especially in tax matters, is often put forward18.
3.7.2.2. Transition policy of government
There are no defined rules for the transition between the old and the new law. But, as the 
legislator has a quite wide freedom, notably regarding retrospectivity, taxpayers complain 
about a lack of legal certainty. In the last years, the government has been a bit more prudent 
in the introduction of new tax statutes, with prior consultation of the professionals, transi-
tion periods, entry into force delayed…, but we are very far from an explicit and published 
transition policy. 
9.	 Cons.	const.	86-223	DC,	29	December	1986,	Loi	de	finances	rectificative	pour	1986,	about	the	validation	of	illegal	
taxation;	followed,	in	tax	matters,	by	Cass.	21	December	1990,	ass.	plén.,	no.	88-15744,	Royal,	and	CE	27	October	
1995,	no.	150703,	min.	du	logement	c/	Mattio.
10.	 Cons.	const.	2005-531	DC,	29	December	2005,	Loi	de	finances	rectificative	pour	2005:	unconstitutionality	of	an	act	
depriving	a	judicial	decision	of	its	effect,	here	the	right	to	deduct	the	VAT	on	motorway	tolls	(ECJ,	aff.	C	276/97,	
12	September	2000,	Commission	c/	France	and	CE	29	June	2005,	no.	268681,	SA	Établissements	Louis	Mazet	et	al.).
11.	 Cons.	const.	86-223	DC,	29	December	1986,	Loi	de	finances	rectificative	pour	1986.
12.	 Cons.	const.	98-404	DC,	18	December	1998,	Loi	de	financement	de	la	sécurité	sociale	pour	1999.
13.	 Cons.	const.	98-404	DC,	18	December	1998,	Loi	de	financement	de	la	sécurité	sociale	pour	1999.
14.	 Cons.	const.	2002-458	DC,	7	February	2002,	Loi	organique	portent	validation	de	l’impôt	foncier	sur	les	propriétés	
bâties	en	Polynésie	française.
15.	 Cons.	const.	2002-458	DC,	7	February	2002,	Loi	organique	portent	validation	de	l’impôt	foncier	sur	les	propriétés	
bâties	en	Polynésie	française.
16.	 Cons.	const.	2002-458	DC,	implicitly;	2005-530	DC,	29	December	2005,	Loi	de	finances	pour	2006.
17.	 Cons.	const.	2005-530	DC,	29	December	2005,	Loi	de	finances	pour	2006;	2009-599	DC,	29	December	2009,	Loi	de	
finances	pour	2010.
18.	 The	situation	was	a	bit	tense	when	the	government	decided	in	2004	to	modify	the	rules	on	the	taxation	of	life	
insurance	savings.	The	last	example	of	a	proposition	to	introduce	in	the	Constitution	a	provision	explicitly	prohibit-
ing	retroactivity	in	tax	matters	was	in	2008,	during	the	parliamentary	discussion	of	a	major	rehauling	of	the	
Constitution	of	1958.
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In November 2004, the government presented 30 measures to improve relations between 
taxpayers and tax authorities; one of these was a formal pledge to stop using, in tax matters, 
retroactive provisions detrimental for the taxpayer. This release is not legally binding, and 
has had little influence on parliamentary debate. It is difficult to ascertain whether it marks 
a deep change in legislative practice.
For example, according to the government’s pledge, incentive tax measures would in 
the future be limited to five years, but are guaranteed during that time period. Since 2004, 
many important incentive tax measures were adopted without the five-year time limit, so it 
seems we should not be over-optimistic about the solidity of the government’s pledge.
It is probable that some instances, such as the Conseil d’Etat, which controls and 
advises the government on every legislative proposal, have developed rules in reviewing 
retroactivity, but the advices of the Conseil d’Etat are not published and it is difficult to ascer-
tain whether it promotes a ‘transition policy’.
3.7.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.7.3.1. Legislating by press release
Legislating by press release is used in France but is not sufficiently identified as a legislative 
practice to have received a name. It is mainly used in cases of anti-abuse legislation or to 
prevent announcement effects in the case of policy change. It is also used when the new tax 
provision is supposed to be an incentive and the government hopes to get effects of its 
policy from the date of the announcement. See for an interesting example, the retroactivity 
of the tax credit on interest on loans for home buying of 6 May 200719, date of the election 
of the President of the Republic, giving credibility to a political promise.
3.7.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
The retroactive period may reach further back in the past than the date of the press release. 
This is, for example, always the case for validation statutes.
3.7.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
Retroactivity is often used to influence the outcome of pending legal procedures (see valida-
tion statutes). Due to constitutional limits, the statute usually provides explicitly that it does 
not apply to any contradictory court decisions that have become final on the merits. But 
final means finished legal proceedings, not pending. The validation statute (directly or 
indirectly) will therefore be applied by the court of appeal20
3.7.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
Retroactive effects are frequently granted to tax statutes favourable to taxpayers, especially 
when the tax benefit is supposed to be an incentive. Retroactivity is, in these cases, linked 
with legislation by press release.
19.	 Loi	no.	2007-1822,	24	December	2007,	Budget	law	for	2008,	Article	13,	following	the	decision	of	the	Conseil	consti-
tutionnel	no.	2007-555	DC,	16	August	2007,	Loi	en	faveur	du	travail,	de	l’emploi	et	du	pouvoir	d’achat	(TEPA).
20.	 But	not	by	the	Supreme	Court,	deciding	on	the	law.	However,	when	the	Conseil	d’Etat	quashes	a	judgment,	it	may	
chose	to	retain	the	case,	and	will,	when	deciding	on	it,	apply	the	retroactive	statute.
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3.7.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.7.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
Until this year, it was impossible for the courts to test the retroactivity of a tax statute for 
compatibility with the Constitution. The revision of the Constitution of 2008, effective from 
1 March 2010, has granted the right for the citizens to challenge an already published law as 
being contrary to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The pertinence of the claim 
is verified by the supreme courts, and the question is answered by the Conseil constitution-
nel (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité or QPC). Some QPC concerning the constitution-
ality of retroactive statutes have already been answered by the Conseil constitutionnel21, 
which has confirmed its case law on the conditions of validity of a retroactive statute. 
3.7.4.2. Examination method
3.7.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
The retroactivity of a tax statute may be tested by the French courts against Article 1 of the 
First Protocol ECHR22. Some administrative courts have found, in cases regarding Article 59 
of the Finance Act of 30 December 2003 (interpretative act about the basis of the taxe profes-
sionnelle) that the taxpayers claiming the reimbursement of their tax had, in the circum-
stances, a legitimate expectation amounting to a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the retroactive act deprived them of this possession, and that it 
was not by reason of the general interest (French administrative courts do not require 
‘pressing’ reasons of general interest)23. The reasons of general interest invoked by the 
government (confirmation of the administrative interpretation, repartition of the tax bur-
den, financial consequences) were not deemed sufficient.
The Conseil d’Etat has not yet ruled on this point, but has considered that when a 
retroactive law enters into force shortly (i.e. six months) after a court decision upon which 
the claimant founded its expectation, the time is too short to give birth to a legitimate 
expectation amounting to a ‘possession’24.
3.7.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, as Community law principles, 
are applied by the courts only in situations pertaining to the application of Community law 
21.	 For	an	example	of	a	tax	statute,	Cons.	const.	2010-53	QPC,	14	October	2010,	Société	Plombinoise	de	Casino.
22.	 CE	8	mars	2002	no.	211327	&	211328,	BNP	(validation	statute).
23.	 CAA	Nancy,	28	January	2008,	06-1362,	Sté	Mécanique	Automobile	de	l’Est;	CAA	Paris,	26	November	2008,	
no.	07-999,	SA	Automobiles	Citroën;	CAA	Nantes,	1	December	2008,	07-3306,	SNC	Peugeot	Citroën	Rennes.
24.	 CE,	19	November	2008,	no.	292948,	SA	Getecom.	In	the	case,	the	retroactive	law	was	prompted	by	a	judgment	in	
favour	of	a	taxpayer.	The	lack	of	a	legitimate	expectation	is	therefore	not	only	due	to	the	shortness	of	the	period	
between	the	judgment	and	the	retroactive	law	(six	months),	but	also	to	the	fact	that	a	French	taxpayer	could	not	
reasonably	have	expected	that	the	legislator	(i.e.	the	tax	authorities)	would	not	react	to	an	embarassing	court	
decision.
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(i.e. VAT)25. They may serve as references for the interpretation of national provisions, in 
order to prevent conflict with EC law26.
Recently, administrative courts have begun to link legal certainty with the Constitu-
tion27, but I have not found examples of its application in tax matters.
3.7.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
It is very difficult for the French courts to use interpretations that avoid what might be ret-
roactive applications because retroactivity must be explicitly provided for by the statute. 
3.7.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.7.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
The idea that a judgment, which is supposed to be an interpretation of what the law has 
always been, may have a retroactive effect, or require a transitional period, is quite new to 
French courts. Prospective overruling has recently been adopted by the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court28 and has not yet received application in tax matters.
3.7.6. Views in the literature
3.7.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
There is no consensus on situations where to grant retroactive effect to tax statutes would 
be in any case justified or unjustified. The main opinion is that the legislator too easily uses 
retroactivity in tax matters (prompting proposals for a constitutional limitation), but that 
retroactivity is nevertheless necessary to prevent undue use of a procedural gap (validation 
statute to prevent a ‘windfall effect’ (effet d’aubaine)), and normal practice for policy changes 
in favour of the taxpayer (legislation by press release). For some recent proposals, see the 
report of O. Fouquet to the Ministry of the Budget, ‘improving the legal certainty between 
tax authority and the taxpayers’, June 2008.
3.7.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view has had little impact on the legal debate about tax retroactiv-
ity. It is sometimes noted that the legislator must have a greater freedom to modify tax 
statutes, without being hampered by grand-fathering obligations, in order to achieve a 
better adaptation of the tax law to economic circumstances, but these considerations are far 
less relevant than constitutional or European principles. In other words, the debate is about 
retroactivity, not retrospectivity.
25.	 CE	30	November	1994	no.	128516,	SCI	Résidence	Dauphine.
26.	 CAA	Bordeaux	16	January	2006	no.	02-955,	Marchesseau;	in	this	case,	prohibition	of	a	retroactive	contestation	by	
the	tax	authorities	of	a	VAT	option.	See	also	CE	16	November	2005	no.	265179,	Société	Métallurgique	du	Rhin:	a	
Council	decision	prorogating,	with	retroactive	application,	a	derogation	rule	is	not	an	infringement	of	a	legitimate	
expectation	as	it	could	be	expected,	on	the	contrary,	that	the	derogation	rule	would	be	prorogated.
27.	 CE,	ass.,	24	March	2006,	no.	288460,	Société	KPMG.
28.	 CE,	ass.	11	May	2004,	no.	255886	to	255892,	Association	AC!;	CE	16	July	2007,	ass.,	no.	291545,	Société	Topic	Travaux	
signalisation.
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3.8.
Germany
Johanna Hey
3.8.1. Introduction
The practice of retroactive tax legislation in Germany is considerably influenced by exten-
sive case law provided by the German Constitutional Court. Since the first decisions on 
retroactivity in the 1960s tax legislation has been the main area in which this court practice 
has developed. 
For almost 50 years the Constitutional Court practice on retroactive tax legislation 
has been quite steady. However, very recently the Court significantly changed its approach 
to retrospectivity. In three judgments of 7 July 2010 the Court strengthened the position of 
the taxpayer1. Due to several requests for constitutional review of German fiscal courts and 
some constitutional complaints by individual taxpayers the judges at the Constitutional 
Court also granted protection against changes which are considered to have only retrospec-
tive effect. This new development is not yet reflected in the academic debate, yet will proba-
bly affect it to a considerable extent. 
3.8.2. Terminology in Germany
3.8.2.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
Based on the case law of the Constitutional Court, the prevailing German doctrine sharply 
distinguishes between retroactivity and retrospectivity as two quite differently conceived 
categories2. In terms of terminology, retroactivity is called “real’ or ‘true’ retroactivity 
(‘echte Rückwirkung’ or ‘Rückbewirkung von Rechtsfolgen’3); retrospectivity is called ‘pseudo’ 
retroactivity (unechte Rückwirkung, ‘tatbestandliche Rückanknüpfung4‘). 
A statute is considered to have retroactive effect when it applies to transactions/cases 
which have been closed before promulgation of the new law. In this case the new statute 
alters legal effects produced prior to its existence. In contrast to this, retrospectivity exists if 
1.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(Bundesverfassungsgericht,	BVerfG),	reference	number	2	BvL	14/02	of	
7	July	2010,	www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100707_2bvl001402.html;	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03	of	7	July	
2010,	www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100707_2bvl000103.html;	reference	number	2	BvR	748/05	of	7	July	
2010,	www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100707_2bvr074805.html.
2.	 Since	judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(Bundesverfassungsgericht,	BVerfG)	of	31	May	1960,	Decisions	
of	the	Constitutional	Court	(Entscheidungen	des	Bundesverfassungsgerichts,	BVerfGE)	11,	at	p.	139	(145-146).
3.	 This	terminology	is	used	since	judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	14	May	1986,	BVerfGE	72,	at	p.	200	
(242),	by	the	Second	Senate	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court,	but	does	not	have	a	different	meaning.
4.	 Terminology	of	the	Second	Senate	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(see	supra	footnote	3).
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the new statute applies to transactions/economic activities which have begun in the past 
but are not yet concluded5. 
In the past the attribution to one of the two categories was of eminent importance, 
because it pre-determined the outcome whether the statute was held to be unconstitutional 
or not (see in detail below section 3.8.4.2). That was because the Constitutional Court classi-
fies retroactive laws in principle as prohibited, whereas laws with only retrospective effect 
are in general permitted. There were only a very few judgments where in the case of mere 
retrospectivity the Constitutional Court nevertheless held a law unconstitutional for the 
reason of violation of the appellant’s legitimate trust in the continuity of legislation. But 
these cases had been decided in other fields, not in tax law. Up to 2010 there was not a sin-
gle case of a solely retrospective tax statute being abrogated by the Constitutional Court. 
This situation changed due to three judgments of 7 July 2010. Here, the Constitutional 
Court acknowledged for the first time that under certain conditions the taxpayer’s confi-
dence needs to be protected against mere retrospective changes of the tax law as well and 
abrogated on these grounds several retrospective changes (see in detail below sec-
tion 3.8.4.2). 
The tax literature is divided; some authors promote a uniform concept of retroactiv-
ity6 mainly to avoid the pre-determination which is the result of the sharp line drawn 
between (true) retroactivity and retrospectivity (pseudo retroactivity) by the Constitutional 
Court. However, most authors want to adhere to the distinction7, even though many criti-
cize the outcome of court practice in cases of retrospectivity. But the fear is that if the dis-
tinction between (true) retroactivity and retrospectivity (pseudo retroactivity) is given up, 
one could no longer rely on the relatively predictable results of the ban of (true) retroactiv-
ity as a general principle.
The ultimate problem is to determine the moment the transaction/taxable activity is 
closed, so amendments/new tax obligations after this date have to be considered retroac-
tive. The difficulties can be illustrated by the reform of the capital gains taxation in Germany 
in 19998, which led to several requests for constitutional review9 and constitutional com-
plaints, which were decided on 7 July 201010.
With Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002 (Steuerentlastungsgesetz) the legislator 
extended the deadline in which capital gains from real estate sales are taxed from two to ten 
years. The bill was adopted in parliament on 4 March 1999, and published on 31 March 
5.	 E.g.	judgments	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	31	May	1960,	BVerfGE	11,	at	p.	139	(146);	of	19	July	1967,	BVer-
fGE	22,	at	p.	241	(248);	of	20	June	1978,	BVerfGE	48,	at	p.	403	(415).
6.	 E.g.	Dieter	Birk,	‘Steuerrecht	und	Verfassungsrecht	–	Eine	Analyse	ausgewählter	Entscheidungen	des	Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts	und	des	Bundesfinanzhofs	zu	verfassungsrechtlichen	Grenzen	der	Besteuerung’,	Die	Verwal-
tung	(DV),	Vol.	35,	p.	91	ff,	at	pp.	109,	111;	Joachim	Lang,	‘Verfassungsrechtliche	Zulässigkeit	rückwirkender	Steuer-
gesetze’,	Die	Wirtschaftsprüfung	(WPg.)	(1998),	pp.	163	ff.;	Monika	Jachmann,	‘Zur	verfassungsrechtlichen	Zuläs-
sigkeit	rückwirkender	Steuergesetze’,	Thüringer	Verwaltungsblätter	(ThVBl.)	(1999),	pp.	269	ff.;	Johanna	Hey,	
Steuerplanungssicherheit	als	Rechtsproblem	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag,	2002),	at	p.	247	and	to	other	
concepts	in	literature	at	pp.	233-239.	
7.	 See	e.g.	Klaus-Dieter	Drüen,	‘Rechtsschutz	gegen	rückwirkende	Gesetze	–	eine	Zwischenbilanz’,	Steuer	und	Wirt-
schaft	(StuW)	(2006),	at	pp.	358-365;	Roman	Seer	&	Klaus	Dieter	Drüen,	‘Der	rückwirkende	Steuerzugriff	auf	
private	Veräußerungsgewinne	bei	hergestellten	Gebäuden	auf	dem	verfassungsrechtlichen	Prüfstand’,	Finanzrund-
schau	(FR)	(2006),	at	p.	661	(668).
8.	 By	Tax	Relief	Act	(Steuerentlastungsgesetz)	1999/2000/2002	of	24	March	1999,	Federal	Law	Gazette	I	1999,	at	
p.	402.
9.	 Request	of	the	Fiscal	Court	of	Cologne	of	25	July	2002,	reference	number	13	K	460/01,	Entscheidungen	der	
Finanzgerichte	(EFG)	2002,	at	p.	1236;	request	of	the	Fiscal	Court	of	Cologne	of	24	August	2005,	reference	number	
14	K	6187/04,	www.fg-koeln.nrw.de;	request	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court	(Bundesfinanzhof)	of	16	December	2003,	
reference	number	IX	R	46/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2004,	at	p.	284.
10.	 See	footnote	1.
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1999. Nevertheless, the extended holding period applied to all sales concluded after 
31 December 1998.
One could argue that up to the moment of buying the property – let’s say on 30 June 
1995 – the taxpayer reckoned with the chance of selling the property any time after 30 June 
1997 (after the two-year speculative holding period) without any fiscal consequences. That 
was possibly the reason why he decided to make a real estate investment. However, nobody 
would consider the taxable event at this moment as already fully closed.
So what is the critical date? After which point does the taxpayer deserve protection of 
his confidence in the existing legal situation? The moment when the former two-year hold-
ing period expired11? The moment he concluded the contract to sell the property? The 
moment he received the sales price from the buyer? Or the moment when the annual tax 
obligation of the tax period, in which he sold the property, arose (= the end of the fiscal 
year)?
In its judgment 2 BvL 14/02 of 7 July 201012 the Constitutional Court deemed the 
expiration of the two-year speculative holding period crucial. From this moment the tax-
payer could expect that his position of being able to sell the property tax-free would be 
respected by the tax legislator. 
3.8.2.2. The relevance of the tax period for the distinction between retroactivity and 
retrospectivity
In this context, one of the biggest controversies between the Constitutional Court and the 
tax literature as well as the fiscal courts is the relevance of the accrual of the tax obligation 
by the end of the year. 
In as early as 1961 in one of its first judgments on retroactivity in tax law13, the Con-
stitutional Court invented a tax period-related concept for the distinction between retroac-
tivity and retrospectivity (known as ‘Veranlagungszeitraumrechtsprechung’). Due to the fact 
that the tax obligation of all period-related taxes (especially personal/corporate income tax, 
value added tax) arises only at the end of the year, the Court concluded that a tax case is not 
closed until the end of the year, because the legal consequences are still open. Therefore, 
insofar as the new statute is promulgated before 31 December, it is considered to be only 
retrospective, even if it applies from 1 January of the current year. Only if the new law also 
claims application for previous years is it conceived to be retroactive. 
In a leading decision of 14 May 198614 the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its case 
law. This was caused by a request for constitutional review of the Supreme Tax Court15, 
which had challenged the formal view of the tax period-related distinction between retro-
activity and retrospectivity. 
German tax literature opposes this view almost unanimously (see below sec-
tion 3.8.7). The main argument against the tax period-related distinction between retroac-
tivity and retrospectivity is that the accrual of the tax obligation at the end of the year is of a 
merely technical character, but provides no insight as to whether the relevant taxable event 
had taken place before. The taxpayer deserves legal certainty about the tax consequences 
the moment he performs transactions (known as ‘dispositionsbezogener Rückwirkungsbegriff’).
11.	 So	Dieter	Birk	&	Egmont	Kulosa,	‘Verfassungsrechtliche	Aspekte	des	Steuerentlastungsgesetzes	1999/2000/2002’,	
Finanzrundschau	(FR)	(1999),	at	p.	433	(438);	contra,	Supreme	Tax	Court	of	16	December	2003	reference	number	IX	
R	46/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2004,	at	p.	284.	
12.	 See	footnote	1.
13.	 Federal	Constitutional	Court	Judgment	of	19	December	1961,	reference	number	2	BvL	6/59,	BVerfGE	13,	p.	261.
14.	 Federal	Constitutional	Court	Judgment	of	14	May	1986,	reference	number	2	BvL	2/83,	BVerfGE	72,	p.	200.
15.	 Request	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court	of	3	November	1982,	reference	number	I	R	3/79,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	1983,	p.	259.
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In its famous decision on the abolishment of tax subsidies for shipbuilding investments of 3 
December 199716, the Constitutional Court accepted for the first time that there are trans-
actions which are fully closed before the end of the fiscal year. However, it limited its deci-
sion to tax subsidies, holding that here the taxpayer in particular depends on the reliability 
of the tax legislation. 
The German Supreme Tax Court, in line with the tax literature, held in a request for 
constitutional review of 2 August 2006 that this view also needs to be applied to regular tax 
provisions17, with the only aim of producing revenue, because they often influence the 
behaviour of the taxpayer in the same way as tax incentives. Therefore, the taxpayer needs to 
know the tax consequences of his economic operations at the time he is undertaking them.
In its answer to this request the Constitutional Court did not alter its distinction 
between retroactivity and retrospectivity. In the judgments of 7 July 2010 the Court adhered 
to the tax period concept18. In the above example (see section 3.8.2.1) concerning the 
extension of the holding period for tax-free capital gains on real estate, it characterized the 
change as only being retrospective even to the extent it applied to transactions concluded 
between 1 January 1999, and 31 March 1999, the date of the promulgation of the Tax Relief 
Act 1999/2000/2002. However, at the same time – and this is a major change – the distinc-
tion between retroactivity and retrospectivity became less important because the Constitu-
tional Court postulated protection against retrospective changes as well. Therefore, the tax 
period-concept probably will lose relevance.
It will be interesting to observe how this change in the Court’s practice will affect the 
legislator’s behaviour. In the past the German tax legislator made excessive use of the tax 
period concept. Very often tax statutes were enacted hastily at the end of December to allow 
them to enter into force for the whole fiscal year starting from 1 January. The legislator 
applied the period-related concept of the Constitutional Court even for inheritance tax, 
despite the fact that the inheritance tax claim accrues upon the event of the succession, and 
not only at the end of the year19. So far the legislator could feel safe in doing so, because 
changes within the tax period for the whole fiscal year always passed the review by the Con-
stitutional Court without any special burden of justification. In the future, according to the 
judgments of 7 July 2010 the tax legislator needs to provide a special justification if he 
wants to apply a change retrospectively from 1 January if the law is enacted later in that 
particular year. 
3.8.2.3. Interpretative statutes: legislative purpose of clarification 
There is no special category of ‘interpretative statutes’ in German law-making. A technical 
term like ‘interpretative statutes’ is unknown. 
16.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	3	December	1997,	reference	number	2	BvR	882/97,	BVerfGE	97,	at	p.	
67;	see	for	detailed	reviews	of	this	decision	Johanna	Hey,	‘Die	rückwirkende	Abschaffung	der	Sonderabschreibung	
auf	Schiffsbeteiligungen’,	Betriebs-Berater	(BB)	1998,	at	p.	1444;	Anna	Leisner,	‘Vertrauen	in	staatliches	Handeln	–	
ein	unkalkulierbares	Risiko?’,	Steuer	und	Wirtschaft	(StuW)	(1998),	at	p.	254;	Rolf	Schmidt,	‘Abbau	der	einkom-
mensteuerlichen	Förderung	von	Handelsschiffen	verfassungsgemäß’,	Der	Betrieb	(DB)	(1998),	at	p.	1199.
17.	 Supreme	Tax	Court	of	2	August	2006,	reference	number	XI	R	34/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2006,	at	p.	887;	as	well	
Supreme	Tax	Court	of	16	December	2003,	reference	number	IX	R	46/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2004,	at	p.	284	(291	
ff.).
18.	 See	Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(Bundesverfassungsgericht,	BVerfG),	reference	number	2	BvL	
14/02	of	7	July	2010,	http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100707_2bvl001402.html,	para.	62;	see	also	the	
answer	to	the	request	of	the	Bundesfinanzhof	of	2	August	2006,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03	/footnote	1)	para.	70.
19.	 Inheritance	tax	reform	1996	with	Annual	Tax	Act	1996,	Federal	Law	Gazette	I	1997,	at	p.	378,	adopted	in	parliament	
December	20,	1996;	promulgated	February	27,	1997,	effective	from	January	1,	1996.
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However, the legislator often claims that an amendment of an existing provision has the 
purpose of eradicating doubts about the correct interpretation of the legal wording 
(‘Klarstellungsinteresse’). These ‘clarification’ provisions are often enacted with retroactivity, 
sometimes applicable to all pending cases (tax assessments which are not yet final and 
conclusive).
In general, these statutes have to be considered retroactive, when the new wording 
has to be applied earlier than entry into force20. Only in cases in which the ‘clarification’ 
statute would have an exclusively declaratory effect, could it be considered to be not retro-
active, because it does not change the legal situation. Nonetheless, often these so-called 
clarifications in fact lead to a significant tightening of the prevailing legal situation. 
In the legal history of an amendment one finds usually only a broad-brush indication 
of the legislative intent of ‘clarification’, which does not allow the distinction between an 
merely declaratory and a constitutive amendment. The identification of a merely interpreta-
tive statute is, of course, deeply intermingled with the dogmatic approach to the boundar-
ies of interpretation of tax codes in the light of the principle of legality21. To be only inter-
pretative the new law would need to stay within the constitutional limits of interpretation 
of the previous wording. It might deviate from the interpretation given by the Supreme Tax 
Court; nevertheless, still has to be compatible with the wording of the tax statute as it was so 
far. This is often questionable. 
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish changes in tax statutes with the legislative 
intent of closing loopholes (‘Lückenfüllung’). Here, the wording is too narrow, either because 
of a mistake of the legislator or because of new tax planning constructions which came up 
after implementation of the original statute. In this case the intended fiscal result cannot be 
reached by interpretation (of course, the problem is closely related to the controversy of the 
legitimacy and scope of ‘economic interpretation’ and analogy in tax law).
In both situations, the legitimacy of a retroactive entrance into force is not fully 
resolved. There are some decisions where the Constitutional Court accepted retroactive 
legislation if the existing law was unclear and confusing22. However, this exception to the 
ban of retroactivity dates back to the early period of court practice. It was developed to 
allow the legislator to overcome flaws of the legal system in the post-war situation23. In 
more recent decisions it has no longer been applied.
3.8.2.4. ‘Validation Statutes’ (‘Nichtanwendungsgesetze’) 
Validation of the Supreme Tax Court’s judicial decisions has become quite a frequent phe-
nomenon24. Such Nichtanwendungsgesetze are often but not always enacted with retroactive 
effect. Especially if the legislator intends to overrule a change of the prevailing court prac-
tice the validation statute often is enacted with effect from the date of publication of the 
20.	 On	this	see	at	length	Johanna	Hey,	‘Vertrauen	in	das	fehlerhafte	Steuergesetz’,	Deutsche	Steuerjuristische	Gesell-
schaft	(DStJG),	Vol.	27	(2004),	at	p.	91.
21.	 See	Frans	Vanistendael	in:	Victor	Thuronyi,	ed.,	Tax	Law	Design	and	Drafting,	Vol.	1	(Washington	D.C.:	International	
Monetary	Fund,	1996)	Chapter	2,	at	pp.	23-24	on	the	dogmatic	approach	to	interpretation	in	Germany.	
22.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	May	4,	1960,	reference	number	1	BvL	17/57,	BVerfGE	11,	at	p.	64	(72)	;	
of	March	23,	1971,	reference	number	2	BvL	2/66,	BVerfGE	30,	at	p.	367	(388);	of	January	17,	1979,	reference	number	
1	BvR	446,	1174/77,	BVerfGE	50,	at	p.177	(194).
23.	 See	Gerhard	Leibholz,	Hans-Justus	Rinck	and	Dieter	Hesselberger,	Grundgesetz	für	die	Bundesrepublik	Deutschland	
(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag),	Article	20	GG,	marginal	note	1637.
24.	 See	also	Wolfgang	Spindler,	Liber	amicorum	for	H.	O.	Solms	(Berlin:	E.	Schmidt	Verlag,	2005)	at	p.	53;	Wolfgang	
Spindler,	‘Der	Nichtanwendungserlass	im	Steuerrecht’,	Deutsches	Steuerrecht	(DStR)	(2007),	at	pp.	1061-1066,	
president	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court,	analyzing	the	increasing	number	of	judicial	decisions,	most	of	them	in	favor	of	
the	taxpayer,	which	are	overruled	–	either	by	a	circular	or	by	a	tax	statute.	
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Supreme Tax Court’s new judgment. In this case, the validation statute is often initiated by a 
circular of the Ministry of Finance (known as ‘Nichtanwendungserlass’), stating that the new 
judgment will – except for the actual decided case – not be applied in general. This is done 
to prevent taxpayers from developing confidence in the new court practice. 
In around 90% of the cases the validation will concern cases where the Supreme Tax 
Court has decided/changed its case law in favour of the taxpayer. This already gives evidence 
that validation legislation normally does not have the purpose of correcting a miscarriage 
of judgment, but is for mere fiscal reasons. This is important because it means that in most 
of the cases we are not dealing merely with a (different) interpretation of the prevailing 
statutes but with an aggravation. 
Whether in these cases an exception to the ban on true retroactivity applies as well is 
not entirely clear. In a recent judgment of the Constitutional Court25, it was argued that 
insofar as the Ministry of Finance announces immediately after publication of the new rule 
that the legislator will intervene, the taxpayer is not able to build up sufficient confidence in 
the new case law. Therefore, he does not need and cannot expect protection against retroac-
tive validation. 
The tax literature criticizes the practice of validation in general if it is done solely for 
revenue reasons26; it is even more opposed to the retroactive enactment of such legisla-
tion27.
3.8.2.5. Relation between the date of publication and the date of entry into force
Conditio sine qua non for the entry into force of a statute is the publication in the Federal Law 
Gazette (see Article 82 para. 1 sentence 1 of the German Constitution). Without publication 
the law does not come into existence. 
Hence, the date of effectiveness has to be distinguished from the date of publication. 
Normally statutes contain a special provision stipulating a date of effectiveness. It can be 
the date of publication. However, often this is a date in the future, such as 1 January of the 
following year, or 30 June, to create a clear and easy cut between the old and the new law. If 
this date of effectiveness is before the date of publication the law will be considered (truly) 
retroactive. Thus, in general the date of publication in the Federal Law Gazette marks the 
distinction between (true) retroactivity and retrospectivity. 
But keep in mind that this general rule is derogated by the so far prevailing court 
practice of period-related distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity in tax law 
(see above section 3.8.2). Accordingly, it does not even need a special provision to make the 
new statute applicable for the whole current fiscal year. It is sufficient to change the law by 
31 December, because that means that the tax obligation will accrue as a result of the new 
law, according to the statutes in existence at the end of the tax period. To exclude transac-
tions concluded before, the legislator would need to formulate transitional rules, saying e.g. 
that the new rule applies only for transactions after the date of adoption or the date of pub-
lication of the new law. 
25.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	May,	12,	2009,	reference	number	2	BvL	1/100,	Vol.123,	at	p.	111	
(May	12,	2009),	reference	number	2	BvL	1/00	and	BFH/NV	2009,	at	p.	1382;	also	before	Judgment	of	January	23,	
1990,	BVerfGE	81,	at	p.	228	(239).
26.	 See	with	many	references	Joachim	Lang,	in:	Tipke/Lang,	Steuerrecht,	20th	ed.	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag,	
2010),	§	5	marginal	note	29-30.
27.	 E.g.	Johanna	Hey,	Steuerplanungssicherheit	als	Rechtsproblem,	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag,	2002),	at	
pp.	327-329.
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3.8.2.6. Concept of retrospectivity
Retrospectivity is a much more open concept than retroactivity. One could argue that 
almost every new statute affects economic activities which have been started in the past. The 
distinction between retrospectivity and mere future effects can again be illustrated by the 
recent reforms of capital gains taxation (see above section 3.8.1):
The 9th Senate of the Supreme Tax Court asked for constitutional review in a case 
where a taxpayer sold property only after publication of the extension of the holding period 
for tax-free capital gains by the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002, although he knew that under 
the new law he was no longer able to sell the real estate without paying capital gains tax. 
However, the referring Senate argued that the new rule had retrospective effect, because it 
did not exclude property which was acquired before it came into force28. In weighing the 
interest of the legislator in changing the law against the taxpayer’s interest in protection of 
his confidence the Supreme Tax Court gave priority to the latter.
The Constitutional Court (judgment 2 BvL 14/02)29 followed the request of the 
Supreme Tax Court because it did not consider the date of the sale of the property to be 
relevant, but the fact that the two-year holding period had expired before the law pro-
longed it to ten years. The requirement of the longer holding period to increases in value 
which had accrued before the new law was published was considered a violation of the 
taxpayer’s legitimate expectations. 
In contrast, the abolishment of the tax exemption for capital gains from shares by the 
Business Tax Reform Act 2008 was clearly not retrospective. The full taxation of capital gains 
had already been adopted on 14 August 200730, but is applicable only to capital gains from 
shares which have been acquired after 31 December 2008. 
Less clear is whether the change from the old shareholder-related thin capitalization 
rule in sec. 8a of the Corporate Income Tax Act to the new general interest deduction ceiling 
has retrospective effect. It was also adopted by the Business Tax Reform Act 2008 of 14 
August 2007 and applies – in case the fiscal year equals the calendar year31 – to interest paid 
from 1 January 2008. Most authors argue that it has no retrospective effect, because it 
became effective only for future business expenses32. In contrast, one could consider it 
retrospective because it applies to existing loans, which often cannot be adjusted to the new 
fiscal situation quickly enough.
3.8.2.7. No categorical distinction between substantive and procedural statutes 
In general, no distinction is made between the (retroactive) enforcement of substantive and 
procedural statutes. New procedural provisions principally apply also to pending cases, 
where the taxable event occurred in the past. However, unlike substantive statutes the tax 
period-related distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity cannot be applied. Due 
28.	 Request	for	constitutional	review	of	16	December	2003,	reference	number	IX	R	46/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2004,	
pp.	284	ff.	The	taxpayer	had	bought	the	real	estate	in	1990,	and	sold	it	on	22	April	1999.	That	was	three	weeks	after	
the	legislator	had	promulgated	the	extention	of	the	necessary	holding	period	from	two	to	ten	years	on	31	March	
1999.
29.	 See	footnote	1.
30.	 Business	Tax	Act	Reform	(Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz)	2008	v.	14.	8.	2007,	Federal	Law	Gazette	I	2007,	at	
p.	1912.
31.	 If	the	fiscal	year	diverges	from	the	calendar	year,	it	applies	already	for	all	fiscal	years	beginning	after	25	May	2007	
(day	of	the	adoption	of	the	bill	in	parliament),	and	not	ending	before	1	January	2008	(Sec.	52	para.	12	d	sen-
tence	1	EStG).	This	is	a	quite	common	technique	used	for	diverging	fiscal	years.
32.	 See	e.g.	Christian	Hick,	in:	Herrmann/Heuer/Raupach,	EStG/KStG-commentary,	§	4h	EStG	Anm.	J	07-3.
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to the general principle that a law may not impose an impossible obligation, a new proce-
dural statute cannot stipulate duties to cooperate with respect to the past. 
3.8.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.8.3.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax laws
Only for criminal laws does the German constitution contain an explicit ex post facto (Arti-
cle 103 para. 2 of the German Constitution). It cannot be analogously applied to retroactive 
tax provisions33.
In tax law the German Constitutional Court bases the principle of non-retroactivity 
on the rule of law (Article 20 para. 3 of the German Constitution). It derives from the rule of 
law the principle of legal certainty and the principle of protection of legitimate expecta-
tions (confidence principle, principle of public trust = ‘Vertrauensschutzprinzip’). For limita-
tions on retrospectivity the Court also refers to the constitutional guarantees of personal 
freedoms as long as the ban of (true) retroactivity is based on the concept of the rule of law. 
The ability-to-pay principle is not used.
3.8.3.2. Transition policy of the legislator
Within the constitutional margins the legislator is free in the design of the transition 
between old and new law. There are neither official nor unofficial guidelines on the transi-
tion policy. Surprisingly enough, the Ministry of Finance, who is drafting the tax bills in 
Germany, also does not apply a general guideline internally to the design of transitional 
law. Hence, it is decided case by case. 
This lack of standardization creates a lack of certainty in itself, because the design of 
the transition from old to new law for the taxpayer is hard to predict.
The legislator normally, but not always, stays within the broad lines drawn by the 
Constitutional Court (see sections 3.8.2.1-4 and 3.8.4.2), especially by making use of the tax 
period-related distinction between principally allowed retrospectivity and in general for-
bidden retroactivity.
Retroactive effect is – as discussed above (see section 3.8.2.4) – regularly granted to 
‘validation statutes’. 
Furthermore, the date of first application is very often – if not assigned to 1 January – 
accelerated from the date of publication to the date of the parliamentary decision (due to 
the case law of the German Constitutional Court, which allows the legislator to go back to 
the adoption of the bill in parliament even though it is considered to be a true retroactivity, 
see also below section 3.8.4.1). The reason for this common practice of retroactivity is to 
prevent taxpayers with the knowledge of the intended abolishment of a tax advantage 
trying to make extensive use of the (old) more favourable rule before the new statute actu-
ally comes into force (so-called ‘announcement effects’). 
The grandfathering policy of the German tax legislator appears to be quite arbitrary. 
Only in some standard situations can recurring patterns be identified. For example, in the 
case of a change of amortization rules, acquisitions done in the past are normally excluded, 
whereby the cut-off date is often not the date of the publication of the new statute, but the 
adoption of the bill in parliament or even earlier (e.g. the date when the bill was proposed). 
Contrary to this, in the case of new restrictions to the offsetting losses, there is no pattern 
conceivable. In the majority of cases they apply also to losses which already occurred in the 
33.	 Prevailing	opinion,	see	e.g.	Klaus	Tipke,	Die	Steuerrechtsordnung,	Vol.	1,	2nd.	ed.,	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	
Verlag,	2000),	at	p.	147.
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past, but sometimes loss-producing activities carried out before the new statute was 
adopted are excluded. The different treatment cannot be traced back to the legislative pur-
pose, e.g. anti-abuse legislation.
In recent years a tendency to more generous grandfathering by the legislator is seen. 
This might be a reaction to the many requests for constitutional review by the Supreme Tax 
Court, calling for stricter standards than in the past. This can be proved again by the exam-
ple of the reform of capital gains taxation in 1999 and 2009. Whilst the extension of the 
periods in which private capital gains are taxed in the Tax Relief Act 1999/2000/2002 has 
been granted without any grandfathering, even with real retroactivity (see above section 
3.8.2.2), the abolishment of the tax-free capital gains from shares by the Business Tax 
Reform 2008 applies only to shares acquired after 31 December 2008. Shares acquired before 
this deadline will remain without any time limitation under the old regime, meaning that 
they can be sold tax exempt after a holding period of one year. 
It will be interesting to observe if and how the judgments of 7 July 201034 change the 
legislator’s transition policy. The Constitutional Court made it very clear that the tax legisla-
tor needs special reasons for retrospective legislation to overcome the taxpayer’s confidence.
3.8.3.3. No ex ante control by an independent body
An ex ante evaluation of possible infringements of the Constitution by an independent body 
is unknown in Germany. The parliament can ask advice from its academic service (Wissen-
schaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages). However, this instrument is hardly ever used. Sometimes 
also the Federal Council (Bundesrat) issues a caveat regarding single provisions even though 
in the end it gives its required consent to the bill.
3.8.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.8.4.1. The role of adoption of the bill in parliament
Very often the tax legislator provides retroactivity till the date of the adoption of the bill in 
parliament – regardless whether there has been a special press release making the parlia-
mentary adoption public. Even though this practice is considered to be truly retroactive, the 
Constitutional Court considers it justified, without asking for special reasons of justifica-
tion.
The rationale behind this court practice is that from the date of adoption of the new 
statute in parliament the taxpayer can no longer trust the continuity of the prevailing legal 
situation. In the general legal literature this exception to the principle of non-retroactivity is 
hardly questioned anymore.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to query this practice. Most tax statutes in Germany need 
the consent of the Federal Council; otherwise they fail. For this reason the adoption of a bill 
in parliament is only a first step. Especially if the political majorities in the Federal Parlia-
ment and the Federal Council are divergent it is doubtful whether the bill will be accepted 
and, if so, with which content. It can take weeks to some months until the fate of the bill is 
sealed. For the taxpayer this creates the unpleasant situation that he can neither trust in the 
still-prevailing legal norms nor in the announced changes.
For this reason the tax literature opposes the practice of retroactivity until the adop-
tion of the bill in parliament. The main reason for this opposition is the special feature of a 
tax law, whereby the consent of the Federal Council is required in order for it to be 
34.	 See	footnote	1.
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adopted35. This could lead to an approach where the tax legislator is allowed to go back to 
the date of the consent in the Federal Council. 
The 11th Senate of the Supreme Tax Court in a request for constitutional review of 
2 August 200636 challenged the Constitutional Court practice in an even more fundamental 
way. The requesting Senate insisted that the earliest constitutionally valid date for enforce-
ment is the date of promulgation in the Federal Law Gazette. Deviation from this date would 
always require a special justification apart from the fact that the taxpayer might have previ-
ously gained knowledge from the adoption of the bill in parliament. The Senate emphasized 
the fact that formal publication of new statutes in the constitutionally provided organ of 
publication is a very important characteristic of a state under the rule of law. For good rea-
sons the Constitution provides only one organ for publication as an essential requirement 
for a statute to come into existence. It is not reasonable to demand that the taxpayer to take 
note of an emerging new statute from other sources, which do not have the same reliability 
as the Federal Law Gazette. 
In its answer to the request of the Supreme Tax Court the Constitutional Court37 
basically reiterated its position that the taxpayer’s confidence in the prevailing legal situa-
tion is abating with the progress of the legislative procedure. Already after the tabling of a 
new bill the taxpayer needs to be aware of the change. The Constitutional Court refers to the 
taxpayer’s responsibility to take precautions, e.g. to negotiate adjustment clauses. Further-
more, it can be required that the taxpayer take legal advice to shelter from negative effects 
of retrospective changes of the law. 
3.8.4.2. Retroactive application from first announcement
The legal relevance of media reports about amendments of tax laws is also a highly contro-
versial topic in Germany. There is no standardized practice of publishing changes of the tax 
code ahead of the formal law-making procedure. Sometimes upcoming changes of the tax 
law will be announced by an official press release of the Cabinet or the Ministry of Finance. 
Besides official announcements, plans to abolish tax subsidies or to impose higher tax bur-
dens are often communicated by private media even before the legislative procedure starts, 
just on the basis of rumours and ‘insider’ information. 
According to the case law of the Constitutional Court, which does not differentiate 
between the quality of the announcement (official press release or any other kind of media 
coverage), announcements are relevant in order to prove whether the trust of the taxpayer 
in the existing law is reasonable or not. Thereby the Constitutional Court makes a distinc-
tion between merely retrospective laws and retroactive laws38. Whilst it considers press 
reports to weaken the trust of the taxpayer in retrospective statutes, it used to be permanent 
court practice that the earliest moment the taxpayer has to envisage a retroactive enforce-
ment of a statute is the adoption of the bill in parliament (see above section 3.8.4.1). How-
ever, in its shipbuilding subsidy decision of December 1997 the Court39 seems to modify its 
practice, holding that if there is a risk of harmful distortions because taxpayers make exces-
sive use of a subsidy before its abolishment, then the legislator is justified in enacting the 
statute with retroactivity until the press release.
35.	 E.g.	Wolfgang	Hoffmann-Riem,	‘Rückwirkende	Besteuerung	der	Bodenveräußerungsgewinne	von	Landwirten’,	
Deutsches	Steuerrecht	(DStR)	(1971),	at	p.	3	(4).
36.	 Supreme	Tax	Court	of	2	August	2006,	reference	number	XI	R	34/02,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2006,	at	p.	887.	
37.	 Judgment	reference	number	2	BvL	1/03	of	7	July	2010	(see	footnote	1),	para.	74.
38.	 See	comprehensively	Johanna	Hey,	Steuerplanungssicherheit	als	Rechtsproblem,	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag,	
2002),	at	pp.	319-326.
39.	 Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	3	December	1997,	reference	number	2	BvR	882/97,	BVerfGE	97,	at	
p.	67	(81).
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The decision on the abolishment of fiscal shipbuilding subsidies had an even more special 
twist, because the Court had to decide about a situation, where the Cabinet on 25 April 1996 
had announced that the subsidy would be abolished for contracts concluded after 30 April 
1996. In the end, the legislator went back to the date of the cabinet decision, excluding 
– contrary to his announcements – contracts concluded between 25 April and 30 April. This 
clearly contravened the principle of good faith. However, the Constitutional Court sustained 
the tax statute at issue, accepting the legislator’s intent to stop the run in shipbuilding 
investment which had occurred after the announcement by not increasing the existing 
overcapacity of cargo ships.
3.8.4.3. Retroactivity and pending cases
If a statute is enacted with unlimited retroactivity, then it applies to any pending procedure. 
Pending cases are normally not excluded from the application of the new statute.
This problem in particular occurs in cases of validation legislation (see section 
3.8.2.4), where the legislator overrules a favourable decision of the Supreme Tax Court. Tax-
payers who expected the favourable decision and who undertook legal action in parallel 
cases will not be able to benefit from the favourable change in the case law, if it is immedi-
ately overruled with retroactivity40. 
3.8.4.4. Retroactivity in favour of the taxpayer
In principle, the legislator is free to grant retroactive effect to tax statutes which are favour-
able to taxpayers. On the one hand, there are no constitutional restrictions. On the other 
hand, favourable changes with retroactive effect are rather rare. One of the reasons for the 
retroactivity of a favourable change might be to make up for a long political debate or a 
protracted legislative procedure. For example, some of the tax reliefs implemented to help 
business enterprises in the ongoing financial crisis have been adopted with retroactive 
effect. 
If it is unclear whether a change will affect the taxpayer’s situation positively or nega-
tively (double-edged changes), the legislator sometimes makes the new law eligible for a 
transitional period, to be applied also for the past. 
3.8.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity
3.8.5.1. Control by the Constitutional Court 
Germany has a very effective system of ex-post control of legislative acts in order to protect 
taxpayers against unconstitutional taxation. 
The capacity to dismiss a tax statute for infringement of the Constitution is exclu-
sively with the Federal Constitutional Court. But there are different ways to take a matter to 
the Constitutional Court. Every German Court can ask for constitutional review by the Con-
stitutional Court if it has doubts whether the law in question for a certain case is compatible 
with the Constitution. Hence, the taxpayer can already ask for presentation to the Constitu-
tional Court at the lower tax court. Recently tax courts have been very active in presenting 
issues of retroactivity/retrospectivity to the Constitutional Court. 
40.	 See	e.g.	the	legislative	answer	to	a	change	if	the	Supreme	Tax	Court’s	practice	on	joint	ventures	for	local	business	tax	
purposes,	in	detail	Paul	Kirchhof	and	Arndt	Raupach,	‘Die	Unzulässigkeit	einer	rückwirkenden	gesetzlichen	
Änderung	der	Mehrmütterorganschaft’,	Der	Betrieb	(DB),	Beilage	1	No.	22,	(2001),	pp.	1-18.
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However, in case neither the lower court nor the Supreme Tax Court has constitutional 
doubts, then – after exhaustion of the recourse to the regular courts – the taxpayer himself 
can file an individual constitutional complaint claiming that the retroactivity/retrospectiv-
ity infringes the rule of law or the principle of public trust.
3.8.5.2. Standards applied to retroactive/retrospective tax statutes by courts
The history of the control of retroactivity by the Constitutional Court and the tax courts can 
be roughly characterized as follows: 
The court practice of the Constitutional Court has been quite stable for around 50 years, 
even though it has continually been subject to profound criticism not only in the legal litera-
ture but also from the tax courts. In the 1980s the Supreme Tax Court attempted by a prelimi-
nary ruling to change the reasoning of the Constitutional Court regarding the tax period- 
related distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity (see section 3.8.2.2)41 – without 
success42. For the next 20 years the tax courts were resigned and just accepted the case law of 
the Constitutional Court. Then, in its judgment of 3 December 1997 the Constitutional Court 
indicated a possible change of its prevailing practice. This decision was the starting point not 
only for a lively discussion in the tax literature, but also for numerous new requests for consti-
tutional review by the tax courts, questioning many of the rules set up by the permanent prac-
tice of the Constitutional Court. The material the tax courts could present to the Constitutional 
Court was enormous because in the late 1990s the tax legislator had often adopted retroactive 
tax statutes. 
Most of the recent requests for constitutional review and individual constitutional 
complaints were decided in the judgments of 7 July 201043. These judgments are very multi-
farious. They basically confirmed the prevailing court practice on the distinction between 
retroactivity and retrospectivity, but caused a sensation by changing the appraisal of retro-
spectivity. 
This background is helpful for understanding differences between the court practice 
of the Constitutional Court and the tax courts, namely the Supreme Tax Court, though in the 
end only the court practice of the Constitutional Court is of interest, because the tax courts 
have no power to declare a retroactive tax statute invalid. 
Because of the importance of the case law of the Constitutional Court as a guideline 
for legislative practice, most aspects have been discussed above. Here I will summarize them 
to give a compact overview:
Applying the described methods of distinction between retroactivity and retrospec-
tivity (see above section 3.8.2.1 and 3.8.2.2) the Constitutional Court has held, in principle, 
that there is a ban of retroactivity, whilst retrospectivity – at least in the past – was generally 
accepted. 
However, the principle of non-retroactivity does not apply absolutely, however, but 
allows important exceptions, which can basically be assigned to two underlying ideas:
a) A reasonable taxpayer cannot claim trust in the (still) prevailing legal situation. This is 
supposed to justify retroactive enactment 
– from the date of adoption of the bill in parliament (see discussion above sec-
tion 3.8.4.1);
– in the case of an evidentially unclear or unconstitutional legal situation.
41.	 Request	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court	of	3	November	1982,	reference	number	I	R	3/79,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	1983,	p.	259.
42.	 See	rejection	of	the	view	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court	by	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	judgment	of	14	May	1986,	
reference	number	2	BvL	2/83,	BVerfGE	72,	p.	200.
43.	 See	footnote	1.
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– This exception has hardly ever been used. It was invented to overcome the transi-
tional period after the Second World War, thus in a situation where the legal system 
needed a full reorganization. The difficulty of this ground of justification is that the 
flaw in the law has to be evident for a ‘normal’ taxpayer.
b) The confidence in the prevailing legal situation has to be subordinated to the interest of 
the legislator to change the law retroactively. This applies if
– the disadvantage the taxpayer suffers from the retroactive enactment is negligible.
– this de minimis rule is merely an outcome of the principle of proportionality.
– the legislator can claim overriding urgent/compelling public interest.
It is common understanding that mere public revenue interests are not sufficient to 
justify retroactive tax laws. Nevertheless, the reason of compelling public interest implies a 
wide latitude in argumentation. So far, the Constitutional Court has never used it as the only 
ground of justification, but has combined it with facts which shook the taxpayer’s faith. This 
is particularly true of the legislative intent to combat announcement effects44. 
Retrospectivity is held unconstitutional only if the taxpayer can claim that his interest 
in continuity of the legal situation outweighs the public interest in changing the law. In the 
past, this requirement was very hard to meet, because the Constitutional Court in the bal-
ancing progress only took into consideration the change as such, and not a change with a 
sufficient grandfathering rule. In the judgments of 7 July 2010 the Constitutional Court 
sharpened the requirements for justification. As of now the legislator needs to prove a spe-
cial urgency for the change to justify its application also to investments/economic activities 
started in the past. It is not enough that the change as such is justified (e.g. closing loop-
holes, abolishment of unjustified tax subsidies), but rather a special reason has to be pro-
vided why it has to be applied with retrospectivity. The breach of confidence must be neces-
sary to foster the aim of the law. The mere aim to collect more revenue by application with-
out grandfathering is not suitable to surmount the taxpayer’s legitimate expectations. In 
the end there is an open process of the weighing of interests, but the legislator must observe 
the limits of reasonableness.
3.8.5.3. Test of retroactivity against Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
To my knowledge there has been no court decision where a retroactive statute has been 
tested against Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR).
3.8.5.4. Retroactivity of Acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation
The German Constitutional Court understands retroactivity mainly as a problem of the rule 
of law. The rule of law has two aspects, one of which is objective (the principle of legal cer-
tainty) and one expressing individual rights (the principle of public trust; confidence prin-
ciple). The structure of the test against this principle of public trust is the following: 
a) Sufficient basis for confidence
b) Confidence
c) Worthiness of being protected
Retroactive subordinate legislation would be tested in the same way as statutory tax 
laws. The taxpayer can claim to rely on subordinate legislation in the same way as on parlia-
mentarian tax statutes. 
44.	 See	Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	3	December	1997,	reference	number	2	BvR	882/97,	BVerfGE	97,	
at	p.	67	(81	ff.).
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In contrast, resolutions of parliament as such have no immediate binding force on the tax-
payer. Hence, they are not object of the protection of public trust. This causes the problem 
that the taxpayer – it is said to destroy his confidence in the still prevailing legal situation – 
cannot claim that he trusted in a resolution of parliament like the adoption of a bill as such 
if in the end the bill fails in the Federal Council.
3.8.5.5. Avoiding unconstitutional retroactivity by interpretation
Tax statutes have to be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution45. Not only the 
courts but also the tax authorities are required to interpret each statute in a way that avoids 
infringements of the constitutional principles of legal certainty and public trust. Constitu-
tional interpretation has – in the margins of the wording – priority over the dismissal of a 
statute as unconstitutional. Hence, in the case law of the Supreme Tax Court transitional 
rules are interpreted in accordance to the principle of public trust. 
3.8.5.6. Self-discipline of the legislator
Especially in the late 1990s the tax legislator pushed the limits set out by the Constitutional 
Court. He seemed to feel free to increase the tax burdens with retroactivity for the current 
fiscal year. This gave rise to numerous requests for constitutional review and constitutional 
complaints, which lead to the sharpening of the Constitutional Court’s practice in its judg-
ments of 7 July 2010.
On the other hand, there are fields where in the past the tax legislator was quite gen-
erous. This is particularly true for changes of depreciation rates or methods. Normally the 
new less favourable depreciation rule applies only to new acquisitions. Sometimes these 
transitional rules are in themselves retroactive in the sense that the deadline is a date before 
publication of the new depreciation rule, often the date of adoption in parliament, but they 
do not apply to assets acquired in previous years. 
In contrast, if the tax legislator limits the fiscal effects of accruals it usually stipulates 
not only restrictions for the future set-up of accruals, but also requires the liquidation of 
accruals set-up in the past in the current or the following taxable years. 
3.8.6. Retroactivity of Case Law
3.8.6.1. Transition practice of the Supreme Tax Court in cases of a change of the 
existing case law
Legitimacy versus necessity of transitional rules in the case of a change of the case law is a 
matter of quite some controversy in the academic literature46.
This might be the reason why the practice of the Supreme Tax Court is not uniform at 
all:
– Sometimes the Supreme Tax Court itself formulates a transitional rule. This happened 
recently when the Grand Senate of the Supreme Tax Court changed its longstanding 
45.	 See	Klaus-Dieter	Drüen,	in:	Tipke/Kruse,	Abgabenordung/Finanzgerichtsordnung	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	
Verlag),	§	4	AO	marginal	notes	238-239.
46.	 Pro	see	e.g.	Johanna	Hey,	‘Schutz	des	Vertrauens	in	BFH-Rechtsprechung	und	Verwaltungspraxis’,	Deutsches	Steuer-
recht	(DStR)	(2004),	at	pp.	1897	ff;	contra	see	Anna	Leisner,	‘Kontinuitätsgewähr	in	der	Finanzrechtsprechung’,	
Deutsche	Steuerjuristische	Gesellschaft	(DStJG),	Vol.	27	(2004),	at	p.	214;	Michael	Fischer,	‘Rückwirkende	Recht-
sprechungsänderung	im	Steuerrecht’,	Deutsches	Steuerrecht	(DStR)	(2008),	at	p.	697;	on	the	whole	Klaus-Dieter	
Drüen,	in:	Tipke/Kruse,	Abgabenordung/Finanzgerichtsordnung,	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag	Cologne),	§	4	
AO	marginal	notes	116-118.
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practice on the inheritability of loss carry-forwards for purposes of the personal income 
tax47, but excluded transfers undertaken in the past regardless whether the tax proce-
dures are still open. The Senate argued that also judiciary is bound by the rule of law. 
Despite the fact that judgments have no erga omnes effect, they also constitute the legal 
situation the taxpayer relies on. Literature reviews of this judgment were ambivalent48. 
The tax authorities followed the Supreme Tax Court and granted a transitional rule by a 
circular, even though the judgment of the Supreme Tax Court has no legally binding 
force except in the decided case.
– In other cases the Supreme Tax Court only suggests that the tax authorities should decide 
case by case to grant protection of the confidence, based on sec. 163, 227 of the General 
Tax Code (Abgabenordnung).
– In some cases the tax authorities grant protection of trust after a change of the case law 
of their own accord, no matter whether this issue was addressed or not by the Supreme 
Tax Court.
– Apart from the question of protection of confidence against retroactive application of a 
new rule the Supreme Tax Court also applies a principle of continuity of its case law49. 
The principle of continuity does not deal with the legal consequences of the abandon-
ment of existing case law, but with the requirements for such abandonment. Substantial 
objective reasons are necessary to invent a new rule. However, the principle of continuity 
does not prevent changes in the case law, but only increases the burden of argumenta-
tion.
The Supreme Tax Court provides/initiates protection of confidence only if the new rule 
is unfavourable for the taxpayer. 
In contrast, the Constitutional Court has a permanent practice of granting protection 
to the fisc’s revenue interests. If it holds a statute unconstitutional in general, its decisions 
have ex tunc effect. The legislator is supposed to repair the legal situation from the begin-
ning. However, in tax law the Constitutional Court very often deviates from this general rule 
in order to protect the national budget. For this purpose the Court grants its decisions only 
ex nunc effect, often even only pro future effect. This ‘Unvereinbarkeitsrechtsprechung’ weak-
ens the protection of taxpayers against unconstitutional taxation, and is rejected by the 
prevailing opinion in the tax literature50.
3.8.7. Views in the literature
3.8.7.1. Main views in the literature
The tax literature promotes a principle of non-retroactivity. Most authors oppose the tax-pe-
riod related distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity51. There is broad support 
for the view of the Supreme Tax Court that the decisive moment has to be the closing of 
transactions by the taxpayer. This is the moment at which the taxpayer needs certainty 
about the tax consequences of his economic decisions. He is entitled to be protected against 
47.	 Judgment	of	the	Supreme	Tax	Court	of	17	December	2007,	reference	number	GrS	2/04,	Federal	Tax	Gazette	II	2008,	
p.	668.
48.	 Pro	also	referring	to	the	US	practice	of	prospective	overruling	Hans-Joachim	Kanzler,	“Vertrauensschutz	oder	
Rückwirkungsverbot	bei	Rechtsprechungswandel	im	Steuerrecht	–	entschieden	am	Beispiel	der	Vererblichkeit	des	
Verlustabzugs’,	Finanzrundschau	(FR)	(2008),	at	p.	465;	contra	see	e.g.	Michael	Fischer,	‘Rückwirkende	Rechtspre-
chungsänderung	im	Steuerrecht’,	Deutsches	Steuerrecht	(DStR)	(2008),	at	p.	697.	
49.	 See	with	references	of	the	case	law	and	the	discussion	in	the	tax	literature	Klaus-Dieter	Drüen,	in:	Tipke/Kruse,	
Abgabenordung/Finanzgerichtsordnung,	(Cologne:	Dr.	Otto	Schmidt	Verlag),	§	4	AO	marginal	notes	307-311.
50.	 See	e.g.	Roman	Seer,	in:	Tipke/Lang,	Steuerrecht,	20th	ed.,	2009,	§	22	marginal	no.	287.
51.	 See	e.g.	Joachim	Lang,	in:	Tipke/Lang,	Steuerrecht,	20th	ed.,	2009,	§	4	marginal	no.	177.
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a later change of the legal consequences, especially when he is no longer able to adjust his 
behaviour to the new law. 
Some authors promote a uniform concept of tax statutes which affect economic deci-
sions made in the past (see also section 3.8.2.1). They argue that the sharp – nevertheless 
often arbitrary – line between retroactivity and retrospectivity hinders reasonable results 
especially for the latter group of merely retrospective changes in the legal situation. The 
worthiness of protection against retrospective tax legislation can be as high as in the case of 
a retroactive change. Hence, there is no categorical difference between retroactive and ret-
rospective tax laws. It might only indicate different levels of intensity of the betrayal of the 
taxpayer’s confidence. However, most authors want to stick to the bifurcated concept of 
retroactivity/retrospectivity, mainly because they fear that otherwise the – fairly effective – 
protection against retroactive changes could be jeopardized, but they call for a better pro-
tection against merely retrospective legislation as well.
Apart from these conceptual questions, the way the Constitutional Court applies the 
grounds of justification towards retroactive legislation is also the object of criticism.
3.8.7.2. Influence of the law and economics view
So far the law and economics view has had no impact on the jurisprudential debate in Ger-
many. The reason for this could be that the whole debate in Germany is mainly driven by 
considerations of constitutional law, basically blind to the economic effects of retroactivity 
vice versa non-retroactivity. 
The few protagonists of a greater freedom of the legislator to change tax statutes even 
retroactively or at least without grandfathering rules52 base their point of view not on pos-
sible economic benefits, but on the democracy principle. They also fear a petrification of the 
law if the tax legislator were always obliged to provide grandfathering rules. 
52.	 See	e.g.	Rainer	Wernsmann,	Grundfälle	zur	verfassungsrechtlichen	Zulässigkeit	rückwirkender	Gesetze,	Juristische	
Schulung	(JuS)	(2000),	at	pp.	39-43.
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3.8.8. Annex I
Table 3-1. Changes of Tax Legislation: Constitutional Restrictions of Retroactivity
	
Change is disadvantageous change is 
 advantageous
real retroactivity
=	applying	to	closed	transactions
(date	of	enforcement	before	
	published	in	the	law	gazette)
pseudo retroactivity 
(=  retrospectivity)
=	changing	the	law	for	open	
	transactions
Conflict	with	the	rule	of	law Conflict	with	the	constitutional	
principle	of	protection	of	confidence	
and	the	guarantees	of	personal	
freedoms
generally: allowed
unconstitutional
Exceptions:
–	 Going	back	to	the	date	of	adoption	
of	the	bill	in	parliament
–	 Correction	of	an	unconstitutional	
or	unclear	legal	situation	
–	 Compelling	reasons	of	public	policy
in principle: constitutional
Weighing	up	between	public	policy	
and	individual	interest
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3.9.
Greece
Eleni Theocharopoulou* 
Konstantinos Remelis** 
Panagiotis G. Melissinos***
3.9.1. Introduction
In Greek tax law, retroactivity of tax statutes containing substantive law is constitutionally 
permissible but within very limited temporal limits, especially in cases when the tax statute 
is unfavourable, in the sense that it imposes a financial burden. In particular, Article 78 
para. 2 of the Greek Constitution provides that ‘A tax or any other financial charge may not be 
imposed by a retroactive statute effective prior to the fiscal year preceding the imposition of the tax’. 
Thus, pursuant to this constitutional principle, a tax statute may be applied to an event 
giving rise to the tax that precedes the time of promulgation of the tax statute, as long as 
the temporal restriction imposed by the Constitution is upheld. Nevertheless, this temporal 
restriction imposed by the Constitution does not apply in cases of retroactivity favourable 
to tax subjects. 
The issue of retroactivity in Greek tax law is dealt with in theory and case law in the 
light of this constitutional provision that applies specifically and exclusively to tax statutes. 
It is not the only constitutional provision that delineates the retroactivity of tax laws, but it 
is the main provision. With regard to the conceptual distinction between retroactivity and 
retrospectivity, this distinction is not known in Greek tax law. This is the reason why there is 
no equivalent term for the notion of retrospectivity in Greek which is encountered in other 
legal orders. The only conceptual distinction that exists in Greek tax law is to be found in a 
theoretical textbook1 and refers to the distinction between true and non-true retroactivity, 
which nevertheless is not addressed conceptually by the case law of administrative (tax) 
courts or of the Greek Council of State (Symboulio tis Epikrateias – StE).2
It should be noted, however, that the conceptual distinction between true and non-
true retroactivity of statutes is also encountered both in Greek civil law theory and in the 
case law of civil courts, including the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos – AP).3 However, this 
distinction is infrequently made and in any event, the content attributed by Greek civil law 
academics to these notions resembles its meaning in many other legal orders. 
1.	 Th.	Fortsakis,	Forologiko	Dikeo	(Tax	Law)	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2008),	no.	123,	at	
p.	123.
2.	 Research	on	judgments	by	the	Greek	Council	of	State/Symboulion	tis	Epikrateias	(StE)	can	be	done	by	case	number	
and	year	of	promulgation	of	judgments	at	www.ste.gr
3.	 Research	on	judgments	by	the	Greek	Supreme	Court/	Areios	Pagosis	can	be	done	by	case	number	and	year	of	prom-
ulgation	of	judgments	at	www.areiospagos.gr.
*	 Eleni	Theocharopoulou	contributed	all	sections	of	the	report,	except	for	sections	3.9.2.4,	3.9.2.5	and	3.9.7.
**	 Konstantinos	Remelis	contributed	sections	3.9.2.4	and	3.9.2.5	of	the	report.
***	 Panagiotis	G	Melissinos	contributed	section	3.9.7	of	the	report.
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The following issues will be examined below: Terminology issues, as discussed in theory and 
case law of Greek courts (3.9.2), issues of ex ante evaluation of retroactivity (3.9.3), the use of 
retroactivity in legislative practice (3.9.4), as well as issues that case law has been occupied 
with, such as the ex post evaluation of retroactivity (3.9.5) and the retroactivity of case 
law (3.9.6). Finally, the views in the literature will be presented (3.9.7). 
3.9.2. Terminology
3.9.2.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
As mentioned in the introduction, legal scholars in Greece use the term ‘retroactivity’, but 
not the term ‘retrospectivity’. In Greek legal academia retroactivity is mentioned in general, 
without any emphasis placed on the distinctions of retroactivity from other concepts. Nev-
ertheless, except for the concept of retroactivity, the distinction between true and non-true 
retroactivity is sometimes used.
3.9.2.1.a. Conceptual variations
Thus, Greek legal academics infrequently use the concepts of ‘true retroactivity’ and ‘non-
true retroactivity’ theoretically.4 In fact, one could claim that ‘true retroactivity’ according 
to Greek legal scholars is mostly identical to the concept of ‘formal retroactivity’, according 
to Dutch tax literature, whereas ‘non-true retroactivity has some points in common with 
retrospectivity – in the broad sense it has and therefore with material retroactivity, accord-
ing to Dutch tax literature. 
It should be stressed in any case that in Greek academia the theoretical distinctions 
between true and non-true retroactivity are used neither as frequently nor with absolutely 
the same content in the various fields of law. Therefore, with regard to this theoretical dis-
tinction which is frequently encountered, especially in civil law, it is established that while it 
is utilized in the case law of the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) (i.e. of the civil courts), 
it is not encountered in the case law of the administrative courts or the Council of State 
(Symboulion tis Epikrateias – (StE). This means that theoretical distinctions concerning 
retroactivity are not used by the administrative courts. In the frame of the ex post, incidental 
and ad hoc review of the unconstitutionality of statutes, the administrative courts and the 
Council of State (StE) rule on the permissibility (or impermissibility) of the retroactivity of a 
statute, whether administrative or tax.5 In particular, with regard to tax laws, the non-utili-
zation of the relevant theoretical distinctions is certainly justified by the fact that there is an 
express constitutional provision that allows even the retroactive levying of tax charges, but 
within a particular time frame, as will be presented in detail.6 
Given the fact that there are discrepancies in the legal definition of retroactivity in 
various fields of law, the issue is presented with respect to two branches: civil law (3.9.2.1.a.i) 
and tax law (3.9.2.1.a.ii). 
3.9.2.1.a.i. In civil law
In civil law, the distinction between true and non-true retroactivity is described as follows: 
The phrase ‘true retroactivity’ of the law usually intimates the regulation by law of legal rela-
tions or effects that arise from or came about before the commencement of its application. 
In contrast, a law is ‘non-truly retroactive’ when a new law regulates (amends or abolishes) 
legal effects emerging after the commencement of its application (even though they emerge 
4.	 See	mention	of	these	terms	in	Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	no.at	p.	123.
5.	 On	the	unconstitutionality	review	of	statutes	by	Greek	courts,	see	below	under	3.9.5.
6.	 See	below	under	3.9.3.1	and	under	3.9.5.1,	3.9.5.2.
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from legal relations or situations existing prior to the law), so this is not actually retroactivi-
ty.7 This is also what the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos -AP) has held.8 
3.9.2.1.a.ii. In tax law
In tax law there is some differentiation in the relevant definitions. The concept of ‘true retro-
activity’ is defined in only one textbook and means the retroactive enactment of new tax 
charges or the retroactive amendment of the existing favourable tax provisions for the 
worse,9 given the fact that the retroactivity of tax abatements is in principle constitution-
ally permissible in Greece. Furthermore, the term ‘non-true retroactivity’ implies the direct 
application of new provisions, even in cases pending before tax authorities or courts.10
The case law of administrative courts and of the Council of State (StE) does not utilize 
the relevant distinction at all. The tax provision in question is controlled by the Council of 
State (and the administrative courts) with regard to its eventual non-compliance with Arti-
cle 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution (on the temporal restriction of unfavourable retro-
activity of tax legislation,11 without any reference to the concepts of true or non-true retro-
activity (in the sense mentioned earlier) or to any other concept of retroactivity. Thus, the 
following were held by the jurisprudence of the Council of State (StE) to be cases of retroac-
tive taxation to the worse: the retroactive abolition or the restriction of an existing favour-
able tax regime,12 the retroactive change in the method of determination of the tax base,13 
the retroactive limitation of deductible expenses14 etc.
In conclusion, the theoretical distinction between true and non-true retroactivity is 
not especially used by the case law of the courts in tax cases. Nevertheless, if cases of non-
true retroactivity of tax laws – in the sense attributed to the concept of non-true retroactivity 
by tax law theory in Greece – are considered to fall theoretically under the concept of retro-
spectivity used in the questionnaire, the following should to be noted: Only in some of the 
cases where the tax legislator ‘intervenes’ in cases pending (in the sense of retroactive regu-
lation of pending cases as defined by the tax legislature) before tax authorities or courts, the 
jurisprudence of the Council of State (StE) poses certain restrictions to this legislative ‘retro-
activity’.15 As to the remainder, the non-true retroactivity of tax laws is mostly found by case 
law to be in accordance with the Constitution. 
3.9.2.1.b. Clear distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
In Greek legal academia and, in particular, in the field of tax law there is no distinction 
between these two concepts. Thus ‘retrospectivity’ in a broad sense may have not been the 
7.	 See Ap. Georgiadis,	Genikes	Arches	Astikou	Dikeou	(General	Principles	of	Civil	Law)	(Athens-Komotini:	
Ant.	N.		Sakkoulas	Publications,	2002),	at	p.32,	who	notes	that	non-true	retroactivity	is	not	in	fact	retroactivity	and	it	
establishes	the	unity	of	law.	
8.	 AP	1316/2006,	AP	1664/2006,	AP	562/2009.
9.	 Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	123.
10.	 Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	no.at	p.	123.
11.	 On	Article	78	para.	2	of	the	Greek	Constitution,	see	for	more	details	below	under	3.9.3.1.	On	tax	statutes	that	provide	
for	the	legislator’s	intervention	in	pending	proceedings,	which	tax	theory	in	Greece	considers	to	be	a	case	of	
non-genuine	retroactivity,	and	on	the	review	of	their	unconstitutionality,	see	below	mainly	under	3.9.2.6.b,	
3.9.2.7.a.i	and	3.9.4.3.a.
12.	 OlStE	1865/1985,	StE	1704/1986.
13.	 StE	3068/1984.
14.	 StE	4155/1984,	StE	1485/1989.
15.	 As	to	be	presented	below	under	3.9.2.7.a	and	3.9.4.3.a.
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object of discourse by Greek legal scholars, at least with regard to tax matters,16 probably 
because of the fact that retrospectivity in broad sense is constitutionally permissible in 
Greek tax law.
3.9.2.2. Relevance of tax period
With regard to the conceptual distinction between actual retroactivity and de facto retroac-
tivity, it should be noted that legal discourse in Greece does not employ this distinction. 
Nevertheless, this distinction is of a certain historical importance for Greece. In particular, 
according to earlier jurisprudence of the Council of State (StE), a relevant issue arose under 
the regime of total constitutional prohibition of the retroactivity of tax law which was 
applicable in Greece on the basis of the military junta constitution of 1968-1974. In fact, on 
the basis of that ‘constitutional’ text and with regard to income taxation of the current 
financial year, a law enacted in the year taxing the income produced that year was held to be 
unconstitutional.17 Therefore, under the regime of a total prohibition of the retroactivity of 
tax legislation, the Council of State (StE) ruled that not only actual, but also de facto retroac-
tivity was unconstitutional.
Under the current Greek Constitution in force (i.e. since 1975 and on), this concep-
tual distinction between actual retroactivity and de facto retroactivity is not of particular 
interest, given the fact that Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution expressly permits both de 
facto and actual retroactivity, as long as the latter does not extend beyond the fiscal year 
prior to the year of enactment of the law.18 Moreover, this is provided by the Greek Consti-
tution regardless of the kind of tax.19 Besides, it is the prevalent opinion in Greece that 
especially where income is concerned, the annual taxable base is only known by the end of 
the year, given the fact that the taxable base of the taxpayer’s annual income is completed 
on the last day of the fiscal year.20 
3.9.2.3. Interpretative statutes
3.9.2.3.a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
The Greek legal system expressly covers the phenomenon of ‘interpretative statute’. The 
interpretation provided through such a law is called an authentic interpretation of law. 
Authentic interpretation is provided by the Constitution in Article 77 and produces retroac-
tive effect. In particular, in the frame of the authentic interpretation of the law, if there is a 
need for clarification of some law, the legislative power interprets the previous law by 
another law, the interpretative statute.
16.	 With	regard	to	the	distinction	between	genuine	and	non-genuuine	retroactivity	in	general,	see	K.	Chrysogonos	and	
G.	Pinakidis,	‘I	archi	tis	prostasias	tis	empistosynis	sto	germaniko	dimosio	dikeo’	(‘The	principle	of	legitimate	
expectations	in	German	public	law’),	Dikeomata	tou	Anthropou,	Special	edition	I,	(2003),	at	pp.	38-47,	S.	Stam-
atopoulos,	I	dikonomiki	anadromi	ton	neon	ousiastikon	ermineftikon	nomon	(The	procedural	retroactivity	of	new	
interpretative	statutes	of	substantive	law),	(Athens:	Research	Institute	for	Procedural	Studies,	1989),	see,	for	
example,	at	pp.	54-86,	J.	Iliopoulos	–	Strangas,	Rückwirkung	und	Sofortwirkung	von	Gesetzen	–	Eine	verfassungsre-
chtliche	Untersuchung	unter	Berücksichtigung	des	deutschen	und	griechischen	Steuerrechts,	(1986).
17.	 See	StE	1723/1981,	Armenopoulos	5	(1982),	at	pp.	388-389.
18.	 On	the	issue	of	Article	78	para.	2	of	the	Constitution,	see	for	more	details	below	under	3.9.3.1	and	3.9.5.2.
19.	 See	however	on	this	issue	under	3.9.3.1	below.
20.	 Compare	K.	Finokaliotis,	Forologiko	Dikeo	(Tax	Law),	no.	280	(Athens-Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2005),	
at	p.	127.
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3.9.2.3.a.i. Legal basis for ‘interpretative statutes’
The legal foundations of the retroactive effect of interpretative statutes are to be found in 
the Greek Constitution. It emanates in particular from the interpretation of Article 77 para.1 
of the Constitution in conjunction with para. 2. In Article 77 para. 1 it is provided that ‘the 
authentic interpretation of the statutes shall rest with the legislative power’, while in para. 2 
of the same article (Article 77) that ‘a statute that is not truly interpretative shall enter into 
force only as of its publication’. The prevailing opinion in Greek case law and theory regard-
ing the retroactivity of interpretative statutes is the following: In the sense of Article 77 para. 
1 of the Constitution, by concretizing its meaning, the interpretative provision reveals the 
initial meaning of the provision interpreted and thus applies together with the provision 
interpreted, having retroactive effect.21 Despite the fact that it may appear to be an inter-
pretative provision, the newer provision is not an authentic interpretation of the law that 
results in retroactivity, if there is no ambiguity and doubt about the provision interpreted; 
on the contrary, it is a pseudo-interpretative statute that will apply only for the future (ex 
nunc), according to Article 77 para. 2 of the Constitution.22 
Nevertheless, as far as tax statutes are concerned, the question arises whether an 
interpretative tax law should have the retroactivity attributed by the Constitution to all 
interpretative statutes or, on the contrary, whether its retroactivity is limited to the time 
limit of one fiscal year of permissible retroactivity imposed by the Constitution on tax 
charges (Article 78 para. 2).23 According to the prevailing opinion, the authentic interpreta-
tion of tax law should be subject to the temporal restriction of the permissible retroactivity 
of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution, which applies specifically to tax charges.24 This 
view is founded on the argument that, since the Constitution prohibits the retroactivity of 
tax laws imposing tax charges that extends beyond the fiscal year preceding the year of its 
enactment, Article 78 para. 2 entails a special provision when compared to the general 
provision of Article 77 on interpretative statutes.25
3.9.2.3.a.ii. Special term for ‘interpretative statutes’
There is no special term for this kind of retroactivity. There is however, as already mentioned 
above, a special term for this kind of interpretation of the law, which is termed in the Con-
stitution ‘authentic interpretation’ and the respective laws are called authentic interpreta-
tive statutes. 
3.9.2.3.a.iii. Standards used for characterization as ‘interpretative statutes’ 
With regard to the standards employed to determine that an interpretative statute is truly 
interpretative the following requirements must be met: 1. the statute being interpreted 
should contain a provision of an ambiguous and doubtful nature that creates uncertainty 
and renders its authentic interpretation by interpretative statute necessary. Usually doubts 
as to the meaning of a provision arise either within the administration or due to disagree-
21.	 For	examples	in	case	law	see	StE	894/1979,	OlStE	5123/1996,	OlStE	3210/2001.	On	theory,	see	P.	Pararas,	Syntagma	
(Constitution)	1975	–	Corpus	II	–	articles	51-80	–	Parliamentary	Law,	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Publica-
tions,	1985),	at	p.	505,	and	the	respective	footnotes,	Stamatopoulos,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	135-136	and	the	respective	
footnotes;	compare	also	G.	Balis,	Genike	arhe	tou	astikou	dikeou	(General	principles	of	civil	law)(1955),	at	p.	33.	
22.	 For	example	see	Stamatopoulos,	supra	note	16,	at	pp.	142-143	and	the	case	law	cited	there.
23.	 See	for	more	details	below	under	3.9.3.1,	3.9.5.1	and	3.9.5.2.
24.	 I.	Anastopoulos,	Forologiko	Dikeo	(Tax	Law),	at	p.	141,	K.	Finokaliotis,(Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publications,	1999),	
at	p.	133,	Stamatopoulos,	supra	note	16,	at	p.	50,	N.	Chatzitzanis,	Kodix	Diikitikis	Dikonomias	(Code	of	Administra-
tive	Court	Procedure)	–	Commentary	by	article,	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2004),	at	p.	631,	
Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	129.
25.	 Pararas,	supra	note	21,	at	p.	502,	nos.	110-111.
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ments in case law (e.g. strong minority opinions).26 The provision being interpreted is 
ambiguous when, after using all known methods of interpretation, it cannot be deduced 
which legal rule (i.e. which meaning or content of the rule) has actually been adopted.27 
2. the interpretative statute should attribute to the provision interpreted its real meaning 
and 3. it has to be voted by the parliament in plenum (Article 72 para. 1 of the  Constitution), 
4. the interpretative statute must be certainly of a later date than the statute being inter-
preted, 5. even if the interpretative statute is not called such, it should be clear from the 
provisions of the statute that it is interpretative in nature. Thus, in the adjudication of many 
cases of the Council of State (StE) on authentic interpretative statutes, mention is made 
either of the ‘type of authentic interpretation’ of an interpretative statute, i.e. the phrase ‘the 
true meaning or the meaning of the provision XYZ is …’ appears, or of the doubts caused by 
the statute interpreted e.g. to the Administration, and in particular to its ambiguity.28 For 
example, a provision clarifying a pre-existing provision that was ambiguous as to its mean-
ing and extent of application, due to consecutive references and due to the wording of the 
relevant provisions, was found to be authentically interpretative.29
If a taxpayer has a different opinion as to the interpretation that is to be given to the 
statute interpreted, I do not consider that there could be a problem. A problem could be 
posed only if the statute interpreted does not necessarily require authentic interpretation, 
but was in fact clear and therefore the alleged true interpretative statute is pseudo-interpre-
tative. In that case, the following could happen: If taxpayer is entitled to bring an action 
seeking annulment of the tax administration act levying a tax charge on him, the taxpayer 
may claim in his brief that, based on the interpretative statute, the latter is not truly inter-
pretative, as the statute interpreted was clear and did not require any authentic interpreta-
tion. Then, the taxpayer may also support his view. The court that is to rule on the action for 
annulment will adjudicate incidentally based on the aforementioned standards whether it 
is a truly interpretative or a pseudo-interpretative statute. In the latter case, the court will 
rule that the law applies since its publication and not retroactively. At the same time, the 
court may attribute to the statute being interpreted the meaning claimed by taxpayers. This, 
however, does not affect other cases, but only the case adjudicated. In any case, if other 
courts addressed the matter and contradictory judgments emerge, then the competent 
court for the resolution of the matter is the Supreme Special Court (Anotato Eidiko 
Dikastirio) (Article 100 of the Constitution).30
3.9.2.4. Validation statutes
3.9.2.4.a. Phenomenon of ‘validation statutes’ known?
Before discussing the phenomenon of validation statutes in Greece, it should be stressed 
that in Greece the annulment by the legislature of a particular court judgment is constitu-
tionally prohibited. Such a practice would contravene the constitutionally guaranteed prin-
ciples of separation of powers (Article 26), of the equality of citizens before the law (Arti-
cle 4), but also to the citizens’ right to judicial protection (Article 20 para. 1). Nevertheless, 
according to the established case law of the Council of State(StE), it is considered that the 
legislature’s intervention in pending proceedings does not violate the constitutionally 
26.	 Pararas,	supra	note	21,	at	p.	482,	no.	31.
27.	 Pararas,	supra	note	21,	at	pp.	483-485,	nos.	34	et	seq.
28.	 OlStE	5123/1996,	StE	248/2003,	StE	2700/2003,	StE	2532/2004,	StE	121/2005.
29.	 StE	248/2003,	StE	2700/2003,	StE	2532/2004,	StE	121/2005.	
30.	 On	the	review	of	the	unconstitutionality	of	statutes	in	Greece,	see	Eleni	Theocharopoulou,	in:	Ana	Paula	Dourado,	
ed.,	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law	–	2009	EATLP	Congress,	Santiago	de	Compostela	(4-6	June	2009),	EATLP	
International	Tax	Series,	Vol.	7	(EATLP,	Series	editor	Kees	van	Raad	2010),	at	pp.	115	–	116.	See	also	for	more	details	
below	under	3.9.5	and	3.9.6	(and	especially	on	the	role	of	the	Supreme	Special	Court)	and	the	relevant	footnotes.
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established principles of separation of powers (Article 26), of the equality of citizens before 
the law (Article 4), or the citizens’ right to judicial protection (Article 20 para. 1) under the 
following conditions: that rules are general and impersonal and no final court judgments 
have been issued nor that the case is pending before a court of cassation.31 Certainly in 
some cases, both in earlier case law of the Court of Auditors (Elegtiko Synedrio-ES)32 and in 
recent cases of the Council of State (StE)33 it is implied that generally lis pendens before 
court authorities and not only the finality of a judgment hinders the legislative intervention 
under influence of the European Court for Human Rights case law, with regard to the obser-
vance of Article 6 para. 1 sentence a ECHR on the right to a fair trial, as long as claims are 
discharged. Furthermore, the new law applied in pending cases may not directly ratify an 
administrative act, the legitimacy of which is pending before a court.34 
With regard to validation statutes in Greece, this has a special content. The ‘validation 
statute’ usually contains the retroactive validation of unlawful regulatory administrative 
acts since their date of issue.35 
Validation statutes in Greece were addressed in jurisprudence and by scholars with 
regard to their dubious constitutionality for various reasons. Academics were particularly 
critical.36 One of the reasons was the fact that validation statutes ratify retroactively a regu-
lation of the administrative authority, usually a ministerial decree, which has been issued in 
violation of the Greek Constitution, because it has been issued without statutory delegation 
or in excess thereof (in violation of the Greek Constitution). 
While in the past the case law of the Council of State(StE) had accepted the constitu-
tionality of such validation statutes37 and therefore their retroactivity, nevertheless under 
the influence of theorical writings38 case law made a significant turn.39 The now-prevailing 
opinion in the case law of the Council of State (StE)40 on validation statutes accepts that 
31.	 StE	1502/1999	(on	pension	issues),	OlStE	542/1999.
32.	 Plenum	ES	2274/1997.
33.	 StE	241/2009,	StE	3801/2003.
34.	 If	it	is	not	pending	before	the	courts,	see	for	a	direct	sanction	of	an	administrative	act,	OlStE	1847/2007.
35.	 See	on	this	matter,	and	on	other	cases	of	validation	statutes,	Dim.	Kontogiorga	–	Theocharopoulou,	‘I	paremvasi	tis	
ektelestikis	exousias	stis	diikitikes	diafores	meso	nomothetikon	rythmiseon’	(‘The	intervention	of	the	executive	
power	in	administrative	disputes	via	legislative	regulation’)	in:	Epistimoniki	Imerida	tis	ENOVE	(ENOVE	scientific	
colloquium)	(Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publications,	1992),	at	p.	163	et	seq.
36.	 See	for	example	N.	Sakellariou,	‘To	provlima	tis	dia	nomou	kyroseos	anypostaton	i	plimelon	aplos	dioikitikon	
praxeon’	(‘The	issue	of	validation	by	statute	of	non-existent	or	merely	deficient	administrative	acts’),	To	Syntagma	
(1978),	at	p.	618	et	seq.,	Dim.	Kontogiorga	–	Theocharopoulou,	E	synepie	tis	akyroseos	diikitikis	praxeos	enandi	tis	
Diikiseos	(Legal	effects	of	the	annulment	of	administrative	acts	towards	the	Administration)	(Thessaloniki:	Sakkou-
las	Publications,	1980),	at	pp.	50	et	seq.,	244	et	seq.,	256	et	seq.,	M-El.	Panagopoulou,	‘To	provlima	tis	anadromikis	
dia	nomou	kyroseos	paranomou	diikitikis	praxeos	prosvlithisas	enopion	tou	StE’	(‘The	issue	of	retroactive	valida-
tion	by	statute	of	an	unlawful	deficient	administrative	act	that	has	been	contested	before	the	Council	of	State’),	in:	
Haristirios	Tomos	(Symmikta)	pros	timin	G.	Papahatzi,	Dimosia	Diikisi	kai	Diikitiki	Dikeiosyni	(G.	Papahatzis	
Honorary	Volume:	Public	Administration	and	Administrative	Justice)	(1989),	at	p.	751	et	seq.,	Ep.	Spiliotopoulos,	
Enhiridio	Diikitikou	Dikeou	(Manual	of	Administrative	Law)	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	
1991),	at	p.	535	et	seq.,	Kontogiorga,	supra	note	35,	at	p.	163	et	seq.
37.	 StE	2270/1987.
38.	 Sakellariou,	supra	note	36,	at	p.	618	et	seq.,	Kontogiorga	–	Theocharopoulou,	supra	note	36,	at	p.	50	et	seq.,	244	et	
seq.,	256	et	seq.,	P.	Pavlopoulos,	I	syntagmatiki	katohyrosi	tis	etiseos	akyroseos	–	Mia	synchroni	epopsi	tou	Kratous	
Dikeou	(The	constitutional	entrenchment	of	the	administrative	action	for	annulment	–	a	contemporary	view	on	the	
rule	of	law)	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	1982),	at	p.	290,	Panagopoulou,	supra	note	36,	at	p.	
751	et	seq.
39.	 Something	that	theory	commended.	See	O.	Papadopoulou,	‘Nomothetiki	kyrosi	kanonistikon	praxeon:	to	chroniko	
tis	nomologiakis	metastrofis’	(‘Legislative	validation	of	regulatory	acts:	a	chronicle	of	the	turnaround	in	case	law’),	
To	Syntagma	1992,	at	p.	51.	
40.	 StE	3596/1991,	StE	1854/1992,	StE	3057/1992,	StE	1235/1994,	StE	822/1995,	StE	4605/1995,	StE	3185/1996.
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they are ineffective as to the part retroactively ratifying a legal rule; yet they apply for the 
future.41 
With particular reference to tax validation statutes it is noted that, while the case law 
of the Council of State (StE) accepted until 1991 that the retroactive ratification of relevant 
ministerial decrees was lawful within the time limits of the constitutionally permissible 
retroactivity (Article 78 para. 2),42 this case law made a U-turn43 under the influence of 
theory44. Due to the constitutional principle of the formal legality of the tax (Article 78 
para. 1 and 4 of the Greek Constitution), according to which the object of taxation, tax rate, 
tax abatements and exemptions require regulation by formal statute, i.e. an act by the legis-
lature, those substantive tax elements cannot be founded on a ministerial decree but they 
must be founded on the formal (validation) statute.45 Therefore, the relevant tax regula-
tions cannot apply retroactively, within the time limits of the constitutionally permissible 
retroactivity (Article 78 para.2), but only after their ratification by law. The case law accepts 
the same for validation statutes of various ‘tax contracts’46, e.g. of the ‘development con-
tracts’ signed between the Ministry of Finance of Greece and taxpayers – entrepreneurs. 
Contracts are signed in the frame of development efforts by the Ministry, by which certain 
tax privileges – incentives are granted to the counterpart (usually taxpayer – entrepreneur), 
in order to take on business activity in a certain field or in a particular geographical terri-
tory. Due to the principle of formal legality of tax (Article 78 paras.1 and 4 of the Greek 
Constitution), substantive tax provisions must be based not on a contract but on the formal 
(validation) statute. Therefore, the relevant tax regulations cannot apply retroactively e.g. 
from the time of conclusion of a tax contract, nor within the time limits of the constitution-
ally permissible retroactivity (Article 78 para. 2), but only after their ratification by law.
3.9.2.4.a.i. Standards used for characterizations as ‘validation statutes’
No standards are used to determine that validation statutes really validate legal practice 
(and not only the unilateral view of the tax authorities). Anyway, validation statutes do not 
have this meaning in Greece.
3.9.2.4.a.ii. Difference between ‘validation statute’ and ‘interpretative statute’
In Greece there is no relation between validation and interpretative statutes. Furthermore, 
the retroactivity of validation statutes is no longer accepted in Greece.
3.9.2.5. Comparison moment
In Greek legal theory there is a distinction between formal validity and substantive validity 
of a statute. The formal validity of the statute commences on the date of its publication in 
the Government Gazette, unless another means of publication applies that approximates its 
character and the object of the regulation attempted. The moment of ‘comparison’ for the 
determination of the statute’s retroactivity is the commencement of its formal validity. This 
results directly from case law, which, according to the wording used in judgments, calcu-
lates the retroactivity period that is permissible pursuant to the Greek Constitution, since 
the promulgation of the statute.47 The substantive validity is distinguished from the formal 
41.	 StE	186/2004,	StE	479/2006,	StE	3490/2007.
42.	 See	Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	pp.	81-82,	no.	95.	See	StE	3386/1985,	StE	4225/1988.
43.	 OlStE	3596-97/1991,	OlStE	872/1992,OlStE	4670-73/1988.	See	also	StE	914/1997.	Compare	and	StE	3016/2009.
44.	 Loukas	Theocharopoulos,	Forologiko	Dikeo	–	Geniko	(Tax	Law	–	General	part)	(Thessaloniki	1981),	at	pp.	140	-144.
45.	 Compare	L.	Theocharopoulos,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	138	et	seq.	See	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	20,	at	pp.	94-95,	Fortsakis,	
supra	note	1	at	pp.	81-82,	no.	95.	See	also	StE	914/1997.
46.	 L.	Theocharopoulos,	supra	note	44,	at	p.	138	et	seq.,	Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	83,	no.	96.
47.	 See	OlStE	1865/1985.
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validity of the statute, if the latter sets a date of entry into force different from the date of its 
publication in the Government Gazette. The substantive validity of a statute depends also on 
the state institution issuing the statute. 
Thus, if the legislation is issued by the legislative power, then it is called ‘formal stat-
ute’ and its substantive effect according to the case law of the Council of State (StE) com-
mences ten days after its publication in the Government Gazette (Article 103 of the Law 
introducing the Civil Code), unless otherwise stipulated in the formal statute. In other 
words, the statute itself may set the date of its entry into force at a time posterior or anterior 
to its date of publication in the Government Gazette. Nevertheless, as far as the possibility of 
retroactivity of unfavourable tax laws is concerned, it is limited to the previous fiscal year of 
the year of publication of the statute, according to Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitu-
tion.48 Any legislative provision to the contrary is unconstitutional. Moreover, the provision 
of retroactivity in tax fines is avoided, given that they are frequently of criminal nature.49
If the rule is issued by the executive power (always based on statutory delegation), 
then it is called ‘regulatory administrative act’ (e.g. ministerial decree or presidential decree 
containing legal rules) and its substantive validity is different from statutes. It commences 
on the date of publication in the Government Gazette (or in any other conducive means that 
is stipulated by law),50 unless the regulatory administrative act determines a time subse-
quent to its publication. Such a rule may be retroactive only if the formal statutory law 
containing the delegation provided expressly for retroactivity of the regulatory administra-
tive act.51 Furthermore, if the content of this regulatory administrative act (based on statu-
tory delegation) is a tax matter, any retroactivity is limited by Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek 
Constitution. In fact, if it is a tax fine, any retroactivity may be excluded.
Nevertheless, it may be the case that the date of the Government Gazette, in which the 
said statute was promulgated may not coincide with the date of the Government Gazette’s 
actual circulation, i.e. the date of its availability to the public. Thus, the date of actual circu-
lation may be posterior to the date of publication, in which case, according to the case law 
of the Council of State52, the 60-day time limit for filing an action for annulment com-
mences on the day following the public availability of the Government Gazette issue.
3.9.2.6. Concept of retrospectivity
3.9.2.6.a. Definition of retrospectivity 
As already mentioned above, the issue has not been addressed by tax law theory in Greece. 
The scientific discussion in Greece refers to topics of true or non-true retroactivity of stat-
utes, which have already been discussed above. Moreover, as already noted, the issue is not 
of so much interest in Greece, in as much as the legislature may levy taxes even with true 
retroactivity, despite the restrictive time limits of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution.53 
Therefore, cases that would fall under retrospectivity in a broad sense are constitutionally 
permissible in Greece. 
48.	 For	more	details	see	below,	especially	under	3.9.3.1	and	3.9.5.1,	3.9.5.2.
49.	 This	appears	to	be	the	recent	tendency	in	the	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State,	being	influenced	by	the	case	law	of	the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	For	more	details,	see	below	under	3.9.2.7.a.ii	and	under	3.9.5.2.
50.	 StE	390/1951,	StE	2031/2009.
51.	 OlStE	3659/1980,	StE	4914/1987,	StE	2031/2009.
52.	 OlStE	2081/1987,	StE	2139/1999,	StE	2946/2008,	StE	2107/2009.
53.	 For	more	details	see	below	under	3.9.3.1.
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Consequently, tax law theory and especially case law have addressed cases that are retroac-
tive or not in the sense of Article 78 para. 2 and whether these cases are constitutional or 
not, while there is no mention of the concept of retrospectivity.
3.9.2.6.b. Examples of retrospectivity
As already mentioned, the theoretical distinction between retrospectivity and retroactivity 
has not really been addressed by tax law theory in Greece. 
An ambiguous case is, in my opinion, that of the legislature intervening in a pending 
trial. Thus, the application of a new tax statute of substantive law to a pending trial is not 
characterized in the case law as retrospectivity, but as retroactivity.54 However, the theory of 
tax law accepts this case as one of non-true retroactivity.55 
Moreover, in my opinion, the following practice could be a case of retrospectivity 
within the meaning used in the General Report: The practice of the Greek tax legislature to 
extend the statute limitations for the state’s fiscal claims before it expires has been repeat-
edly held by the case law of the Council of State (StE) to be constitutional. According to this 
case law, as long as the extension of the statute of limitations is granted before its expiry, 
then this law is not retroactive and it is constitutional.56 On the contrary, if the statute of 
limitations expires and its extension is then provided for in a new statute, then this is a case 
of the retroactive levy of tax.57 
3.9.2.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
Except for the distinction between procedural statutes and tax statutes of substantive law, 
the present section will deal with procedural provisions, as a special category of procedural 
statutes. In the Greek legal order the triple distinction between procedural statutes (dikono-
miki nomi), i.e. statutes that are applied in the procedure before the courts, procedural 
provisions (diadikastikes diataxis), i.e. provisions that are applied before (tax) authorities, 
and tax statutes of substantive law seems to be more accurate. It should nevertheless be 
noted that the distinction between procedural statutes (dikonomiki nomi) and procedural 
provisions (diadikastikes diataxis) is not prevalent either in Greek tax law theory,58 or in 
case law. In spite of this, it is more correct as a distinction, as, pursuant to Greek law, differ-
ent procedures apply before administrative and tax authorities and before the administra-
tive – tax courts. In fact, except for the Code of Procedure before Administrative Courts, 
there is now a Code of Administrative Procedure. Besides, in contrast to courts in other legal 
orders, Greek courts, both administrative – tax courts and civil courts, have two instances 
and beyond that, adjudicate appeals in cassation filed before the Council of State (Sym-
boylion tis Epikrateias -StE) for administrative-tax disputes, and before the Supreme Court 
(Areios Pagos -AP) for civil and criminal disputes. For all the above reasons, the distinction 
between procedural rules in procedural statutes and procedural provisions is preferred in 
the present national report. The term ‘procedural statutes’ will be used here to mean stat-
utes referring to court competence and the procedure to be observed before courts. In con-
trast, the provisions concerning the tax authority competence and those concerning proce-
dure before tax authorities are considered procedural provisions. Despite the fact that 
54.	 On	the	issue	of	the	intervention	of	legislature	in	pending	proceedings,	see	the	analysis	below	under	3.9.7.2.a	and	3.9.4.3.
55.	 Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	123,	no.	123.
56.	 StE	4710/1984,	StE	2866/1985,	StE	3141/1985,	StE	1104/1992,	StE	523/2000,	StE	858/2002.	Compare	StE	1508/2002.	
57.	 Compare	StE	1508/2002.
58.	 However,	in	N.	Chatzitzanis	there	is	reference	to	the	said	distinction,	yet	without	emphasis,	see	N.	Chatzitzanis,	
Enhiridion	Genikon	Arhon	Forologikou	Dikeou	(Manual	of	General	Principles	of	Tax	Law)	(Athens	–	Komotini:	Ant.	
N.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	1991),	at	pp.	75-76.
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Greek case law and theory make no reference to the relevant distinction, this distinction has 
a certain impact in Greece with regard to the application of tax law in time.
In particular, the application in time of a tax statute in Greece is indeed determined 
up to a certain extent by whether the tax statute is a substantive one or on the contrary, if it 
is a procedural statute referring to court competence and procedure to be observed before 
courts (in tax cases) or a tax statute of procedural law, i.e. of a tax statute referring to com-
petence and procedure to be observed before the tax authorities. Nevertheless, there are 
also other significant parameters for the temporal application of such laws. The relevant 
case law of the Council of State (StE) always is handed down on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account various parameters. Before referring to the application in time of procedural 
provisions in tax statutes (that refer to the procedure before tax authorities), reference will 
be made to the application in time of procedural statutes referring to competence and 
procedure before courts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of tax statutes containing 
substantive law. Finally, reference will be made to procedural provisions referring to compe-
tence and procedure to be observed by the taxpayer or / and the tax administration in pro-
cedures before the tax authorities.
3.9.2.7.a. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect
3.9.2.7.a.i. On procedural statutes
In principle, new procedural statutes apply in pending proceedings, unless there is an express 
provision to the contrary in the procedural law. In particular, the case law of the Council of 
State (StE) has ruled that, according to the general principle of the law of procedure, newer 
provisions on court competence and procedure59 apply also in pending proceedings, unless 
there is a provision to the contrary in the statute.60 In fact, case law seems to definitely uphold 
this principle in cases where the newer procedural statute enhances the protection of citi-
zens.61 It should be noted, however, that there are so many express contradictory procedural 
provisions on the applicable procedural status, as will be presented below, that the principle 
above is of limited practical application. Besides, case law handed down a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, especially for the admissibility of remedies (instances, court competence, which reme-
dies and which time limit) before ordinary administrative courts,62 where previously applica-
ble procedural statutes did not expressly provide for the basis for adjudication of its legal 
status, a general principle of law had been formulated, by which the admissibility of remedies 
had to be adjudicated according to the statute that was in force at the time that the contested 
judgment was issued63. Yet nowadays there is an express general statutory provision especially 
for the admissibility of legal remedies (which renders the previously applicable general proce-
dural principle64), pursuant to which ‘the admissibility of legal remedies is adjudicated 
according to the statute that was in force at the time that the contested judgment was 
issued.’65 Thus, taking into account that the payment of the required appeal fee is a prerequi-
site for the admissible filing of legal remedies, it was ruled that, should the legal regime 
59.	 According	to	the	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State	(StE),	procedure	is	e.g.	the	way	of	granting	power	of	attorney	to	a	
lawyer,	see	StE	285/	1999.
60.	 StE	5343/1987,	StE	2048/	1988,	StE	4571/1988,	Ste	285/1999,	StE	564/2004,	StE	1710/2008.
61.	 StE	2048/1988.	
62.	 It	should	be	noted	that	the	Council	of	State	(StE)	is	not	affeceted	by	this,	as	there	was	an	explicit	provision	for	it.
63.	 See	Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	24,	Article	83,	at	p.	650	and	the	relevant	case	law	there.
64.	 Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	24,	Article	83,	at	p.	650.
65.	 Article	83	para.	3	of	the	Code	of	Administrative	Court	Procedure	(regarding	ordinary	administrative	courts),	Arti-
cle	77	para.	5	of	p.d.	18/1989	(regarding	the	Council	of	State/StE),	Article	24	para.	1	Law	Introducing	the	Code	of	Civil	
Procedure.	See	also	case	law	in	OlStE	2659/2008,	StE	2946,	StE	471/2008,	StE	3588/2006,	StE	1081/2006,	
OlStE	3407/2001,	OlSte	654/1993.
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regarding appeal fees be modified, when there is a lack of a legislative regulation to the con-
trary, the statute that was in force at the time that the contested judgment was issued applies, 
and not what applied at the time of the hearing of the case or of the payment of the fee.66 
Therefore, with regard especially to all issues of admissibility of legal remedies, these are adju-
dicated according to an express legislative provision – of Greek law – pursuant to the statute 
that applied at the time that the contested judgment was issued, unless of course, a new spe-
cial statute provides otherwise, e.g. application to pending cases. 
Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution, which refers to tax statutes in general, does not 
apply to procedural statutes. Thus, in the case of procedural statutes on tax cases especially, 
their retroactivity appears not to be temporally restricted by the said article,67 but their 
application is possible in pending proceedings. However, the potential unconstitutionality 
of the legislator’s intervention in a pending trial is (ex post) reviewed by the case law of the 
Council of State (resulting in the non-application of the unconstitutional provision by the 
judge in the case at hand), only on the basis of other constitutional principles, such as that 
of Article 20 on the citizens’ rights to judicial protection and of Article 6 ECHR on a right to 
a fair trial.68 For example, the express abolition by law of the appellate instance through the 
establishment of general and objective criteria (e.g.in all pending appeals that have not 
been heard) was considered to be constitutional69. In particular, it was a legislative restric-
tion of the grounds for appeal in tax cases, leading to an express termination of proceedings 
pending before the Administrative Court of Appeals, for cases not yet heard. It was held in 
this matter that the appeal is not an established procedural right of the claimant and that 
such a statute (establishing a retroactive restriction of the grounds for appeal and therefore 
an abolition of pending appeals not yet heard) is constitutional and does not contravene 
Article 6 para. 1 ECHR70.
In any case, with regard to the temporal application of procedural statutes, the Coun-
cil of State (StE) should take into account whether the retroactive application of a proce-
dural statute leads to economic duress for the individuals. Therefore, in that case, the imme-
diate effect of the procedural statute should be ruled to be unconstitutional, at least on the 
basis of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution.
3.9.2.7.a.ii. On substantive law statutes
New tax statutes of substantive law apply ex nunc, i.e. they apply to events giving rise to tax 
levying that are subsequent to the entry into force of the law. Therefore, the timing of the event 
giving rise to the tax determines the applicable tax regime. However, the application of tax 
statutes of substantive law (e.g. of laws regulating the tax subjects and objects, tax rates, etc.)71 
is also retroactively permitted for taxable events that precede the year of publication of the 
new statute. The same may apply in pending proceedings.72 Understandably, in both cases this 
has to be expressly provided for, and in any case, this retroactivity, in case it is unfavourable, is 
limited in time by Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution. Therefore, the retroactivity of 
66.	 DEfKom	151/2010,	StE	2772/2008,	StE	723/2008,	StE	3426/2007,	StE	2251/2007,	StE	3951/2005,	StE	3388/2005,	
StE	3071/2004.
67.	 Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	75,	K.	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	24,	at	p.	129.
68.	 See	for	example	StE	2371/1997,	in	which	the	court	did	not	acknowledge	the	violation	of	these	rights	in	the	case	at	
issue.	For	more	details,	see	immediately	below,	under	3.9.2.7.b.
69.	 StE	1455/1999.
70.	 StE	5495/1996,	StE	5512-16/1996,	StE	2371/1997.
71.	 In	fact,	the	Greek	Constitution	compels	the	regulation	of	the	substantial	tax	elements	by	formal	statute,	i.e.	an	act	of	
the	legislative	power,	according	to	the	principle	of	formal	legality	of	taxes	(Article	78	paras.	1	and	4)	and	their	
provision	via	regulatory	administrative	acts	is	prohibited. Substantial	tax	elements	are	those	stipulated	in	the	
Constitution,	i.e.	the	tax	subject	and	object,	the	tax	rate	and	the	abatements	and	exemptions	from	tax.
72.	 OlStE	1865/1985.
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the relevant law may not extend beyond the fiscal year preceding the publication year of the 
tax statute.73 The same applies for regulatory administrative acts that refer to tax matters of 
substantive law.74 In the latter case, their retroactivity is certainly allowed only if the statute of 
delegation, on which the relevant administrative acts were based, expressly provides for their 
retroactivity, as already presented in the section regarding the comparison moment.
A particular case is posed by tax statutes that provide for matters of criminal nature, 
such as the imposition of tax fines due to tax violations; in this case the following applies: If 
the new statute is milder than the preceding legal regime, then this milder statute applies 
also in pending proceedings, unless it (the same new statute) excludes such retroactivity.75 
The same is acknowledged by the case law of the Council of State in cases where a tax statute 
provides, instead of a tax fine, additional taxes (for the non-submission or late submission 
of tax declarations) or any other surcharges, due to violation of tax obligations.76 Neverthe-
less, the retroactivity of such tax statutes has the following particularities: 1. It is absolutely 
prohibited with regard to tax fines, when these are unfavourable for the perpetrator of tax 
violations, given the fact that they have criminal features,77 2. Regarding additional taxes 
and surcharges, their retroactivity is permissible, even when they are unfavourable in com-
parison with the previous regime, and also apply to pending proceedings, as long as there is 
an express legislative provision. Yet, this retroactivity is restricted within the time limits of 
Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution and the retroactivity of the relevant law may not 
extend beyond the fiscal year preceding the publication year of the tax statute78.
3.9.2.7.a.iii. On procedural provisions
Finally, with regard to ‘procedural’ provisions (i.e. those concerning tax authority compe-
tence and those concerning procedure before tax authorities), with regard to their temporal 
application, the following should be noted: A view was expressed, according to which the 
time limitation in retroactivity of Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution does not apply 
to them.79 Therefore, based on this view, a new procedural tax provision may be retroactive 
beyond the fiscal year preceding that of its imposition. 
With regard to the immediate effect of procedural provisions on tax obligations that 
were created before these, this was indeed the case law of the Council of State (StE), both 
before the 1975 Constitution (i.e. under a constitutional regime that did not prohibit the 
retroactivity of tax laws in Greece), and under the 1975 Constitution.80 It is also significant 
that even if this statute expressly provides for its entry into force in the future, the case law 
73.	 For	more	details,	see	below	under	3.9.3.1	and	3.9.5.1,	3.9.5.2.
74.	 Non-substantial	tax	elements	may	be	enacted	by	regulatory	administrative	acts	that	have	been	issued	on	the	basis	
of	a	relevant	legislative	authorization.	These	elements	are,	for	example,	the	obligation	of	the	trader	to	keep	book	
and	documents,	the	net	profit	rate	as	a	presumption	employed	to	establish	the	tax	base,	the	objective	value	of	
immovable	property,	etc.
75.	 For	example	StE	4256/2001,	StE	3941/2004,	StE	3821/2005,	StE	2077/2009.	Compare	StE	3941/2004,	StE	2210/2003
76.	 StE	2460/1981,	StE	370/	1983,	StE	2672/1984,	StE	974/1990.	Compare	also	AP	1009/2006.
77.	 According	to	Article	7	para.1	2nd	sentence	of	the	Greek	Constitution,	the	retroactivity	of	a	more	onerous	criminal	statute	
is	prohibited.	Nevertheless,	the	Council	of	State	(StE)	does	not	invoke	Article	7	para.	1	of	the	Constitution	in	the	case	of	
tax	fines,	even	though	it	adopts	in	its	case	law,		–	being	influenced	by	the	case	law	of	the	ECHR	–	the	position	that	several	
administrative	(tax)	sanctions	(mostly	multiple	smuggling	duties	and	a	customs	fine	for	the	possession	of	an	exempted	
vehicle	by	a	person	that	is	not	temporarily	exempt)	possess	certain	features	that	resemble	penalties	in	the	sense	of	
Articles	6	para.	1	and	7	para.	1	ECHR	(on	multiple	duties,	see	StE	689/2009,	DEfKom	151/2010,	on	a	customs	fine	due	to	
unlawful	possession	of	an	exempt	vehicle,	see	StE	2077/2009,	StE	1728/2008,	StE	463/2008,	StE	3919/2006,	StE	
981/2006,	StE	3709/2005,	StE	1203/2005,	StE	2797/2004),	excluding	–	as	contravening	Article	7	para.	1	ECHR	–	the	
imposition	of	any	sanction	preceding	the	promulgation	of	the	law,	by	which	the	sanction	is	imposed.	
78.	 StE	2460/1981,	StE	370/	1983,	StE	2672/1984,	StE	974/1990.	Compare	also	AP	1009/2006.
79.	 Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	76,	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	20,	at	pp.	125-126.
80.	 See	Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	76.
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of the Council of State provides that the provision applies as a procedural provision also to 
the period preceding its entry into force.81 Besides, it is self-evident that with regard to local 
competence of tax authorities for issuing the act charging the tax, the reference date is the 
time that the act was issued and not the time that the tax obligation was created. So, for 
example, the Council of State (StE) held that in a case of inheritance tax, the reference date 
for assessing which is the locally competent tax authority to issue the demand for payment 
of the inheritance tax was not the time of death of the deceased but the time of issue of the 
act (which took place many years after the death of the deceased). Therefore, where the 
competence of the authority issuing the fiscal act is concerned, the tax procedural provision 
has immediate effect.
Nevertheless, there are also cases where case law is probably different. Thus, with 
regard to the application in time of procedural provisions, there is relevant case law of the 
Council of State (StE), stipulating that they apply to acts taking place during the time of 
their effectiveness and not retroactively to previous acts. In fact, even though retroactivity 
was expressly provided for in the provision, which contained – among other things – the 
conditions for the submission to the customs office of an application for exemption from 
duties for destruction of goods coming from the inward-processing procedure, the Council 
of State (StE) did not apply the relevant procedural provisions to the acts preceding the 
publication date of the statute. In the grounds of the relevant adjudication a holding was 
included that it is not possible to overturn all those provisions created earlier under the 
regime of a different legal framework.82
Moreover, for the application of procedural provisions ratione temporis, the Council 
of State takes into account whether through the retroactive application of a procedural 
provision leads to the imposition of e.g. a tax fine or of an unfavourable tax charge. In that 
case, the immediate application of the procedural provision may be held unconstitutional.
3.9.2.7.b. Rules considered to be procedural rules
As already discussed above, if it is more correct in Greece to distinguish procedural rules in 
a broader sense from those applied in administrative procedure (before administrative 
courts) and those that govern the administrative – tax procedure (before the tax authori-
ties), it becomes clear that both categories involve issues of competence and procedure. 
With regard to the issue of which rules are procedural rules in a broader sense, relevant 
references are made especially in the case law. Thus, according to the case law of the Council of 
State (StE), cases of procedure are for example the method of providing power of attorney to a 
lawyer83, but also the abolishment of the appellate instance,84 issues of competence and 
procedure that should be observed before a court,85 the obligation to pay the appeal fee. Also 
the provisions on the possibility of issuing a temporary tax assessment notice, instead of a final 
one,86 but also of issuing a complementary tax assessment notice were found to be procedural 
provisions.87 Furthermore, other procedural provisions comprise these on the conditions for 
applying for exemption from levies, as well as the provisions on the procedure of establish-
ment of tax entitlements originating from competent tax authorities, but also the provisions 
on the competence of the authority issuing the tax act.88
81.	 StE	5182/1987.
82.	 StE	2601/1994.
83.	 StE	285/1999.
84.	 Compare	StE	1455/1999,	StE	5495/1996,	StE	5512-16/1996,	StE	2371/1997.
85.	 StE	1222/1989.
86.	 StE	5182/1987.
87.	 StE	1119/1984,	StE	1222/1989,	StE	2397/1990	in	Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	76.
88.	 On	competence,	see	StE	3314/1985,	StE	626/1986.
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More specifically, regarding the rules of evidence and the burden of proof, and whether they 
constitute procedural rules or not: Regarding administrative-tax disputes, it should be 
noted that the Council of State (StE) has held that the holding of the evidence procedure 
before the administrative courts is a procedural act in the sense of Article 178 of the Code of 
Administrative Court Procedure.89 In that sense, the invocation and submission of evidence 
was considered to be a procedural act. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, according to the 
case law of civil courts, the admissibility of evidence is inextricably related to the emergence 
of the dispute at hand. Therefore, it has been ruled that according to the principle the 
resulting from Articles 5 paragraph 2 sentence d, 20 and 21 of the Law introducing the Code 
of Civil Procedure, the admissibility of a means of evidence that is inextricably related to the 
emergence of the dispute at hand is in principle regulated by the statute that is in force at 
the time of the emergence of the right at hand, or otherwise, at the time that the events to 
be proved took place.90 
In any case, the characterization of a legislative act as procedural rule does not neces-
sarily have a definitive impact on the application of the relevant statutes in time; the reason 
for this is that the application of the particular statutes in time depends also on the general 
legislative and constitutional framework. Thus, as an example of the admissibility of legal 
remedies that, while they constitute a procedural rule (that applies before courts), there is a 
legislative provision (has already said) stipulating that they are regulated by the statute 
‘that was in force at that time of issuing of the contested judgment’, unless there was an 
express legislative provision to the contrary. It was expressly ruled that the admissibility of 
legal remedies falls under the jurisdiction and competence of the court before which they 
are filed, as well as their timely filing.91 Therefore, a new statute that modifies all issues of 
admissibility of the legal remedies after the issuing of the contested judgment, does not 
apply to cases that are issued prior to its adoption, without any express legislative provision. 
In any event, in the framework of the judicial unconstitutionality review of statutes, should 
the statute in force be deemed unconstitutional, then it is not applied by the judge, but the 
statute preceding it applies. 
Furthermore, regarding procedural rules applicable before tax authorities there is for 
example case law by the Council of State (StE) referring to the conditions for submission to 
the customs office of an application for exemption from duties for destruction of goods 
coming from the inward-processing procedure.92 In that case, while the new law granted 
retroactivity to the relevant conditions for filing an application for exemption from levies, 
the Council of State (StE) refused to apply this new statute retroactively, as already pre-
sented above.93
With regard especially to the statute of limitations, it is unclear whether it belongs to 
the provisions of substantive law or to procedural rules. In my opinion, the statute of limita-
tions is related to the underlying right and for that reason it is an institution of substantive 
law. In fact, there is case law where the unconstitutionality of the legislative resurgence of 
an expired statute of limitation was reviewed, in view of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitu-
89.	 StE	3542/2001,	3758/2004,	876/2005,	823/2007.
90.	 Compare	AP	136/1967,	AP	606/1974,	AP	1151/1974,	AP	496/1975,	AP	188/1976,	AP	1475/1983,	AP	602/1992.	It	should	be	
noted,	however,	that	this	principle	does	not	apply	in	the	commissioning	of	an	expert’s	report	and	in	the	inspection	
of	the	place	or	thing	in	question	as	means	of	evidence,	the	permissibility	of	which	is	assessed	by	the	statute	in	force	
at	the	time	of	the	hearing,	as	the	interested	parties	did	not	have	knowledge	of	these	means	of	evidence	at	the	time	
that	the	facts	to	be	proved	took	place.	Compare	AP	496/1975,	AP	188/1976	(in	Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	24,	Article	147,	
at	p.	934).
91.	 OlStE	654/1993,	OlStE	4113/1995,	StE	1108/2006,	StE	2946/2008.
92.	 StE	2601/1994.
93.	 See	above	under	3.9.2.7.a.iii.
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tion,94 which means that it was conceived as a provision of substantive law. Nevertheless, 
during the adjudication of the administrative – tax cases, judges examine the statute of 
limitations first and then proceed to the merits of the case, if the statute of limitations does 
not apply. In other words, it deals with the statute of limitations as a procedural step. More-
over, the older case law of the Council of State implies its procedural nature, as it invokes a 
general principle of law, according to which the statute of limitations is regulated as to its 
commencement and duration by the most recent statute, which also regulates the statutes 
of limitation that commenced during the time that the previous statute was in force. As 
these statutes of limitation did not apply they do not constitute a right already acquired, 
but a mere expectation of that right, which could be modified by law.95
3.9.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.9.3.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
In Greece there is no general prohibition of retroactivity of tax statutes, but there are consti-
tutionally-based strict temporal restrictions to this retroactivity. These restrictions are 
expressly laid down in a constitutional provision that refers exclusively to tax matters. 
According to the 1975 Constitution of Greece (Article 78 para. 2), a temporal restriction is 
imposed on the retroactivity of tax statutes in so far as tax charges are levied herewith (levy-
ing of tax charges includes the retroactive abolition of a tax exemption). This implies that 
there is no constitutional temporal restriction on tax abatements. Still, any tax abatement, 
and especially if imposed retroactively, should not violate the constitutionally established 
principle of equal treatment in the area of taxation (Article 4 para. 5); otherwise it is uncon-
stitutional on those grounds. 
With regard to the constitutional provision on the non-retroactivity of tax statutes, it 
appears that there is a prohibition of the unlimited temporal retroactivity of tax statutes, in 
so far as it contains tax charges, i.e. an onerous modification of the tax regime.96 However, 
according to the same article of the Greek Constitution, the introduction of a tax statute 
(including not only the enactment, but also the amendment of a tax provision) is permitted 
the retroactivity of which does not exceed the fiscal year preceding its year of publication. 
In fact, such retroactivity is acknowledged by the Greek Constitution regardless of the 
kind of tax.97 Nevertheless, the retroactive levying of consumption tax should be avoided, 
as it is a tax that is passed over to consumers, as well as because VAT as a Community tax is 
governed by the principles of Community law, such as for example the Community princi-
ple of the protection of citizen’s legitimate expectations against the State, which, according 
to ECJ case law, is on certain occasions violated by tax provisions with retroactive effect.
94.	 DEfAth	1844/2005.
95.	 StE	1974/1955	in	N.	Chatzitzanis,	I	forologiki	nomi	(os	ermhnefthisan	ypo	tou	Symbouliou	Epikratias	ke	tou	Areiou	
Pagou)	[Tax	statutes	(as	interpreted	by	the	Council	of	State	and	the	Supreme	Court)],	Vol.	1	(Thessaloniki	1965),	at	p.	66.
96.	 Thus,	in	the	frame	of	the	(judicial)	unconstitutionality	review	of	a	tax	statute,	the	Council	of	State	(StE)	ruled	
recently	in	its	plenary	judgment	1912/2009	(for	more	details,	see	below	under	4.2)	that	the	enactment	of	a	new	
retroactive	tax	statute	constitutes	an	(unconstitutional)	onerous	modification	of	the	tax	regime.	Of	earlier	decisions	
of	the	Council	of	State	(StE),	see	indicatively	OlStE	1865/1985,	OlStE	1705/1986,	StE	4155/1984,	StE	2516/1980.	It	
should	be	noted	that	the	(judicial)	unconstitutionality	review	of	a	statute	in	Greece	is	only	performed	ex	post	and	
not	ex	ante,	and	by	all	courts	on	their	own	motion,	when	a	case	is	brought	before	them	after	an	administrative	
complaint;	at	the	same	time,	the	review	is	incidental	and	does	not	result	in	the	abolition	of	the	legislative	provision,	
which	is	deemed	to	be	unconstitutional	ad	hoc,	but	in	its	non-application	in	the	present	case	at	issue.	For	more	
details,	see	below	under	3.9.5	and	3.9.6.
97.	 Compare	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	20,	at	pp.	127-128,	no.	282.
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However, in Greek parliamentary history the particular temporal restriction of permissible 
retroactivity until the fiscal year preceding the year of the tax statute’s publication did not 
always apply. Thus, due to the lack of the relevant prohibition in previous Greek Constitu-
tions, including the 1952 Constitution that was in force until the current 1975 Constitution 
in force98, retroactivity of tax statutes was permissible, as long as there was an express legis-
lative provision. In particular, the case law of the Council of State – during the exercise of the 
incidental review of unconstitutionality, which is performed ex post in Greece –, acknowl-
edged, on the one hand, that retroactive tax charges are contraindicated by the rules of 
financial science; however, in conclusive circumstances taxation may be levied retroactive-
ly.99 It should be noted, that, in relation to the retroactivity of tax statutes, case law never 
defined the notions of ‘the rules of financial science’ or of ‘conclusive circumstances’. In fact, 
it is expressly left to the absolute (and so exclusive) judgment of the legislator to determine 
whether these circumstances existed or not.100 For this reason, case law did not review legis-
lation for unconstitutionality in cases where the legislator considered that there were con-
clusive circumstances justifying retroactivity. This was the position of both the Council of 
State (StE)101 and of the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos – AP)102; in its plenary judgment 
69/1963 the latter placed upon this power of the legislative the restriction of the reasonable 
time. According to the above judgment, retroactivity was not to exceed a ‘reasonable period 
of time’, which was at the discretion of the courts. This particular judgment stated that the 
‘reasonable period of time’ extended to one year, and grounded this restriction of the rea-
sonable time on the need to establish citizens’ confidence in the State103. The Council of 
State had ruled similarly at the time.104 
Finally, according to the current Constitution in force, it should be recalled that, 
while the retroactivity of authentic interpretative laws is provided for (Article 77 para.2), i.e. 
that they apply in parallel with the statute interpreted, the view prevails that the temporal 
restriction of retroactivity in Article 78 para.2 applies especially in interpretative tax stat-
utes, except for cases of tax abatements, where the authentic interpretative statute applies 
retroactively since the commencement of the effect of the statute interpreted. 
3.9.3.2. Transition policy of government
There is no general transitional policy or transitional policy on tax in Greece.
98.	 It	should	be	recalled	that	during	the	dictatorship	in	Greece	any	kind	of	retroactivity	of	tax	statutes	was	banned	
under	Article	82	para.	3	of	the	junta	Constitution	of	1968-1974.	In	fact,	the	Council	of	State	(StE)	had	ruled	that	such	
a	prohibited	type	of	retroactivity	was	that	of	a	tax	statute	enacted	in	1973	that	regulated	also	the	company	results	of	
the	current	fiscal	year,	i.e.	of	the	1973	fiscal	year,	even	though	the	fiscal	year	of	their	taxation	would	be	1974.	(StE	
1723	/1981,	Armenopoulos	1982,	5,	at	pp.	388-389).
99.	 StE	392/1931.	See	K.	Finokaliotis,	I	syntagmatiki	katohirosi	ton	arhon	tis	nomimotitas	ke	veveotitas	tou	forou	kai	tis	
apagorefsis	tis	anadromikotitas	ton	forologikon	nomon,	(The	Constitutional	entrenchment	of	the	principles	of	
legality	and	certainty	of	tax	and	of	the	prohibition	of	retroactivity	of	tax	statutes),	(Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publica-
tions,	1984).	See	also	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	24,	at	p.	127,	no.	449.	
100.	 StE	392/1931,	StE	1064/1940,	StE	1041/1941,	StE	2464/1952,	StE	798/1956,	OlStE	1604/1957,	StE	322/1961	(in	
Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	95,	at	p.	33).
101.	 Finokaliotis,	supra	note	20,	at	pp.	123-124,	no.	275.	See	StE	1787/1952,	StE	322/1968,	StE	1097/1969,	StE	2863/1979.	
102.	 AP	377/1958,	AP	103/1963.
103.	 See	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	20,	at	p.	124,	no.	275,	Fortsakis,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	126,	no.	125.
104.	 StE	3215/1978.
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3.9.3.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
3.9.3.3.a. Advisory body such as the Council of State
While in Greece both the Council of State (StE) and the Court of Auditors (ES) possess con-
sultative competence, the former in the previous processing of presidential decrees and the 
latter on pension law bills, nevertheless the contemporary role of the Council of State in tax 
matters does not appear to be significant. It should be taken into account that, according to 
the Greek Constitution, only non-substantive elements of tax can be regulated by presiden-
tial decree, i.e. matters that do not involve tax subjects or objects, tax rates and tax exemp-
tions.105 Therefore, the Council of State possesses no consultative power on the substantive 
elements of the tax, i.e. the subject, the object, tax exemptions and tax rates, which accord-
ing to the Constitution are established by formal law and not by presidential decree. 
3.9.3.3.b. Rules to review retroactivity, grandfathering or favourable retroactivity
Regarding to retroactivity issues of presidential decrees, the main commitment of the Coun-
cil of State as a consultative institution emanates from Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution, 
in case these are of a fiscal nature. As for the rest, there are no restrictions in cases of grand-
fathering or favourable retroactivity. In any event, because the Council of State as a consul-
tative institution reviews only presidential decrees (which constitute a type of subordinate 
legislation for Greek standards), then, in order for the presidential decree to be constitu-
tionally retroactive, it is required that the enabling statute on the basis of which it was 
issued expressly provides for retroactivity.106
3.9.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.9.4.1. ‘Legislating by press release’
In Greece, the phenomenon of ‘legislating by press release’ is not known. 
3.9.4.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
Generally the Greek Constitution provides for the basis for temporally restricted retroactiv-
ity of tax statutes, even though it is avoided in modern politics, as being politically costly. 
Thus, retroactivity extending further back than the first announcement is avoided in prac-
tice, even though institutionally permitted, as long as it extends within the constitutionally 
permitted time limits.
Nevertheless, what is noteworthy about Greek reality is that Article 78 para. 3 of the 
Greek Constitution exceptionally stipulates that consumer tax and duties may be collected 
from the date on which a relevant bill may be tabled at the parliament, i.e. before voting on 
the bill takes places, as long as a time-limit for the promulgation of the law imposed by the 
Constitution is observed. Otherwise, the said taxes and duties already collected since the 
tabling of the bill are to be refunded as unduly collected. The reason for the exceptional 
permissibility of the collection of consumer taxes and duties since the date of tabling of the 
105.	 On	the	principle	of	formal	legality	of	tax	and	substantial	tax	elements,	see	Theocharopoulou,	supra	note	30,	at	
pp.	110-112	and	the	relevant	footnotes.
106.	 OlStE	3659/1980,	StE	4914/1987.
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bill and not since the date of its enactment is the prevention of ‘swindling.’107 In particular, 
as there are usually press reports some time before the imposition of new taxes and duties, 
there is a risk that merchants massively import products under the previous tax regime in 
order to keep them off the market while being aware of the oncoming increase in consumer 
taxes or duties, and then channel them to the market after the enactment of the relevant 
statute at a price increased by the respective tax amounts, which, however, merchants were 
under no obligation to pay. 
3.9.4.3. Pending legal proceedings
3.9.4.3.a. Influence of retroactive tax statutes
As an introductory note, it should be underlined that the legislature’s intervention in pend-
ing proceedings should generally adhere to some conditions that the case law has based on 
provisions of the Constitution and of the ECHR. Moreover, the legislature’s intervention in 
pending proceedings, especially in tax disputes, demonstrates some additional particulari-
ties, especially because of the temporal constitutional restrictions on retroactivity. 
Regarding the general conditions by which the established case law of the Council of 
State (StE) considers the legislature’s intervention in pending proceedings to be constitu-
tional, the following can be observed: The enactment of statutory provisions with retroac-
tive effect, which is permissible in special cases only by a general and express constitutional 
provision [in criminal penalties (Article 7 of the Constitution), in taxes (Article 78 para. 2 of 
the Constitution) etc.] is allowed in principle as long as the retroactivity does not infringe 
any constitutionally protected rights.108 What is more, the constitutionally guaranteed 
principles of the separation of powers (Article 26), of citizens’ equality before the law (Arti-
cle 4), and of the right to judicial protection (Article 20 para. 1) are not infringed, as long as 
the legal rules are general and impersonal and no final (unappealable) judgments have 
been issued, nor is the case pending before a court of cassation109 However, in certain cases, 
both in earlier case law, especially that of the Court of Auditors (ES),110 and in recent Council 
of State judgments,111 it appears that generally not only lis pendens but also the finality of a 
case is grounds for banning the legislature’s intervention, as there is certain influence of the 
ECtHR case law on the observance of Article 6 para. 1 sentence a of the ECHR about the right 
to a fair trial, but only as long as claims are discharged. In any case, with regard to Article 6 
para. 1 of the ECHR and tax matters, the the Council of State has ruled mainly on the occa-
sion of contested procedural (tax) legislative acts and not on substantive tax statutes, where 
Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution as a rule applies. Regarding procedural statutes and 
procedural provisions in the Greek legal order, these have been explained in detail above, in 
the section about statutes having immediate effect and the procedural rules.112
The period of retroactivity of tax statutes of substantive law cannot be particularly 
lengthy in Greece, due to Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution.113 Pending proceedings may 
be affected only if so provided by the relevant statute of substantive law and, in any case, 
107.	 The	Greek	constitutional	legislator	had	in	mind	a	practice	of	some	merchants	–	especially	in	the	past.	From	the	date	
the	newspapers	informed	the	public	that	a	new	consumer	tax	or	a	new	duty	was	to	be	imposed	in	Greece,	these	
merchants	massively	imported	products	in	Greece	under	the	previous	non	tax	regime	but	waited	for	the	imposition	
regime	in	order	to	sale	these	products	in	the	Greek	market	at	a	price	increased	by	the	consumer	or/and	duty	taxes	
which	supposed	to	burden	these	products	from	the	beginning,	although	in	fact	the	later	never	happened.
108.	 StE	7/1997,	StE	2371/1997,	StE	5495/1996.
109.	 StE	1502/1999	(on	pension	issues),	OlStE	542/1999.
110.	 OlES	2274/1997.
111.	 StE	241/2009,	StE	3801/2003.
112.	 Under	3.9.2.7.a.i,	3.9.2.7.a.iii	and	3.9.2.7.b.
113.	 See	above	under	3.9.3.1	and	below	under	3.9.5,	3.9.5.1,	3.9.5.2.
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within the limited time frame of retroactivity of Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution. 
Otherwise, the relevant tax statute is unconstitutional and should not be applied by the 
administration and courts.114 Certainly, if the tax statute does not contain purely tax provi-
sions, e.g. provisions involving the imposition or modification of a tax rate, tax subjects, 
objects, tax exemptions etc. but contains provisions for the imposition of tax fines or sur-
charges or additional taxes, i.e. provisions of a punitive nature, then the following applies: 
With reference to the provisions imposing a tax fine, additional tax, etc., as already indi-
cated, the case law of the Council of State accepts that a presumption of retroactive effect of 
the new more lenient statute applies to pending cases, unless this new law expressly 
excludes it. If this new statute is unfavourable to the perpetrator of tax violations, then in 
the case of tax fines, the law does not apply to the pending case, as it contravenes the Consti-
tution. In the case of additional taxes, even if this new regulation is unfavourable, it can be 
applied to pending cases as well, if this new law expressly so stipulates, but this retroactivity 
cannot exceed the restricted time limits of Article 78 para. 2 of the Greek Constitution.115
According to case law, authentic interpretations of tax statutes cover all matters that 
are not finally (unappealably) adjudicated. 
3.9.4.3.b. Pending legal proceedings excluded from application retroactivity?
There is no relevant statistical data on whether pending legal proceedings are excluded 
from the application of a new statute. It appears that both options occur.
3.9.4.4. Favourable retroactivity
Favourable retroactivity of tax laws, i.e. of substantive tax laws (that impose taxes) does not 
occur frequently, despite its unlimited temporal permissibility under the Greek Constitu-
tion to the extent that the fiscal equality principle is not infringed. On these matters, namely 
in which cases the jurisprudence considers that there is favourable retroactivity and in 
which cases the retroactivity of tax statutes infringes the fiscal equality principle, there is an 
extensive analysis in the ex post evaluation of retroactivity in case law and particularly in the 
examination method. Otherwise, even in the case of favourable retroactivity, the interven-
tion of the legislature should respect the principle of separation of powers and the res judi-
cata (as in unfavourable retroactivity as well).116 
It should be clarified, however, that in the case of additional taxes (due to the imposi-
tion of an inaccurate or overdue tax statement)and tax fines, favourable retroactivity is 
temporally permitted in general, as long as Article 78 para. 2 does not exclude it, and the 
– favourable or unfavourable – nature of the new statute is (ex post) assessed in case law, as 
we will see below,117 not from a general aspect but in view of a particular base, i.e. in view of 
the particular factual background.118 In fact, it should be recalled that if in the particular 
case the provision is more lenient, then the administration and courts are under an obliga-
tion to apply the latter provision (unless excluded by the same provision).
114.	 StE	207/1988.
115.	 StE	2460/1981,	StE	370/1983,	StE	2672/1984,	StE	974/1990.	Compare	also	AP	1009/2006.
116.	 See	above	under	3.9.4.3.a.
117.	 See	below	under	3.9.5.2.
118.	 StE	3941/2004,	StE	4256/2001
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3.9.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
It should be initially clarified that in Greece the review of the unconstitutionality of statutes 
is performed ex post by any court, but only incidentally, i.e. on the occasion of hearing the 
claim. In other words, citizens cannot file directly against an unconstitutional statute, 
requesting the recognition of its unconstitutionality. The incidental judicial review of the 
unconstitutionality of statutes is performed as follows: citizens vested with a legal interest 
file an action against the act issued in application of the law and, on the occasion of the 
hearing of the case, there is either an invocation of unconstitutionality of the statute on 
which the act is based, or the court may on its own motion review the constitutionality of 
the statute. If a statute is found to be unconstitutional by the said court, then it does not 
apply it in the particular case, but this ruling does not have an erga omnes effect, as this 
review is only incidental, specific and determinative. Thus, this statute is not abolished and 
also another court can rule – on the occasion of another case – that the same statute is con-
stitutional. If a legislative provision is found by the Supreme Special Court (Anotato Eidiko 
Dikastirio) to be unconstitutional, which is an extraordinary procedure (Article 100 of the 
Constitution), only then can this adjudication have an erga omnes effect,119 following publi-
cation of the relevant judgment or from the time stipulated therein.
Furthermore, regarding the method of reviewing the unconstitutionality of statutes 
by courts, it should be mentioned that in Greece, judges interpret the law according to the 
Constitution. This means that if a statute allows room for more than one interpretation, 
then the court selects the interpretation that is compliant with the Constitution. In this 
procedure, the methods of legal interpretation that courts are allowed to use are always 
taken into account. After following the legal methods of interpretation, a law is found to be 
unconstitutional only if there can be no interpretation that is compliant with the Constitu-
tion.120
119.	 See	also	Theocharopoulou,	supra	note	30,	at	pp.	115	–	116.	See	also	below	under	3.9.6	(especially	on	the	role	of	the	
Supreme	Special	Court).	Of	the	Greek	literature,	especially	on	the	Supreme	Special	Court,	see	K.	Yiannopoulos,	To	
Anotato	Idiko	Dikastirio	–	me	aformi	tin	apofasi	8/2007	AED	(The	Supreme	Special	Court	–	in	response	to	judgment	
8/2007	of	the	Supreme	Special	Court),	(Athens:	Nomiki	Bibliothiki	Editions,	2009)	(passim).	On	the	unconstitu-
tionality	review	of	statutes	in	general,	see	W.	Venizelos	Ev.	–	Skouris,	O	dikastikos	elenhos	tis	antisyntagmatikotitas	
ton	nomon	(The	judicial	review	of	the	unconstitutionality	of	statutes),	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	N.	Sakkoulas	Pub-
lishers,	1985),	passim,	A.	Manitakis,	Kratos	Dikeou	kai	dikastikos	elenxos	tis	antisyntagmatikotitas	ton	nomwn	(The	
Rule	of	Law	and	judicial	review	of	unconstitutionality	of	laws)(Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publishers,	1994),	passim,	
A.	Dimitropoulos,	Geniki	Syntagmatiki	Theoria	(General	Constitutional	Theory),	Vol.	A,	(Athens-Komotini:Ant.	N.	
Sakkoulas	Publications,	2004),	at	p.	396	et	seq.,	S.	Orfanoudakis,	I	yperohi	tou	Syntagmatos	enanti	tou	nomou	os	
apavgasma	tou	Syntagmatismou	(The	supremacy	of	the	Constitution	over	statutes	as	a	reflection	of	Constitutional-
ism)	(Sakkoulas	Editions:	Athens	–	Thessaloniki,	2008),	at	p.	175.	
120.	 On	the	interpretation	of	statutes	in	accordance	with	the	Constitution,	see	studies	in	D.	Tsatsos,	ed.,,	I	erminia	tou	
Syntagmatos	(Interpretation	of	the	Constitution)	(1995),	K.	Chrysogonos,	‘I	symfoni	me	to	Syntagma	erminia	sti	
nomologia	tou	Symvouliou	tis	Epikratias’	(‘Interpretation	according	to	the	Constitution	in	the	case	law	of	the	
Council	of	State’),	To	Syntagma	(1994),	at	p.	223	et	seq.,	K.	Stamatis,K.,	‘Erminia	ton	diataxeon	tis	nomothesias	
symfona	me	to	Syntagma	me	aformi	tin	StE	4208/1997’	(‘Interpretation	of	legislative	provisions	in	accordance	with	
the	Constitution	in	response	to	judgment	4208/1997	of	the	Council	of	State’),	Nomos	ke	Fysi	5	(1998),	at	p.	87	et	
seq.,	D.	Filippou,	‘I	thriskeftiki	isotita	ke	i	arhi	tis	symfonis	me	to	Syntagma	erminias	ton	nomon’	(‘Religious	equal-
ity	and	the	principle	of	interpretation	in	accordance	with	the	constitution’),	Dikeomata	tou	Anthropou	(2000),	at	
p.	689	et	seq.	
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3.9.5.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
In Greece courts review the retroactivity of a tax statute for its eventual unconstitutionality, 
but also for the violation of general principles of the law, especially if the latter are consid-
ered to be constitutionally established. 
In detail, regarding the review of the retroactivity of a tax law based on the Greek 
Constitution, it appears that: Due to the existence of Article 78 para. 2, which determines in 
particular when the retroactivity of a tax statute is prohibited, the constitutionality review 
of a tax statute is in general performed by the courts on the basis of that article. However, at 
the same time, if it is a case of retroactivity of tax abatement, which is not hindered by Arti-
cle 78 para. 2, the retroactivity of this tax exemption may be held to be unconstitutional on 
the basis of Article 4 para. 5 (of the Constitution) on equality in tax matters if the conditions 
imposed by the principle of equal treatment are not met. In any event, if there is a case of 
favourable retroactivity in general, the temporal restriction of Article 78 para. 2 of the Con-
stitution does not apply to tax statutes. For example, with regard to provisions on determin-
ing a new tax base, the case law is as follows: these are indeed subject to the temporal 
restriction of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution, but if the modification in identifying the 
net taxable income by a retroactive statute does not lead to a heavier taxation for taxpayers, 
then retroactivity is permissible.121
With regard to tax fines, potentially Article 7 para. 1 of the Constitution on the prohi-
bition of retroactivity of unfavourable penal provisions122 is now taken into account by the 
recent case law of the Council of State, despite the fact that express reference to the article is 
always avoided. This can be attributed to the fact that, in earlier case law of the Council of 
State, tax fines were considered to be administrative sanctions and not criminal law penal-
ties.123 It was thus ruled that the levying of a multiple duty (by a customs authority) for 
smuggling constitutes an administrative sanction,124 while Article 7 of the Constitution 
refers only to criminal statutes; therefore Article 7 of the Constitution does not apply to tax 
fines.125 Nevertheless, the recent case law of the Council of State (during the last five years) 
makes references to Article 7 para. 1 of the ECHR.126 In this light, certain provisions were 
found by the Council of State to be violating Article 7 para. 1 of the ECHR; these provisions 
involve the imposition of a fine due to the possession of a vehicle that was tax exempt 
according to Community law provisions, by a person that was not provisionally exempt, as 
the statute required127 Also, multiple smuggling duties were found by the Council of State to 
possess features of Articles 6 paras. 1 and 7 para.1 of the ECHR.128 In any event, even the tax 
legislator respects this prohibition and avoids granting retroactive effect to tax fines. 
The retroactivity of interpretative statutes is reviewed by the Council of State, based 
on Article 77 para. 2 of the Constitution, which prohibits the retroactivity of pseudo-inter-
pretative statutes, and it is limited, if unfavourable, by the temporal restriction of Article 78 
para. 2 of the Constitution.129 
Furthermore, the following can be observed about the statute of limitations: adminis-
trative courts and the Council of State (StE) in Greece have declared tax statutes extending 
121.	 StE	2001/1976,	see	Finokaliotis,	supra	note	24,	at	p.	129.
122.	 According	to	Article	7	para.1	of	the	Greek	Constitution,	no	crime	will	occur,	nor	may	punishment	be	inflicted	unless	
specified	by	law	in	force	prior	to	the	perpetration	of	the	act	defining	its	constitutive	elements.
123.	 StE	1253/1992,	OlStE	3278/1992,	StE	1562/1979.
124.	 StE	2905/1997,	StE	3611/2003,	OlStE	990/2004.
125.	 StE	2905/1997.
126.	 StE	2077/2009,	StE	3537/2008,	StE	1203/2005,	StE	2797/2004,	StE	2470/2003.
127.	 StE	3537/2008.
128.	 StE	689/2009,	DEfKom	151/2010,	DEfAth	2924/2007.
129.	 See	above	under	3.9.2.3.a.i,	3.9.2.3.a.iii,	3.9.3.1	and	3.9.4.3.a.
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the statute of limitations shortly before expiry to be non-retroactive and constitutional.130 If, 
however, the statute of limitations has expired, the new statute extending it is unconstitu-
tional.131 It is also significant that the unconstitutionality of ‘the extension of the statutes of 
limitations’ as a time-limit for prescription was assessed in a judgment on the basis of Arti-
cle 78 para. 2 of the Constitution,132 i.e. by the criteria employed in Greece to review statutes 
of substantive tax law, while in another judgment133 a different grounds was used: that the 
potential application of a provision on debts already prescribed before its entry into force 
would primarily contravene the principle of the rule of law, as well as the constitutional 
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations deriving from it (especially from 
Articles 2 para.1 and 5 para. 1 of the Constitution). 
With regard to the principles of legal certainty and of legitimate expectations, it 
appears that in recent years the Council of State reviewed a retroactive tax statute with 
regard to the rule of law and the individual constitutional principles of legal certainty and 
of legitimate expectations that derive from it.134 It is established nevertheless that in the 
recent cases before the Council of State – where the court had the opportunity to rule in a 
relevant matter, taking into account that the principle of legitimate expectations is more 
frequently invoked by the claimant – the court, when adjudicating on the potential incom-
patibility of the tax law with the said principle, usually rules that there is no such incompat-
ibility.135
Furthermore, when there is a case of a tax statute that involves a matter of Commu-
nity law, such as e.g. VAT as a Community tax, then the principles of Community law, such as 
the Community law principle of protected legitimate expectations of the citizens against 
the State are taken into account. 
With regard to procedural provisions applied in pending tax proceedings, the case 
law of the Council of State reviews this retroactivity not in relation to Article 78 para. 2 of 
the Constitution, but in relation to the constitutional principle of equality (Article 4) and 
the citizens’ constitutional right to judicial protection (Article 20 para.1). These matters are 
certainly taken into account in general by the Council of State, when adjudicating on legis-
lative provisions, even of substantive law, that apply on pending proceedings. Finally, the 
application of a statute on pending proceedings may not violate the constitutionally estab-
lished principle of separation of powers (Article 26).136 
In any case, beyond the issue of judicial review of the retroactivity of a tax statute (as 
already discussed), another issue is important to the Greek legal order that involves not the 
retroactive enactment of tax by the legislature, but the retroactive charging of tax by the 
administration, and the judicial review of the compatibility of any retroactive charging of 
tax with the general principles of sound administration: the ex post judicial review – as 
already indicated, this is the method of judicial review employed in Greece – of the retroac-
tive charging of tax by the tax administration against a certain taxpayer, who, however, had 
been exempted in the past by the tax administration itself, due to erroneous interpretation 
of the tax legislation. In particular, while it is in principle accepted that the Greek tax 
administration may retroactively charge taxes, in case it is ascertained that some taxpayers 
were tax exempt due erroneous interpretation of the tax statute, there is a bar to it: the 
130.	 StE	4710/1984,	StE	2866/1985,	StE	3141/1985,	StE	1104/1992,	StE	523/2000,	StE	858/2002.	Compare	StE	1508/2002.	
131.	 DEfAth	1844/2005,	compare	StE	1508/2002.
132.	 DEfAth	1844/2005.
133.	 StE	1508/2002.
134.	 Accordingly	StE	1508/2002,	in	which	the	Council	of	State	recognized	as	a	judicial	body	the	principle	of	legitimate	
expectations	as	a	constitutional	principle.	However,	this	principle	had	been	invoked	in	earlier	case	law	of	the	
Council	of	State,	yet	not	in	tax	matters.
135.	 For	example	StE	171/2006,	OlStE	2469/2008.
136.	 For	more	details,	see	above	under	3.9.2.4.a,	3.9.2.7.a.i	and	3.9.4.3.a.
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principles of sound administration [general principle of law that is not constitutionally 
established in Greece, but is now a fundamental right contained in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (Article 41]. The relevant case law of the Council of 
State (StE) accepts that the principle of sound administration hinders retroactive charging 
and, consequently, the retroactive collection of the respective tax is accepted only under 
particularly strict (special) conditions.137 It should be noted that a recent case before the 
Council of State reviewed, not only in relation to the general principle of sound administra-
tion, but also in relation to the Community principle of legitimate expectations, the permis-
sibility or impermissibility of the retroactive charging of VAT (against a taxpayer) on the 
side of the administration, while the taxpayer had been exempted by the tax administration 
for that period due to erroneous interpretation of the tax statute.138
Finally, one should mention the particular case of the exceptional collection of con-
sumption tax and duties – permitted by the Greek Constitution in Article 78 para. 3 – since 
the time of the tabling of the relevant bill in the parliament, i.e. before enactment of the 
statute. In this case, the relevant statute has to be promulgated within a certain time-limit 
determined by the Constitution. Otherwise, all taxes collected are considered to be uncon-
stitutional and therefore, unduly collected and are to be refunded. Nevertheless, had the 
relevant statute not been promulgated in a timely way in the past, governments used to 
submit to the parliament a new law with the exact same content and grant retroactive effect 
to it, within the permissible temporal limits of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution. As a 
result, by enactment and promulgation of the relevant retroactive tax statute, all unduly 
collected taxes would be a posteriori ‘legitimized’, in order to avoid refunds. The Council of 
State ruled that such statutes were constitutional,139 despite the fact that by such a ruling it 
accepted the breach of a constitutional provision (i.e. of Article 78 para. 3), by another con-
stitutional provision (namely Article 78 para. 2).
3.9.5.2. Examination method
As already clarified above, in Greece courts interpret the law according to the Constitution. 
This means that if a statute through its provisions allows room for many interpretations, 
then the court selects the interpretation that is compliant with the Constitution. In this 
procedure, the methods of legal interpretation that courts are allowed to use are always 
taken into account. After following the legal methods of interpretation, a law is found to be 
137.	 It	is	required	that	it	be	a	consumer	tax	for	which	taxpayers	during	a	long	period	of	time	had	a	constant	and	justified	
conviction,	due	to	positive	actions	of	the	Administration	(interpretative	circulars,	audit	reports,	written	responses	
by	the	Administration	to	relevant	questions),	that	they	are	not	subject	to	this	tax,	a	fact	that	resulted	in	taxpayers	
not	passing	the	tax	over	to	consumers.	At	the	same	time,	taxpayers	have	to	prove	that	the	financial	stability	of	their	
enterprise	is	jeopardized,	should	they	be	called	on	to	pay	the	said	tax	retroactively.	To	prove	the	concurrence	of	the	
risk	to	the	financial	stability	of	their	enterprise,	taxpayers	have	to	invoke	concrete	facts	occurring	at	the	critical	time	
of	issuing	of	the	tax	assessment	that	relate	to	the	general	financial	state	and	potential	of	the	enterprise	and	in	view	
of	which	the	financial	stability	if	the	enterprise	is	at	risk.	There	is	abundant	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State	on	the	
above	matters,	see	El.	Theocharopoulou,	‘Idieterotites	kata	tin	efarmogi	ton	forologikon	nomon	apo	ti	Forologikh	
Dioikisi	ke	to	dikasti	se	schesi	pros	tin	efarmogi	ton	diikitikon	nomon	–	ipo	to	fos	tis	nomologias	StE,	AED,	DEK’	
(‘Particularities	during	the	application	of	tax	statutes	by	the	Tax	Administration	and	courts	in	relation	to	the	appli-
cation	of	administrative	statutes	–	also	in	light	of	the	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State,	the	Supreme	Special	Court	and	
the	European	Court	of	Justice’),	in:	Haristirio	eis	Louka	Theocharopoulo	ke	Dimitra	Kontogiorga	–	Theocharopoulou	
(Liber	ad	honorem	of	Loukas	Theocharopoulos	and	Dimitra	Kontogiorga	–	Theocharopoulou	–	Volume	III)	Nomos,	
No.	10,	(Thessaloniki:	Aristotle	University	of	Thessaloniki,	2009),	at	pp.	228-229.
138.	 On	the	principle	of	legitimate	expectations	in	the	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State,	see	below	under	3.9.5.4.
139.	 StE	4225/1988,	Diikitiki	Diki	1989,	at	p.	948.
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unconstitutional only if there can be no interpretation that is in compliance with the Con-
stitution. 
Regarding the review of the unconstitutionality of tax statutes, it appears that their 
interpretation according to the Constitution mainly results from the application of the 
narrow interpretation of tax provisions. It should be noted that the Council of State applies, 
as a matter of principle, the narrow interpretation of tax provisions,140 due to the constitu-
tionally established principle of the formal legality of tax (Article 78 paras. 1 and 4 of the 
Constitution). Therefore, the incongruence of the retroactivity of a tax statute to the Consti-
tution and to the constitutionally established general principles of the law may also result 
from the narrow interpretation of tax statutes, only if within this framework its interpreta-
tion according to the Constitution is not possible. At the same time, the specific provision is 
used rather than the general one, even in cases when the general provision is posterior to 
the specific one.141 In fact, a special law may be abolished by a posterior statute only by 
express provision.142 Should the provision be found to be unconstitutional, courts are not to 
apply it (but usually apply instead a provision previously in force, without prejudice to the 
application of the constitutional provision of Article 78 para. 2 especially in tax matters).143
At the same time, especially with regard to the judgment on the incongruence of the 
retroactivity of the substantive tax statutes to the Constitution, courts review the unfavour-
ability of the new retroactive tax statute, i.e. the onerous modifications of the tax regime,144 
only if this retroactivity exceeds the constitutionally imposed temporal limits. The tempo-
rally unlimited retroactivity of the unfavourable tax law is prohibited, according to Arti-
cle 78 para. 2 of the Constitution. At this point it should be recalled that Article 78 para. 2 
provides that ‘A tax or any other financial charge may not be imposed by a retroactive stat-
ute effective prior to the fiscal year preceding the imposition of the tax’. In other words, in 
order for a tax statute to be unconstitutional, the following two cumulative conditions 
should be met: Firstly, it should be unfavourable, and secondly, it should exceed the consti-
tutionally determined permissible period of retroactivity. Therefore, tax exemptions may as 
a matter of principle have unlimited retroactivity.
At this point, it is worth referring in more detail to the interpretation given by the 
Council of State on the occasion of hearing tax cases with regard to the method of calcula-
tion of the temporal restriction of constitutionally permissible retroactivity under Article 78 
para. 2. First of all, the tax may not have retroactive effect extending beyond the fiscal year 
preceding the year of the publication of the statute imposing the tax. In particular, the 
following holding has been handed down: the fiscal year preceding the publication year of 
the relevant tax statute was found to be the fiscal year during which the tax object was 
acquired, and not the fiscal year during which the tax object is subjected to taxation, 
according to the relevant provisions.145 Therefore, if, for example, the law imposing income 
140.	 On	the	interpretation	of	fiscal	provisions	in	general	(including	also	tax	provisions),	it	is	interesting	to	see	the	recent	
paper	by	N.	Milionis,	‘Zitimata	erminias	ton	dimosionomikon	diataxeon:	Theseis	kai	anaskeves’	(‘Interpretation	
issues	in	fiscal	provisions:	Views	and	disaffirmations’)	in:	Haristirio	eis	Louka	Theocharopoulo	ke	Dimitra	Konto-
giorga	–	Theocharopoulou	(Liber	ad	honorem	of	Loukas	Theocharopoulos	and	Dimitra	Kontogiorga	–	Theocha-
ropoulou	–	Volume	I)	Nomos,	No.	10,	(Thessaloniki:	Aristotle	University	of	Thessaloniki,	2009),	at	pp.	461-476.
141.	 For	example	compare	StE	2624/1998.
142.	 StE	252/1988,	StE	2624/1998,	StE	3003/2001,	StE	2591/2007,	StE	2455/2008,	StE	692/2009.
143.	 On	unconstitutionality	review,	see	for	more	details	below	under	3.9.6.
144.	 Out	of	the	recent	case	law	of	the	Council	of	State,	see	indicatively	OlStE	1912/2009,	but	also	earlier	judgments	OlStE	
1865/1985,	OlStE	1705/1986	and	StE	4155/1984,	StE	2516/1980.
145.	 Accordingly,	in	judgment	OlStE	1865/1985,	it	was	held	that	Law	231/1975	that	contained	a	retroactive	restriction	of	
an	existing	income	tax	abatement	published	on	6	December1975,	could	not	apply	retroactively	to	income	incurred	
during	a	business	period	that	expired	before	1	January	1974.	Judgment	StE	648/1995	is	in	the	same	spirit	but	is	based	
on	a	different	background	and	legal	framework.
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tax is published in 2010, the retroactive taxation of income derived in 2008 is prohibited 
(despite the fact that the tax declaration for this income is submitted in 2009), but income 
derived in 2009 may be taxed. It was also held (in a case of purchase of immovable property) 
that the relevant tax imposed on the transfer of property imposed by a statute with retroac-
tive effect may not extend beyond the fiscal year preceding the year of publication of the 
statute, where the preceding year is considered to be the year in which the taxable legal 
relationship came about.146 Recently, the Council of State ruled in plenum that the legisla-
tive provision published in 1998 (Article 8 of Law 2579/1998), according to which tax-ex-
empt reserves formed before 1 January 1997 are retroactively taxed, is also unconstitutional 
due to non-permissible retroactivity.147 
As to the unfavourability of the retroactive tax statute, this results from a comparison 
between the new tax regime that is retroactively enacted and the previous regime. Thus, the 
retroactive abolition or limitation of an existing favourable tax regime,148 the favourable 
deprivation of the right to select a special tax regime149, the retroactive limitation of tax-ex-
empt expenses150, the special compulsory retroactive closure of pending real estate tax 
cases, in the sense of a retroactive compulsory determination of the value of immovable 
property (and in comparison to the previous rule), which might eventually lead to an 
increase of the tax assessment of property that is subject to real estate tax151 etc. were all 
found to be unconstitutional. Especially in pending cases, courts will compare the new 
retroactive statute and the previous one to ascertain whether the new statute applies and 
until when it may be applied.152 
However, the comparison between the previous and the retroactive tax statute and 
the judgment on the unfavourability of the retroactive tax regime is not always equally 
clear. Thus, in recent case law of the plenum of the Council of State involving reserves, it was 
found that the new provision that retroactively imposed income tax on the reserves of these 
companies is unfavourable, irrespective of the fact that new, lower (than those applicable at 
the time) tax rates had been enacted.153 But in that case the fact was also taken into account 
that the new tax statute for the first time laid down retroactive taxation on reserves that 
were temporarily exempt, because they had not been distributed or capitalized. In particu-
lar, it was held that this new provision constitutes a retroactive onerous change of the tax 
regime of these companies, because income tax is levied directly and compulsorily on a tax 
base that during its formation and the publication of the above statute was tax free, and its 
taxation depended on future facts that were related to the will of these companies. 
It was ruled that the legislative prohibition of refund to taxpayers of taxes that were 
unduly collected due to the imposition of taxes that was based on invalid provisions also 
constitutes a case of retroactive imposition of tax in the sense of Article 78 para. 2 of the 
Constitution154.
With regard to the enactment of a retroactive tax abatement, this is initially accepted 
without limitations, as long as it does not violate the constitutional principle of equal treat-
ment in tax matters (Article 4 para. 5 of the Constitution). According to this principle, there 
has to be equal tax treatment of similar situations and unequal tax treatment of unequal 
146.	 StE	600/2003.
147.	 OlStE	1912/2009,	StE	1467/2010.
148.	 StE	1781/1978,	OlStE	1865/1985,	OlStE	1705/1986,	OlStE	2139-2150/1989.
149.	 StE	2516/1980.
150.	 StE	4155/1984.
151.	 OlStE	2863-2871/2003.
152.	 On	this	matter,	see	above	under	3.9.2.7.a	and	3.9.4.3.a.
153.	 OlStE	1912/2009,	StE	1467/2010	accordingly.
154.	 StE	422/1981,	StE	2285/1981,	StE	2630/1981	(see	in	N.	Chatzitzanis,	supra	note	58,	at	p.	72),	StE	1104/1992.
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situations, while tax allowances do not breach this principle if justified by reasons of public 
interest.
The case law of the Council of State is of particular interest in cases of tax exemptions 
that were enacted in breach of EU law and were subsequently found to be invalid. The provi-
sions that formed the basis for the refund of the unpaid taxes (due to a previously estab-
lished tax exemption that is contrary to EU law) were not found to be governed by Article 78 
para. 2 of the Constitution. Thus, taking into account the ECJ case law on prohibited State 
aids,155 the Council of State held that Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution is not violated in 
the following case: when a statute is enacted aiming at the retroactive levying of taxes 
beyond the permissible limits of Article 78 para. 2 on a certain category of companies that 
had been unlawfully exempted in the past, given the fact that this tax exemption was found 
by the ECJ to be a prohibited State aid. However, the reasoning employed by the Council of 
State to establish that the refund of the contribution does not fall within the scope of Article 
78 para. 2 of the Constitution was partly diversified over time. Thus, initially this quest for 
taxes was held by the Council of State to not constitute a retroactive abolition of a tax 
exemption, but instead that Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution aims at ensuring legal 
certainty and does not refer to the adoption of measures that are imposed by EU law.156 
Subsequently, while the Council of State case law continued to not subject these cases to 
Article 78 para. 2, it made a turn as to the reasoning by adjudicating that such provisions on 
tax collection do not constitute an abolition of tax exemptions but that these provisions on 
exemption from the said tax obligation were ab initio invalid, due to imcompatibility with 
Article 92 para. 1 of the EC Treaty.157 
With regard to the review of the incongruence of a tax statute in relation to Commu-
nity law, the following is to be observed:The retroactive levying of consumption tax should 
be completely avoided, as it is a tax that is passed over to consumers,158 as well as because 
VAT as a Community tax is governed by the principles of Community law, such as for exam-
ple the Community principle of the protection of citizen’s legitimate expectations against 
the state, which according to ECJ case law, is on certain occasions violated by tax provisions 
with retroactive effect.159 
Furthermore, as already mentioned earlier,160 the practice of the Greek tax legislature 
to extend the statute of limitations for the state’s fiscal claims before it expires has been 
repeatedly held by the case law of the Council of State to be constitutional. According to this 
case law, as long as the extension of the statute of limitations is granted before its expiry, 
then this law is not retroactive and it is constitutional.161 On the contrary, if the statute of 
limitations expires and its extension is then provided for in a new statute, then this is a case 
of unconstitutional retroactive levying of tax.162 
With regard to the unconstitutionality of procedural statutes in tax law, this is 
assessed, as already mentioned, not on the basis of Article 78 para. 2 of the Constitution, i.e. 
155.	 In	fact,	the	ECJ	judgment	against	Greece	(of	10	June	1993)	for	breaching	Community	law	played	an	important	role,	
as	Greece	did	not	comply	with	a	Commission	decision	on	the	invalidity	of	aids	granted	to	exports	by	its	enterprises	
in	the	form	of	tax	exemptions,	see	case	C-183/1991	Commission/	Greece	[1993]	ECR	1993,	p.I-3131.
156.	 StE	1957/1999.	The	judgment	of	the	Council	of	State	at	hand	was	handed	down	after	taking	into	account	the	relevant	
case	law	of	the	ECJ,	especially	in	case	C-183/1991	Commission/Greece	[1993]	ECR	1993,	p.I-3131	(see	previous	foot-
note)	and	in	case	C-387/1992	Banco	Exterior	de	Espana/Ayuntamiento	de	Valencia	[1994]	ECR	1994,	p.	I-877	(where	
it	was	ruled	that	tax	exemptions	may	constitute	State	aids).
157.	 StE	115/2004,	StE	49/2006.	Compare	also	StE	1861/2004	and	StE	1333-1335/2002.
158.	 Finokaliotis,	supra	note	24,	at	p.	131.
159.	 See	below	under	3.9.5.4.
160.	 Under	3.9.5.1.
161.	 StE	4710/1984,	StE	2866/1985,	StE	3141/1985,	StE	1104/1992,	StE	523/2000,	StE	858/2002.	Compare	StE	1508/2002.
162.	 DEfAth	1844/2005,	compare	StE	1508/2002.
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not on the basis of the temporal restrictions applied to the retroactivity of an unfavourable 
tax statute, but on the basis of other constitutional provisions, such as for example the 
citizens’ right to the provision of judicial protection (Article 20 para. 1 of the Constitution) 
or the principle of separation of powers (Article 26 of the Constitution). Thus, a statute 
imposing the payment of a corresponding appeal fee (2%) on the object of the dispute in 
monetary tax disputes, without determining at the same time a relevant upper limit to this 
fee, was found to be unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable in the case at hand. This 
ruling was justified by the fact that this provision contravenes that of Article 20 para. 1 of 
the Constitution (on the citizens’ right to judicial protection) and it is therefore inapplica-
ble in every case, because, depending on the object of the dispute, it may result in such a 
high appeal fee, that it exceeds the purpose of its imposition and renders the filing of the 
appeal excessively difficult.163 In contrast, the statute imposing a fixed fee of EUR 9 was 
found to be constitutional and thus applicable. The same applies to the statute that even 
retroactively limited the appealability of first instance judgments by determining a mini-
mum amount of the dispute (thus covering pending proceedings as well). It was ruled in 
particular that the enactment of such a law does not breach the constitutional principle of 
equality (Article 4 para. 1 of the Constitution), nor the right to judicial protection (Article 
20 para. 1 of the Constitution), given the fact that the retroactivity of this statute was based 
on a general and objective criterion that applied to all appeals still pending before adminis-
trative courts of appeal but which had not been heard yet (at the time that the statute was 
published). The Court made it clear in this respect that ‘an acquired procedural right of the 
appellant’ is not created merely by the fact of filing an appeal against a first – instance judg-
ment, and that such a statute does not violate the ‘principle of the lawful judge’ established 
in Article 8 of the Constitution, because the limitation of the appealability of judgments 
does not constitute a removal of a case from the competent court but a permissible regula-
tion of pending cases.164 It was also ruled that such a statute does not contravene Article 6 
para. 1 ECHR.165
As far as tax fines are concerned, in recent years the Council of State reviews their 
retroactivity in relation to Article 7 para. 1 ECHR. Thus, any legislation imposing a retroac-
tive fine, i.e. for violations that took place before the publication of the relevant statute in 
the Government Gazette and referring to the import of a private passenger vehicle which 
was imported with certain deductions, whereas its owner was not entitled to the temporary 
exemption provided by the statute, was found to contravene Article 7 para. 1 ECHR and 
therefore to be inapplicable.166 In contrast, the same legislation was found to be compatible 
with Article 7 para. 1 ECHR and thus to be valid, with regard to violations perpetrated after 
the publication in the Government Gazette of the relevant statute imposing the sanction – 
fine.167
It should furthermore be recalled that when it comes to tax fines and additional taxes 
(due to the submission of an overdue or inaccurate tax return), the general principle of 
retroactive application of the more lenient law applies168 (unless that same law clearly 
excludes retroactivity). With regard to the examination method employed by case law in the 
assessment of the favourability in the nature of the more recent law for taxpayers, it should 
be noted that its comparison to the statute that was in force at the time that the tax obliga-
163.	 OlStE	3470/2007,	StE	58-59/2010,	StE	1901/2009,	StE	1734/2009,	StE	204/2009,	StE	556/2008,	StE	404/2008,	
StE	276/2008.
164.	 OlStE	3621/1995,	StE	1277/1996.
165.	 StE	5495/1996,	StE	5512-26/1996,	StE	2371/1997.
166.	 StE	3537/2008.	See	also	StE	2077/2009.
167.	 StE	3537/2008.
168.	 For	example	StE	4256/2001,	StE	3941/2004,	StE	3821/2005.
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tion arose does not take place on the basis of an objective judgment of the two statutes in 
their entirety, but specifically, i.e. in view of the facts of the case at issue.169
3.9.5.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
With regard to a tax issue, the Council of State has in fact not ruled to date on a violation of 
the said article.
Nevertheless with regard to retroactivity, the Council of State reviewed for its compat-
ibility with Article 7 para. 1 ECHR the legislation that imposed fines retroactively, i.e. for 
violations that took place before the publication of the relevant statute in the Government 
Gazette and referring to the import of a private passenger vehicle, which was imported with 
certain deductions, whereas its owner was not entitled to the temporary exemption pro-
vided by the statute.170
3.9.5.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
In the framework of the review of unconstitutionality of laws, and of the eventual violation 
of Community law by a formal statute or a regulatory administrative act, courts are in a 
position to review whether the retroactivity of a statute breaches the principle of legal cer-
tainty and in particular the principle of legitimate expectations. In this case the following 
distinction can be made: the judicial review of the adherence to the principle of legitimate 
expectations by the tax legislator or by the tax administration.171 
In particular, in the case of tax statutes, whether these are(parliamentary) statutes or 
secondary legislation, the Council of State has occasionally reviewed their retroactivity in 
relation to the principle of legitimate expectations, without, however, accepting that there 
is a violation of the principle. The long-term preservation of a tax regime that is favourable 
to a specific group of persons does not constitute any obstacle to its modification.172 In fact, 
reference to that was made in a certain case, not only to the principle of legitimate expecta-
tions, but also to the principle of legal certainty, without ruling in the end that either of the 
two principles was breached.173 
However, it is interesting to present as part of the recent Greek case law the cases in 
which the Council of State reviewed not the retroactivity of the tax legislation, but the retro-
active charging of tax by the tax administration in relation to the principle of legitimate 
expectations.174 More precisely, these were cases where the tax administration retroactively 
charged VAT to the expense of a company that had not been charged with VAT until then, 
due to erroneous interpretation and application of the law on the side of the administra-
tion. In these cases, the Council of State accepted that the tax administration is obliged 
during the application of VAT as a Community tax to observe the Community principle of 
the citizens’ legitimate expectations against the state. In fact, the Council of State deter-
mined for the first time in judgment 426/2007 the conditions that need to be met according 
to the case law of the ECJ for the application of the principle of legitimate expectations. In 
particular, the Council of State, relying on the relevant judgments of the ECJ on its request 
169.	 StE	4256/2001,	compare	StE	3941/2004.
170.	 StE	3537/2008.	See	also	StE	2077/2009.
171.	 See	El.	Theocharopoulou,	supra	note	137,	at	pp.	215-219,	231-234.	On	the	principle	of	legitimate	expectations	in	Greek	
case	law	and	theory	generally,	see	the	studies	in	the	legal	periodical	Dikeomata	tou	Anthropou,	Special	edition:	
Kratos	Dikeou	ke	prostatevomeni	empistosyni	(Rule	of	law	and	legitimate	expectations),	Vol.	I,	(Athens:	Ant.	N.	
Sakkoulas	Publications	2003).
172.	 StE	171/2006.
173.	 StE	1508/2002.	See	immediately	below	3.9.5.5.
174.	 StE	426–430/2007,	compare	StE	2825-2829/2007.	See	Theocharopoulou,	supra	note	137,	at	pp.	217-218,	231-234.	
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
284
for a preliminary ruling,175 held in this judgment that there has to be good faith on the side 
of the taxpayer with regard to the tax exemption, so that the taxpayer a) could not recog-
nize the inaccuracy of the information provided by the national tax authority and b) the 
administrative act, by which information was granted to him with regard to the tax was by 
itself conducive of good faith on the side of the taxpayer regarding the tax exemption. Nev-
ertheless, the Council of State did not finally rule in its judgment 426/2007 on the violation 
of the principle in this case, but remanded the case for adjudication to the Administrative 
Court of Appeals.176 
Judgments 2825-2829/ 2007 of the Council of State are worth mentioning. In these 
rulings, the Court accepted for the first time in a VAT case a breach of the EU law principle of 
legitimate expectations of businessmen. In these cases, actions of the tax authorities 
amounting to the receipt of periodical VAT returns and statements of account could have 
led a wise businessman to have legitimate expectations as to the amount of VAT to be 
returned. In particular, this was the case of a company that claimed to have submitted from 
1992 to 1997 all periodical VAT returns and statements of account to the competent tax 
authority, which, even though it received them, did not notify the company about the appli-
cable (regular) VAT rate, but only in 1998 did it issue a notice of assessment of the tax using 
the regular VAT rate. In other words, the company repaid until then the output tax with a 
reduced VAT rate, considering that items (viz. ice cubes) sold were subject to the reduced 
VAT rate as is water, while the tax authority received all relevant returns over the years with-
out notifying the company about the applicable VAT rate.
3.9.5.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
Courts in Greece interpret statutes in compliance with the Constitution and, in this frame-
work, if they have the possibility, they will select the interpretation which will lead to the 
avoidance of the retroactive effect of a statute, especially if the retroactive application of a 
statute raises constitutionality issues. An exemplary case for this is that of the Council of 
State 1508/2002, in which the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a provision that was in 
effect from 12 September1997 and extended the statute of limitations for uncontested 
debts at tax offices (towards the state and third parties), which were to prescribed in the 
years 1997 and 1998. The provision was found to be constitutional, as the Council of State 
by strict interpretation of the relevant provision accepted that this provision implies that it 
does not cover all debts of 1997, but only these for which the statute of limitations had not 
expired at the time of publication of this law (thus, the debts whose statute of limitations 
expired from 12 September 1997 onwards).177 In the opposite case, i.e. if the provision com-
prised all debts of 1997, the Council of State expressed the opinion that the constitutionally 
guaranteed principle of the rule of law would thus be violated, along with the principles of 
legal certainty and legitimate expectations deriving from it. 
175.	 Joined	cases	C-181/04	to	183/04	Elmeka	NE/Minister	for	Economic	Affairs	[2006]	ECR	2006,	p.I-8167.
176.	 StE	426/2007.	It	should	be	noted,	that	when	adjudicating	a	petition	for	cassation,	the	Council	of	State	as	a	cassation	
court	lacks	competence	to	investigate	the	facts	of	the	case,	but	may	set	aside	the	final	judgment	(issued	in	the	
present	case	by	the	Court	of	Appeals)	due	to	misinterpretation	or	misapplication	of	the	law	or	due	to	defective	
statement	of	the	reasons	in	the	final	judgment	(of	the	Court	of	Appeals	in	the	present	case).
177.	 See	Sp.	Vlachopoulos,	‘I	arhi	tis	prostatevomenis	empistosynis	tou	diikoumenou	kai	i	symfoni	me	to	Syntagma	
erminia	ton	nomon’	(‘The	principle	of	legitimate	expectations	and	the	interpretation	of	statutes	according	to	the	
Constitution’),	Dikeomata	tou	Anthropou,	Special	edition,	Vol.	I,	op.	cit.,	2003,	at	p.	239	et	seq.
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3.9.5.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
The Constitution in Greece imposes certain restrictions to the retroactivity of tax statutes, 
which are interpreted by the case law, as already discussed above. 
3.9.6. Retroactivity of case law
In Greece, the court’s judgment on tax law matters is binding upon the parties, i.e. tax 
administration and the taxpayer. In particular, if this judgment annuls or modifies the 
administrative act by which tax or a tax fine was imposed upon the particular taxpayer, this 
judgment is binding upon the administration and any other public authority, as well as 
courts, and involves the particular taxpayer that filed an appeal. Nevertheless, the annul-
ment or modification by the judge of the administrative act imposing tax or a tax fine 
applies retroactively, i.e. since the issuing of the said act, thus resulting either in a refund 
with interest of the taxes that were unduly paid, or the payment to the state of the taxes that 
were not charged or paid until the day of the hearing of the case. If the annulment of the act 
charging the tax is due to the unconstitutionality of the statute that was the basis for its 
issuing, it should be clarified that the ruling on unconstitutionality does not produce an 
erga omnes and a res judicata effect. The reason is that this is a case of incidental review of 
unconstitutionality178. The judicial review of the unconstitutionality of statutes in Greece 
takes place only ex post; it is diffuse, incidental, ad hoc and determinative. The review of the 
unconstitutionality of statutes in Greece is not incidental, but main, concentrative and 
abstract, with an erga omnes effect179 in only one case: when two contradictory judgments 
are issued by two supreme courts in Greece (e.g. Council of State and Supreme Court, or 
Council of State and Court of Auditors, or Supreme Court and Court of Auditors) regarding 
the substantive (un)constitutionality of a law. As there is doubt as to the constitutionality of 
a statute due to the contradictory judgments, then the matter is introduced for adjudica-
tion on the controversy – based on Article 100 of the Constitution – before the Special 
Higher Court (Supreme Special Court) and its ruling on the unconstitutionality of the par-
ticular provisions results in its declaration as invalid (erga omnes, naturally). In the first 
approach, this is a case of substantive exercise of legislative power by the Supreme Special 
Court, while in the second approach, it is a case of judicial sanctioning of the legislature, 
due to unconstitutionality of a legislative provision. In any event, the erga omnes invalidity 
of a provision is not retroactive.180 
178.	 Instead	of	others,	see	Yiannopoulos,	supra	note	119,	at	pp.	170	–	171	and	the	relevant	bibliography.
179.	 Compare	OlStE	1937/1998,	paragraph	10.	See	A.	Manitakis,	Elliniko	syntagmatiko	dikeo	–	Themeliodis	enies	(Greek	
constitutional	law	–	Fundamental	notions),	Vol.	I	(Thessaloniki:	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2004),	at	pp.	465-467,	
Venizelos	Ev.	–	Skouris,	supra	note	119,	at	pp.	60	et	seq.,	68,	H.	Chrysanthakis,	E.	Galani,	and	P.	Pantazopoulos,	
Isigisis	syntagmatikou	dikeou.	Organosi	tou	Kratous.	Atomika	ke	kinonika	dikeomata,	ESDA	(Lectures	on	constitu-
tional	law.	State	organization.	Civil	and	social	rights,	ECtHR)	(Athens,	2007),	at	pp.	39	–	40.
180.	 Cf.	A.	Dervitsiotis,	Simiosis	Syntagmatikou	Dikaiou	(Notes	on	Constitutional	Law)(Athens:	Law	and	Economy,	P.N.	
Sakkoulas	Publications,	1998),	at	p.	154.
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3.9.7. Views in the literature
3.9.7.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
In Greece there is no diversity regarding the opinions expressed in the literature in refer-
ence to retroactivity of tax statutes. The prevailing opinion accepts that the Constitution 
expresses the public sense of justice and therefore the legal academic world does not feel 
the need to investigate the possibility of its reform. On the contrary, legal scholars focus on 
efforts to protect and interpret the constitutional provision. Thus, the discussion on the 
retroactivity of tax legislation is limited to the effort to ascertain whether a tax statute is in 
violation of the Constitution.
In particular, Article 78 paragraph 2181 of the Constitution establishes limited retroac-
tivity with regard to tax charges (and not tax allowances) in the following sense: On the one 
hand, it allows the retroactive imposition of taxes if they refer to the fiscal year preceding 
the imposition of the tax whereas, on the other hand, it deprives the legislature of the right 
to impose a retroactive tax before the aforementioned time i.e. before the fiscal year preced-
ing the imposition of the tax.
The enactment of the said article is mainly the result of the coalescence of two princi-
ples: Firstly, the principle of legal certainty and secondly, the principle of democracy. There-
fore, on the one hand, the constitutional provision aims to establish a secure economic 
environment that would allow everyone to know in advance what taxes would be levied on 
their economic activities182. On the other hand, though, it seeks to allow any newly elected 
government to apply its economic policy immediately after its election183. Apart from the 
above, the constitutional provision also allows any given government to impose limitedly 
retroactive taxes in the case of extreme circumstances. 
It must be noted that the legislature and the executive have generally been observant 
of Article 78 paragraph 2 of the Constitution and in the rare exceptions that this was not the 
case, case law has held the majority of relevant provisions to be unconstitutional. Finally, as 
already stated above, the prevailing opinion is that Article 78 paragraph 2 of the Constitu-
181.	 ‘A	tax	or	any	other	financial	charge	may	not	be	imposed	by	a	retroactive	statute	effective	prior	to	the	fiscal	year	
preceding	the	imposition	of	the	tax.’
182.	 Before	the	constitutional	reform	of	1975	this	was	a	demand	raised	by	politicians,	university	professors,	lawyers	and	
economists	who	were	disappointed	by	court	decisions	issued	prior	to	1975	that	had	declared	retroactive	tax	legisla-
tion	to	be	permissible.	The	fifth	revisional	parliament	answered	their	call	and	unanimously	accepted	that	retroactiv-
ity	of	tax	laws	should	be	prohibited.	Therefore,	the	discussion	held	during	the	first	phase	of	the	parliamentary	
debate	was	short	and	focused	primarily	on	fairness	arguments,	such	as	reliance	considerations,	accepting	them	as	
obvious.	Nevertheless,	during	the	second	parliamentary	debate,	held	in	plenary	session,	the	initial	decision	was	
overturned	and	limited	retroactivity	was	established.	
183.	 If	limited	retroactivity	had	not	been	permitted	then	newly	elected	governments	would	not	be	able	to	apply	their	
political	platform	from	the	commencement	of	their	term.	For	example,	if	a	government	was	elected	by	the	people	in	
June,	even	if	income	tax	rates	were	changed	immediately	after	election,	the	incomes	burdened	by	the	new	tax	
regime	would	be	those	of	the	future,	i.e.	in	the	best-case	scenario	the	incomes	created	in	the	period	from	June	to	
December.	The	tax	revenues,	though,	deriving	from	this	income	would	be	collected	near	the	end	of	the	next	year.	
Therefore,	in	the	meantime	the	taxes	would	be	collected	according	to	the	tax	regime,	implemented	by	the	previous	
government.	Therefore,	it	would	be	difficult	or	almost	impossible	for	any	given	government	to	practice	its	own	
economic	policy,	as	fiscal	policy	would	not	be	able	to	be	applied	for	a	considerable	period	of	time.	This	fact	would	
lead	to	the	inability	of	newly	elected	governments	to	exercise	an	overall	economic	policy,	when	at	the	same	time	
they	would	have	to	apply	inconsistent	policy	segments.	Thus,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	will	of	the	people	would	
not	be	observed	and	respected	in	an	immediate	manner.
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tion expresses the public sense of justice and therefore no significantly different opinions 
concerning the retroactivity of tax statutes have arisen184. 
3.9.7.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
In Greece the view expressed by the economic analysis of law and generally by law and eco-
nomics on transitional tax law has not given rise to discussions in the scientific literature. 
Moreover, it is not a view invoked by politicians and finally it has not been reviewed by case 
law. The aforementioned is the result of two main factors: 
a. The fact that the respective constitutional provision expresses the public sense of justice 
and therefore the legal academic world does not feel the need to investigate the possibil-
ity of its reform (as described in more detail in 3.8.6.1.)and 
b. The poor influence of the law and economics approach in Greece185. 
It must be emphasized that due to the aforementioned reasons the law and econom-
ics view on transitional law has not been introduced at all in Greece, let alone promote a 
debate. 
184.	 A	different	approach	worth	mentioning	is	expressed	by	Professors	Anastopoulos	and	Fortsakis	(I.D.	Anastopoulos	
and	Th.	P.	Fortsakis,	Forologiko	Dikeo	(Tax	Law),	(Athens-Komotini:	Ant.	Sakkoulas	Publications,	2002,	at	p.	122)	in	
reference	to	the	principle	of	democracy.	In	this	textbook	the	writers	refer	to	the	principle	of	democracy,	not	in	order	
to	justify	the	allowance	of	retroactivity	(as	done	by	the	members	of	parliament),	but	its	prohibition.	In	particular,	
they	claim	that,	if	retroactive	taxation	were	to	be	permitted,	then	the	democratic	legitimization	of	the	present	
legislature	would	substitute	the	respective	legitimization	of	the	previous	legislature.
185.	 In	1999	Assistant	Professor	Aristides	N.	Hatzis	stated	the	following:	‘Economic	analysis	of	law	(EAL)	is	at	a	nascent	
level	in	Greece.	It	is	virtually	unknown	to	the	great	majority	of	lawyers	and	economists	(including	academics),	who	
think	of	it	as	something	as	exotic	and	elusive	as	sociology	of	law…’	Ten	years	later,	although	there	has	been	
improvement,	the	situation	is	not	all	that	different.	Despite	the	fact	that	law	and	economics	is	an	elective	course	in	
the	Faculties	of	Law	of	the	Kapodestrian	University	of	Athens	and	of	the	Aristotle	University	of	Thessaloniki	and	is	
frequently	referred	to	in	textbooks	of	various	fields	of	law,	most	Greek	jurists	are	expected	not	to	have	knowledge	of	
the	content	of	the	term,	while	it	may	be	the	case	that	they	have	not	heard	of	it	at	all.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	
that	the	Greek	Association	of	Law	and	Economics	was	established	in	2002.	Furthermore,	relevant	articles,	even	
though	limited	in	number	and	in	attention	received,	have	discussed	matters	from	various	fields	of	the	legal	science,	
such	as	commercial	law,	labour	law,	family	law,	law	of	obligations,	property	law,	criminal	law,	etc.
	 In	particular,	there	are	only	limited	articles	with	regard	to	the	economic	analysis	of	tax	law,	which	are	mainly	
introductory	in	nature.	At	the	same	time,	it	should	be	noted	that	transitional	tax	law	has	not	been	the	object	of	
research	and	therefore,	the	opinions	voiced	by	Professors	Graetz,	Kaplow	and	the	other	researchers	in	the	area	of	the	
economic	analysis	of	tax	law	have	not	been	presented	in	Greece.

289
3.10.
Hungary
Daniel Deak 
3.10.1. Introduction
Positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is 
unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches 
such an intolerable degree that the statute, as ‘flawed law’, must yield to justice.’1 
Retroactive actions can take place in the various segments of business life. Appar-
ently, legislation or the judiciary repeal of statutes can be retroactive (it is assumed that 
judicial law-making is not possible). Moreover, companies may be induced to reopen their 
final accounts retroactively both for financial accounting and income tax purposes. In tax 
law, self-revision of the past tax liability can also occur. For legal purposes, the facts of time, 
and changes in time, matter. Both the legislator and courts refrain from interfering with 
completed legal relationships unless there is good reason to do so. The statute of limita-
tions2 constitutes quite a serious burden for the actions of the state organs, as clearly 
became evident in Hungary in as early as the nineties where the formulation of political will 
of the new democracy collided with the constraints of the rule of law. 
The evaluation of retroactive (or retrospective) legislation is a matter of providing 
transitional justice, or rather of seeking to manage transitional times by means of law (i.e., 
treating an inter-temporal conflict of laws). The two extremes between which a solution 
must be found are legality and legitimacy. The first option is emphasized by Kelsen or Rad-
bruch. According to them, the idea of substantive justice is to be subsumed under the scope 
of positive law. It is suggested that not only material justice or legitimacy, but also equality 
are values that cannot be considered to be indispensable within the borders of a legal order. 
Arguably, positive law must not be subject to outward ideas. It must be a closed system 
driven by the logic of consistency only. If this is the case, a legal system is apt to substitute 
lawfulness for any kind of justice.3 
Retroactive or retrospective legislation can be forgiven for good reasons. After all, the 
supremacy of the parliament of a country to make law may prevail if necessary over the 
legal certainty maxim. Legislating substantive rights may thus take priority over the formal 
1.	 Gustav	Radbruch,	‘Statutory	Lawlessness	and	Supra-Statutory	Law	(1946)’,	Oxford	J	Legal	Studies	(2006),	Vol.	26,	
No.	1,	at	p.	7;	Gustav	Radbruch,	‘Gesetzliches	Unrecht	und	übergesetzliches	Recht’,	Süddeutsche	Juristenzeitung,	
No.	1,	1946,	at	p.	107.	
2.	 It	is	a	statute	prescribing	a	period	of	limitation	for	the	bringing	of	certain	kinds	of	legal	action	(taken	from	the	New	
Oxford	American	Dictionary,	Apple	Macintosh).	
3.	 According	to	Kelsen,	the	enforcement	of	law	can	be	guaranteed	by	the	systematic	application	of	the	promise	of	
organized	coercion,	the	eventual	technique	of	law.	The	technique	of	social	control	means	with	Kelsen	in	turn	the	
forms	in	which	conformity	to	legal	norms	can	be	achieved.	Hans	Kelsen,	‘The	law	as	a	specific	social	technique’,	
University	of	Chicago	Law	Review	(1941-42),	Vol.	9,	at	p.	79.	
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concept of the rule of law principle.4 Indeterminate legal concepts may challenge the oper-
ability of the legal order, however. Thus, the rule of law may arguably set a standard that 
cannot be superseded at any instance by any public body (state organ), bound to effective 
laws, even if enjoying full legitimacy. 
Lawfulness certainly prevails over justice in the field of criminal law. In the area of tax 
law, however, legal certainty may be subject from time to time to the considerations of 
equity or efficiency. This does not mean that the certainty maxim drafted by Adam Smith5 
would not be the norm, in comparison to which deviations like retroactivity can take place 
only exceptionally. 
3.10.2. On terminology 
3.10.2.1. In general
In many jurisdictions, there are no separate terms to denominate legislation which is retro-
active or retrospective (e.g., ‘lois rétroactive’, ‘effetto retroattivo’, ‘обратная сила закона’). In 
German legal discourse, the case of retroactive or retrospective legislation is better defined 
to the extent that distinction can be made between ‘echte und unechte Rückwirkung’. Since 
this report is prepared in English, I shall explicitly distinguish between the two terms. Fol-
lowing the Latin roots of ‘retroagere’ (drive back) and ‘retrospicere’ (look back), I shall use 
the term ‘retroactive’ for ‘ex post facto’ legislation. Where a law enters into force with a 
retroactive effect, I mean that it is applicable to events that started and ended in the past, 
that is, before the date the law entered into force. Subsequently stipulating rights and obli-
gations that apply to past relationships, a statute is thus introduced as if it had existed 
before the existence of these relationships. In other words, changes may be made effective 
in past years, deeming the law to have been that which it was not.6 A statute, entering into 
force retrospectively, is applicable to existing relationships, which have started in the past, 
but which have not yet completed at the time when the new law enters into force. Retro-
spective legislation suggests changes in law prospectively. This is because the new law will 
be applicable to events that continue to exist. 
In the first case (retroactivity), one can take a look at events from the perspective of a 
tense of ‘praeteritum imperfectum’, in the second case (prospective legislation) from the 
perspective of a tense of ‘praesens perfectum’. In other words, retroactive legislation alters 
the past legal consequences of past actions while retrospective legislation changes the 
future legal consequences of past actions. Admittedly, the borderline between retroactive 
and retrospective legislation is elusive in many cases. This is because the actions that are 
affected by new laws can hardly be distinguished conceptually as to whether the events that 
are addressed by a new statute belong to the past or they continue to exist in certain ways in 
4.	 Geoffrey	T.	Loomer,	‘Taxing	out	of	time:	parliamentary	supremacy	and	retroactive	tax	legislation’,	British	Tax	Review,	
2006,	No.	1,	at	p.	84.	
5.	 An	Inquiry	in	the	Nature	and	Causes	of	the	Wealth	of	Nations,	in:	R.R.	Salter,	J.L.B.	Kerr	and	A.	Easson,	Cases	and	
Materials	on	Revenue	Law	(London:	Sweet	and	Maxwell,	1990),	at	p.	1.	
6.	 Loomer,	supra	note	4,	at	p.	64.	
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the future as well.7 In the case of retrospective legislation, vested rights are to be respected 
by introducing grandfathering provisions (or phasing out rules in respect of diminishing 
relief opportunities and phasing in rules in respect of newly introduced liabilities). Strictly 
speaking, a statute enters into force retrospectively if it has immediate effect without grand-
fathering existing rights. 
Quite confusingly, retroactivity is usually called in the British judiciary practice retro-
spective, and a retrospective law is called as quasi-retrospective.8 Tax legislation may prefer 
different approaches, depending on a particular case. Retroactive legislation means in 
countries like the Netherlands ‘formal retroactivity’, retrospective legislation suggests in 
turn ‘material retroactivity’. 
3.10.2.2. Legal discourse 
In Hungarian legal language, no distinction can be made between retroactive and retro-
spective legislation. The term ‘visszaható’ means both retroactive and retrospective. A clear 
distinction is still made in fact between retroactive and retrospective legislation. 
In Hungary, retrospective legislation occurs frequently in the area of administrative 
tax law. From year to year, the new provisions of administrative tax law are applicable even 
to pending tax matters, provided, however, that changes in the law do not take place to the 
detriment of taxpayers.9 Retrospective provisions may also concern substantive tax law, 
but not frequently. In most of such cases, the new law is complemented with grandfathering 
rights. Thus, the new law usually introduces transitional measures in order to protect vested 
rights. Retroactive legislation is against the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, as has 
been confirmed by the Constitutional Court several times. Exceptions to this occur very 
rarely, and in favour of citizens only. 
3.10.2.3. Statutes applying to a previous year (actual retroactivity) and statutes 
applying as from the beginning of the current year (de facto retroactivity) 
It can happen in Hungary that tax law provisions are changed retroactively in the sense that 
during the fiscal year changes are introduced even concerning existing legal relations with a 
retroactive effect to the beginning of the fiscal year. If such changes are in favour of taxpay-
ers, they can enter into force. If changes imply in any respect a new burden for taxpayers, 
they cannot be introduced. The distinction between the cases where the new provisions 
which entered into force during the fiscal year apply to the previous fiscal year or they apply 
as from the beginning of the current year is nevertheless of no relevance. 
In Hungary the argument cannot be accepted that the problem of retroactive legisla-
tion would allegedly not arise due to the fact that the liability to pay tax would arise at the 
7.	 It	may	be	difficult,	in	particular	in	practice,	to	clearly	clarify	the	connection	between	the	past	and	present	tenses	for	
the	purposes	of	identifying	the	legal	effect	of	particular	events.	The	difference	between	them	can	be	described	as	a	
matter	of	degree,	rather	than	as	a	matter	of	categorical	distinction.	This	does	not	mean	that	there	would	be	no	
reason	to	maintain	distinction	–	as	a	binary	issue	–	between	retroactive	and	retrospective	effects	–	in	theory	at	least.	
No	definitional	distinction	can	be	accepted	between	primary	and	secondary	retroactivity	(i.e.,	between	retroactive	
and	retrospective	legislation).	Jill	E.	Fisch,	‘Retroactivity	and	legal	change:	an	equilibrium	approach’,	Harvard	Law	
Review	(1997),	Vol.	110,	at	p.	1069.	The	illusive	nature	of	a	precise	definition	of	the	problem	of	‘ex	post	facto’	legisla-
tion	converts	the	analysis	from	a	binary	into	a	quantitative	issue.	Rather	than	asking	whether	retroactivity	is	appro-
priate,	we	should	ask	what	degree	of	retroactivity	impact	is	appropriate.	See	pp.	1072-1073.	
8.	 Attorney	General	v	Vernazza	[1960]	A.C.	965	(HL),	Wilson	v	First	County	Trust	Ltd	(No.2)	[2003]	UKHL	40;	[2004]	1	
A.C.	816	(HL),	Catherine	S.	Bobbett,	‘Retroactive	or	retrospective?	A	note	on	terminology’,	British	Tax	Review,	2006,	
No.	1,	at	p.	16.	
9.	 Section	182	(1)	of	the	Act	XCII	of	2003	on	Taxation	Order,	as	amended.	
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end of the fiscal year only, following the date when the new rules entered into force at the 
start of this year. Notably, the liability to pay income tax is of a substantive nature and arises 
from the legal relationship from which taxable income can be earned. Once the taxpayer 
enters into such a relationship, the liability arises to pay and administer income tax (by way 
of filing tax returns, notifying the tax authorities of certain events, etc.). It is another ques-
tion that the taxpayer is due to pay (and administer) income tax following the year only in 
which income has been earned by way of filing the annual tax return. Moreover, income tax 
liability arises ‘in abstracto’ when the taxpayer enters into a legal relationship which makes 
it possible for the taxpayer to earn income. The date when taxable income is deemed to be 
derived may, however, be different from the date when the taxpayer enters into such a legal 
relationship. 
For instance, under employee stock offering programmes eligible employees are 
entitled to subscribe to shares, which are normally locked up for a certain time period. They 
are subject to tax liability from the very date they entered the programme, be it enrolling in 
it or subscribing to shares. The date when taxable income is, however, deemed for tax law 
purposes to be earned is at the later date only when an employee is entitled for any reason 
to dispose of the shares subscribed or to otherwise benefit directly or indirectly from the 
shares deposited during the lock-up period. It is a third date when the employee who has 
earned taxable income has to file a tax return and pay tax accordingly.10 
3.10.2.4. Interpretative statutes 
The Hungarian law is quite strict in prohibiting both retroactive and retrospective legisla-
tion. Retrospective legislation can be forgiven in a number of cases, however. An example 
for this is a judgment of the Constitutional Court, approving an exception to the prohibi-
tion of retrospective legislation on the grounds that the new law, introducing an anti-avoid-
ance-principle, was of an interpretative nature.11 The Constitutional Court discussed 
whether the principle that contrived transactions had to be disregarded for tax purposes – 
introduced in line with the adoption of the then effective Act on tax administration, which 
entered into force on 1 January 1991 – could be applied to transactions which were carried 
out before the date of entry into force of this Act. Arguments can be raised in favour of the 
application of this principle to the cases started not only after, but also before the effective 
date to the extent that the law, now embodying this principle, did not create individual 
obligations on the taxpayers involved in current matters. The only thing that has allegedly 
changed is that the same tax law must now be applied with more consistency. Even if the 
problem of retrospective legislation could be raised, the Constitutional Court treated the 
anti-avoidance principle under discussion as a matter of interpretative law and, as such, did 
not consider that it would fall within the ambit of the prohibition of retrospective legisla-
tion. 
The Constitutional Court is right, indeed, in arguing that the introduction of such a 
principle does not place on taxpayers new substantive law obligations. It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether taxpayers will be protected against the change in law with a retroactive effect 
10.	 For	example,	the	underlying	tax	liability	can	occur	on	1	July	2009	when	an	employee	enrols	in	a	programme	and	
subscribes	to	shares	during	a	period	of	subscription,	which	is	to	follow	enrolment,	but	which	may	not	be	longer	
than	a	couple	of	weeks.	Their	shares	will	be	freed	no	earlier	than	on	1	July	2012.	This	is	the	date	when	the	employee	is	
obliged	to	recognize	that	taxable	income	has	been	derived,	even	if	the	employee	decides	to	sell	his	or	her	shares	at	a	
later	date,	let	us	say,	on	1	November	2012.	The	date	of	1	July	is	the	first	day	the	employee	can	dispose	of	the	shares	
subscribed,	irrespective	of	the	fact	if	the	employee	exercised	this	right	or	not.	The	employee	will	then	be	obliged	to	
file	an	income	tax	return	for	the	income	earned	during	the	fiscal	year	of	2012	no	later	than	on	31	May	2013.	Liabilities	
may	still	occur	already	in	2012	to	arrange	for	advance	income	tax.	
11.	 724/B/1994.	AB,	No.	2/IV,	Para.	II.4.	
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in the sense that the introduction of new procedural rules may also lead to laying new obli-
gations on taxpayers. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions on an anti-avoid-
ance principle can really be seen as those of an interpretative nature. 
3.10.2.5. Validation statutes 
There is no ‘validation statute’ in Hungary, which would be designed to overrule a judicial 
decision and validate the existing legal practice by introducing new legal rules with a retro-
active effect, in order to prevent taxpayers from effectuating tax avoidance. No example can 
be given from the Hungarian practice for the problem (or for a similar problem) raised 
before the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in the case of the National & Provincial 
Building Society and others v. the United Kingdom.12 An interpretative statute cannot be con-
sidered in Hungary as identical to a validation statute. 
3.10.2.6. Effective date preceding the date of entry into force 
It is quite normal in Hungary that the effective date of particular provisions would follow 
the date when an Act enters into force. It is categorically prohibited that the effective date of 
provisions would precede the date when the new Act enters into force. It is not prohibited 
that the new law is introduced with an immediate effect (the effective date and the date of 
entry into force are the same in this case). However, it is a matter of discussion (or of the 
discretion of the Constitutional Court, which must decide from case to case) if those who 
are addressed by the new law have enough time to prepare themselves for the application of 
the new law. In that respect, it is not the date of entry into force, but that of the promulga-
tion of the new law that matters, i.e. this is the basis for comparison. 
3.10.2.7. Retrospective legislation (material retroactivity) 
Retrospective legislation is not acceptable in Hungary either in the tax law area, or any-
where else. Exceptions to this rule are rare. Section 226 (2) of the Civil Code (Act IV of 1959, 
as amended) is noteworthy, as it provides for that the contents of the contracts, concluded 
before the date when the new law entered into force, cannot be changed by statutory law, 
but exceptionally. This means retrospective legislation, affecting the transactions started 
earlier. However, the new law is applicable prospectively. This exceptional power of legisla-
tion can be explained by analogy with the principle of the ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’. 
The retrospective nature of legislation can be identified in different cases. These cases 
have in common, however, that they have not yet been fully completed. For instance, the 
assets purchased may have appreciated. As a result, capital gains will be accrued. The new 
tax law will apply to the taxation of capital gains, even if they accrued earlier, in the instance 
that capital gains are deemed to be derived at the time only when the assets are disposed of 
at a gain. One can argue that the date when the new law entered into force was preceded by 
the date when the acquisition of the assets took place. However, one must also take into 
consideration that the new law entered into force before the date when the disposal of the 
same assets would have been effectuated. 
The question can be raised if this case is conceptually different from a loan contract, 
which has not yet expired, and the taxation of interest changes in the meantime. This is a 
12.	 The	UK	legislator	had	to	overrule	with	retroactive	legal	rules	the	judgment	made	in	the	case	of	Woolwich	1	where	
the	taxpayer	liberated	itself	from	the	liability	to	pay	tax	on	interest	in	a	gap	period	due	to	the	fact	that	the	1986	
Regulations	were	void	on	technical	grounds.	Application	No.	117/1996/736/933-935,	judgment	at	Strasbourg	on	
23	October	1997.	
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case arguably different from the first one because the single transaction, subject to tax, has 
not yet been completed at the time when the law changed. In fact, for tax purposes, no dis-
tinction can be made between the two cases, however. Even in the first case, the transactions 
of acquisition and disposal must be linked to each other in order to arrive at the economic 
content, according to which the taxable event can be interpreted. In both cases, the tax 
legislation is retrospective. Tax laws can change in Hungary, although with grandfathering 
(as mentioned). 
3.10.2.8. Statutes having an immediate effect in the areas of substantive and 
procedural tax law 
In the Hungarian practice, a distinction is to be made between substantive and procedural 
law where legal rules are introduced with an immediate effect. Substantive tax law rules are 
usually introduced with grandfathering. Administrative tax law rules with an immediate 
effect can be applied to pending cases (resulting in retrospective legislation), providing, 
however, that changes do not take place to the detriment of the taxpayer, as mentioned. 
Administrative tax law provisions can be found both in the Taxation Order Act and in inde-
pendent laws on particular taxes (laws on individual income tax, corporate tax, VAT, excise 
duties, etc.). The Taxation Order Act contains the basic principles that are guiding for the 
application of tax law in general (prohibition of the abuse of law, legal certainty, non-dis-
crimination, equity, etc.). They can hardly be considered procedural law provisions. In the 
rest of the Taxation Order Act, the legal provisions on tax administration can be found. They 
entail the legal provisions on the exercise by the tax authorities of jurisdiction in tax mat-
ters (rules on gathering tax information, tax assessment, the payment of taxes, etc.) and 
those on the operation of the tax authorities. The provisions belonging to the former group 
can be considered procedural tax provisions, properly speaking. 
In a legal case brought before the Constitutional Court,13 it was discussed that the 
law on duties was amended from 1990 to 1991, resulting in abolishing a number of relief 
opportunities as from 1 January 1991. The Constitutional Court concluded that the infringe-
ment of Section 12 (2) of the Act XI of 1987 on legislation (as amended) on the prohibition 
of retroactive legislation could be identified where the new law was applicable to any cases 
already filed for assessment with the Duties Office, even if the liability to pay duty could 
have been developed before, i.e., at the date when the taxable contract was concluded. Argu-
ably, the taxable transaction could have been completed during the fiscal year of 1990, 
before the time the new law entered into force. This way, the new law created the liability to 
pay duty relating to a transaction made in the past, that is, retroactively. This is an inexcus-
able infringement of the legal certainty principle (Section 3.10.2). 
The Hungarian legislator assumed at that time that the legal rules on the liability to 
pay duties on property transfer and on procedures instituted before the authorities of pub-
lic administration and the courts are of procedural nature as a whole. Not making a distinc-
tion between the substantive and procedural aspects of the liability to pay duties, the legis-
lator neglected the fact that the liability of payment could be developed at the time when 
the contract was concluded, preceding the event when the complete contract was filed for 
assessment with the Duties Office, which then imposed the duty payable by taking a formal 
decision. This confusion could not occur after the judgment of the Constitutional Court. 
A similar problem occurred at the time of Hungary’s EU accession (on 1 May 2004) 
when the EC Assistance Directive and the EC Tax Collection Directives were introduced, and 
were promptly applied, even to the matters not yet finished until the time of accession. 
Although on the same basis of substantive tax law, the Hungarian taxpayers could still 
13.	 7/1992	(30.I.)	AB.	
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encounter a new situation where the liability to pay taxes is enforced on a new procedural 
law basis. Such a situation is in fact more burdensome for taxpayers. It is a question only if 
this change in the taxpayer’s burden can be recognized for legal purposes. Following the 
idea that the protection of the taxpayer rights must not be confined to that of substantive 
law rights, this question must be answered in the affirmative, given that, upon the protec-
tion of the taxpayer rights, procedural rights cannot always be separated from substantive 
law rights. As a consequence, one can argue that the retrospective effect of new procedural 
law rules can be considered in breach of the constitutional principle of the rule of law. 
3.10.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity 
3.10.3.1. Legal basis for retroactivity 
In Hungary, there is no explicit prohibition in the Constitution or in anywhere else in the 
legal system on retrospective or retroactive legislation. From the principle of the rule of law 
as enshrined in Section 2 (1) of the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary, as amended, the Constitutional Court has developed, however, that retrospective 
legislation is not possible, but exceptionally, and with regard to the protection of vested 
rights, and retroactive legislation is prohibited as such (with very small exceptions, and only 
if the new law is in favour of citizens). This restrictive approach can be explained by the 
historical reason that, upon the transition into the new democracy, the political changes, 
even if revolutionary, could take place strictly within the limits of legal continuity. This 
historical background explains the sensibility of the public authorities to retrospective or 
retroactive legislation, which is considered the infringement of not only the rule of law, but 
the social compact, according to which radical political changes took place peacefully, and 
the Republic of Hungary is in full the legal successor of the People’s Republic of Hungary 
existing before 23 October 1989. (This is the main reason, for example, why Hungary in 
1990 did not renegotiate with banks the huge public debt assumed by the old government.) 
3.10.3.2. Transition policy 
The government has not released a transition policy paper in Hungary. However, the Consti-
tutional Court developed a subtle policy on the possibility of retrospective legislation with 
particular regard to the protection of vested rights as well as on retroactivity. The first time, 
the Constitutional Court had to face the problem of retroactivity in the criminal law area in 
1991 when it prevented the parliament from changing the criminal law rules on the statute 
of limitations in respect of politically motivated crimes perpetrated during the revolution 
and civil war of 1956 with a view to prosecuting these crimes. The second time, the Constitu-
tional Court had the opportunity to deal with the problem or retrospective legislation in 
1995 when public benefits and allowances were widely reduced through a reform package 
due to the overall budgetary constraints. The Constitutional Court developed its stance on 
the conditions under which vested rights must be protected. 
As a consequence of the constitutional practice, the tax legislator is also careful. Ret-
roactive tax legislation does not occur (with exceptions to the very few cases where changes 
in law are in favour of taxpayers). The legal rules introduced from year to year in the area of 
tax administration result in retrospective legislation, applicable to pending cases. They 
must not be applied to the detriment of taxpayers, however (as discussed). Retrospective tax 
legislation usually takes place, but in respect of major issues always with grandfathering. As 
a consequence of all the more irregularities as recently experienced in the operation of the 
national government, tax legislation has been very unstable, meaning that tax laws may 
change even within one single fiscal year. 
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3.10.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice 
3.10.4.1. ‘Legislating by press’ 
The instrument of ‘legislation by press release’ does not exist in Hungary. The Constitutional 
Court is very conservative, sticking to the date of promulgation, in respect of which legisla-
tion must not have retroactive effect. It can even happen that the Constitutional Court is not 
satisfied if a new law is promulgated and published in the official gazette. It is also required 
that a copy of the gazette with the new law should be available for those who are addressed 
by the new law, including both the public authorities and citizens. 
3.10.4.2. Pending substantive tax law cases excluded form retroactive legislation 
Pending cases cannot be affected in any way by retroactive legislation. As mentioned, new 
legal rules on tax administration can apply retrospectively, with the proviso, however, that 
the new law may not negatively affect taxpayers. The Constitutional Court has the power to 
repeal a legal rule considered to be unconstitutional retroactively, and may provide that the 
repealed law cannot apply to a pending case. Repeal by judiciary means of legal rules retro-
actively is, of course, a different matter from adopting a new legal rule with a retroactive 
effect. 
3.10.4.3. Grant of retroactive effect to tax statutes that are favourable for taxpayers 
It is not precluded in Hungary that in very exceptional cases the legislator grants retroactive 
effect to tax statutes that are favourable for taxpayers. It can even happen that amnesty 
programmes are introduced, but very rarely. Such amnesty programmes are still strongly 
criticized because they hurt the principles of the ability to pay and of legal certainty, and 
they have not been associated with the programme of combating tax avoidance and tax 
evasion.14 
3.10.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity 
3.10.5.1. Testing by courts of the retroactivity of a tax statute for compatibility with 
the Constitution 
The Hungarian courts are not allowed to test Acts or legal regulations for compatibility with 
the Constitution. As a consequence, the retroactivity of a tax statute cannot be tested either. 
The Supreme Court does not have any jurisdiction over constitutional matters. The courts 
are also bound to the effective legal rules as they are. The only possibility for a court is to 
apply for a legality review with the Constitutional Court where the court seized of a specific 
case, while applying legal rules, finds that the conformity of these rules with the constitu-
tional order is doubtful. The Constitutional Court has the exceptional opportunity to repeal 
the legal rule found to be unconstitutional with a retroactive effect. This rule cannot then be 
applied to the specific case either. 
Hence, constitutional review is within the exclusive competence of the Constitutional 
Court. Normal courts may file an application only concerning the compatibility of the laws 
applicable in a specific case to the Constitutional Court. It is for the latter to decide on com-
patibility. An application to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review can be made 
14.	 D.	Deák,	‘Hungary’s	half-way	tax	amnesty’,	Tax	Notes	International	(February	16,	2009),	Vol.	53,	No.	7,	at	
pp.	603-607.	
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by ordinary courts in terms of a court resolution (a decree). Litigating parties may, of course, 
propose that the court seized in the specific legal case should file the issue to the Constitu-
tional Court. The standard for testing by courts of retroactivity is the principle of legal cer-
tainty.15 
3.10.5.2. Testing by courts of the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of the 
First Protocol ECHR 
The problem of the retroactivity of Hungarian legislation has not yet been brought before 
the ECJ or the ECtHR. In principle, it is not precluded that Hungarian courts refer to Article 1 
of the First Protocol ECHR16 in the context of retroactivity where they approach the Consti-
tutional Court for review. 
3.10.6. Retroactivity of case law 
3.10.6.1. Abandonment by the Supreme Court of the existing case law and formulation 
by the Court of a new general rule 
In Hungary judgments do not have an ‘erga omnes’ effect. While the study of the relevant 
legal cases has been all the more important in the recent two decades, there are no prece-
dents in Hungary. Where differences occur for any reason between judgments made in 
comparable cases, the Supreme Court must pass resolutions on the uniform applicability of 
law. The aim of such resolutions is solely to solve the possible conflicts developed between 
the past judgments. The Supreme Court is not allowed to abandon existing case law and 
formulate a new general rule. 
The Constitutional Court has the power to repeal Acts or legal regulations if they are 
found to be unconstitutional. Normally, the Constitutional Court will repeal them prospec-
tively. If they are repealed with retrospective effect, this fact is always precisely explained by 
the judgment. The Constitutional Court is not authorized to formulate new principles of law 
or adopt transitional measures. It has the power, however, to decide that the legal norms 
repealed with a retroactive effect should not affect certain legal relationships that have been 
completed. Apparently, the Constitutional Court refrains from interfering with the past 
without sufficient reason. 
Legal cases cannot be reopened in Hungarian law as a result of new judgments. It is a 
possibility to get remedy only where it turns out that the legal rules applied in the case 
under discussion have been declared subsequently to be unconstitutional. Due to the prin-
ciple of ‘res iudicata’, final judgments are not subject to review, but within the strict limits of 
a petition of legal review that can be filed with the Supreme Court within 60 days from the 
time the judgment has been final, and in certain cases only. 
Where the Constitutional Court repeals certain legal provisions with a retroactive 
effect and excludes the applicability of these provisions to a case that has been decided by a 
final judgment, the Supreme Court asks the petitioner who challenged the applicability of 
the provisions to the case under discussion to decide whether to apply for novation of litiga-
tion within 30 days (Section 361 of the Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure, as amended). 
Furthermore, final judgments may in principle be changed as a result of the intervention of 
the ECJ that may find that the national law provisions, on the basis of which the case was 
15.	 How	the	Constitutional	Court	interprets	it	is	discussed	in	detail	in	the	paper	at	p.	10	[see	1/1992.	(5.III.)	AB,	
Paras	III.	1,	3,.	4,	5,	IV.	1].
16.	 European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	signed	at	Rome	on	4	November	1950;	Protocol	No.	1,	signed	at	Paris	on	
20	March	1952.	
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decided, are not consistent with Community law (see, e.g., Kühne and Heitz, Lucchini, 
Kempter). 
3.10.7. Views in the literature 
3.10.7.1. Background study on the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s practice on 
retrospective and retroactive legislation with particular regard to tax cases 
a. A history of the restrictive approach to retroactive legislation 
The Constitutional Court already faced the problem of retroactive legislation early in the 
nineties. Legal certainty was one of the crucial issues at the time when at stake was how 
successful the transition from state socialism and a centrally managed economy to a parlia-
mentary democracy and a market economy would be. The Constitutional Court contended 
that even the utmost radical political changes had to take place strictly within the frame-
work of the rule of law. Changes in the legal system were therefore established on the conti-
nuity principle: the democratically elected new parliament and the government responsible 
for this parliament were bound to the old legal rules, which were in effect at the time of 
taking over power. To date, the only possibility to change the effective legal rules has been if 
changes are in accordance with the constitutional order and the due procedures of legisla-
tion. 
There was a landmark decision in 1992 when the Constitutional Court prevented the 
parliament from adopting a law which was designed to change the criminal law rules on the 
statute of limitations in respect of the political crimes perpetrated during the 1956 revolu-
tion that had not been persecuted before 1990 for political reasons (as mentioned).17 The 
idea was that these crimes must not remain unpunished because the new republic must be 
freed from the psychological and moral burden of the crimes left unpunished. It was still 
difficult to digest the lesson that political ideas could not be developed unless they were 
consistent with the effective legal order. In particular, it was important to understand that 
even the – possibly invisible – law had to be respected on how to change laws. 
Obviously, the questions of the statute of limitations and retroactive legislation must 
not be discussed in the same way in criminal and tax law. However, this judgment of the 
Constitutional Court goes beyond the scope of criminal law in its significance. It has laid 
down the foundations, which have been effective to date, of the possible treatment of retro-
active and retrospective legislation in general. One cannot understand except from this 
judgment of the Constitutional Court why the Hungarian standpoint on retroactive legisla-
tion has been much more restrictive than in old democracies. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the term the ‘state of law’ (the rule of law) 
suggests a state of the art and a project simultaneously. The rule of law can be accomplished 
not only because the state organs operate regularly, but also due to the fact that the whole 
society is permeated by the conceptual order of constitution (Section III.1). The point of the 
changes of the political system of 1989 is that the radical political changes are accompanied 
from a legal point of view by continuity. As a consequence, no distinction may be made 
between the two layers of the legal order, depending on whether laws have been adopted 
before or after the political changes (Section III.3). The two layers of the law are of the same 
value, validity and nature, the Constitutional Court contends. 
The legal certainty standard requires that the legal relationships as completed must 
not be affected unless there are exceptional circumstances that produce proof to the con-
trary. Legal facts become independent of the underlying legal norms (Section III.4). The 
state must thus not interfere with the accomplished legal facts, but exceptionally. Justice 
17.	 1/1992	(5.III.)	AB.	
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that can be spelled out in a judgment, being of a partial and subjective nature, should be 
superseded by the legal certainty standard, based on objective criteria and on pure formali-
ties (Section III.5). Legal certainty requires that legal provisions be clear, predictable and 
transparent. It directly follows from these requirements – the Constitutional Court con-
tends – that the application of retroactive legislation or legislation per analogy is prohibited 
(Section IV.1). 
The constitutional liberties represent the very foundations of the state of law 
(Rechtsstaat). It follows therefrom that the public power is not without limitation. State 
interference must take place in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore, 
state interference cannot be considered constitutional unless it is indispensable, necessary 
and proportional with the envisaged aims (Section IV.2). 
This standpoint may also serve as guidance for the prescription of tax liability. It can 
be required from a constitutional point of view that the private law-driven schemes must 
not be affected by tax legislation as long as the abuse of law cannot be ascertained. Even in 
respect of tax legislation private law takes priority over public law. This entails that public 
bodies cannot act unless they are explicitly authorized to do so. There is thus no universal 
authority that would be granted to the public authorities. Where the authorization of the 
state organs is incomplete or obsolete, gaps left by public law must be filled by the princi-
ples and consideration of private law. 
The Constitutional Court holds that, according to the rule of law, it is not guaranteed 
that a time period will not elapseafter which crimes can no longer be prosecuted. It is guar-
anteed, however, that the rules on the statute of limitations are unchanged. Administrative 
measures are not apt for interrupting or suspending the period of the statute of limitations 
(Section V.2-3). By force of the statute of limitations, the natural fact of the running of time 
is converted into legal facts, i.e., into facts with a legal effect (V.4). The state has a limited 
possibility to interfere with this process. 
One can add that, quite similarly, it is difficult to change the conditions for the recov-
ery of tax claims. Where tax amnesty is introduced, the enforceability of taxes is unexpect-
edly and radically reduced, and the tax claim developed in the past can be forgiven due to 
the new law introduced retroactively. This change is made in favour of taxpayers. However, 
it can be criticized because an amnesty project will change the allocation of the public bur-
den, which inadvertently affects the taxpayers who cannot, or will not, benefit from the 
amnesty programme. 
3.10.7.2. Retrospective and retroactive legislation 
In an important case,18 the Constitutional Court introduced a distinction between retro-
spective and retroactive legislation, holding that it was justified to interfere prospectively 
with the conditions of the preferential long-term housing loans granted by the state. These 
loans were determined with low interest rates before the political changes. It could be justi-
fied to adjust these interest rates to reflect the deterioration of the circumstances in the 
public budget. It could also be appreciated that the changes were accompanied with transi-
tional measures, giving a possibility for debtors to opt out. The government made use of 
Section 226 (2) of the Civil Code (as discussed, it provides that the contents of the contracts 
which were concluded before the entry into force of a new law can exceptionally be changed 
by the new law). The Constitutional Court contended that in principle the state could not be 
prevented from unilaterally changing the conditions of contractual relationships, the com-
ponents of which arose both from private and public law (Section IV.4). 
18.	 32/1991	(6.VI.)	AB.	
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Under Section 12 (2) of the Act on Legislation, a legal rule must not determine any obliga-
tion, which had to be fulfilled before the date when the new rule was promulgated. The 
provisions on changing the interest conditions of preferential housing loans cannot be 
interpreted as if they had been introduced with a retroactive effect. The increase in the inter-
est rate ensured the amendment of the conditions of the preferential loans for the future. 
This is true even if the new law induces changes that affect the conditions of the existing 
loan contracts. This amendment is thus not covered by Section 12 (2) of the Act on Legisla-
tion. The new law may still be affected by Section 12 (3) of the same Act. According to it, the 
date of entry into force must be determined in such a way that enough time remain for 
making preparations for the application of the new law. In the specific case, the legislator 
could not be blamed even for the infringement of the provisions of Section 12 (3) because 
the new law was accompanied by the introduction of transitional rules (Section V.1.3). The 
Constitutional Court did not find a link between the changes in the conditions of preferen-
tial public loans and the ability-to-pay principle. There was a dissenting opinion, however, 
according to which the changes made in the conditions of subsidies are inseparably con-
nected to the liability to pay taxes. 
Another early case can also be highlighted.19 It can be seen from the files that the 
transfer of immovable property for no consideration was made on 30 December 1989, the 
case was filed for assessment with the Duties Office on 3 January 1990, the new law on the 
property transfer duty was adopted and promulgated on 28 December 1989, but the official 
gazette with the new law on the liability to pay duty on the gratuitous transfer of property 
was distributed and delivered to subscribers only on 8 January 1990. The new law entered 
into force on 1 January 1990 with effect as from the same date. 
The Constitutional Court concluded (Section II.2) that the legislator infringed both 
Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 of Section 12 of the Act on Legislation because 
– the law, being inconsistent with Section 12 (2), created an obligation in connection with 
a transaction completed before the date when information of the new law was available 
for taxpayers (that is, before 8 January 1990); and 
– the new law did not leave enough time for preparations that would have been necessary 
in compliance with Section 12 (3). 
Interestingly, the new law had already been adopted by the parliament on 28 Decem-
ber 1989, before the date when the transaction was effectuated (on 30 December). Taxpayers 
might have had the opportunity to be informed of the new law as early as 28 December 
1989. However, the Hungarian practice is strict enough to stick to the later date for compar-
ison. Hence, those who are addressed by the new law should be granted the real opportu-
nity to be informed of the new law, which could be ensured if the date of comparison is no 
earlier than at the date when the official gazette was delivered to its subscribers. 
As discussed, the Constitutional Court did not object to the increase of the interest 
rates of the preferential housing loans for 1991. However, the problem of increasing the 
interest rates of the preferential housing loans was the subject of another case as well.20 
This time, the Constitutional Court did not approve that the new law was introduced with 
effect from 1 January 1991, although a copy of it was available for those who were addressed 
by the law on 14 January 1991 only when the official gazette with the new law was delivered 
to subscribers. This way, the new law created obligations with a retroactive effect. Accord-
ingly, the Constitutional Court declared the provisions of the new law unconstitutional for a 
period from 1 January to 13 January 1991, but added that the act of repeal does not affect 
the legal relationships developed before the date when the resolution of the Constitutional 
Court was promulgated (30 April 1991). The Constitutional Court took into consideration 
19.	 34/1991	(15.VI.)	AB.	
20.	 25/1992	(30.IV.)	AB.	
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that the inapplicability of the new law for a short period of two weeks would lead to confu-
sion, and it was not the intention of the Constitutional Court to cause problems for people 
having in legal relationship that have been already completed. In this judgment the Consti-
tutional Court nevertheless reasoned as follows: it is not consistent with the principle of the 
rule of law that someone could be called into account for the infringement of a legal rule of 
which the affected person was not aware, and could not be aware of, because the new rule 
was not promulgated or because it was promulgated subsequently and introduced with a 
retroactive effect. 
In another case,21 there was a problem with a ministerial decree on customs tariffs 
because the new regulation entered into force on 11 February 1991 with effect on the same 
day, and it was promulgated no earlier than on the same day. The Constitutional Court had 
the opportunity to illuminate the meaning of Section 12 (3) of the Act on Legislation (Sec-
tion II), holding that the effective date of the new rules must be determined with regard at 
least to the following: 
– a copy of the official gazette with the new law must be available, and time must be 
allowed for those who are addressed by the new law to study it and get information from 
the authorities if necessary in connection with its application; and 
– the authorities competent to apply the new law must also be given enough time to pre-
pare themselves. 
Exceptionally, it is not precluded that new legal rules will be promulgated on the date 
when they enter into force and become effective where the early publication would endan-
ger the correct application of the new law (one can add that, for example, it may be the 
legislator’s intention to preclude in this way the application of blatant tax planning 
schemes). 
In a further case,22 the Constitutional Court was expected to decide on the confor-
mity with the constitutional order of the abolishment in 1995 of a number of child-care 
benefits. The abrupt introduction of the new law was condemned. The Constitutional Court 
concluded that the change under discussion in the conditions of social security allowances 
could not be challenged even if they concerned existing family relations. However, vested 
rights must be protected. To that end, a sufficient transitional period must be ensured to 
give enough time to those who are addressed by the new law to prepare themselves (Sec-
tion 1). 
Sometimes it can happen that the calculation of the (advance or final) tax liability is 
based on the income earned in the previous year. In one case,23 the Constitutional Court 
made a scrutiny of the newly adopted law on the liability of a particular class of sole traders 
to pay social security contributions, based on the income earned in the previous year. The 
Constitutional Court has explained that this does not mean retroactive legislation if the new 
law provides for the conditions of the liability to pay contribution prospectively. Further-
more, it is matter of technique only whether or not to calculate the liability of payment, 
based on the previous year’s earnings (Section II.1). 
It cannot yet be precluded that the application of such a technique may result in the 
infringement of the taxpayer rights, which must be protected constitutionally. For instance, 
in the case of the National & Provincial Building Society and others, which was brought before 
the ECtHR,24 the applicants raised among other things the objection to the UK law on the 
taxation of interest in a gap period that the prompt taxation of interest, based on the inter-
21.	 28/1992	(30.IV.)	AB.	
22.	 43/1995	(30.VI.)	AB.	
23.	 54/1995	(15.IX.)	AB.	
24.	 Application	No.	117/1996/736/933-935	by	the	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society,	the	Leeds	Permanent	Building	
Society	and	the	Yorkshire	Building	Society	v.	the	United	Kingdom;	judgment	at	Strasbourg	on	23	October1997.	
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est income earned in the previous fiscal year, and its later correction, regularly led to grant-
ing taxpayers a loan involuntarily to the Treasury. In such circumstances, the introduction of 
taxation in a gap period may result in retroactive legislation. Where, however, the technique 
of the calculation of tax liability, which is based on previous year-earnings, is neutral, it 
must be insulated from the problem of retroactive legislation. 
3.10.7.3. Failure to explore the lack of retrospective legislation due to the failure to 
discover the lack of real change in the law 
Conflicts between the principle of the prohibition of retrospective or retroactive legislation 
and the protection of the public interest (or, in particular cases, the respect of the consider-
ations of equity or efficiency) cannot be solved mechanically. Instead, inquiries must be 
made into the facts and circumstances as the case arises. Attention must be given, among 
other things, to the circumstances in which the new legal provisions have been adopted. It 
must be borne in mind that the rights vested not long before the entry into force of the new 
law requires particular protection. 
In a case,25 the Constitutional Court, making a scrutiny of the Act, which extended 
the obligation of obtaining from the police a permit for Flobert rifles retrospectively, did 
not consider the new law unconstitutional in general. The new Act interfered with the exist-
ing conditions of holding personal weapons, but it was introduced prospectively. The Con-
stitutional Court still identified the problem that the new law was not simply applied to 
those who already possessed weapons, but also to those who were in the process of applying 
for a renewed permit. The Constitutional Court concluded that the legislator was not rea-
sonable in extending the new law with a prompt effect even to those who were applying for 
a renewed permit. The new Act could be challenged because it did not secure a transitional 
period in which the persons concerned by the new law could have prepared themselves for 
the application of the new law (Section III.B.2.1). 
Similarly, if companies have enjoyed corporate tax allowance relating to qualifying 
investment projects for a long period of time, they must not be considered to be harmed if 
the allowances will be reduced or withdrawn after a while. However, when taxpayers enter a 
privileged status just before the time the law has been changed, they may expect a kind of 
stability, and that the law should not be changed abruptly. It is another issue if tax holidays 
are granted for a specific period of time. In these cases vested rights certainly enjoy 
increased protection. 
In one case,26 the Constitutional Court repealed retrospective legislation which had 
changed the conditions of tax holidays prospectively, allegedly to the detriment of existing 
taxpayers. The new Act restricted the scope of existing tax holidays, but the effective liability 
to pay tax did not change because of the simultaneous reduction in corporate tax rates. The 
taxpayers argued that they were entitled to a tax allowance, calculable as a certain percent-
age of nominal corporate tax. This percentage was changed to their detriment. The govern-
ment argued in turn that the taxpayers did not suffer any disadvantage because the tax 
liability was the same as a result of the general reduction in the corporate tax liability. As a 
consequence, no retrospective legislation could be ascertained. According to the Constitu-
tional Court, however, the reduction by retrospective legislation in vested rights obtained 
for a specific period of time could not be upheld (Section II.7.1). As a consequence, the Con-
stitutional Court repealed the law under dispute with a retroactive effect to the date of its 
entry into force. 
25.	 9/2007.	(7.III.)	AB.	
26.	 16/1996	(3.V.)	AB.	
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Before 1995, corporate taxpayers could benefit under certain conditions from a 100% allow-
ance of 36% corporate tax. After 1995 (and in 1996), they could benefit under similar condi-
tions from 100% of 18% corporate tax. However, a 23% supplementary tax was levied on 
distribution as well. According to the interpretation of the new law by the Finance Ministry, 
the supplementary tax could be treated as a withholding tax on dividends that could be 
sheltered almost in full by a respective double tax convention. It could not yet be taken for 
granted that the supplementary tax could have been treated as a withholding tax on divi-
dends,27 although this question was not discussed by the Constitutional Court. 
The Constitutional Court preferred a formalistic approach, which can be criticized.28 
Namely, it focused on the basic tax of 18% only, and discussed the change in the corporate 
tax burden without taking into account the interplay between the basic tax and the supple-
mentary tax. In fact, the Constitutional Court failed to make a real assessment of the corpo-
rate tax burden changes from 1994 to 1995 as a whole. Had the Constitutional Court 
grasped the real case, it would have realized that no change took place in corporate tax 
burden in fact. Accordingly, if no change takes place, there is no room for ascertaining ret-
rospective legislation either. There were dissenting opinions. Their point was that the major-
ity opinion was not well-grounded because the Constitutional Court discussed the basic tax 
in isolation from the supplementary tax, misled by the petitioners who, being interested in 
raising the issue of the basic tax only, did not challenge the new legal provisions on the 
supplementary tax. 
3.10.7.4. Repeal of existing laws with retroactive effect 
Under Section 42 (1) of the Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court, as amended, 
where the Constitutional Court repeals legal rules for any reason, those rules will be abol-
ished with an ‘ex nunc’ effect, that is, as from the date when the resolution of the Constitu-
tional Court is promulgated. They cannot thus be applied from that date on [Section 43 (1) 
of the Act on the Constitutional Court]. Under Section 43 (2), nullification by the Constitu-
tional Court of legal rules does not affect either the legal relationships entered into before 
that date, or the rights and obligations arising from these relationships. Exceptionally, 
under Section 43 (4), the Constitutional Court is empowered to repeal a legal rule as from a 
fixed future date, or even with an effect of ‘ex tunc’. The Constitutional Court may also 
decide under the same Section whether the legal provisions repealed (retroactively or pro-
spectively) are applicable or not to a specific legal case referred to by petitioners before the 
Constitutional Court. 
In one case,29 it was proposed that the Constitutional Court be obliged as a rule to 
repeal the legal rules found to be unconstitutional with an ‘ex tunc’ effect. Arguably, once a 
legal rule is considered to be unconstitutional, it is invalid, and must be declared inapplica-
ble with effect both retroactively and prospectively. The Constitutional Court did not agree 
with this proposition, holding that one must distinguish between the act of nullification 
and the fact of being null and void (invalid from the outset). The Constitutional Court, while 
examining the legal rules presented before it, does not take a stand on the question whether 
the legal rule, which is to be repealed, is invalid. It only decides on the non-applicability of 
the legal rule that has been found to be unconstitutional. Since the question of invalidity is 
27.	 C-294/99	Greek	Amstel,	ECR	2001,	p.	I-6797,	Paras	28-29,	C-375/98	Epson,	ECR	2000,	p.	I-4243.	Para.	23,	C-284/06	
Burda,	ECR	2008,	p.	I-4571,	Para.	52.	For	comments,	see:	D.	Deák,	‘Supplementary	corporate	tax	in	Hungary:	Confu-
sion	for	foreign	investors’,	Tax	Notes	International	(December	4,	1995),	Vol.	11,	No.	23,	at	pp.	1480-1483.	
28.	 D.	Deák,	‘Hungary’s	Constitutional	Court	invalidates	new	limits	on	investment	incentives’,	Tax	Notes	International	
(July	8,	1996),	Vol.	13,	No.	2,	at	pp.	88-90.	
29.	 10/1992	(25.II.)	AB,	Para.	II.3.	
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not affected, the Constitutional Court did not commit itself to decide on abolishing a legal 
rule, which is not consistent with the constitutional order with a retroactive effect. It can do 
that, but it is not obliged to do that. 
The act by the Constitutional Court of nullification is of constitutive nature, that is, 
the act under discussion becomes inapplicable as a result of the specific decision of the 
Constitutional Court. Were it possible to ascertain the invalidity of the legal rules under 
discussion, the decision of the Constitutional Court would be of declarative nature only 
(only declaring what the law has been), meaning that the legal rule as challenged before the 
Constitutional Court would have been invalid from the outset irrespective of whether the 
Constitutional Court decided on it or not. 
Similarly, the non-application of national law contrary to Community law does not 
mean that the national law provisions, which cannot be applied in a certain case, would be 
invalid. The ECJ held in Joined Cases C-10/97 to 22/97 IN.CO.GE. ‘9030 that the obligation of 
a national court to disapply national legislation introducing a charge contrary to Commu-
nity law must lead that court, in principle, to uphold claims for repayment of that charge. 
Such repayment must be ensured, however, in accordance with the provisions of its national 
law, on condition that those provisions are not less favourable than those governing similar 
domestic actions and do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise 
of rights conferred by Community law. Any reclassification of the legal relationship estab-
lished between the tax authorities of a Member State and certain companies in that State 
when a domestic charge subsequently found to be contrary to Community law was levied is 
therefore a matter of national law. The national law classification of the relationship 
between the taxpayers and the tax authorities was important in the said case in two 
instances because it depended on the classification of this relationship whether 
– a court competent in fiscal or civil law matters had to take a decision; and 
– the time limits relating to fiscal or civil law matters were applicable. 
In another case,31 the Constitutional Court found that the law, which provided for 
the effective date of 1 July 2001 on the changes in the conditions of the payment of profes-
sional training contribution, but which was promulgated on 5 July only, was unconstitu-
tional due to retroactive legislation. However, the Constitutional Court did not repeal the 
Section of the new law which provided for the effective date ‘ex post facto’, taking into 
account that interference with complete legal relationships would lead to problems in the 
application of the law on professional training contribution (Section III.2). 
The voluntary reduction in competence of the Constitutional Court is developed, seen 
from the point of view of dogmatics, suggesting distinction between the act of nullification 
and the fact of invalidity. Such a standpoint can be supported by considerations of legal 
policy as well. The Constitutional Court emphasizes the importance of the rule of law and 
legal certainty. It therefore carefully considers whether to interfere with the legal relation-
ships that have been completed. Very convincing arguments should exist to justify that the 
legal rules found unconstitutional are abolished with a retroactive effect. 
Another aspect of retroactivity can be revealed in connection with identifying the 
effect of the ECJ judgments. It is the established practice of the ECJ that the rules of Commu-
nity law as interpreted by the ECJ must be applied by the national courts even to legal rela-
tionships entered into before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation. It is 
only exceptionally that the ECJ may set limits on the effect of its judgments. Two criteria 
must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those persons who 
30.	 ECR	1998,	p.	I-6307,	Para.	29;	See	also:	Joined	Cases	C-392/04	and	C-422/04	i-21	Germany,	Arcor	AG,	ECR	2006,	
p.	I-8559,	Para.	72.	
31.	 797/B/2001	AB.	
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are concerned should have acted in good faith and there should be a risk of serious difficul-
ties.32 
In Hungarian law, in addition to the normal legal actions brought before courts, 
citizens may put forward complaints of constitutional nature (Section 48 of the Act on the 
Constitutional Court). Such a complaint can be presented before the Constitutional Court 
and involves the alleged inconsistency with the Constitution of the legal rules applicable in 
a specific legal case. The petitioner may ask that the respective legal rules be declared 
unconstitutional with an effect retroactive to the case under dispute. Where such a claim is 
met by the Constitutional Court, the claim can be enforced before the normal court by 
means of a particular legal remedy as regulated by the Act on Civil Procedure (as discussed 
above). 
National legal provisions can be declared by the ECJ not applicable with a retroactive 
effect to the case under discussion where it turns out subsequently that they are not consis-
tent with Community law. As a result, the resolutions of the national authorities passed 
earlier are to be revoked and replaced by new ones that reflect the change in the legal basis. 
In Kühne & Heitz, it was held that the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 
EC imposes on an administrative body an obligation to review a final administrative deci-
sion, where an application for such review is made to it, in order to take account of the 
interpretation of the relevant provision given in the meantime by the ECJ where 
– under national law, it has the power to reopen that decision; 
– the administrative decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of a 
national court ruling at final instance; 
– that judgment is, in the light of a decision given by the ECJ subsequent to it, based on a 
misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being 
referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third Paragraph of Article 234 
EC; and 
– the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becom-
ing aware of that decision of the Court.33 
3.10.7.5. Relevance of the practice of the ECtHR and the ECJ on retroactive legislation 
to Hungarian law 
An early case discussed before the ECtHR34 offers a clear presentation of the legal basis for 
retroactive legislation, the components of which are as follows: 
– Article 6 ECHR on fair trial cannot be applied directly in respect of retroactive legislation. 
This is because no subjective right can be found that would be associated with legislative 
amendments. A legislative amendment affecting the applicant’s civil rights cannot be 
regarded as a determination of those rights. 
– Similarly, Article 13 ECHR on effective legal remedy does not relate to legislation and 
does not guarantee a remedy by which legislation could be controlled as to its confor-
mity with the Convention. 
– In the light of Article 14 ECHR on non-discrimination, in conjunction with Article 1 of 
the First Protocol on the protection of property, it is not precluded that retroactive legis-
lation is adopted in order to prevent taxpayers from getting involved in manoeuvres of 
32.	 Joined	Cases	C-290/05	Nádasdi	and	C-333/05	Németh,	ECR	2006,	p.	I-10115,	Paras.	62-63.	
33.	 C-453/00,	ECR	2004,	p.	I-837,	Para.	28.	See	also:	Joined	Cases	C-392/04	and	C-422/04	i-21	Germany,	Arcor	AG,	
ECR	2006,	p.	I-8559,	Para.	72;	C-119/05	Lucchini,	ECR	2007,	p.I-6199,	Para.	63;	C-2/06	Kempter,	ECR	2008,	p.	I-411,	
Para.	46.	
34.	 Application	No.	8531/79	by	A.,	B.,	C.	and	D.	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	decision	of	10	March	1981	on	the	admissibility	of	
the	application.	
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tax avoidance. Such a law can be justified to the extent that combating tax avoidance can 
be recognized as a reasonable legislative aim. The retroactivity of legislation is not dis-
proportionate to the aim sought to be realized if it is necessary for fully achieving this 
aim. The provision of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the First Protocol on the right of a state to 
secure the payment of taxes can be applied to a legislative measure, which is designed to 
prevent tax avoidance. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court also confirmed several times that the legislator 
widely enjoys freedom in changing the conditions of the share in public burden, including 
the payment of taxes. Retroactive legislation still cannot be recognized, as discussed above. 
The Hungarian standard developed by the Constitutional Court is thus higher, compared to 
the practice of the ECtHR, which seems to be more lenient in this respect. 
In the case of M.A. and others,35 it was discussed before the ECtHR that the Finnish 
parliament adopted in September 1994 an amendment to the existing income tax law with 
a planned effective date of 1 January 1995. Having been informed of the proposed amend-
ment, a series of Finnish companies accelerated the right of eligible employees to exercise 
the rights, which were secured to them by employee stock option programmes, with a view 
to escaping being subject to the less beneficial taxation expected as a result of the proposed 
legislative changes. Reacting to these manoeuvres, the Finnish parliament adopted the new 
law in December 1994 with a retroactive effect to September 1994, applicable to the taxpay-
ers who took part in employee stock option programmes and whose programmes provided 
after September 1994 for acceleration. The ECtHR approved the procedure of the Finnish 
legislator. In the light of the Hungarian practice the Constitutional Court has developed so 
far, it is most likely that such a piece of retroactive legislation would have been repealed as 
unconstitutional. 
As seen in in De Haan Beveer36, according to settled case law, procedural rules are gen-
erally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, 
whereas substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying to situations existing 
before their entry into force. This means that, as a rule, the ECJ not only does not approve 
retroactive, but even retrospective legislation in the area of substantive law. This is a practice 
that seems to be much more restrictive than that of the ECtHR, and as much restrictive as 
the Hungarian practice. Notably exceptions to the prohibition of retroactive legislation are 
not unprecedented in the ECJ practice.37 
In Stichting ‘Goed Wonen’ II, it was held that when the new law exempts an economic 
transaction in respect of immovable property previously subject to VAT, it may have the 
effect of revoking a VAT adjustment made on account of the exercise, when immovable 
property was used for a transaction regarded at that time as taxable, of a right to deduct VAT 
paid in respect of the supply of that immovable property. The principles of the protection of 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty do not preclude a Member State, on an excep-
tional basis and in order to avoid the large-scale use, during the legislative process, of con-
trived financial arrangements intended to minimize the burden of VAT that an amending 
law is specifically designed to combat, from giving that law retroactive effect when eco-
nomic operators carrying out economic transactions such as those referred to by the law 
were warned of the impending adoption of that law and of the retroactive effect envisaged 
35.	 Application	No.	27793/95	by	M.A.	and	34	others	against	Finland,	decision	at	Strasbourg	on	10	June	2003.	
36.	 C-61/98,	ECR	99,	p.	I-5003,	Para.	13.	
37.	 C-368/89	Crispoltoni,	ECR	1991,	p.	I-3695,	Para.	17,	C-376/02	Stichting	‘Goed	Wonen’	II,	ECR	2005,	p.I-3445,	Para.	32.	
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in a way that enabled them to understand the consequences of the legislative amendment 
planned for the transactions they carry out.38 
It follows from the above analysis that the Hungarian position developed by the Con-
stitutional Court is quite restrictive. As emphasized, retroactive tax legislation is not possi-
ble, unless exceptionally, and exclusively in favour of taxpayers. The Constitutional Court is 
also steady in its practice, not repealing the legal provisions held to be unconstitutional 
with a retroactive effect. Retrospective legislation is approved in the administrative tax law 
area where the new law may apply to pending cases; however, again with the proviso that 
changes in the law may not affect taxpayers badly. In the substantive tax law area, legisla-
tion with immediate effect must be normally accompanied by grandfathering. It is still an 
exception to the strict Hungarian standpoint that the provisions of anti-avoidance princi-
ples are not considered to be apt to create individual rights and obligations. As a conse-
quence, they may (and must) even be legislated retroactively, although they may not violate 
taxpayer rights.
Compared to the ECJ judgment in Stichting ‘Goed Wonen’ II, the Hungarian practice 
seems to be anachronistic in that the Constitutional Court requires that those who are 
addressed by the new law should be provided with a copy of the official gazette with the 
new law. The Constitutional Court does not take into consideration that it may well happen 
before both the ECJ and the ECtHR that taxpayers can be expected to be informed of the 
legislation by press release. The above-mentioned rigid features of the Hungarian practice 
can be explained, as discussed, by the history of the political transition. In a new democracy, 
sensibility is shown at legal forums to changes that would impair legal certainty and stabil-
ity. This is why mistrust of retroactive, and even retrospective, legislation has been wide-
spread to date.39 
Arguments for retroactivity cannot be easily accepted in a Central and East European 
country like Hungary because as the Hungarian law stands at present instability can hardly 
be tolerated. If the high-level instability of the legal system were further enhanced by broad 
retroactive legislation, it would undermine social cohesion. A dynamic theory that argues 
for the acceptability of retroactive legislation depending on a state of instable equilibrium 
is viable, provided that the outcome of a stable equilibrium is as much likely as an unstable 
one. For the lack of such a balance, however, a theory, which is otherwise complex and elas-
tic, does not seem to be operative. One can conclude that retroactive legislation is a kind of 
luxury, which a sophisticated legal system can allow. In a less balanced society, the elbow-
room for policymaking is more restrictive and the legislator’s power is more fragile. The 
considerations of efficiency and the opportunity of market remedies do not seem to be 
sufficient to compensate the threat of disintegration. The tax legislature in Hungary enjoys 
a relatively large amount of freedom, including the possibility of the milder forms of retro-
active (or rather retrospective) legislation. This does not yet mean that even the tax legisla-
tor would not be disciplined by the standards the Constitutional Court has laid out. 
38.	 Para	45.	The	taxpayer	granted	a	usufructuary	right	in	rem	on	28	April	1995,	the	Netherlands	government	announced	
its	intention	to	amend	the	effective	law	already	on	31	March,	the	bill	was	submitted	to	the	parliament	on	23	May	and	
adopted	by	it	on	18	December	with	a	retroactive	effect	to	31	March.	
39.	 A	theory	of	equilibrium	would	be	permissible	for	retroactivity	in	a	state	of	flux.	In	the	context	of	a	stable	equilib-
rium,	the	lawmaker	should	avoid	retroactivity.	See:	Jill	E.	Fisch,	supra	note	7,	at	p.	1106.	Change	is	relatively	easy	in	
an	unstable	equilibrium,	however,	and	relatively	little	force	is	needed	to	effect	change	in	this	respect	(p.	1108).	The	
likelihood	of	legal	change	mitigates	the	potential	fairness	problems,	and	efficiency	will	in	turn	be	appreciated.	
Arguments	for	retroactivity	are	more	compelling	in	such	a	context	(p.	1109).	
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3.11.
Italy
Fabrizio Amatucci
3.11.1. Terminology
3.11.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
a. In general
Usually in Italian legal discourse there is a distinction between the concepts of retrospectiv-
ity and of retroactivity.1 Nevertheless, in the field of taxation the distinction between two 
concepts do not have the same meaning2 and sometimes retrospectivity is considered in 
the same way as retroactivity.3
Generally the tax literature uses different terminology: retroattività propria o vera 
retroattività (true retroactivity)4 similar to material retroactivity or retrospectivity to 
explain a situation concerning cases in which a new statute changes a previous statute with 
negative effects for taxpayers affecting results of past events for the future and to distin-
guish it from formal retroactivity (retroattività impropria or richiamo circostanziato dei fatti). 
In the latter case there is no change in a previous statute but just reference to facts occurring 
in the past (i.e. tax amnesties).
This distinction in case law and tax rules (legislation) is usually unclear. There is often 
no reference to this distinction by tax courts. Furthermore, there is sometimes confusion 
between the two concepts.
b. Conceptual distinction between a statute that applies to a previous year (actual retroactivity) 
and a statute that applies as from the beginning of the current year (de facto retroactivity)
The conceptual distinction between actual and de facto retroactivity5 is employed in Italy 
where it is referred to as ‘retroattività autentica (real retroactivity) when a statute applies 
from the beginning of the current year and non autentica (unreal retroactivity) when a stat-
ute applies to a previous year. In particular, in tax case law while the former is not admitted, 
sometimes the latter is admitted and is considered compatible with prohibition of retro-
activity because there is no violation of the actuality of ability-to-pay principle if the current 
fiscal year is still not concluded when the new statute comes into force, changing tax rules 
from the beginning of the same year (see Constitutional Court decisions nos. 341/2000 and 
16/2002). 
1.	 R.	Quadri,	Disposizioni	sulla	legge	in	generale	in	Commentario	al	codice	civile, (Bologna-Roma:	Scailoja	Branca,	
1974),	at	p.	92.
2.	 F.	Amatucci, L’efficacia	nel	tempo	della	norma	tributaria	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	2005),	at	p.	13.
3.	 V.	Mastroiacovo, I	limiti	alla	retroattività	nel	diritto	tributario	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	2005),	at	p.	310.	The	effect	of	retro-
spectivity	is	not	to	alter	or	modify	a	previous	statute	or	of	a	past	event	for	the	future.
4.	 G.A.	Micheli,	Corso	di	diritto	tributario	(Torino:	Utet,	1989),	at	p.	61,	Amatucci, supra	note	2, at	p.	8.
5.	 V.	Thuronyi,	Comparative	Tax	Law	(The	Hague:	Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	at	pp.	79-80.
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3.11.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes explicitly known’?
The interpretative statute is known in the Italian tax system and it is called ‘legge di interpre-
tazione autentica’.
b. Legal basis for interpretative statutes and special term for this kind of retroactivity 
There is no legal basis in the Constitution for the retroactive effect of an interpretative tax 
statute, but we can find it in Article 11 of preleggi of codice civile and in Article 1 para. 2 and 
Article 3 of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights (L. no. 212/2000) where interpretative law (legge 
di interpretazione autentica) can be recognized even if by way of exception.
The special term used for this kind of retroactivity is: ‘norma effettivamente inter-
pretativa’.
3.11.1.3. Standards used for characterization as ‘interpretative statute’ 
To determine whether a tax statute can be considered to be a ‘legge di interpretazione auten-
tica’ and whether it is really interpretative, the standards are uncertainty and unclearness of 
a prior tax statute or provision (to be interpreted) or a different or contrasting interpreta-
tions by the tax court 6 or by the tax authorities. It is necessary for the interpretative statute 
to impose the correct meaning of an uncertain tax rule without addition and update (ius 
novum). The case of confirmation of the view of tax authorities can be regarded as a problem 
(see section 3.11.1.4). 
3.11.1.4. Validation statutes 
a. Phenomenon of interpretative statutes explicitly known?
The Italian legal system does not recognize the phenomenon of ‘validation statute’. How-
ever, the Italian academic literature sometimes recognizes validation statutes referred to as 
‘convalida legislativa7’ when the legislator introduces a new tax rule by means of an inter-
pretative statute specifically to validate a ‘minority tendency’ in case law or a certain view 
taken by the tax authorities or to overrule a judicial decision.
b. Standards used for characterization as ‘validation statute’ 
The standards used to determine the ‘validation statute’ are the intention to prevent with 
retroactive effect a consolidated case law tendency that is not compatible with tax policy or 
to validate an interpretation made by the tax authorities that is not favourable to the tax-
payers for tax reasons or to validate a legal practice. The validation statute is a type of abuse 
of legislative judicial activity.
c. Difference between a ‘validation statute’ and ‘interpretative statute’ 
A validation statute is generally incompatible with the bona fide principle and the principle 
of legitimate expectations8 and it can be considered an intrusion by the legislator on the 
judicial activity of the tax court. When the interpretative statute has no aim other than the 
6.	 In	some	cases	the	Constitutional	Court	(347/2000	–	525/2000)	has	held	that	interpretative	statute	is	admissible	
even	if	there	are	no	contrasting	interpretations	by	the	tax	court.
7.	 Amatucci,	supra	note	2,	at	p.	113.
8.	 Sometimes	even	interpretative	statutes	are	considered	not	acceptable	because	they	are	in	violation	of	fundamental	
principles	such	as	legitimate	expectation	and	legal	certainty.	See	decision	of	the	Italian	Constitutional	Court	
no.	193/1991,	39/1993,	229/1999,	525/2000.
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clarification of another statute (i.e. if the existing rule is unclear and to avoid different treat-
ment deriving from contrasting judicial decisions), it is considered compatible with the 
prohibition of retroactivity. It is possible to assert that interpretative statutes can be consid-
ered legitimate because they are not in fact fully retroactive. Full or true retroactivity occurs 
when a new statute changes a previous statute with negative effects for taxpayers affecting 
results of past events for the future.
3.11.1.5. Moment of entry into force 
There is sometimes a difference between the date of entry into force of a statute and its 
effective date (it can be a date in the past). The moment of entry into force of a statute is the 
publication in the government’s official journal (Gazzetta Ufficiale) even if it refers to previ-
ous facts.
3.11.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
a. In general
In the Italian tax legal system there is no a definition of retrospectivity or true and material 
retroactivity. This phenomenon, in the different terminology of Italian tax system (vera 
retroattività o retroattività propria) (see section 3.11.1.1), could be defined as the case where 
there is an alteration of previous tax statutes by a new statute affecting results of past events 
or facts for the future with negative effects for taxpayers. Generally retrospectivity of a stat-
ute is not predictable and triggers a change of the fundamental elements of tax obligation 
causing a violation of the actuality (or permanence) of the ability-to-pay principle and of 
legitimate expectations of taxpayers because it represents an obstacle to tax planning and 
economic activity. 
b. Examples of situations that would be regarded as retrospective and not retrospective
There are several examples of situations that are regarded as retrospective or included in the 
material retroactivity sphere (truly retroactive – veramente retroattive). Generally, all situa-
tions where there is an alteration or a modification of the effect of previous rules would be 
considered retrospective. Another situation regarded as retrospective is the case of the 
repeal of multi-year tax allowances already given. There are different situations of retrospec-
tive statutes considered perhaps wrongly as interpretative rather than material retroactivity 
by the Italian Constitutional Court9; for example, Article 11 L. 413/1991 concerning taxa-
tion of capital gains deriving from expropriation and Article 14 L. 537/1993 concerning 
retroactive taxation of illegal earnings.
The lack of clarity of a previous rule legitimating an effectively interpretative statute 
and the tax amnesties are cases that would not be regarded as retrospective.
3.11.1.7. Distinction between substantive statutes and procedural statutes: the impact 
of immediate effect
a. In general 
In the Italian tax system a distinction is made between substantive statutes and procedural 
statutes. For procedural statutes, limitation of the retroactive effect is usually excluded by 
general legal principles and by the principle that rules have immediate effect (and new rules 
are applicable in pending proceedings), while it is recognized for substantive statutes.
9.	 See	Constitutional	Court	decision	no.	315/1994	and	no.	109/2002.
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On the basis of this rule the statutes that will be applied by the tax administration are those 
in force when activity is carried out even if taxable events occurred prior to the date on 
which the statute enters into force.10
The academic literature and case law consider that the immediate effect principle is 
acceptable only if the procedural statutes are more favourable to taxpayers (in melius) giv-
ing them more guarantees without burdening them with further obligations. These proce-
dural statutes should be directly applicable in pending proceedings even though they refer 
to past events.11 Ius superveniens through immediate effect is considered in any case not 
applicable to situations that have been clarified and concluded before the entry into force 
of the statute.12 
b. Rules considered procedural rules
Generally, the procedural rules concern taxpayers’ formal obligations and they should not 
be retroactive if is not expressly established (Article 3 para. II of Statute of taxpayer’s rights 
L. no. 212/2000). However, there are also procedural rules that concern evidence; these are 
referred to as warrantee rules ‘di garanzia’. They introduce new particular instruments for 
tax administration in tax assessment.13 These rules should not be considered (as often hap-
pens) to be procedural rules because they can affect privacy and their right to defence and 
they should therefore not be retroactive.14 These procedural rules in fact give new powers to 
the tax administration to use new documentation as evidence (for instance, assessment on 
bank accounts), giving rise to particular problems if they come in to force before the tax-
payer is notified of the assessment.
3.11.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.11.2.1. Constitutional limitations to tax retroactivity
There is no principle in the Italian Constitution imposing a limitation on the retroactivity of 
tax statutes as there is for example in criminal law (Article 25 of the Italian Constitution). 
However, the Constitutional Court effectively upholds the ability-to-pay principle (Article 
53 of the Italian Constitution) and in particular its ‘actuality’ in some cases as a limitation. 
Recently the prohibition of retroactivity has been based on the principle of legitimate 
expectations (Constitutional Court decisions no. 229/1999 and no. 525/2000) deriving from 
the constitutional principle of equality that is also recognized in EU law.15
10.	 See	decision	of	Italian	Supreme	Court	of	Cassation	(Corte	di	Cassazione)	of	4.11.1999	no.	76	and	of	22.12.2000	
no.	16097.
11.	 F.	Tesauro,	Istituzioni	di	diritto	tributario	(Torino:	Utet,	1999),	at	p.	29,	Amatucci,	supra	note	2,	at	p.	146.	See	case	
law:	decision	Commissione	Tributaria	Centrale	no.	293	of	22.01.2002.
12.	 See	dec.	Cass.	no.	936	of	16.1.2009	and	no.	10982	of	13.5.2009.
13.	 See	R.	Schiavolin, L’utilizzazione	fiscale	delle	risultanze	penali	(Milano,	Giuffrè,	1994),	at	p.	35,	G.	Redi, ‘Segreto	
bancario	ed	efficacia	nel	tempo	delle	norme	procedimentali’,	in:	Rivista	di	diritto	tributario	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	1997),	
section	II,	at	p.	30.	
14.	 M.	Capelletti,	‘La	‘’natura”	delle	norme	sulle	prove’,	in	:	Scritti	dedicati	ad	Alessandro	Raselli	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	1971),	
at	p.	434;	R.	Lupi,	Metodi	induttivi	e	presunzioni	nell’accertamento	tributario	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	1988),	at	p.	315.
15.	 See	ECJ	judgm.	Industria	Salumi	case	C-212/80	–	217/80	of	12.11.1981	and	Goed	Wonen	case	C-376/02	of	26.4.2005
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3.11.2.2. Tax transition policy of government 
There is no transition policy concerning the introduction of tax statutes. The Italian system 
does not have policy guidelines granting retroactive effect to statutes and grandfathering.
Sometimes transitional statutory rules and grandfathering clauses are applied to 
regulate the new effects on past events for a short period when a new statute comes into 
force to substitute or modify a previous statute.
3.11.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
a. Advisory body such as Council of State
Sometimes on rare occasions the Council of State has provided advice in the field of taxa-
tion, but it has never laid down criteria on tax retroactivity. 
3.11.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.11.3.1. Use of legislating by press release 
In Italy the instrument of ‘legislating by press release’16 or communication of bills proposed 
in parliament is not used to provide retroactive effect from the date of press release (as in 
countries like Germany, Ankündigungseffekt). This instrument, however, is known in the 
literature as the announcement effect or ‘effetto annuncio’17 publicizing a provision. 
Although is not recognized in the Italian system, legislating by press release might be useful 
to assess ‘predictability’, which is one of criteria used by the national tax court to justify 
retroactivity.
Elements that can be used by taxpayers to predict the enactment of retroactive stat-
utes include the current economic and social situation and political trends.
3.11.3.2. Pending legal proceedings excluded from the application of retroactive 
statute?
Generally, pending legal proceedings are excluded from the application of new substantive 
statutes. To prevent this phenomenon Article 3 para. II of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights (L. 
no. 212/2000) provides that the deadlines for new tax obligations or legal proceedings 
should be provided not before 60 days from the coming in to force of the new statute.
3.11.3.3. Favourable retroactivity 
Following case law (decision of Supreme Court of Cassation, no. 5931/2001) and the aca-
demic literature18, the retroactivity of tax statutes that are favourable to taxpayers is gener-
ally permitted. The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation19 held in fact that: ‘while it is true 
that the enactment of more favourable statutes than in the past cannot be hindered, it is 
also true that the right to verify the existence of the subjective and objective requisites 
established by new law is preserved’.
16.	 For	an	example,	see	the	disputed	retroactivity	in	the	Stichting	Goed	Wonen	II	case	(ECJ	C-376/02).
17.	 Amatucci,	supra	note	2, at	p.	90.
18.	 See	A.D.	Giannini,	I	concetti	fondamentali	(Torino:	Utet,	1956),	at	p.	51;	G.	Bernoni,	‘Sentenze	della	Cass.	e	Statuto	del	
contribuente’,	in:	Il	fisco	Roma,	Eti,	n.	28/2001,	at	p.	9509,	G.	Marongiu, Lo	Statuto	dei	diritti	del	contribuente	
(Torino,	Giappichelli,	2004),	at	p.	82.
19.	 Judgment	Supreme	Court	of	Cassation,	Sez.	I,	no.	6752	of	20.7.1994.	
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3.11.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.11.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
In the Italian legal system, the Constitutional Court usually tests the compatibility of retro-
active tax statutes with the Constitution and with general legal principles. Sometimes other 
courts (Court of Cassation) can test the compatibility with constitutional principles or the 
Statute of taxpayer’s rights (L. no. 212/2000). 
In general, the Constitutional Court can declare a retroactive tax statute compatible 
with the ability-to-pay principle (Article 53 of Italian Constitution), with Article 3 of the 
Italian Constitution (equality principle) and with Article 41 of the Italian Constitution con-
cerning the freedom-of-economic-activity principle or with related principles of legal cer-
tainty or legitimate expectations. Other courts examine whether the prohibition of tax 
retroactivity provided for by Article 3 of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights is respected. In some 
cases justifications are accepted for granting retroactivity such as in an extraordinary eco-
nomic situation (joining a single European currency) (decision of Constitutional Court 
no. 16/2002)20 or in the fight against evasion and avoidance (decision of Constitutional 
Court no. 143/1982). In this latter case, it is considered necessary to respect the proportion-
ality principle in the light of the other fundamental constitutional rights.
Among the justifications which can make retroactivitity compatible with the 
above-mentioned principles, the pursuit of the protection of a higher collective interest is 
generally accepted, as is the case with the curbing of tax evasion and the abuse of tax law. 
However, the field is sometimes extended to include ‘Treasury requirements’ based on 
extraordinary fiscal needs.
3.11.4.2. Examination method when courts rule retroactivity incompatible
The Constitutional Court, in its evaluation of legitimacy of retroactivity, has in several cases 
tested the retroactivity of tax statutes against the Italian Constitution and the general prin-
ciples. In some cases (decision of the Constitutional Court no. 229/1999, no. 341/2000 
no. 525/2000), a new (and enlarged) approach is followed and an evaluation method is used 
based on the principle of legitimate expectations and not on Article 53 of the Italian Consti-
tution (ability-to-pay principle). On the basis of this principle the retroactivity of tax stat-
utes must be justified by reasonabless and must not be in conflict with values and constitu-
tional interests. 
An interesting approach was adopted in another case of the Supreme Court of Cassa-
tion (decision no. 7080 of 14.4.2004 of Supreme Court of Cassation). It was affirmed that if a 
tax benefit on alcoholic drinks is withdrawn with retroactive effect for the period between 
the production and the sale of the product, there is a conflict with the principle of legiti-
mate expectations.
The ECJ adopted a similar approach in the Schlossstrasse case (case C-396/98 of 
8.6.2000) which concerned the right of taxpayers to VAT deduction that is acquired in a case 
in which a legislative amendment post-dated the supply of those goods or services but 
pre-dated the commencement of such operations. 
20.	 In	Decision	16/2002	(id.)	the	Constitutional	Court,	in	dealing	with	the	claim	of	unconstitutionality	under	Article	77	
concerning	Treasury	requirements,	upheld	the	necessity	and	urgency	of	the	situation,	given	the	extraordinary	
economic	circumstances	at	the	time	of	the	financial	measures	of	1996.	The	verifying	of	the	justification	for	a	retro-
active	law	in	the	light	of	the	principle	of	proportionality	has	fundamental	importance	as	does	the	assessment	of	the	
constitutional	values	involved	in	retroactive	legislation.
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3.11.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
Italian courts do not test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of the First Proto-
col ECHR. 
3.11.4.4. Examination method for testing retroactivity of subordinate legislation 
against legal certainty 
The approach adopted for testing against the principle of legal certainty is similar to the 
other situations concerning testing the retroactivity of a tax statute. Particular attention was 
given to whether Article 3 of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights (L. 212/2000) concerning subor-
dinate legislation had been respected.
The Supreme Court of Cassation held (decision no. 7080/2004) that the prohibition of 
tax retroactivity under Article 3 of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights, even though it is not 
constitutional principle, is a helpful interpretative criterion (decision no. 41/l 2008, no. 
180/2007, no. 428/2006). Even if the legislator is not bound by prohibition of retroactivity, 
Article 3 of the Statute of taxpayer’s rights (because in hierarchy not higher than law), this 
rule can be useful in the court’s interpretation. 
3.11.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
Italian courts do not use interpretations that avoid what might be retroactive application, 
because such application might raise further questions about the legitimacy and validity of 
a retroactive rule.
3.11.4.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
The Italian courts normally recognize limits on the use of retroactivity (see section 3.11.4.2).
3.11.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.11.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial changes by courts
If a tax court abandons existing case law and formulates a new (general) rule, the Supreme 
Court does not provide any kind of transitional rule to limit the retroactive effect of its 
judgment. A limit could be represented by the principle of legitimate expectations.
3.11.6. Views in the literature
3.11.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
The opinion in the tax literature is generally against unfavourable retroactivity or retrospec-
tivity (Marongiu, Lupi, Della Valle, Amatucci).21 The distinction between interpretative 
statutes and retrospective statutes is recognized (Fantozzi, Russo). Moreover, the academic 
literature is not unanimous on the legitimacy of (de facto) retroactivity (retroattovità non 
autentica). Some authors are in favour (Cipollina,Della Valle) and some are against it (Ama-
tucci, Marongiu). The identification of limits to the prohibition of retroactivity through the 
application of legitimate expectations and ability-to-pay principles based on justifications 
21.	 For	a	different	position	see:	V.	Mastroaicovo,	I	limiti	alla	retroattività	nel	diritto	tributaria	(Milano:	Giuffrè,	2005),	at	
p.	108.
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is an interesting academic issue. The retroactive effect to tax statutes is considered justified 
in the presence of predictability (see section 3.11.3.1) and in the case of the achievement of 
economic and social objectives like the fight of tax evasion22 when there is no conflict with 
constitutional principles.23
3.11.6.2. Debates on law and economics view on transitional tax law 
In Italy there has been no significant debate in the tax literature comparable in any way to 
what has been taking place in the USA. 
The problem which confronts Italian theory is how to verify whether an economic 
justification exists in terms of efficiency of retroactivity and its being prohibited and 
whether the argument can be accepted on the basis of which retroactivity and the changing 
of rules can make it possible to adapt to economic and social developments. The answer 
which is given is that the phenomenon of retroactivity cannot be evaluated in terms of 
economic efficiency24. The certainty of law which protects taxpayers overrides economic 
requirements which can be met through the imposition of new taxes and laws which are 
not unfavourable and do not have retroactive influence on effects already determined by 
preceding laws. 
22.	 See	G.	Marongiu,	La	retroattività	della	legge	tributaria,	in	Corriere	tributario,	2002,	at	p.	471
23.	 M.	Bertora,	Legittimità	delle	norme	retroattive	in	Rivista	di	diritto	finanziario,	1969,	at	p.	156.	
24.	 E.	Allorio,	Note	e	pareri	sull’irretroattività	delle	norme	tributarie,	in	Diritto	dell’economia,	1957,	at	p.	1212,	held	that	
there	can	be	no	economic	plan	when	there	is	uncertainty	in	the	legal	system.	
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3.12.
Luxembourg1
Alain Steichen
3.12.1. Terminology
3.12.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
a. Conceptual variations
The courts only refer to (formal) retroactivity. Retrospectivity is a term used by scholars only.
b. Clear distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
We would draw the same distinction as the one indicated above (in the questionnaire; edi-
tors). 
3.12.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
Yes, since the triggering event for any income tax liability is the calendar year end. Hence, 
any tax law changes enacted during the year are technically not retroactive, even if de facto 
they are. We would use the term ‘economic retroactivity’ for those situations.
3.12.1.3. Interpretative statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
The Constitution expressly provides for the possibility for parliament to interpret a law it 
has passed. This interpretative law would not be retroactive since it would only state the 
constant intent of parliament. Such laws are very uncommon in practice.
b. Legal basis for ‘interpretative statutes’ 
Yes: Constitution Article 48 ‘L’interprétation des lois par voie d’autorité ne peut avoir lieu 
que par la loi’.
c. Special term for ‘interpretative statutes’
No.
d. Standards used for qualification as ‘interpretative statutes’
N/A since to date no such laws have been adopted in tax matters.
1.	 Editors’	note:	the	replies	in	this	report	have	been	provided	to	the	original	questionnaire.	Due	to	circumstances	
beyond	his	control,	the	author	was	not	able	to	finalize	the	draft	of	his	national	report	and	to	use	the	headings	
proposed	by	the	editors.	The	headings	used	in	this	report	are	thus	added	by	the	editors.
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3.12.1.4. Validation statutes
In Luxembourg laws may be changed in order to address unfavourable case law. If so, to 
date, the changes never have any retroactive effect. 
3.12.1.5. Comparison moment
The relevant date for determining whether a law is retroactive or not is the date of publica-
tion of the law versus the date of the taxable event (31.12. for income taxes).
3.12.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
The means a tax law change which in the future adversely impacts past transactions. An 
example of retrospectivity which has been accepted by the courts as being not a breach of 
retroactivity is the change of depreciation rates for existing real estate. The impact of the 
change would unfold in future years although the taxpayer might not have bought the asset 
in the past had he/she known about the changes to come. Another example is the lowering 
of the threshold percentage ownership from 25% to 10% enabling private taxpayers to sell 
tax-free shares in companies. In order to avoid retrospectivity, parliament deferred the entry 
into force of that provision for existing shareholdings to five years from the date of publica-
tion of the law. 
3.12.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
This distinction also exists in Luxembourg, changes to procedural rules applying also to 
pending court cases and to dealings with the tax authorities (unless stated otherwise). 
The distinction is not as straightforward as one might think. Some procedural rules 
are so closely linked to the substantive rules that they follow their treatment. An example 
would be a change of the rules on time-barrenness (when does the tax liability cease to 
exist?).
3.12.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.12.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
The principle of non-retroactive is not written in the Constitution. Since 1805 it is laid down 
in the Civil Code and has been understood by courts over time as reflecting a general princi-
ple of law also applicable in tax matters. Because the principle has only legislative value, any 
law may be retroactive if parliament so decides. 
3.12.2.2. Transition policy of government
a. Is there a tax transitional policy of government?
There are no publicly available guidelines, but in practice laws are not retroactive as a result 
of implicit policies.
b. Transition policy and favourable retroactive effect
Tax laws frequently have retroactive effect if favourable to taxpayers. This often is the case 
because the legislative process takes more time than anticipated, and parliament wants to 
have the new rules apply as from the date where the good news had been announced to the 
taxpayers by way of the government filing of the draft bill.
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3.12.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
a. Advisory body such as Council of State
Yes, we have a Conseil d’Etat.
b. Rules to review retroactivity
The Conseil d’Etat would raise the question of retroactivity if a bill is intended to be retro-
active. Ultimately, though, parliament could disregard the objection.
3.12.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.12.3.1. Legislating by press release
a. In general
Press releases are used, though not for setting the date of entry into force of the law. Press 
releases are purely used for information purposes without any legal consequences attached 
to them.
b. Use of ‘legislating by press release’
In non-tax law occasionally used. In tax law to date only where the law is favourable to the 
taxpayer.
3.12.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
N/A in fact.
3.12.3.3. Pending legal proceedings – influence of retroactive tax statutes
N/A.
3.12.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.12.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
The issue is not one of non-conformity to the Constitution.
3.12.4.2. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
N/A, absent any retroactive tax laws. Otherwise, the ECHR could be a relevant set of rules 
since the ECHR supersedes contrary domestic laws as a result of the monist approach 
adopted in Luxembourg.
3.12.4.3. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
In the few cases where retroactivity in non-tax matters has been decided upon by parlia-
ment, the courts would not have any authority to test the scope of the retroactivity against 
any constitutional principles, since the non-retroactivity is only a general principle with 
legal status which hence may be set aside by any law (though never by a governmental 
decree which has a lower status).
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3.12.5. Retroactivity of case law
No court would ever hold in its decision that its judgment would have an effect going 
beyond the case it had to rule on. Whether or not its decision has a broader scope will be for 
the tax authorities, scholars and taxpayers to decide. Because of this, the courts would not 
provide for any transitional or grandfathering periods either.
3.12.6. Views in the literature
3.12.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
Scholars in general are critical of any retroactivity, since it contravenes legal certainty. In the 
case of abuse of law rules where the taxpayer was aware of forthcoming changes (through a 
press release, for example), the retroactivity nevertheless is accepted. 
3.12.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transition law
The view of economists in this debate is not really being taken into consideration in Luxem-
bourg. Generally speaking, retroactive laws are justified in Luxembourg by a relatively sim-
ple reasoning, which is not too different from the net welfare gain terminology used by 
some economists:
– a reasonable assumption to make as regards any change of laws is that the new law only 
is adopted because it is considered to be an improvement over the existing law
– in that case, the new law should be applied to as great an extent as possible; in tax law 
matters, this means to any cases where a tax assessment has not yet been made.
– if parliament at the end of the day does not give any retroactive effect to the new law, 
despite the two comments above, it is only because of principles such as the principle of 
legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of certainty, the 
principle of the rule of law, the principle of justice which taken collectively are felt on 
balance to be more important than the efficiency aspects of retroactivity.
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3.13.
Netherlands
Hans Gribnau and Melvin Pauwels
3.13.1. Terminology
3.13.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
Until the PhD dissertation of the Dutch legal scholar Hijmans van den Bergh1 in 1928, in 
the Netherlands discourse the concept of ‘retroactivity’ was linked with the doctrine of 
‘acquired rights’ or ‘vested rights’. Basically, the opinion was that a statute could be charac-
terized as retroactive if acquired rights were infringed. Hijmans van den Bergh stated, how-
ever, that a distinction should be made between retroactive effect, exclusive effect (nowa-
days usually called immediate effect) and grandfathering. The advantage of this approach is 
that the characterization of the temporal effect of a statute is not confused with the 
appraisal of the temporal effect. The approach taken by Hijmans van den Bergh has gener-
ally been accepted in the Netherlands legal discourse, although some minor adjustments 
have been made over the course of time.
Recently, the various concepts in transitional tax law have been analysed and summa-
rized in two PhD dissertations.2 The conclusions of both scholars are grosso modo the same. 
They argue that, on the one hand, there are transitional rules that determine the temporal 
effect of the statute concerned: retroactive effect, immediate effect and delayed effect, and 
that, on the other hand, transitional rules may make it possible for certain existing situa-
tions to be grandfathered. Furthermore, they argue that the issue of transitional law with 
respect to a statute should be distinguished from the date of entry into force of that statute. 
The moment of entry of force marks the moment as from which the statute becomes valid 
and thus can be applied. However, to which events and to which periods the statute may 
then – after the entry of force – be applied depends on the transitional rules (and obviously 
the ratione materiae of the statute concerned).
Most of the time the temporal effect of a statute (ratione temporis) can be derived from 
the transitional rule in that statute, namely by means of comparing the ‘effective entrance 
date’ that the statute mentions, with the ‘date of entry into force’ of the statute (which latter 
date should be – as required by Article 81 of the Constitution3 – on or after the date of 
publication of the statute in the official gazette). So, if the effective entrance date is set prior 
to the date of entry into force, the statute has retroactive effect; if the effective date is the 
same as the date of entry into force, the statute has immediate effect; and if the effective 
date is set on a date after the date of entry of force, the statute has delayed effect. The retro-
1.	 L.J.	Hijmans	van	den	Bergh,	Opeenvolgen	van	rechtsregels	(PhD	dissertation	Utrecht,	1928).
2.	 M.R.T.	Pauwels,	Terugwerkende	kracht	van	belastingwetgeving:	gewikt	en	gewogen	(Retroactivity	of	tax	legislation:	
weighing	and	balancing)	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Uitgevers,	2009)	and	M.	Schuver-Bravenboer,	Fiscaal	Overgangsbeleid	
(Deventer:	Kluwer,	2009).
3.	 See	with	respect	to	this	provision	also	section	3.13.2.1.
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
322
active effect just mentioned is called ‘formal retroactivity’ (formeel terugwerkende kracht), to 
be distinguished from ‘material retroactivity’ (see below).
Please note that the above also implies that – unlike in some other countries – one 
speaks also of (formal) retroactive effect in case a statute enters into force at a certain 
moment in a tax year and is applicable as from the beginning of that year. So, unlike for 
example Germany, the Netherlands prevailing opinion does not use a tax period-related 
concept of retroactivity, but uses a taxable event-related concept of retroactivity.
As stated above, besides the transitional rules that determine the temporal effect, 
there are transitional rules that may make it possible that certain existing situations are 
grandfathered. Existing situations may partly be grandfathered, but also temporarily; these 
two ‘options’ may be chosen for one and the same existing situation. The question whether 
or not to grandfather not only arises when the statute has immediate effect but also when 
the statute has retroactive effect or has delayed effect.
If a new statute has immediate effect and existing situations are not grandfathered, 
the literature refers to the effect of the statute on those existing situations as ‘material retro-
activity’ (materieel terugwerkende kracht). See with respect to this term also section 3.13.1.6 
below. 
Note that in Dutch legal language only one term (namely terugwerkende kracht), 
instead of two, is used but that an adjective (formeel (formal) and materieel (material)) is 
added to that term to make a distinction that corresponds to the two kinds of retroactivity 
for which in English two terms are used (‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’).
It can be concluded that in the Netherlands a distinction is made that corresponds to 
the distinction between retroactive and retrospective to which the questionnaire refers. The 
Netherlands makes a distinction between formal retroactivity and material retroactivity.
3.13.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
As discussed in section 3.13.1.1, the Netherlands prevailing opinion does not use a tax peri-
od-related concept of retroactivity, but uses a taxable event-related concept of retroactivity.
3.13.1.3. Interpretative statutes
The conceptual variations that are mentioned in questions (2)-(4), i.e. interpretative statutes 
and validation statutes, are not commonly known in Dutch legal discourse. 
It is true that the Netherlands legislator sometimes introduces a tax statute with 
retroactive effect and states that the statute only provides an interpretation (i.e., only clari-
fies the meaning) of another statute, but in the Netherlands legal system this phenomenon 
is not given a label, i.e. ‘interpretative statute’. 
3.13.1.4. Validation statutes
As stated above, the concept of ‘validation statute’ is not commonly known in Dutch legal 
discourse. 
Thus, although it sometimes happens that the Netherlands tax legislator introduces a 
statute with retroactive effect to confirm a legislative practice or to ‘overrule’ a judicial deci-
sion that deviates from legislative practice (or only from the view of the Netherlands tax 
authorities), the phenomenon ‘validation statute’ is not recognized as such.
3.13.1.5. Comparison moment
As can be derived from section 3.13.1.1, the prevailing opinion in the Netherlands com-
monly uses the date of entry into force as the ‘comparison moment’.
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3.13.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
The concept of retrospectivity that is used in the questionnaire has a corresponding concept 
in Dutch tax discourse. This concept is the above-mentioned concept of ‘material retroactiv-
ity’ (materieel terugwerkende kracht). The concept of ‘material retroactivity’ is, however, not 
well-defined in Netherlands legal (tax) discourse. Nonetheless, with respect to some events, 
the Netherlands prevailing opinion would agree to use the term ‘materially retroactive’. For 
example, suppose an income tax statute enters into force on 1 January 2010, and provides 
that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that date without grandfathering accrued 
but unrealized gains. As a result, gains that accrued prior to 1 January 2010 and that are 
realized after that date would not be tax exempt, although they accrued in a period when 
the exemption applied. Because of this result, such a statute would be called ‘materially 
retroactive’.
3.13.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
The distinction between substantive statutes and procedural statutes mentioned in ques-
tion 7 is also made in Netherlands legal practice. Hence, a new procedural statute having 
immediate effect is directly applicable, also to legal proceedings regarding taxable years 
before the moment of entry into force. For example, the Netherlands legislator made an 
amendment to the existing rules regarding additional assessments in 1994, which amend-
ment held that imposing an additional assessment would be possible in the case of ‘bad 
faith’ of the taxpayer. This change was applicable to all additional assessments imposed 
after the entry into force, thus also to those regarding years prior to 1994.4 
The consequences of the immediate effect of the introduction (or change) of rules 
regarding evidence or the burden of proof, as a matter principle depend on whether such a 
rule is incorporated in a procedural rule or in a substantive rule. If such a rule is incorpo-
rated in a substantive rule (e.g., ‘cost of maintenance of real estate is only deductible when 
there are documents that can prove the maintenance’) while before the legislative change 
the proof did not necessarily have to be provided by documents, the immediate effect of the 
change would generally imply that the change is only applicable to costs made after the 
moment of entry of force – which usually is the beginning of the next tax year. If, however, a 
rule of evidence or the burden of proof is incorporated in a procedural rule (e.g., the rule 
that in case a taxpayer has filed a tax return that is substantially incorrect, the taxpayer 
bears the burden of proof that the assessment imposed by the tax authorities is not correct), 
the immediate effect of the change would be that the change is applicable to all assessments 
imposed after the entry of force of the rule, thus also to assessments regarding previous tax 
years.
3.13.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.13.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes5
The Constitution contains a provision that prohibits retroactivity of criminal statutes (Arti-
cle 16: ‘No fact is regarded as criminal than by force of a preceding criminal statute’; italics 
4.	 Compare	Supreme	Court	12	May	1999,	No.	34	347,	BNB	1999/258,	and	Supreme	Court	11	June	1997,	No.	32	299,	
BNB	1997/384.
5.	 See	in	detail	M.R.T.	Pauwels,	‘Retroactivity	of	Tax	Legislation;	Constitutional,	Judicial	and	Self-regulatory	Limitations	
in	Netherlands	Law’,	in:	Billur	Yalti	(ed.),	Retroactivity	in	Tax	Law,	Koc	University	Istanbul	Tax	Conference	Series	1,	
(Istanbul:	Koc	University	Publications,	2011).
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supplied). The Constitution does contain the principle of legality with regard to taxes,6 but 
that provision does not explicitly impose limitations on the retroactivity of tax statutes. 
Furthermore, the Constitution does not contain a provision in which the principle of legal 
certainty (or the principle of ability to pay) is laid down either.
One might think at first sight that a ban on retroactivity is implicitly laid down in 
Article 88 of the Constitution. That article provides that a statute does not enter into force 
before the statute is published (in the official gazette). However, as mentioned above (sec-
tion 3.13.1.1/ 3.13.1.2/ 3.13.1.5) it is important to make a distinction between the (moment 
of) entry of force of a statute and its temporal field of application. The moment of entry of 
force marks the moment from which the statute becomes valid and thus can be applied. 
That application, as from that moment, might also include the periods or events prior to the 
moment of entry of force.7 Thus, where the legislator grants retroactive effect to a statute, 
it does not violate Article 88 of the Constitution.
There is an old act (the General Provisions Act (Wet Algemene Bepalingen)) of which 
Article 4 provides: ‘A statute only binds for the future and has no retroactive effect.’ How-
ever, according to case law of the Supreme Court this provision is not addressed to the legis-
lator but only to the court – which may not grant retroactive effect to a statute unless the 
legislator has provided so.8
Notwithstanding the above, in Dutch legal discourse it is generally accepted that the 
principle of legal certainty and of legitimate expectations are general legal principles.9 
These principles are ‘unwritten’ constitutional norms. These principles normatively restrict10 
the legislator in its possibilities to grant retroactive effect. The latter is not altered by the fact 
that (see section 3.13.4.1 below) there is a constitutional prohibition for the courts to test 
acts of parliament for compatibility with general legal principles (unless such a principle is 
incorporated in a binding international treaty).
3.13.2.2. Transition policy of government
As mentioned in the explanation to this question, the Netherlands State Secretary of 
Finance has published – and discussed with parliament – a memorandum on transition 
policy.11 The State Secretary plays a leading role in the enacting of tax legislation, so it is his 
task to establish a general policy.12 This memorandum sets out the main lines of his ‘transi-
tional policy’ with respect to the introduction of tax statutes. The memorandum is not 
legally binding, but it is influential in the parliamentary debate, for example, in the event 
6.	 Article	104	of	the	Constitution:	‘State	taxes	are	imposed	by	force	of	a	statute.’
7.	 Depending	on	whether	or	not	the	legislator	provided	retroactive	effect	to	the	statute.
8.	 E.g.,	Supreme	Court	No.	16	452,	13	January	1971,	BNB	1971/44.
9.	 Compare	e.g.	Supreme	Court	No.	26	974,	7	October	1992,	BNB	1993/4.
10.	 ‘Restrict’;	hence,	not	an	absolute	prohibition.
11.	 In	the	Netherlands	the	enactment	of	a	statute	(act	of	parliament)	is	not	solely	a	task	of	parliament,	but	it	is	a	task	of	
parliament	and	government	together	(Article	81	of	the	Netherlands	Constitution).	The	government	is	constituted	
by	the	King	and	the	Ministers	(Article	42	of	the	Constitution).	In	cases	in	which	the	Minister	regards	it	as	appropri-
ate,	the	State	Secretary	can	replace	the	Minister	(Article	46	of	the	Constitution).	Statutes	are	signed	by	the	King	and	
one	or	more	Ministers	or	State	Secretaries	(Article	47	of	the	Constitution).
12.	 The	State	Secretary	of	Finance	introduces	most	of	the	tax	bills.	He	is	also	head	of	the	tax	administration,	and	as	such	
is	politically	responsible	for	its	functioning.	Unlike	some	other	countries,	he	is	not	part	of	the	civil	service.	See	on	
the	key	role	of	the	State	Secretary	of	Finance	in	Netherlands	tax	law,	Hans	Gribnau,	‘Separation	of	Powers	in	Taxa-
tion:	The	Quest	for	Balance	in	the	Netherlands’,	in:	Ana	Paula	Dourado	(ed.),	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law,	EATLP	
International	Tax	Series	vol.	7	(Amsterdam:	International	Bureau	of	Fiscal	Documentation,	2010)	and	Richard	Happé	
and	Melvin	Pauwels,	‘Balancing	of	Powers	in	Dutch	Tax	Law:	General	Overview	and	Recent	Developments’,	in:	Chris	
Evans,	Judith	Freedman	and	Richard	Krever	(eds.),	The	Delicate	Balance.	Tax,	Discretion	and	the	Rule	of	Law	
(Amsterdam:	International	Bureau	of	Fiscal	Documentation,	2011),	at	pp.	223-254.
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that a bill includes retroactive effect. The State Secretary and parliament discuss the tempo-
ral effects of the bill in terms of this memorandum. Furthermore, lower courts and advo-
cates-general to the Supreme Court sometimes refer to the memorandum when testing 
transitional rules of a statute for compatibility with Article 1 First Protocol ECHR. Also, in 
the tax literature the memorandum is used to discuss the fairness of the transitional rules 
included in a bill.
The status of the memorandum is not entirely clear. When discussing the memoran-
dum with parliament, the Netherlands State Secretary of Finance ended the discussion by 
stating that the advice of the Council of State with respect to retroactivity13 would be the 
guideline in the future. In practice, however, the lines of the memorandum still seemed to 
be used by the State Secretary when drawing up tax bills.14 In December 2009, upon request 
of member of the Senate, the State Secretary however again confirmed that he agrees with 
the view of the Council of State. Time will tell whether the State Secretary indeed follows the 
criteria laid down in the view of the Council of State. 
The memorandum sets out as the starting points of tax transitional policy that in 
principle no retroactive effect will be granted to statutes and that statutes in principle will 
have immediate effect (without grandfathering). The memorandum consists of two parts. 
The first deals with (formal) retroactivity. The second part deals with immediate effect and 
grandfathering (thus, also with issue of material retroactivity (retrospectivity)).
The memorandum is especially focussed on changes in legislation that are disadvan-
tageous for taxpayers. It pays no attention to the topic of granting retroactive effect to tax 
statutes that are favourable to taxpayers.
In the first part of the memorandum it is stated that the question whether or not 
retroactivity is justified is a matter of balancing of interests: on the one hand, legal certainty 
of the individual taxpayers concerned and, on the other hand, the interest of the society as a 
whole that are served by granting retroactive effect to the statute concerned. Whether or not 
retroactivity in a concrete case is justified cannot be answered in general but depends on 
the circumstances of the case. However, two elements can be distinguished. The first ele-
ment is called the ‘substantive element’: whether or not a justification exists for granting 
retroactive effect. The second element is called the ‘timing element’, which element refers to 
the period of retroactivity.
With respect to the ‘substantive element’ the memorandum mentions several rele-
vant circumstances and factors that could justify retroactivity and/or that should be taken 
into account. In brief, these are:
– The new statute targets abuse or improper use of tax rules;
– There is an obvious omission in the existing legislation;
– Announcement effects would occur after publication of the bill if no retroactive effect is 
granted;
– The government’s budgetary interest;
– Practical aspects regarding the implementation and execution of the tax legislation by 
the tax authorities.
With respect to the ‘timing element’ the memorandum states that the retroactive 
effect should in principle not reach further back in time than the moment at which the 
taxpayers have been informed about the intention to introduce a new statute. This latter 
moment is, e.g., the moment at which a bill is submitted to parliament or the moment at 
which a press release is issued in which the intention of introducing a new statute with 
retroactive effect is announced. However, retroactivity could also be justified in case the 
amendment concerned is ‘otherwise’ foreseeable, e.g. in the case of an obvious omission. 
13.	 See	section	3.13.2.3	for	this	view.
14.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	2,	section	A.3.3.
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Furthermore, if there are very weighty arguments, the retroactive effect could even reach 
further back in time than the moment on which the regulation concerned was foreseeable 
for taxpayers. According to the memorandum, such arguments could be very big budgetary 
interests of the government or avoiding a small group of taxpayers from getting an unin-
tended and unjustified advantage.
The second part of the memorandum points out that the question whether a statute 
should have immediate effect (without grandfathering) or should provide for grandfather-
ing, is (also) a case of the balancing of interests. These interests are the legitimate expecta-
tions of the taxpayers and the interest that is served by the statute concerned. In comparison 
with the first part (regarding retroactivity), the second part gives less guidance with respect 
to the circumstances and factors that should be taken into account when balancing the 
interests concerned.15 It is a pity in particular that little attention is given to the question 
when expectations raised by the existing law can be considered ‘legitimate’. Furthermore, it 
would have been helpful if the memorandum had provided examples of situations in which 
grandfathering is considered appropriate. Most of the examples provided refer to situations 
in which grandfathering is not regarded as appropriate (according to the memorandum), 
which is obviously less informative as it is in line with the transition’s starting point of 
immediate effect without grandfathering.
3.13.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
The Netherlands Council of State (Raad van State) advises the Netherlands government and 
parliament on legislation and governance and is the country’s highest administrative 
court.16 Like the House of Representatives and the Senate, which together form the States 
General (parliament), the Netherlands Court of Audit and the National Ombudsman, the 
Council of State is one of the High Councils of State. These are bodies regulated by the Con-
stitution, each with its own specific task, which it carries out independently of the govern-
ment. The Council of State provides government and parliament with independent advice 
on legislative proposals, i.e. bills submitted to parliament by the government.17 In one of its 
advices with respect to a concrete legislative proposal, the Council of State has formulated 
its general criteria for examining tax transitional law.
With respect to (formal) retroactivity the Council of State says that only in the event 
of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is it allowed to grant retroactive effect to statutes that are 
disadvantageous18 to taxpayers. Such exceptional circumstances could be present in the 
case of considerable announcement effects or in the case of large-scale tax abuse or improper 
use of tax rules. Please note that these requirements are stricter than those mentioned in the 
State Secretary’s memorandum: only two circumstances are mentioned and those two are 
more restrictive (see the adjectives in italics). Also with respect to the period of retroactivity 
(the ‘timing element’ in the memorandum) the Council of State is stricter than the State 
Secretary. According to the Council, retroactivity is in any case not allowed if the regulations 
concerned were not sufficiently known to taxpayers at the point in time to which the retro-
active effect reaches back.
15.	 The	memorandum	mentions	factors	that	are	relatively	abstract,	such	as	the	nature	of	the	new	regulations,	the	
nature	of	the	old	regulations,	the	degree	of	reality	of	the	expectations,	the	extent	of	the	breach	with	the	old	law	by	
the	new	regulations,	whether	the	change	of	the	statutes	was	foreseeable,	and	whether	positions	taken	up	under,	
and	relying	on,	the	old	law	can	be	changed.
16.	 The	basis	for	its	responsibilities	can	be	found	in	Articles	73-75	of	the	Netherlands	Constitution.
17.	 After	a	bill	–	together	with	the	accompanying	Explanatory	Memorandum	–	is	discussed	in	the	Council	of	Ministers,	it	
goes	–	together	with	the	authorization	of	the	King	–	to	the	Council	of	State	for	advice;	see	Article	73	of	the	Nether-
lands	Constitution	and	Article	15	of	the	Council	of	State	Act	(Wet	op	de	Raad	van	State).
18.	 The	advice	of	the	Council	of	State	does	not	deal	with	the	retroactivity	of	favourable	tax	statutes.
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With respect to the question of grandfathering or not, the remarks of the Council of State 
with respect to ‘material retroactivity’ (retrospectivity) are relevant. These remarks were 
made in an advice regarding a legislative proposal that provided that the new statute would 
also be applicable to existing agreements. The Council of State remarked that in case a stat-
ute has ‘material retroactive effect’ a balancing of interests is necessary: on the one hand, 
the interest of grandfathering existing agreements and, on the other hand, the financial 
interest of the government. The Council notes that a relevant circumstance to be taken into 
account is whether the taxpayers could rely on the fact that the transactions concerned were 
in line with aim and purpose of the law, and apart from that were not considered undesir-
able.
As far as we are aware, the Council of State has not indicated any general criteria for 
assessing favourable retroactivity.
3.13.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.13.3.1. Legislating by press release
The Netherlands legislator occasionally makes use of the instrument of ‘legislating by press 
release’. Please note that this instrument is in fact mentioned in the above-mentioned (see 
section 3.13.2.2) memorandum of the State Secretary where the ‘timing element’ is elabo-
rated on. It is, however, certainly not the case that the instrument is used very often.
There are grosso modo three types of situations in which the instrument is used. The 
first is that the new statute is aimed at (existing or expected) abuse or improper use of tax 
rules. Without an announcement that retroactive effect will be granted to the moment of 
the announcement of the legislative proposal, it is feared that an announcement effect 
would take place, i.e. that taxpayers would just quickly make use of the loophole between 
the moment of announcement and the introduction of the new statute. An example of such 
a situation in which the instrument of ‘legislation by press release’ is used, can be found in 
the Stichting Goed Wonen II case of the ECJ (C-376/02). Advocate-General Tizzano was very 
critical with respect to the instrument19 and concluded that the retroactivity concerned was 
contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The ECJ, however, did not condemn the use of the 
instrument in general terms, but ruled – amongst other things – that the Netherlands court 
should assess whether the press releases concerned were sufficiently clear to enable taxpay-
ers to understand the consequences of the legislative proposal regarding the transactions. 
Eventually, the Netherlands court ruled that this was the case.20
The second type of situation is that an existing favourable tax policy rule (for exam-
ple, a fiscal subsidy) is changed or withdrawn. In order to avoid announcement effects and 
negative consequences for the government’s budget the Netherlands legislator sometimes 
considers it necessary to grant retroactive effect to the change (or, as the case may be, the 
withdrawal) till the moment of the public announcement of the change and its retroactive 
effect. An example is the withdrawal of the personal-computer facility (which facility made 
it possible for an employer to grant a (wage and income) tax-free allowance to an employee 
19.	 Paragraph	38	reads:	‘It	is	true	that	(…)	the	practice	in	some	Member	States	is	to	give	forewarning	of	legislative	
measures	by	means	of	press	releases	intended	to	apprise	those	affected	by	the	legislation	in	due	time.	It	appears	to	
me,	all	other	considerations	aside,	that	such	a	practice	cannot	be	extended	to	the	context	of	a	common	market	
encompassing	all	European	economic	operators,	in	which	the	practice	normally	followed	is	inspired	by	the	princi-
ple	that	the	behaviour	of	citizens	is	guided	and	regulated	by	laws	rather	than	by	press	releases.	Indeed,	as	the	
Commission	has	rightly	pointed	out,	the	existence	of	a	particular	practice	in	a	must	not	lead	to	a	situation	through-
out	the	Community	in	which	citizens	in	general	and	taxpayers	in	particular	are	called	on	to	rely	more	on	announce-
ments	in	the	press	than	on	the	law	in	force.’
20.	 Supreme	Court	No.	34	514,	14	December	2007,	BNB	2008/37.
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for the acquisition of a computer). This facility was withdrawn with retroactive effect to the 
moment at which the press release announcing the intention of withdrawal with retroactive 
effect was issued. The Netherlands Supreme Court ruled that this retroactive effect did not 
violate Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR.21
The third type of situation concerns the situation in which the Supreme Court has 
given a judgment that is considered undesirable by the government. The legislator may 
then amend the statute involved. Sometimes, the legislator then grants retroactive effect to 
the amendment, often with the purpose of avoiding announcement effects. An example 
concerns the legislative amendment of the Personal Income Tax Act further to a judgment of 
the Supreme Court with respect to the exit tax on pensions when a person emigrates. The 
Supreme Court held, in short, that the exit tax was a ‘treaty override’ under the old tax treaty 
with Belgium. The legislator reacted to this judgment by amending some technicalities of 
the exit tax, with retroactive effect to the date of the press release announcing the amend-
ment. Please note with respect to this third type of situation that the legislator sometimes 
even grants retroactive effect that goes further back in time than the first announcement; 
see section 3.13.3.2.
3.13.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
It only very incidentally happens that retroactivity goes further back than the moment at 
which the change and its retroactive effect was announced. There are, however, three types 
of situations in which this sometimes happens.
The first type is a rather specific one. The situation arose after to the major and funda-
mental amendment of the personal income tax system in 2001, namely the replacement of 
the Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) 1964 by the PITA 2001. After the introduction of the PITA 
2001, it appeared that this act contained several, mostly technical, errors and omissions. 
Therefore, the State Secretary submitted bills to repair the errors and omissions with retro-
active effect reaching back to the moment of entry into force of the PITA 2001, i.e., further 
back in time than the moment at which the repair was announced. In its advice the Council 
of State agreed to the retroactive effect because it thought that errors and omissions are 
reasonably unavoidable in the case of such a major tax revision. However, according to the 
Council of State, the repair amendments that are granted retroactive effect should be minor 
amendments and should be reasonably expected by the taxpayers. Eventually, parliament 
also agreed with the retroactive effect of several of the proposed amendments. 
A second type of situation is when legislation contains obvious omissions and errors. 
Repairing with retroactive effect till the moment the omission or error arose not only hap-
pens in the case of incorrect cross-references etc., but sometimes also in the case of substan-
tial errors, e.g. if an amendment has the unintended result that a certain item of income is 
no longer taxable.
A third type of situation is that new legislation is introduced further to a judgment of 
the Supreme Court. In case the legislator considers the judgment undesirable, e.g. because 
the judgment exposes a loophole in the existing legislation and/or because of the drastic 
negative consequences of the (erga omnes effect of the) judgment for the government’s 
budget, the legislator sometimes grants retroactive effect to the legislation that ‘over-
rules’22 the judgment. However, parliament is sometimes critical when the State Secretary 
21.	 Supreme	Court	No.	07/10481	and	07/13624,	2	October	2009,	BNB	2011/47.
22.	 Please	note	that	it	is	not	a	genuine	overruling,	because	it	is	usually	provided	that	the	new	legislation	does	not	affect	
the	case	in	the	judgment	of	the	Supreme	Court.	It	is	an	‘overruling’	in	the	sense	that	the	interpretation	of	a	statute	
(or	the	rule	provided)	by	the	Supreme	Court	is	overruled	by	the	legislator.
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submits a bill to overrule a judgment of the Supreme Court. The result may be that the State 
Secretary withdraws the bill or amends the bill limiting the retroactivity.
3.13.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
Because most of the cases of retroactivity of legislation concern the above-mentioned (see 
section 3.13.3.1) phenomenon of ‘legislating by press release’ (and therefore the period of 
retroactivity is limited to the moment of announcement of the amendment concerned), the 
retroactive effect normally does not have the effect that pending legal proceedings are influ-
enced.
Especially, in cases in which the period of retroactivity reaches further back in time 
than the moment of announcement (see in this respect section 3.13.3.2), it could in theory 
happen that the new statute (with retroactive effect) has an influence on pending legal 
proceedings before the courts.23 There are, however, no clear examples of this in the case 
law of the Supreme Court. 
There is one example of a situation in which the tax authorities took a position in a 
lower court proceeding that was contrary to existing case law of the Supreme Court but in 
line with a bill (which included an amendment with retroactive effect) that still had to be 
submitted to parliament. The court ruled at a time when the bill had still not been submit-
ted (let alone enacted by parliament) and held in favour of the taxpayer. In addition, the 
court condemned the tax authorities to pay the taxpayer’s full legal costs because of ‘abuse 
of the legal proceedings’.24 In this situation, however, the statute was not in force yet and as 
such could not influence the outcome of the legal proceedings.
If an amendment is introduced with a far-reaching retroactive effect to ‘overrule’ a 
decision of the Supreme Court (see section 3.13.3.2), the legislator usually provides that the 
new statute is not applicable to the case of the taxpayer who pursued the proceedings that 
led to the decision concerned of the Supreme Court. This may be done in the bill but it is 
also possible that the State Secretary of Finance explicitly confirms this during the parlia-
mentary proceedings.25
3.13.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
The Netherlands legislator sometimes grants retroactive effect to tax statutes that are 
favourable to taxpayers. It is difficult to say in which types of situations this happens, 
because most of the time there is little debate in parliament if favourable retroactivity is 
proposed by the State Secretary of Finance in a bill. Furthermore, the above-mentioned 
general memorandum of the State Secretary of Finance gives no attention to this topic. 
Moreover, in the Netherlands tax literature there is little debate and little research with 
respect to this issue of favourable retroactivity.26
Nonetheless, it seems that if favourable retroactivity is granted, it occurs most of the 
time in situations in which the field of application ratione materiae of a provision has a dif-
ferent scope than expected and intended. E.g., in the case of a favourable provision (such as 
a tax exemption or a tax subsidy): a certain type of situation does not fall in the field of 
23.	 Note	that	the	above	statements	hold	for	(retroactivity	of)	substantive	statutes.	Obviously,	new	procedural	statutes	
are	as	a	matter	of	principle	also	applicable	to	pending	legal	proceedings,	as	this	is	the	general	transitional	rule	with	
respect	to	procedural	statutes	(see	section	3.13.1.7).
24.	 Court	of	Appeals	of	s-Hertogenbosch	No.	00/2803,	16	July	2003,	V-N	2003/36.5.
25.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	2,	at	pp.	315-317.
26.	 The	main	exception	in	the	recent	literature	is	the	article	by	M.	Bravenboer	and	A.O.	Lubbers,	‘Tijd	voor	uitbreiding	
van	de	Notitie	terugwerkende	kracht	en	eerbiedigende	werking’,	Weekblad	voor	fiscaal	recht	(2005),	at	
pp.	964	970.
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application ratione materiae of that statute, while it was expected or intended that it would 
(‘under-inclusiveness’). E.g., in the case of an ‘unfavourable’ provision (such as a provision 
that imposes a tax liability or that denies a tax deduction): a certain type of situation does 
fall within the field of application ratione materiae of that statute, while it was neither 
expected nor intended that it would (‘over-inclusiveness’). The key factor is whether or not 
the field of application ratione materiae of the provision goes against the expectations and/
or intentions with respect that field. For example, when the former Article 12 of the Nether-
lands CITA (which was a kind of anti-abuse rule) was withdrawn there was a lot of discus-
sion as to whether the withdrawal should have retroactive effect, amongst other things 
because the provision had been highly criticized from the start. At the end, parliament 
decided that retroactive effect was not appropriate, amongst other things, because the 
arguments pro withdrawal with retroactive effect were not new arguments, but were argu-
ments that had already been considered when introducing the provision.27 In other words, 
it was not the case that the field of application was different from that originally expected 
and intended. Another example: when the Supreme Court unexpectedly ruled that cable 
networks should be regarded as immovable property (and not as movable property as was 
the assumption in practice) and therefore real estate tax was due when transferring cable 
networks, the legislator amended the Real Estate Tax Act, introducing an exemption for 
transfer of cable networks. This amendment entered into force on 1 January 2006 and was 
granted retroactive effect till 6 June 2003, being the date of the decision of the Supreme 
Court.
Finally, please note that granting retroactive effect is not the only instrument that the 
government has in case it considers a certain (non-)application of a provision that is disadvan-
tageous for taxpayers to be undesirable. The same result can de facto be reached in case the tax 
authorities issue an ‘approving’ tax policy rule. In such a policy rule it is then stated that the tax 
authorities will apply the provision concerned in an advantageous way in the situations for 
which the (non-)application of the provision concerned is considered undesirable.
3.13.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.13.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles28
In Netherlands law, the courts are not allowed to test acts of parliament for compatibility 
with the Constitution, because of a constitutional prohibition to do so (Article 120 of the 
Constitution). Because of this constitutional prohibition the Netherlands Supreme Court 
held that it is allowed neither to test acts of parliament for compatibility with general legal 
principles that are not laid down in the Constitution. 
There are exceptions with respect to the latter. The courts are permitted to test an act 
of parliament for compatibility with a general legal principle in case the principle con-
cerned is incorporated in a provision of an international treaty that has direct effect. Hence, 
courts may examine acts of parliament for compatibility with the principle of equality as 
incorporated in Article 14 ECHR and in Article 1 of the Twelfth Protocol ECHR29 (while they 
27.	 See	e.g.,	the	arguments	of	the	Member	of	the	Upper	Chamber	(and	tax	law	professor	at	the	University	of	Tilburg)	
Essers	in	Handelingen	I	(Parliamentary	Proceedings	of	the	Upper	Chamber),	29	November	2005,	No.	357,	p.	8,	
regarding	bill	No.	29686.
28.	 See	also	Pauwels,	supra	note	5.
29.	 See	for	an	overview	of	the	Netherlands	case	law	in	that	respect,	e.g.,	J.L.M.	Gribnau	and	R.H.	Happé,	‘Equality	and	Tax	
Law:	a	Matter	of	Principle’,	in:	L’année	fiscale:	Revue	annuelle	(Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	2005),	at	
pp.	127-143,	and	C.A.T.	Peters,	Dutch	Branch	Report,	in:	L.	Hinnekens	&	P.	Hinnekens	(eds.),	Non-discrimination	at	
the	Crossroads	of	International	Taxation,	Cahiers	de	droit	fiscal	international,	93a	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Fiscale	&	
Financiële	Uitgevers,	2008),	at	pp.	407-426.
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cannot test for compatibility with the principle of equality laid down in the Netherlands 
Constitution). With respect to the issue of retroactivity and retrospectivity Article 1 of the 
First Protocol ECHR is particularly important; see section 3.13.4.3.
A second exception is that if an act of parliament falls within the scope of European 
Union law, the retroactivity of such an act can be tested against the general principles of 
European Union law,30 e.g., the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty. 
Therefore, retroactivity as well as retrospectivity of national VAT legislation may be tested 
against these general principles of EU law. An important example for the Netherlands legis-
lative practice is the Stichting Goed Wonen II case (C-376/02), in which the phenomenon of 
‘legislating by press release’ was at discussion (see section 3.13.3.1).
In contrast to acts of parliament, the courts are allowed to examine subordinate legis-
lation (i.e. not acts of parliament; thus, e.g., local legislation) for compatibility with legal 
principles, even if these principles are ‘unwritten’. Therefore, the courts do examine the 
retroactivity of subordinate legislation for compatibility with the principle of legal cer-
tainty.
3.13.4.2. Examination method
Not applicable. There is no testing against the Constitution in the Netherlands; see sec-
tion 3.13.4.1.
3.13.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
As mentioned, the Netherlands courts are not allowed to test retroactivity of an act of par-
liament for compatibility with the ‘unwritten’ principle of legal certainty (unless EU law is 
applicable, in which case the act can be tested against the European law principles of legal 
certainty and protection of legitimate expectations). Therefore, taxpayers can only request 
courts to test the (formal and/or material) retroactivity concerned for compatibility with 
Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR. In addition, since taxpayers (or at least their advisers) 
have become more familiar with the possibility to make an appeal to Article 1 of the First 
Protocol ECHR in court, there is a growing number of cases in which the courts have to rule 
on the compatibility of retroactivity with that provision. 
However, until now the Netherlands Supreme Court has never held (formal and/or 
material) retroactivity of an act of parliament to be contrary to Article 1 of the First Protocol 
ECHR.31 When testing retroactivity the Supreme Court often bases its analysis on the 
grounds of the ECHR in the M.A. case.32 The reasons that the Netherlands Supreme Court 
had never found retroactivity in concrete case incompatible with Article 1 of the First Proto-
col ECHR are that, on the one hand, the ECtHR has ruled that ‘a Contracting State, not least 
when framing and implementing policies in the area of taxation, enjoys a wide margin of 
appreciation’ and that the legislator’s assessment is accepted unless it ‘is devoid of reason-
30.	 The	answer	to	the	question	when	exactly	an	Act	can	be	tested	for	compatibility	against	a	general	principle	of	Com-
munity	law	appears	to	not	yet	be	very	clear.	See	for	a	view	S.	Douma,	‘The	Principle	of	Legal	Certainty:	Enforcing	
International	Norms	uUnder	Community	Law’,	in:	S.	Douma	and	F.	Engelen	(eds.),	The	Legal	Status	of	OECD	Com-
mentaries	(Amsterdam:	IBFD,	2008),	at	pp.	217-249.
31.	 See	Pauwels,	supra	note	2,	section	D	with	an	overview	of	the	case	law.	Please	note	that	there	is	one	decision	of	a	
lower	court	–	the	Court	of	Appeals	of	The	Hague	July	21,	No.	04/03463,	V-N	2007/2.10	–	in	which	retroactivity	of	a	
statute	was	declared	incompatible	with	Article	1	of	the	First	Protocol	ECHR.	This	decision	has	been	discussed	by	
Hans	Pijl,	‘Netherlands	Tax	Law	Meets	Human	Rights	Law’,	European	Taxation	2006,	at	pp.	453-456.	The	tax	authori-
ties	decided	not	to	appeal	this	decision	before	the	Netherlands	Supreme	Court,	although	they	did	not	agree	with	the	
grounds	of	the	decision.
32.	 ECtHR	No.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,	(decision),	M.A.	and	34	Others	against	Finland.
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able foundation’,33 and, on the other hand, the Netherlands legislator has, according to the 
Supreme Court, not exceeded that margin in the cases in which the Supreme Court had to 
decide.
Note that the ECtHR is stricter towards retroactivity in the situation the retroactivity 
has a decisive influence on pending legal proceedings. For such a situation the ECtHR has 
ruled that ‘the principle of the rule of law and the notion of fair trial (…) preclude any inter-
ference by the legislature – other than on compelling grounds of the general interest – with 
the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute.’ 
This rule originates from case law with respect to the application of Article 6 ECHR (which 
provision is not applicable to pure tax cases34).35 However, this rule is now also applied in 
the sphere of Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR, to tax cases as well.36 In this respect it is 
important that mere budgetary reasons are not accepted as ‘compelling grounds of the 
general interest’.37
3.13.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The Netherlands courts can test retroactivity of subordinate legislation (i.e. legislation not 
from the national parliament, but e.g. local legislation) against the principle of legal cer-
tainty.
The Supreme Court refers to ‘the legal principle based on the requirements of legal 
certainty that legislative measures should only apply for the future.’ The Supreme Court has 
ruled that deviation from this principle in disadvantage for taxpayers is only justified in 
case of ‘special circumstances.’38 It is, however, not yet entirely clear which circumstances 
could qualify as special circumstances. It is clear though that ‘foreseeable’ could qualify as 
such a special circumstance. So, in case the taxation, for which the retroactive rule provides, 
was foreseeable for taxpayers, the retroactivity could be justified.39 Please note that the 
Supreme Court has never ruled in a concrete case that the formal retroactivity at stake was 
incompatible with the principle of legal certainty; in most cases the taxation was considered 
foreseeable for the taxpayer involved.
The courts are not only permitted to test formal retroactivity but also material retro-
activity (i.e. the case of not providing for a grandfathering provision) for compatibility with 
the principle of legal certainty. The Supreme Court has noted that ‘for the principle of legal 
certainty (…) also respecting legitimate expectations is important.’40 However, the courts 
seem to be reluctant to accept the existence of legitimate expectations; a change of the tax 
rate is, for example, not considered to violate the principle of legal certainty.41 There is only 
one case in which the Supreme Court ruled that legitimate expectations were violated by 
33.	 ECtHR	No.	27793/95,	10	June	2003,	(decision),	M.A.	and	34	Others	against	Finland.	See	also	ECtHR,	No.	21319/93,	
23	October	1997	21449/93	and	21675/93,	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.,	paragraph	80.
34.	 ECtHR	July	12,	2001,	No.	44759/98	(Grand	Chamber),	Ferrazzini	against	Italy.
35.	 E.g.	ECtHR	October	23,	1997,	No.	21319/93,	21449/93	and	21675/93,	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	c.s.	and	
ECtHR	Nos.	24846/94	and	34165/96	to	34173/96	(Grand	Chamber),	28	October	1999,	Zielinski	and	Pradal	and	
Gonzalez	and	Others	v.	France.
36.	 ECtHR	No.	30345/05,	23	July	2009,	Joubert	against	France.
37.	 ECtHR	No.	30345/05,	23	July	2009,	Joubert	against	France.
38.	 E.g.,	Supreme	Court	No.	22	456,	24October	1984,	BNB	1985/59,	and	Supreme	Court	No.	43	936,	24	April	2009,	
BNB	2009/158.
39.	 E.g.	Supreme	Court	No.	22	456,	24	October	1984,	BNB	1985/59,	and	Supreme	Court	No.	43	936,	24	April	2009,	
BNB	2009/158.
40.	 Supreme	Court	No.	26	974,	7	October	1992,	BNB	1993/4.
41.	 E.g.	Supreme	Court	No.	31	920,	7	May	1997,	BNB	1997/211.
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the immediate effect (without grandfathering) of an amendment.42 That case concerned a 
municipal tax that was to be paid for the granting of a licence by the local authorities. The 
tax regulations provided for an exemption for certain licences. This exemption was with-
drawn at a certain moment, without, however, providing for grandfathering licences for 
which the application was already filed, not even for the licences for which the application 
was filed prior to the moment that the intention to withdraw the exemption was 
announced by the local legislator. The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption still applied 
to the latter licences, because of the principle of honouring legitimate expectations.
3.13.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
There are no clear indications that the courts use interpretations that avoid what might be 
retroactive applications. The determination of the courts whether a statute has retroactive 
effect and whether the retroactive effect of a statute also applies to the case at hand does not 
seem to be handled differently from cases in which the field of application ratione materiae 
of a statute has to be determined. Similar to these cases, the common interpretation meth-
ods are used by the courts when there are questions of transitional law. Thus, it may happen 
that according to the wording of the provision and its transitional provision a certain case 
would fall under the retroactive effect of the provision, but that the court nonetheless 
decides otherwise because parliamentary history shows that the retroactive effect is meant 
for a different type of situation than one at hand.43 Conversely, even if a statute does not 
explicitly provide for its retroactivity, it is possible that the court reaches the conclusion, e.g. 
on the basis of the purpose of the statute and/or the history of its enactment, that that stat-
ute has retroactive effect.44 Notwithstanding the previous remark(s), as the starting point is 
that statutes do normally not have retroactive effect, the courts do not easily assume that a 
statute has retroactive effect in case there is no indication in the statute itself that this is the 
case.
3.13.4.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
As can be inferred from the answers to the previous questions, the Netherlands courts set 
only few limits on the use of retroactivity of acts of parliament. The main reason is that, as 
mentioned above (see section 3.13.4.1), the courts have few possibilities to test retroactivity 
of acts of parliament because of constitutional constraints. In principle, they can only test it 
for compatibility with Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR (unless EU law is applicable, in 
which case the retroactivity can also be tested for compatibility with the EU principle of 
legal certainty), which possibility does not, however, provide serious latitude for the courts, 
because of the ECHR’s doctrine of ‘wide margin of appreciation’.
Subordinate legislators seem to be disciplined with respect to the use of retroactivity. 
As shown above, the Supreme Court has never found the (formal) retroactive effect of a 
subordinate statute incompatible with the principle of legal certainty (see section 3.13.4.4). 
The reason may well be that the draftsmen of subordinate tax legislation (e.g. the local 
authorities such as the municipality) are relatively self-disciplined.
42.	 Supreme	Court	No.	26	974	7	October	1992,	BNB	1993/4.
43.	 Supreme	Court	No.	39	617,	3	February	2006,	BNB	2007/70.
44.	 Supreme	Court	No.	19	017,	7	March	1979,	BNB	1979/125.
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3.13.5. Retroactivity of case law
First of all, it should be noted that, perhaps unlike the courts of some other countries, the 
Netherlands Supreme Court more or less explicitly makes clear whether a certain consider-
ation in its judgment has an erga omnes effect, i.e. is a general rule.45
If the Netherlands Supreme Court deviates from a rule that it laid down in an earlier 
judgment, it nowadays tends to do that explicitly. Furthermore, most of the times the Court 
explains why it deviates from existing case law. In case the new rule is unfavourable to tax-
payers (compared to the old rule), the Court sometimes provides for a transitional rule. This 
latter seems even to be standard practice in the field of case law on the concept of ‘sound 
business practice’ (goed koopmansgebruik) to determine the annual profit of an enterprise. 
For example, when the Supreme Court rules that a certain type of earnings should be taken 
into account as taxable income at an earlier time than it would have been according to 
previous case law46, the Court often provides for this in a transitional rule.47 Such a transi-
tional rule usually states that the new rule is only applicable to situations that arise after a 
certain future date. Such a rule, therefore, contains in fact two elements of transitional law. 
First of all, the new rule has delayed effect – i.e. the rule is applicable as from a date in the 
future; also called ‘prospective overruling’. The second element is that situations, for exam-
ple contractual obligations, that exist at that future date, are grandfathered; so, even after 
the future date, not the new rule but the old rule applies to those situations. If the Supreme 
Court provides for such a transitional rule, it usually justifies this decision by referring to 
the taxpayers’ legitimate expectations based on the old case law.
However, in case the Supreme Court abandons existing case law and provides for a 
new rule that is favourable to taxpayers (and therefore unfavourable to the government’s 
budget), the Supreme Court does not usually provide for a transitional rule. This means that 
the new rule is directly applicable and has in fact retroactive effect (thus, in favour of tax-
payers). Sometimes, such a ruling provokes a reaction from the State Secretary of Finance, 
i.e. he submits a bill containing retroactive effect to ‘overrule’ the retroactive erga omnes 
effect of the Court’s judgment in order to avoid negative budgetary consequences (see also 
section 3.13.3.2).48
3.13.6. Views in the literature 
3.13.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
In the literature there does not seem to be a communis opinio with respect to the question 
when retroactivity of tax legislation is justified. However, the view that retroactive legisla-
tion that is disadvantageous to taxpayers is never justified or only in extreme circumstances 
is losing ground. E.g., the line of two recent PhD dissertations49 is grosso modo that the ques-
tion whether retroactivity is permitted cannot be answered in abstracto but should be 
answered by balancing the interests concerned and by taking into account the circum-
45.	 See	on	the	issue	of	how	to	find	out	whether	a	judgment	of	the	Netherlands	Supreme	Court	contains	a	general	rule	
A.O.	Lubbers,	Belastingarresten	lezen	en	analyseren	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Fiscale	&	Financiële	Uitgevers,	2007).
46.	 Or	that	a	certain	type	of	expenses	can	only	be	taken	into	account	as	tax-deductible	costs	at	a	later	moment	than	it	
could	have	been	according	to	previous	case	law.
47.	 See	e.g.,	Supreme	Court	November	13,	1991,	No.	27	563,	BNB	1992/109,	Supreme	Court	December	18,	1991,	
No.	26	674,	BNB	1992/181	and	Supreme	Court	June	28,	2000,	No.	34	169,	BNB	2000/275.	See	also	an	article	of	one	of	
the	judges	of	the	Netherlands	Supreme	Court,	J.W.	van	den	Berge.,	‘Fiscaal	overgangsbeleid	van	de	rechter’,	in:	
A.O.	Lubbers	(ed.),	Opstellen	fiscaal	overgangsbeleid	(Kluwer:	Deventer,	2005),	at	pp.	35-46.
48.	 See	for	examples	Pauwels,	supra	note	2,	section	11.17.4.
49.	 Pauwels,	supra	note	2	and	Schuver-Bravenboer,	supra	note	2.
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stances of the legislative case. More in general, in the Netherlands literature it seems to be 
accepted that retroactive effect may be granted to anti-abuse rules if there is a fear of 
announcement effects, provided that the period of retroactivity effect is limited to the 
moment of the announcement and that the announcement is sufficiently clear.
Nevertheless, the general opinion in the Netherlands literature seems to be that there 
should be weighty arguments to justify retroactivity of tax legislation, also in case the 
period of retroactivity is limited to the moment of the announcement of the bill (the phe-
nomenon of ‘legislating by press release’). The latter is remarkable as it seems that in some 
other countries it is quite common that legislation is granted retroactive effect until the 
moment of the announcement of the bill.50 Therefore, it seems that the appreciation of 
retroactivity partly depends on the legal culture of a country.
3.13.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view on transitional tax law has provoked very little debate in Dutch 
legal discourse. E.g., in parliamentary debate no typical law and economics arguments have 
been used. Also in the literature there is little attention for the law and economics view. 
If attention is given to this issue in the literature, most of the time it is noted that 
some elements of the view are interesting and have added value (e.g. attention to the 
behavioural effects of transition policy – such as the fact that standard practice that also in 
the case of anti-abuse legislation retroactivity does not go beyond the date of announce-
ment, has the effect that there is no incentive for taxpayers not to look for loopholes as the 
period until the announcement will not be affected –, and the notion that grandfathering 
could have the (negative) effect that some taxpayers get a ‘windfall gain’).51 But the view 
itself usually gains little support because of the strong utilitarian approach of law, in which 
there is little attention for fairness arguments and e.g. the intrinsic legal value of legal cer-
tainty.
50.	 See	e.g.	G.T.	Loomer,	‘Taxing	Out	of	Time:	Parliamentary	Supremacy	and	Retroactive	Tax	Legislation’,	British	Tax	
Review	2006,	p.	68,	and	A.	Harper,	‘Tax	Post	Facto’,	British	Tax	Review	2006,	p.	395	with	respect	to	the	UK	and	
Canada.
51.	 See	Pauwels,	supra	note	2,	section	7.3.
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3.14.
Poland
Piotr Karwat
3.14.1. Terminology
3.14.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
a. Conceptual variations
The Polish legal literature refers to the concept of ‘retroactivity’ in the broad sense of this 
word including the following situations: 
– the statute covers the period before the date of entry into force,
– the statute covers only the period after the date of entry into force, but, having an imme-
diate effect, may alter future tax consequences of a past event.1
b. Clear distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’?
Although statutory laws, including the Constitution, contain no norms which would, as a 
general rule, prohibit or limit the retroactive effect and do not define any terms such as 
‘retroactivity’, nevertheless, thanks to the contribution of the Constitutional Court, one can 
assume that the legal language employs a strict distinction between ‘non-retroactivity’ 
(defined as ‘the principle of no retroactive effect of law’) and ‘non-retrospectivity”2 (which 
includes ‘the principle of protection of acquired rights’ and ‘the principle of protection of 
business in progress’).3 Both principles are derived by the Constitutional Court from the 
constitutional principle of a democratic state of law.4
3.14.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
The distinction between ‘actual retroactivity’ i.e. a statute applying to a previous year and 
‘de facto retroactivity’ i.e. a statute entering into force during the current year but applying 
to the whole year from its beginning, which is made in some countries, is not easy to find in 
the Polish legal or tax literature. According to ‘non-retroactivity’ criteria developed by the 
Constitutional Court, any changes in legislation potentially extending the tax burden (e.g. 
repealed tax exemption) in the annual tax (e.g. income tax) during a fiscal year in force from 
1.	 A.	Gomułowicz	andJ.	Małecki,	Podatki	i	prawo	podatkowe	(Warsaw:	LexisNexis,	2002),	at	p.	104;	H.	Litwińczuk	in:	
H.	Litwińczuk,	P.	Karwat	and	W.	Pietrasiewicz,	Prawo	podatkowe	przedsiębiorców,	Vol.	1	(Warsaw:	ABC,	2006),	at	
pp.	73-74;	A,	Gomułowicz,	Zasady	podatkowe	wczoraj	i	dziś	(Warsaw:	ABC,	2001),	at	p.	30.	
2.	 Cases	before	Constitutional	Court:	P	40/07,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	2009,	No.	1,	series	A,	item	4;	
K	9/95,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	1996,	No.	1,	item	2;	K	24/97,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyj-
nego	1998,	No.	2,	item	13.	
3.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	P	6/07	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	2009,	No.	1,	series	A,	item	2.
4.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	U	1/86,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	1986,	No.	1,	item	2.
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the beginning of such year would be undoubtedly classified as ‘actual retroactivity’, as 
would regulations that apply to previous fiscal years.5
3.14.1.3. Interpretative statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
In the Polish legal system the ‘interpretative statute’ has not been explicitly listed in the 
exhaustive catalogue of acts constituting sources of law in the Constitution.6 In the past, 
the General Tax Act contained a substitute for such a solution: the Minister of Finance was 
guaranteed a right to issue general official interpretations of tax law, which were of a char-
acter binding for the tax authorities, thus de facto making such interpretations legal 
norms.7 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court held that the binding character of interpre-
tations was contrary to the Constitution.8 Currently, general official interpretations of the 
Minister of Finance are not binding and the legal character thereof is close to individual 
official interpretations (advance rulings).9 The Ministry of Finance and the tax authorities 
reporting to the Ministry several times gave an interpretation according to which the char-
acter of specific amendments to a statute (introduced on the initiative of the Minister of 
Finance) only ‘clarifies the meaning’ and does not extend the subject, object or basis of 
taxation. According to such an interpretation, e.g. foreign exchange differences that, as a 
result of amendments, were added to the catalogue of taxable income, were taxable income 
also prior to such amendments as they were covered by the ‘general’ meaning of income. 
The administrative courts (and the Supreme Court) have usually (not always) rejected this 
line of interpretation, abiding by the principle that the change of provisions serves the 
change of a legal norm and not its ‘better’ interpretation.10 
3.14.1.4. Validation statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘validation statutes’ known?
There is no such phenomenon in Polish law as ‘validation statute’. It is possible that the 
legislator, on the initiative of the Minister of Finance, reacts to the emerging line of jurispru-
dence towards an unclear provision in two ways: (1) it accepts such a line and suggests 
amendments to change a given provision in such a manner that its literal interpretation 
gives effect consistent with the common view of the courts or (2) it rejects it and amends the 
provision in such a manner that its literal wording no longer allows the previous interpreta-
tion of the courts. In the latter case (2), the tax authorities are particularly tempted to prove 
that the amendments are of a character ‘clarifying the meaning’ only, as mentioned in sec-
tion 3.14.1.3. As mentioned above, this reasoning is not, however, supported by the courts. 
However, as far as the former case (1) is concerned, taxpayers in disputes with the tax 
authorities are inclined to state that the legislator only ‘clarified the meaning’ of the norm 
and it should had been equally understood also prior to the amendments. Such reasoning 
may encounter sympathy in the case law, in particular if the norm ‘clarifying the meaning’ 
in its version prior to the amendments was – in the court’s opinion – contrary to European 
Community laws.11 Nevertheless, contemporary tax legislation does not reveal a case where 
5.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	K	13/93,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	1994,	No.	1,	item	6.
6.	 Article	87	of	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1997,	No.	78,	item	483).
7.	 Article	14	§	2	of	Act	on	Rules	for	Taxation	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1997,	No.	137,	item	926	as	amended	at	Dziennik	Ustaw	
2002,	No.	169,	item	1387).
8.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	K	4/03,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	2004,	No.	5,	series	A,	item	41.
9.	 Article	14a	of	Act	on	Rules	for	Taxation.
10.	 Case	before	Supreme	Court:	III	ARN	50/92,	Orzecznictwo	Sądu	Najwyższego	Izba	Cywilna	1993,	No.	10,	item	181.
11.	 Case	before	Supreme	Administrative	Court:	I	FSK	641/09,	www.orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl.
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the legislator introduces amendments with retroactive effect in order to reject (also with 
retroactive effect) the line of case law already shaped. One could state that the legislator 
treats any possible court decisions against the tax authorities as ‘learning from error’ and 
draws conclusions for the future. 
3.14.1.5. Comparison moment
The Polish legal system contains a subordinate legislative regulation regarding legislative 
technique that provides for a possibility of entry into force of a normative act as of (a future 
date) with the effective entrance date as of (a date in the past).12 However, such a formal 
possibility is not used in tax legislation due to quite a restrictive view of the Constitutional 
Court in this respect.13 Neither the legislator nor the Minister of Finance, who issues subor-
dinate legislation, will even try to grant retroactive effect to them. In the case of statutes, if 
the plan of legislative work indicates that the legislative process cannot be finished and the 
statute cannot be announced prior to the moment from which it would legally enter into 
force, such a moment is appropriately postponed to a future date. In the case of subordinate 
legislation called ‘regulations’ (executive acts to a statute) issued by the Minister of Finance, 
quite often it was a ‘last-minute’ practice to publish directives one or two days prior to the 
date on which they should enter into force in order to allow a statute to function properly. 
The moment of ‘publication’ is indicated by the date of issue of „Dziennik Ustaw’ (the Polish 
Journal of Laws), which – until 2012 – was not necessarily the same as the date of actual 
availability of a given Journal of Laws.14 The above-described practice was dangerously close 
to the line of ‘non-retroactivity’ and may even have overstepped it. The Minister of Finance, 
however, usually ensured availability of a normative act, making its text available on his 
official Internet website15 prior to the moment of its entry into force. Besides, it has to be 
admitted that this ‘last-minute’ practice has significantly decreased recently.
3.14.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
a. Definition of retrospectivity
The Constitutional Court derived from the constitutional principle of a democratic state of 
law, among other things, two principles complementing each other: (1) protection of 
acquired rights and (2) protection of business in progress, both of which are the manifesta-
tions of the principle of certainty of tax law.16 Breach of any of such principles might be 
classified as ‘retrospectivity’ within the meaning in section 3.14.1.1.b. The principle of pro-
tection of acquired rights contains the postulate of a taxpayer’s legal security consisting in 
the fact that his rights acquired under a statute would not be suddenly and unreasonably 
abolished or restricted. The principle of protection of business in progress is a postulate for 
the legislator in order to take into account the fact that many actions taken by a taxpayer 
are spread over time. A taxpayer makes a decision on a given undertaking, acting in specific 
legal conditions, including tax conditions, and he has a right to expect that such conditions 
will not be considerably worsened during the execution of such an undertaking. Both rules 
are addressed to the legislator who, when abolishing or restricting norms which are benefi-
cial for taxpayers, should not limit the rights of those who have already acquired certain 
powers under those norms and who intend to apply them, and the acquisition of benefits 
12.	 Regulation	by	Prime	Minister	concerning	„Rules	of	Legislative	Technique’	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2002,	No.	100,	item	908).
13.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	K	15/91,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	1992,	No.	1,	item	8.
14.	 Since	2012	the	Journal	of	Laws	has	been	issued	only	in	electronic	version	(published	only	on	the	website).
15.	 www.mf.gov.pl.	
16.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	P	6/07	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	2009,	No.	1,	series	A,	item	2.
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should be guaranteed, by way of transitional provisions, to those who undertake actions to 
acquire such benefits but who had not acquired them by the date of the amendments.
b. Examples of retrospectivity
There are several cases where the legislator applied certain transitional solutions to avoid 
the charge of ‘retrospectivity’:
1. The Personal Income Tax Act used to contain a tax exemption consisting in the 
possibility to deduct from income the expenses for purchase or construction of a 
residential house or a flat. Such an exemption was, after a certain time, changed to 
deduction from the tax of a portion of expenses. However, a taxpayer who has 
already incurred certain housing expenses under the ruling of the old statute was 
entitled to make use of the exemption under the old, more beneficial rules, until 
the moment of completion of the investment. The exemption was eventually abol-
ished, nevertheless those who started housing investments under the provision 
remained entitled to exemption until the completion of the investment.17 It 
should be emphasized that transitional provisions guaranteed not only protection 
of acquired rights (the right to deduct during future tax years the exemptions that 
have already been made) but also protection of business in progress (the right to 
deduct expenses already made after abolition of the exemption for an investment 
commenced prior to its abolition);
2. Provisions providing for full deduction in the VAT system of input tax on the pur-
chase and leasing of cars and fuels were toughened. Amendments provided for a 
possibility to continue deductions under the rules applied so far, of a tax accrued 
on leasing instalments applied for the period after the amendments in the case of 
leasing agreements made prior to the amendments.18 A formal condition was that 
a leasing agreement should be filed with a fiscal office on a specified date. At the 
same time, it has not been recognized that the immediate prohibition of deduc-
tion of the input tax on the purchase of car fuel, introduced by amendments, 
breached the rule of protection of business in progress;
3. As a general rule, any amendments to the Personal Income Tax Act enter into force 
on 1 January, i.e. as of the beginning of the fiscal year for majority of companies. 
For the companies whose fiscal year begins on a date different from 1 January, the 
legislator introducing the amendments in general provides for transitional provi-
sions according to which new rules are binding for such companies only from the 
beginning of their fiscal years commencing after 1 January of a given year;19
 On the other hand, amendments to the provisions on the statute of limitations of 
tax obligations should be considered permissible ‘retrospectivity’: in transitional 
provisions related to such amendments, there is a binding principle of applicable 
new provisions, provided that if, according to the old provisions, the statute of 
limitations would occur earlier, then such old provisions would apply.20
 Cancellation of tax provisions having the character of a sanction (reference is not 
made here to criminal provisions but to tax obligations arising in relation to gen-
eral rules) for which transitional provisions explicitly provide that since the date 
17.	 Article	12	of	Act	Amending	the	Personal	Income	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2003,	No.	202,	
item	1956).
18.	 Article	7	of	Act	Amending	the	Value	Added	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2005,	No.	90,	item	756).
19.	 Article	4	of	Act	Amending	the	Corporate	Income	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2003,	No.	202,	
item	1957).
20.	 Article	20	of	Act	Amending	the	Act	on	Rules	for	Taxation	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2002,	No.	169,	
item	1387).
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of entry into force of amendments, such provisions are not applied to previous 
factual states, is not regarded as ‘retroactivity’ or ‘retrospectivity’.21
3.14.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
Substantive statutes apply to factual states occurring after the date on which the statute 
enters into force, while procedural statutes apply to pending proceedings, directly after the 
entry into force of such statutes.22 The subject of the proceedings, i.e. substantive law pow-
ers, including the moment of occurrence thereof, is of no importance for the determination 
of which procedural statutes apply in given proceedings.
The following, inter alia, are considered procedural rules: the rules of gathering evi-
dence, rules of appeal, extraordinary course of repealing decisions, rules of fiscal control.
3.14.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.14.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
As mentioned in section 3.14.1.1.b, limitations to ‘retroactivity’ are derived by the Constitu-
tional Court from the general constitutional principle of a democratic state of law.
3.14.2.2. Transition policy of government
There are ‘rules of legislative technique’23 which also regulate the issues concerning transi-
tional and adjusting provisions. As indicated by the title, these are rules of a technical char-
acter: recommendations as to the language of a statute, typical terms of the legislative lan-
guage, layout of a normative act, etc. They do not contain any directives with regard to the 
creation of transitional provisions or general principles of applying a statute after its 
amendment in relation to future factual states, or legal relations having their sources in the 
events prior to the amendments.
The ‘rules of legislative technique’ have acquired a form of a ‘regulation’ being an 
executive act to the Act on the Council of Ministers.24 Therefore, formally they constitute the 
source of absolutely binding laws. In fact, however, they are addressed only to the govern-
mental administration. The opinion of the judiciary expressed in one of judgments in rela-
tion to the ‘rules of legislative technique’ is as follows: ‘The regulation of the Prime Minister 
as regards the rules of legislative technique is not a normative act, but reflects the standards 
of legal culture’.25
The ‘Rules’ do not contain any guidelines with respect to granting retroactive effect to 
statutes or grandfathering.
There is no formalized legal act or any other document which would contain guide-
lines regarding retroactivity. Nevertheless, the examples given in section 3.14.1.6.b indicate 
that in situations where the amendments act or – depending on the individual situation of a 
taxpayer – may act to the benefit of a taxpayer, the transitional provisions provide for a 
possibility to apply the new statute with retroactive effect.
21.	 Article	13	of	Act	Amending	the	Value	Added	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2008,	No.	209,	
item	1320).
22.	 Case	before	Voivodeship	Administrative	Court	in	Białystok:	I	SA/Bk	245/04,	www.orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl.
23.	 See	section	3.14.1.5.
24.	 Article	14	of	Act	on	the	Council	of	Ministers	(Dziennik	Ustaw,	2003,	No.	24,	item	199).
25.	 Case	before	Voivodeship	Administrative	Court	in	Warsaw:	III	SA/Wa	2433/05,	www.orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl.
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3.14.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
An independent body that, due to its rank and authority, could be asked for advice in the 
assessment of draft legal acts with respect to the question whether the granting of retroac-
tive effect is allowed would be the Constitutional Court. Unfortunately, the Court has no 
such powers. It is a typical constitutional court rendering judgments regarding the consis-
tency of already enacted legal acts with the acts of a higher rank, including the Constitution.
3.14.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.14.3.1. Legislating by press release
‘Legislating by press release’ is not used in Poland due to the requirement of an appropriate 
vacatio legis imposed many times by the Constitutional Court. In the case of taxes paid annu-
ally (income taxes), in spite of lack of an express constitutional norm in this respect, it has 
been assumed – after the Constitutional Court – that amendments to the statutes may enter 
into force as of the beginning of a new year and must be announced by the end of Novem-
ber of the previous year, at the latest.26 When planning the amendments, the Government 
must take into consideration what is known as an announcement effect and can do nothing 
else but accept it. It happens, however, that less radical solutions are applied to limit the 
announcement effect, such as the requirement to report (register) in the tax office the fact 
of performance of a certain action on a certain date; otherwise the tax consequences result-
ing from the new statute would apply to such an action.27
3.14.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
Retroactive effect of the legislation is acceptable only in the case of amendments to the 
benefit of a taxpayer.
3.14.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
Since retroactive legislation hardly exists in Poland it is no use discussing its influence to 
pending legal proceedings.
However, there in an example of the non-retroactive amendment of a substantive 
statute, advantageous for taxpayers, accompanied by transitional procedural provision, that 
gave substantive retroactive effect to the benefit of the taxpayers, to whom the tax authority 
‘did not manage’ to impose a tax (to finish the proceeding) before the date of entry into 
force of the amendment. In 2008 provisions on additional tax obligations, which was a 
specific sanction for incorrect preparation of a tax return, were deleted from the VAT Act. 
There was no substantive transitional provision; nevertheless, the procedural transitional 
provision stipulated that tax proceedings pending with regard to such obligations, in spite 
of the fact that they referred to the period when the old provisions still applied, were sub-
ject to cancellation, and new ones cannot be commenced.28 This procedural solution 
granted taxpayers positive substantive retroactive effect, but the beneficiaries of this effect 
were only those taxpayers to whom the proceedings were still pending. Those taxpayers in 
relation to whom proceedings had already been terminated, did not make use of such ‘pro-
26.	 Case	before	Constitutional	Court:	K	13/93,	Orzecznictwo	Trybunału	Konstytucyjnego	1994,	No.	1,	item	6.
27.	 Article	7	of	Act	Amending	the	Value	Added	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2005,	No.	90,	item	756).
28.	 Article	13	of	Act	Amending	the	Value	Added	Tax	Act	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2008,	No.	209,	
item	1320).
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cedural’ retroactivity effect. The solution applied in this case was typical for criminal law 
rather than for tax law.
3.14.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
Due to the Constitutional Court’s restrictive views on retroactivity, especially in taxation, the 
legislator is generally reluctant to introduce retroactive statutes. There is always a risk that 
an amendment which seems to be advantageous for everyone will turn out to be disadvan-
tageous in some specific circumstances.
Nevertheless, sometimes the legislator decides that the legislation could be retroac-
tive if there is no risk of potential negative effect for taxpayers.
The most common fields for favourable retroactivity are:
1. optional solutions (e.g. individual depreciation rates, simplification schemes, optional 
lump-sum taxes or flat rates, etc.);
2. tax rates reductions, tax reliefs, exemptions (in the case of VAT – only optional exemp-
tions);
3. new procedural solutions (e.g. advance rulings, electronic tax returns, etc.).
Sometimes the reason why the amendment is considered favourable is the increased 
level of certainty of tax law. In such a case the retroactive effect is also acceptable. For 
instance, new legislation regarding the tax consequences of leasing was published during 
2001. It entered into force in September 2001 but covered the whole year 2001.29 
Amendments to the provisions of limitation (expiration) of tax liabilities are also 
considered favourable retroactivity if the transitional provisions provide for the lex benignor 
principle: new provisions are applicable unless, according to the old provisions, the tax 
liability would expire earlier; then such old provisions would apply.30
3.14.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
The Polish Constitution explicitly formulates the principle of its primacy and direct applica-
tion.31 The administrative courts, however, when rendering judgments not only in tax cases, 
express a unanimous opinion that such a provision does not entitle the courts to refuse 
application of a provision of a statutory act, the non-constitutionality of which has not been 
established by the Constitutional Court.32 A provision of a statute is deemed constitutional 
as long as its non-constitutionality has not been established by the Constitutional Court. 
Administrative courts refuse to apply subordinate legislation if it is found to be contrary to 
the Constitution or statutes. Usually, however, the basis on which subordinate legislation is 
being contested is the fact that it was issued without statutory authorization or handles 
matters reserved for a statute. Charges of retroactivity happen sporadically (such charges 
were reported in the 90s in relation to a directive on the depreciation of fixed assets, which 
entered into force during a fiscal year with effect from the beginning of that year).33 Admin-
istrative courts more and more frequently refuse to apply the provisions of tax statutes, 
which are recognized by the courts to be contrary to the provisions of European Community 
29.	 Act	Amending	Personal	Income	Tax	Act,	Corporate	Income	Tax	Act	and	Value	Added	Tax	and	Excise	Act	(Dziennik	
Ustaw	2001,	No.	106,	item	1150).
30.	 Article	20	of	Act	Amending	the	Act	on	Rules	for	Taxation	and	Some	Other	Acts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2002,	No.	169,	
item	1387).
31.	 Article	8	item	2	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1997,	No.	78,	item	483).
32.	 Cases	before	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court:	II	FSK	852/07,	II	FSK	1013/06,	II	OSK	548/06,	website:	orzeczenia.
nsa.gov.pl.
33.	 §	17	of	Regulation	by	Minister	of	Finance	concerning	assets	regarded	as	fixed	assets,	rules	and	rates	of	depreciation	
and	terms	of	updating	of	assessment	of	fixed	assets	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1992,	No.	30,	item	130).
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law.34 This concerns, however, the cases of conflict with specific provisions of tax directives, 
and not the infringement of the prohibition of retroactive effect.
As we can see, in the case of statutes, recognition of inadmissible retroactivity of a 
provision by the administrative court is practically impossible. In the case of regulations, it 
is possible to refuse application thereof, but other reasons, other than retroactivity, are 
dominant.
In practice, the Constitutional Court is the only judicial body entitled to test the retro-
activity of tax statutes. If the statute has a disadvantageous impact on taxpayers, the retroac-
tivity is considered unconstitutional.
3.14.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.14.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
In tax matters, the highest judicial authority is the Supreme Administrative Court. This is a 
court of second instance whose judgments are binding only in the case in which they were 
rendered. If an administrative court sitting in a normal composition comes to the conclu-
sion that it encountered a complicated legal issue, then it will file an application for a reso-
lution to be taken in the composition of seven judges, the whole chamber or the full compo-
sition of the Supreme Administrative Court. Also such a resolution will not be absolutely 
binding (it is binding only in that particular case); nevertheless, if in any other case the 
administrative court does not share the view of such a resolution, then the court is obliged 
to address that particular legal issue to be resolved again in the form of a resolution.35 A 
resolution, similarly to all other court awards, has retroactive effect in the sense that legal 
views presented in such resolutions are binding for the courts and authorities examining 
the given case in spite of the fact that those views were obviously pronounced after the 
occurrence of the event concerned.
A separate issue is the effectiveness of the judgments of the Constitutional Court. As a 
general rule, the judgment of the Constitutional Court regarding non-constitutionality of a 
provision enters into force as of the date of its announcement. Nevertheless, the Court may 
decide on a later date on which the non-constitutional provision will cease to be in force.36 
The above-mentioned regulation could suggest that the judgments of the Court are not of a 
retroactive character. In practice, however, procedural provisions are of key importance, 
making it possible to reopen proceedings in the case finished by a final decision if it had 
been based on a provision, the non-constitutionality of which was subsequently recognized 
by the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the taxpayers, in whose case no proceedings 
were pending but who paid on their own the tax which was due on the basis of a provision 
then repealed by the Court, are entitled to demand reimbursement of overpaid tax.37
34.	 Case	before	Supreme	Administrative	Court:	I	FSK	2105/08,	www.orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl.
35.	 Article	269	of	Act	on	Proceedings	before	Administrative	Courts	(Dziennik	Ustaw	2002,	No.	153,	item	1270).	
36.	 Article	193	item	3	of	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1997,	No.	78,	item	483).
37.	 Article	74	of	Act	on	Rules	for	Taxation	(Dziennik	Ustaw	1997,	No.	137,	item	926).
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3.15.
Portugal
Glória Teixeira1
3.15.1. Terminology
3.15.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
a. In general
In Portugal constitutional, tax and civil law use the word ‘retroactivity’. ‘Retrospectivity’ is a 
term used by the prevailing opinion and in the tax literature where it is called ‘inappro-
priate retroactivity’.
The Portuguese Civil Code in Article 12º, n.º 1 provides the general rule of time appli-
cation of laws (tempus regit actum), but does not forbid the retroactivity of law. According to 
the same code (see Article 13º, n.º 1), retroactivity is even the normal solution in the case of 
authentic/truly interpretative statutes.
The Portuguese Constitution deals with the concept of retroactivity in several articles: 
Article 18º n.º 3 – prohibiting retroactivity of the laws restricting freedoms, liberties and 
guarantees; Article 29º n.º 4 related to criminal law and Article 103º n.º 3 prohibiting retro-
activity in tax matters.
Also, the General Tax Law, (‘LGT – Lei Geral Tributária’) refers to the prohibition of the 
creation of retroactive taxes on Article 12º, n.º 1.
Before the constitutional revision of 1997, the Portuguese Constitutional Court had 
already accepted the principle of non-retroactivity as a valid one. However, the Court 
defended that only cases of intolerable retroactivity were strictly forbidden because of the 
principle of legal certainty and trust (Article 2º of the Constitution), which implies a mini-
mum of certainty of law and respect for previously created expectations of citizens. 
In fact, this system reflected some European ideas. During the formation of the mod-
ern tax state in Europe, taxation has been an attribute of democracy with the limits of 
‘no taxation without representation’.2
After the constitutional revision of 1997, the Constitutional Court seems to have 
adopted a stricter approach. This approach can be examined with regard to at least three 
questions: is retroactivity in tax matters forbidden even if the new law is to the benefit of the 
taxpayers? Concerning direct taxation with respect to a tax that it is imposed in certain 
periods of time (normally, on a yearly basis), can the new law published in the middle of the 
year ‘n’ only be applied in the year ‘n+1’ or are other solutions also possible (e.g. a pro rata 
temporis solution in the year ‘n’ or even its application to the first of January of year ‘n’)? 
1.	 I	would	like	to	thank	the	CIJE	researchers	–	Patrícia	Azevedo,	Sérgio	Silva,	Helena	Freire	and	Dino	Almeida	–	for	their	
valuable	research	and	administrative	support.
2.	 Generally,	the	courts	defend	an	interpretation	of	fundamental	law	based	on	principles	and	general	criteria	
(e.g.,	Constitutional	Court	Decisions	-T.C,	Proc.	nº:	772/2007;	Proc.	n.º	382/01;	Proc.	n.º:	365/91).	
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Only after the constitutional review of 1997 has this ‘special’ principle been explicitly set 
forth in the Constitution, and has been reflected in the prevailing opinion and court prac-
tice. The constitutional review argues in favour of the thesis that the retroactivity would 
make the law uncertain and may bring about situations of injustice.
Moreover, the Portuguese legal system does not have what are known as ‘validation 
statutes’. 
b. Conceptual variations
The term ‘retroactivity’ can be used with various meanings. However, the prevailing opinion 
and tax literature tend to try to define it more precisely and make a distinction between 
‘proper retroactivity’ and ‘inappropriate retroactivity’ (‘retrospectivity’).
The principle of ‘retroactivity’ prescribes that laws cannot produce effects at a date 
previous to their entry into force. ‘Retroactivity’ stricto sensu means that a new legal provi-
sion governs a situation that existed previous to the law’s entry into force. It makes a con-
nection between the effects of a new legal provision and factual situations that happened 
before the law’s entry into force. It is associated to ex tunc force (to the past). 
In contrast, ‘retrospectivity’ or ‘inappropriate retroactivity’ implies that the new legal 
provision has application to existing situations, although the new provision has future, ex 
nunc, effects. 
This distinction is not only important in the prevailing opinion and tax literature but 
also for the courts in order to help them to balance constitutionally protected interests so 
that an evaluation of what it implies can be done.
The concept of ‘retrospectivity’ does not have a clear and generally accepted defini-
tion. This is because, as already mentioned, this term is used essentially in court practice and 
discussed by legal scholars and in the tax literature. 
Retrospectivity can be defined as a kind of ‘retroactivity’ but an ‘inappropriate’ one. 
There is a separation of meanings between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ retroactivity because of 
the difference in the effects. ‘Retrospectivity’ means that a new provision applies to new 
facts, but there was a previous context to the factual circumstances which surely created 
legal expectations. This distinction of treatment is important because of the principle pre-
scribed in Article 2º of the Portuguese Constitution.
On this issue, the tax literature refers to the case of the ultra-activity of laws.3 This 
ultra-activity implies that sometimes it is not reasonable to extinguish certain situations 
constituted and legally expected because of the previous law. To solve this, the legislator 
sometimes enacts provisions of ‘transitional law’.
Furthermore, the prevailing and tax literature tend to divide ‘retroactivity’ into levels. 
This ‘inappropriate retroactivity’ (‘retrospectivity’) is what is called the second level. The 
facts and the effects took place according to the previous law, but the effects affect the sta-
bility and security of tax relations. 
The legislative tax process involves different phases: creation, implementation, levy 
and collection of tax and frequently a new law comes into effect and affects citizens’ expec-
tations or their rights and obligations. In this context, the Portuguese Constitution provides 
in Article 103º for two types of limitations regarding retroactivity of tax laws. The first is a 
prohibition of applying taxes with retroactive effect and the second concerns the legality of 
payment and collection of taxes. 
The interpretation of this provision is not unanimous in the tax literature, especially 
the definition of the boundaries of the second limitation. 
3.	 Sá	Gomes,	Nuno,	Manual	de	Direito	Fiscal,	volume	II,	Ciência	e	Técnica	Fiscal,	nº	174.
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There is a general consensus that the introduction of new taxes and changes in the tax bases 
or tax rates may not apply retroactively.4 However, the opinions diverge when applying the 
second limitation concerning the retroactivity of tax provisions regulating the payment and 
collection of taxes. Several authors,5 including myself,6 admit that the principle of 
non-retroactivity can be overridden in the field of payment or collection of taxes because, 
frequently, those provisions aim to enhance efficiency and security in the process of tax 
payment and collection.
There is also a different level of discussion in the domestic and comparative tax litera-
ture relating to the first limitation or the acceptable types of retroactivity when introducing 
new taxes and changes in tax bases or tax rates.
The principle of non-retroactivity also has a different economic and legal impact in 
the tax system, depending on the structure or type of tax. In the case of consumption taxes 
(VAT or excise duties), usually the gap between taxable facts and the occurrence of their 
effects is reduced or even nil and consequently the application of the principle does not 
raise particular problems. However, the case is different for income or property taxes or 
what are known as ‘periodical’ taxes of which the taxable event or their effect is spread, 
generally, through the calendar year and any legal changes during this period may create 
problems of retroactivity. Fortunately, in the recent Portuguese experience tax changes that 
have been made during the taxable period had been favourable to the taxpayer and as a 
result litigation was not triggered. However, the problem still persists if tax changes start to 
penalize the taxpayers, as is happening now, under current difficult public finance condi-
tions. From a strict legal point of view, the final solution must be the same for both circum-
stances because there is no tax provision that expressly prescribes the application of the 
more favourable regime as is the case in criminal law.
Here, the tax literature is not unanimous. Some authors would like to see apportion-
ment rules allocate to the respective time period the applicable law or regime. Others argue 
that the applicable law at the beginning or even at the end of the financial or calendar year 
must prevail.
In Portugal, from a strict substantive and also formal point of view, tax changes must 
be approved by the parliament at the time of the approval of the financial budget (‘Finan-
cial Budget Law’). Public finance principles and legislation require, for certainty and public 
revenue reasons, that any tax changes must be set out in that law and will apply during the 
next financial year. In other words, tax changes during the financial year are exceptional, if 
not forbidden altogether. 
c. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes 
According to a rather widely accepted definition, substantive rules are those that prescribe 
rights, obligations and definitions related to facts. Procedural rules assure that the substan-
tive rules are put in practice, establishing what has to be done to make substantive laws 
effective.
As previously mentioned, Article 103º, nº 3 of the Portuguese Constitution estab-
lishes a general prohibition of ‘retroactivity’ in tax matters: no one can be forced to pay 
illegal taxes (e.g. not created by Law or authorized Decree-Law), ‘retroactive’ taxes or the 
levy of is not legal. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of that article provides that not only taxes but 
also taxpayers’ guarantees are created by law. 
4.	 An	express	prohibition	is	included	in	the	Brazilian	Constitution	of	1988	(Article	150º)	and	Constitutions	of	other	
Portuguese	speaking	countries.	For	further	developments	see	Miranda,	Jorge,	Medeiros,Rui,	Constituição	Portu-
guesa	Anotada,	Tomo	II	(Lisbon:	Coimbra	Editora,	2006).
5.	 See	Freitas	Pereia,	Manuel	Henrique,	Fiscalidade,	3ª	edição,	(Lisbon:]:	Almedina,	2009).
6.	 See	Teixeira,	Glória,	Manual	de	Direito	Fiscal,	2ª	edição	(Lisbon	]:	Almedina,	2010).
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The Portuguese courts accept that the ‘non-retroactivity’ principle of tax law must be 
adjusted as far as procedural rules are concerned. Firstly, the Constitution does not prohibit 
procedural rules having ‘retroactive’ effect, even when dealing with taxpayers’ rights and 
guarantees, except in cases forbidden by Article 18º, nº 3 of the CRP. Secondly, new proce-
dural provisions have an immediate application even in pending procedures (see Article 
12º, n.º 3 of the LGT). However, a careful analysis has to be done in order to respect the ‘min-
imum contents’ of taxpayer’s rights and consequently to avoid abuse or disregard for the 
legal certainty and legitimate expectations principle.
The opposite of the ‘ultra-activity’ (described in the previous section) takes place here 
in the context of procedural statutes. The legislator opted for an immediate application of 
the new provisions not only for the future but also to pending situations.
Procedural rules are laid down in the Tax Procedural Code (‘CPPT – Código de Procedi-
mento e de Processo Tributário’), in the LGT and, in some cases, in the tax statutes.
Those provisions include the regulation of issues such as reasonable time periods 
regarding specific procedures, taxpayers’ guarantees and rights, recitals and legal causes to 
be invoked, briefs to be presented along with requirements of all kinds, rules on stay of 
proceedings, rules on limitation and dismissal, appeals; provisions on preliminary orders 
and also provisions related to the tax insolvency process.
There is also the inspection statute (‘RCPIT – Regime Complementar do Procedimento 
de Inspecção Tributária’) which establishes the procedure applicable in the case of tax 
inspections, namely rights and obligations of the taxpayers, in accordance with the princi-
ple of contradiction, and rules of procedure applicable to the tax administration, such as 
the right of access to the taxpayers’ premises, the right of access to data and computer facili-
ties, etc.
As far as the burden of proof is concerned, it is divided between the tax administra-
tion and taxpayer and they must prove their own respective arguments before the tax 
courts.
The general principle concerning the burden of proof is laid down in Article 74º and 
Article 89º-A, n.º 3 and 4 of the General Tax Law (LGT).
3.15.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
In Portugal there is an ex ante evaluation of retroactivity. This evaluation can be done with 
the control a priori of the constitutionality of tax statutes. 
Accordingly, all main tax policies are discussed and approved under the rules of the 
Portuguese Constitution (Article 165º, nº1, i) of the CRP). Taxation is under the regime of 
reserve of law (reserva relativa) – government may legislate only if authorized by parliament 
– and this is a competence of ‘Assembleia da República’ (the Portuguese parliament). The 
government can only legislate with express authorization of the parliament and within the 
limits of this authorization. The legal form of tax legislation by delegation of the parliament 
is a law of authorization laid down in Article 165º, n.º1 and 2 of the CRP. 
During the legislative process, judges and the judiciary do not intervene. The courts 
cannot influence the current activity of parliament because the judicial and legislative pow-
ers are separate. Only the Supreme Court’s decisions have some informal influence and can 
constitute jurisprudence guidelines. The judicial and executive powers cannot jointly take 
formal part in legislative activity.
Also, under Portuguese constitutional law – Article 71º (Lei do Tribunal Constitu-
tional),- there is another restriction based on the evaluation of the retroactivity system. It is 
a legal mechanism intended to be used in specific situations, to search for any violation of 
the Constitution, according to general principles. The Constitution imposes limits to retro-
activity of tax law especially when it affects the principle of legal certainty or legitimate 
expectations.
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In summary, in the Portuguese parliament all main tax policies are discussed and approved 
under the rules of the Constitution (Article 165º nº1, paragraph i). Taxation is a matter of 
‘reserve of law’ and is a competence of Assembleia da República. The government can only 
legislate with express authorization of that assembly (Article 165º n.º2). 
Moreover, Portuguese law does not have a policy on transition. The tax administra-
tion scrutinizes ex ante evaluation of retroactivity under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance and its special department ‘Centro de Estudos Fiscais’.
Finally, the Portuguese Constitution includes a department called ‘Conselho de 
Estado’ (Articles 141º to 146º) and according to Article 165º, the Council of State (‘Conselho 
de Estado’) has no mandate to legislate or make legislative proposals. It functions as a polit-
ical consultative organism of the Republic’s President and only provides aa opinion at the 
President’s request.
However, the analysis of non-retroactivity provisions is not allowed at the ‘Conselho 
de Estado’. 
In Portugal, retroactivity is a matter to be decided on by the appropriate legislative 
assembly or courts because of the special knowledge required, involving a precise and 
sophisticated monitoring of the law.
The Portuguese system prohibits retroactivity of tax statutes but it provides transi-
tional rules for some of the taxes, such as the income taxes. These transitional rules exist to 
treat situations where taxes are formed successively and where therefore the tax is affected 
by the date when a new statute comes into force. These transitional provisions are carefully 
scrutinized by the courts when applying tax law.
3.15.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice 
The instrument of ‘legislating by press release’ is not used in the Portuguese tax system.
Furthermore, there is no ‘retroactivity period’ in which the new provisions can apply 
to existing facts, previous to their entry into force.
Legal proceedings are governed by Article 12º, nº 3 of the General Tax Law (LGT). 
According to this provision, new rules have an immediate effect and new proceedings are 
regulated in accordance with the new law.
3.15.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
In Portugal there are two types of ex post evaluation of retroactivity. The first one (Article 281 
of the CRP) is the mechanism of the abstract review of constitutionality, upon the request of 
several institutions (President, Prime Minister, Ombudsman, General Prosecutor, etc.). The 
second one is the mechanism of specific review (Article 280 of CRP): in a judicial case con-
cerning tax matters, taxpayers can present an allegation in court regarding the incompati-
bility of a tax statute (or of some of its provisions) with the principle of non-retroactivity or 
with other general constitutional principles (legal certainty, etc.) If, inter alia, the court 
refuses to apply the tax provision on the basis of unconstitutionality or if it applies a provi-
sion the unconstitutionality of which has been raised during the judicial proceedings, the 
decision of the court should be, in the first case, or could be, in the second, submitted to the 
Constitutional Court (Articles 280 of the CRP and 71 of the Constitutional Court Statute – Lei 
do Tribunal Constitucional).
Portuguese courts usually test the compatibility with the Constitution and with gen-
eral legal principles such as the principle of legal certainty. They consider ‘unconstitutional’ 
laws, ‘retroactive’ provisions that contravene the principles of security and predictability 
and reasonable expectations, in an abnormal way.
In the Portuguese Civil Law Code, Article 12º expressly states that the law only applies 
to future circumstances, after its publication and entry into force. Both facts and their 
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effects that occurred under the timing of the ‘old law’ cannot be subject to the new regime 
or, in other words, retroactivity of the new law does not apply either to past facts or their 
effects even if the later are postponed or extended under this new law. In contrast, in Arti-
cle 13º, retroactivity is accepted in the case of interpretative laws or statutes if those do not 
exceed the scope and substance of the law being interpreted and also safeguard settled case 
law or concluded agreements.7
The Constitutional Court uses material criteria to fix the limits of ‘retroactivity’. These 
limitations depend on the consequences of the ‘retroactivity’ as far as the expectations of 
citizens are concerned.
Portuguese courts do not directly test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Arti-
cle 1 (‘protection of property’) of the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). They use other types of procedures such as the material criteria referred 
above, testing the results and their effect on citizens’ rights and comparing those results 
with the basic principles of the Constitution. However, and as a result of the supremacy of 
international law (see Article 8º of the CRP), it is acceptable for Portuguese courts to test 
retroactivity against international statutes.
3.15.5. Retroactivity of case law
In Portugal case law is not a source of law. Accordingly, the decisions of the Supreme Court 
do not constitute legal and binding rulings.
However, case law is growing in importance and there is also a tendency of the lower 
courts to follow the decisions of higher courts. If the lower court applies a different deci-
sion, it has to explain the reasons which support such different decision.
Also, it is possible that an interpretative rule laid down by the Supreme Court can be 
adopted as tax statute. This is not considered to be a breach to the principle of non-retroac-
tivity as long as the interpretation given was predictable and was in the spirit of the rule. 
3.15.6. Views in the literature
In Portugal there are no cases that can justify or not justify the granting of retroactive effect 
to tax regulations because there is a principle of non-retroactivity. 
Nevertheless, the question of retroactivity in favour of the taxpayer and the question 
concerning the effects of the entry into force of direct taxation when it occurs in the middle 
of the year remain open.
It was in 1997 that the principle of non-retroactivity was inserted in the Portuguese 
Constitution. At that time, there were some opinions for and against it.
Those who were against it thought that the problem had already been solved with the 
principles in place and they argued that there was no need to define it expressly. They also 
argued that the principle did not solve all the problems and there were many questions left 
unsolved. 
Those in favour of the principle argued that this was the only way to stop abuse by the 
legislative bodies.They also argued that the rules of interpretation could still be imple-
mented without jeopardizing the principle of retroactivity because the interpretation rules 
have to be always enacted in the spirit of the law and may not create a new law.8
7.	 See	Pires	de	Lima,	Antunes	Varela,	Código	Civil	Anotado,	volume	I,	3ª	edição	(Lisbon:	Coimbra	Editora,	1982).
8.	 See	Casalta	Nabais,	José,	O	Dever	Fundamental	de	Pagar	Impostos	(Lisbon:	Almedina,	1998),	Bacelar	Gouveia,	Jorge,	
A	Irretroactividade	da	Norma	Fiscal	na	Constituição	Portuguesa,	Ciência	e	Técnica	Fiscal	nº	387	(Jul/Set,	1997)	and	
Morais,	Rui,	A	Revisão	da	Constituição	Fiscal,	Juris	et	de	Jure,	UCP	(Porto,	1998).
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Spain
Pedro M. Herrera and Ana Belén Macho
3.16.1. Terminology
3.16.1.1. Distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’
There is no legal definition of retroactivity in Spanish law, either in the general sense or in 
the tax field.
In most of the Spanish literature a broad concept of retroactivity prevails, which has 
been passed down from civil law literature (De Castro), that makes a distinction between 
three levels of retroactivity (maximum-level retroactivity, medium-level retroactivity, and 
minimum-level retroactivity). These three levels were initially adopted in the jurisprudence 
of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 6 of 1983). 
From 1987 onwards, in Spanish constitutional jurisprudence, a distinction is made 
between ‘authentic or proper retroactivity’, or of a maximum level, and ‘improper retro-
activity’, or of a medium level (Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 126 of 1987). This 
distinction has been maintained to the present day (among the most recent decisions is 
found the Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 74 of 2010). 
For the Spanish Constitutional Court, ‘authentic retroactivity’ exists in the case of 
‘those legal regulations that subsequently aim to tie existing situations produced or devel-
oped prior to the law itself’ and there is ‘improper retroactivity’ in the case of ‘the regula-
tions that aim to have a bearing on current legal situations or relations that have yet to be 
concluded’. The literature prefers to stick to a concept of retroactivity that refers to the 
structure and content of the legal tax norm1.
In the Spanish literature, the distinction is also made between ‘formal retroactivity’ 
and ‘material retroactivity’ as synonyms for proper retroactivity and improper retroactivity’. 
The term ‘retrospectivity’ is not frequent, but it is also used on occasion as a synonym for 
‘improper retroactivity’.
3.16.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
In Spain the conceptual distinction between an income tax statute that applies to a previous 
fiscal year (retroactividad auténtica) and an income tax statute that applies as of the begin-
ning of the current fiscal year (retroactividad impropia) is usually employed. 
According to the Spanish Constitutional Court, if the income tax rules are changed as 
of the beginning of the current fiscal year, this is a case of ‘improper’ retroactivity.
The case of ‘improper’ retroactivity is permitted if it does not breach the principle of 
legal certainty (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 182 of 1997).
1.	 Ana	Belén	Macho	Pérez,	El	Principio	de	Irretroactividad	en	Derecho	Tributario	(Barcelona:	Universitat	Pompeu	
Fabra,	2005),	at	p.	612.
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This conceptual distinction is materially significant, because the Spanish Constitutional 
Court applies different standards (see section 4).
3.16.1.3. Interpretative statutes
Spain has interpretative ministerial orders in tax matters (Article 12.3 of the General Tax Act 
(GTA)). Their inherent ‘retroactive’ effect is permitted inasmuch as they do not add anything 
new to the interpreted rule, but only point out the right interpretation. However, this view 
is debated in the literature, because the interpretative order restricts the scope of interpre-
tation of a former statute.
3.16.1.4. Validation statutes
The legal system knows the phenomenon of ‘validation statute’, but according to the Consti-
tutional Court a statute which tries to heal former unconstitutional or illegal tax debts leads 
to maximal retroactivity and is forbidden (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 
116/2009 and 146/2009).
3.16.1.5. Comparison moment
In Spain a distinction is made between the date of entry into force of a statute and the effec-
tive date of a statute2. As a general rule, tax statutes enter into force twenty days after their 
complete publication in the Official Gazette (Article 11.1 GTA), if they do not provide for 
something else. 
In principle, the relevant moment to compare, in order to determine whether a stat-
ute has retroactive effect or not, is the date of the entry into force of the statute, but the 
moment of publication in the Official Journal (and even the moment of publication of the 
draft statute in the parliamentary gazette) is relevant for assessing the degree of legal uncer-
tainty caused by the retroactive effect.
3.16.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
See section 3.16.4.
3.16.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
a. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect
As a general rule (with the exceptions provided by transitional provisions) procedural rules 
do not apply to procedures initiated before the statute’s entry into force (transitional provi-
sion No. 3 GTA). 
b. Rules considered procedural rules
Tax assessment, tax audit and tax collection rules are considered procedural rules. The Span-
ish General Tax Act also characterizes rules on the burden of the proof as procedural rules 
(Article 105). 
2.	 Macho,	supra	note	1,	at	p.	46.
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3.16.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.16.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) prohibits the retroactivity of criminal and 
administrative penal provisions and of provisions which restrict individual rights. However, 
according to the Spanish Constitutional Court, the prohibition does not include genuine 
tax rules. However, the constitutional principle of legal certainty (also foreseen in Article 9.3 
SC) is in conflict with the higher levels of retroactivity if it is not justified by extraordinary 
reasons of public interest.
3.16.2.2. Transitional policy of government
According to Article 10(2) GTA No. 58/2003, unless the contrary is provided tax norms will 
not have retroactive effect and will apply to taxes without a taxable period accrued after the 
entry in force and to other taxes the taxable period of which begins after entry into force.
3.16.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
Article 107 SC foresees the Council of State as the supreme advisory body of the govern-
ment. Its regulation is included in the Organic Parliamentary Act No. 3 of 1980. Nevertheless 
there are no special requirements for requesting advice regarding retroactive rules.
3.16.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.16.3.1. Legislating by press release
In Spain the legislator occasionally makes use of an instrument similar to the instrument of 
‘legislating by press release’. It is permissible to prevent announcement effects through the 
publication of the draft retroactive provisions in the parliament’s official journal. In this 
case, retroactivity is permitted back to the date of publication in the journal. 
3.16.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
Sometimes the Spanish legislator grants retroactive effect to tax statutes going further back 
in time from the moment of its first announcement. This may be permitted, taking into 
account imperative reasons of general interest which are at stake and the degree of legal 
uncertainty which could be caused to the taxpayers (see section 4).
3.16.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
Even if the retroactive period is long, pending legal proceedings are as matter of principle 
excluded from the application of the new statute.
3.16.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
Retroactive effect to tax statutes which are favourable to taxpayers only apply to administra-
tive penalties, surcharges (Article 10.2 GTA) and, occasionally, to late interest and special 
cases of tax liability (first transitional provision of the General Tax Act).
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3.16.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
In Spain, courts can test the retroactivity of regulations for compatibility with the Constitu-
tion and with parliamentary acts. If they consider that a parliamentary act is incompatible 
with the Constitution they should suspend the procedure and refer the question to the 
Constitutional Court. 
The Spanish Constitutional Court can test the retroactivity of a tax statute against the 
principle of legal certainty provided by Article 9.3 SC.
In Spanish practice, courts do not test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Arti-
cle 1 of the First Protocol ECHR.
The Spanish Constitutional Court differentiates three degrees of retroactivity, taking 
into account whether the statute applies to legal situations before the publication of the 
statute (maximal retroactivity) to situations commenced before the publication but ended 
after the publication of the statute (medium or ‘improper retroactivity’) and those not really 
commenced before the publication of the law (mere expectations). This third case (mini-
mum degree of retroactivity) is allowed. Medium or improper retroactivity is allowed, pro-
vided it does not create a serious breach of legal certainty. Maximum retroactivity is forbid-
den unless it is justified by serious reasons of general interest.
According to our constitutional case law:
– Statutes providing for retroactive charges with the aim of healing former unconstitu-
tional ‘fees’ result in a case of maximal retroactivity which cannot be justified (Judg-
ments of the Constitutional Court Nos. 116/2009, 146/2009, 161/2009 and 74/2010).
– If the income tax rates are increased at the middle of the taxable period (the calendar 
year) with effect from 1 January through a Decree-Law confirmed by a latter parliamen-
tary act, retroactivity is possible, even if the Decree-Law is declared unconstitutional for 
legislating on matters reserved to a parliamentary act. This is so, because the unconstitu-
tional Decree-Law had an announcement effect and therefore the taxpayers’ legal cer-
tainty was respected (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 192 of 1997).
– It is constitutional to abolish permanent tax allowances from a periodical tax on real 
estate without granting any transitional rights for future taxable events (grandfather-
ing). In this case there is no real retroactivity or acquired rights but merely taxpayers’ 
expectations (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 6 of 1983). However, it is uncon-
stitutional to abolish exemptions applicable to already accrued taxable events (Judg-
ment of the Constitutional Court No. 234 of 2001, regarding excise duties).
– It is constitutional to increase the tax rate of already accrued tax debts on gambling 
devices if there are reasons of public interest to do so, e.g. past extraordinary profits 
which were taxed at a very low rate where the business activity is not desirable (Judg-
ment of the Constitutional Court No. 126 of 1987). If such reasons do not exist, the retro-
active taxation is unconstitutional (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 173 of 
1996).
3.16.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.16.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
According to Article 40 of the Organic Parliamentary Act on the Constitutional Court, con-
stitutional judgments cannot revise final judgments (res iudicata), with the only exception 
of criminal judgments or judgments on administrative penalties, where the penalty or 
responsibility should be reduced as a consequence of the unconstitutionality. Regarding tax 
matters, the Constitutional Court has the tendency to explicitly reject the reimbursement of 
unconstitutional tax debts if they are final (Judgment of the Constitutional Court No. 45 of 
1989). However, in several cases the Supreme Court has considered that this limitation of 
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effects must be helpful through a right to damages equal to the amount of the tax paid and 
the late interest (Judgments of the Supreme Court of 22 February 2005 and 5 December 
2006). 
3.16.6. Views in the literature
3.16.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
The literature generally agrees that retroactivity of tax statutes is constitutional provided 
the legal certainty is not affected in a disproportionate way. However, it is considered that 
the distinction made by Constitutional Court of three degrees of retroactivity is too formal 
and does not reflect the severity of the breach of legal certainty.
3.16.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view on transitional tax law has not led to debate in Spain.
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3.17.
Sweden 
Katarina Fast, Peter Melz and Anders Hultqvist
3.17.1. General introduction
The Swedish Constitution is based on four constitutional statutes: the Instrument of Gov-
ernment, Regeringsformen (1974:152), the Act of Succession, Successionsordningen 
(1810:0926), the Freedom of the Press Act, Tryckfrihetsförordningen (1949:105) and the Fun-
damental Law on Freedom of Expression, Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen (1991:1469).1 The 
Instrument of Government contains the main provisions. The Riksdag Act, Riksdagsordnin-
gen (1974:153) comprises provisions on the rules for parliament. Only the Instrument of 
Government (IG) and the Riksdag Act (RA) are relevant for this report. 
The Swedish Instrument of Government (IG) of 1975 does not mention any general 
prohibition concerning retrospective legislation. However, in chapter 2 IG there is an 
explicit prohibition of retrospective legislation regarding criminal law and tax law.
In practice, the IG is of rather limited importance in the legislative process as well as 
regarding the application of the law. Some of the reasons mentioned in the Swedish doc-
trine are the lack of constitutional tradition in the courts and the weak elements concerning 
the separation of powers in the Swedish Constitution.2 However, the IG has gradually 
increased in importance since the entry of Sweden into the European Union in 1995 and the 
Europeanization of Swedish legal culture.3 
The Swedish Constitution is not clearly based on the principle of separation of pow-
ers as in the case of most European countries, but focuses on what is known as the principle 
of the people’s sovereignty (folksuveränitetsprincipen) with a diversity of functions (funktions-
fördelning). According to Chapter 1, Article 1 IG ‘All public power in Sweden proceeds from 
the people. Swedish democracy is founded on the free formation of opinion and on univer-
sal and equal suffrage. It shall be realized through a representative and parliamentary polity 
and through local self-government. Public power shall be exercised under the law.’4 This 
means that the courts are subordinate to the parliament (Riksdagen), even though politics 
1.	 The	articles	of	the	Swedish	Constitution	referred	to	in	this	report	are	all	in	accordance	with	the	official	English	
version:	The	Constitution	of	Sweden	–	The	Fundamental	Laws	and	the	Riksdag	Act,	(Stockholm:	Sveriges	Riksdag,	
2000).	The	official	English	version	is	also	available	at	the	homepage	of	the	Riksdag,	www.riksdagen.se.
2.	 See	for	example	Thomas	Bull,	‘Konstitutionella	snedsteg	–	en	studie	av	svensk	trohet	mot	grundlag’,	in:	Eivind	Smith	
and	Olof	Petersson,	eds.,	Konstitutionell	demokrati	(Stockholm:	SNS	Förlag,	2004),	at	p.	86;	Persson	claims	that	in	
general,	there	is	a	lack	of	legal	principles	in	the	explanatory	statements	for	new	legislation,	even	in	an	international	
perspective;	Asa	Persson,	De	politiska	partiernas	rättspolitik,	(Uppsala:	Iustus	förlag,	2004),	at	p.	299.
3.	 See	for	example	Joakim	Nergelius,	Förvaltningsprocess,	normprövning	och	Europarätt	(Stockholm:	Norstedts	
juridik,	2000).
4.	 The	reform	of	the	IG	in	2011	indicates	however	a	trend	towards	a	strengthening	of	the	principle	of	separation	of	
powers	in	Sweden.	The	so	called	“manifest	criterion”	concerning	judicial	review	of	legislation	by	the	courts	and	
other	public	bodies	(lagprövning,	se	further	3.17.5)	has	been	repealed.	There	have	also	been	changes	in	the	rules	
regarding	the	appointment	of	judges.
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and the administration of justice are treated as two separate areas.5 There is also an obliga-
tion for the legislator to pay regard to the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
Fundamental Freedoms from 1950 (ECHR) under Chapter 2, Article 19 and the law 
(1994:1219) on the European Convention of Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms.
Fundamental rights and freedoms are regulated in Chapter 2 of the IG. It contains 
absolute rights, which may not be limited by other means than through a change of the IG 
(a constitutional amendment) according to a particular procedure mentioned below.6 
Relative rights may in principle be changed by ‘ordinary’ law, which means a decision by the 
parliament in which more than half of those voting concur (Chapter 4, Article 7 IG). 
The Constitution can be amended according to Chapter 8, Article14 IG by means of 
two parliamentary decisions of identical wording. The second decision may not be taken 
until elections for the parliament have been held, and the newly-elected parliament has 
convened. At least nine months must elapse between the time when the matter was first 
submitted to the Parliament and the date of the election, unless the Committee on the Con-
stitution (Konstitutionsutskottet) grants an exception from this provision by means of a deci-
sion taken no later than the committee stage, in which at least five-sixths of the members 
concur.
Regarding law which is not constitutional law, Chapter 8, Article 18 IG prescribes that 
no law may be amended or abrogated other than by another law. Articles 17 and 18 in the 
same chapter apply in a similar way with respect to amendment or abrogation of constitu-
tional law. It is therefore impossible for the government to change a law by way of an ordi-
nance or other statutory instruments. 
The Legality Principle in the Swedish IG takes its starting-point in the general stipula-
tion in Chapter 1 Article 1 IG: ‘Public power shall be exercised under the law.’ 
Only the parliament (Riksdagen) can enact laws (Chapter 1, Article 4 IG). 
The legality principle (legalitetsprincipen) is manifested in the Constitution (Chap-
ter 8 IG). 
Certain fields can only be regulated by an act of law, the ‘sphere of mandatory law’ 
(Chapter 8, Article 2 IG). This category involves civil law in its entirety and provisions for 
defining and delimiting the courts in the administration of justice. The power to tax provided 
for in Chapter 8, Article 3 IG may only be delegated to the government in respect of customs 
duties. 
The other level is called the sphere of facultative law and opens up an important area of 
delegated legislation. This technique is commonly used in wide areas of public law (Chapter 
8, Articles 3, 5 and 7 IG). As mentioned this is of no interest concerning tax legislation, with 
the exception of customs duties (Chapter 8, Article 9 IG). 
Thus, tax law, with the exception of import duties and tax regarding the regulation of 
traffic within the municipality, cannot be regulated other than by an act of law (Chapter 8, 
Article 3 para 2 IG), which means only by a decision of the parliament. 
The legality principle concerning taxation (den skatterättsliga legalitetsprincipen) is 
manifested in the Constitution (Chapter 8, Article 3, IG and Chapter 2, Article 10 IG). The 
central tenet of the legality principle is that tax provisions shall be promulgated by law. It 
represents a long tradition concerning prerequisites for taxation. The parliament may not 
delegate this competence to the government or to a public authority, except when introduc-
ing regulations to supplement and/or implement statutory provisions under limited cir-
cumstances. 
According to the prevailing opinion in Sweden, a reasonable consequence of the 
legality principle is that taxes may only be levied according to the law applicable at the time 
5.	 Frederik	Sterzel,	Författning	i	utveckling	(Gothenburg:	Iustus	förlag,	1998),	at	p.	48.	
6.	 The	prohibition	against	retroactive	tax	law	is	absolute.
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of the circumstance that gave rise to the tax liability in question, which means that retroac-
tive tax legislation is prohibited (förbud mot retroaktiv skattelag).7 
Another result of the legality principle is that taxes may not be imposed through 
analogous application of the law (analogiförbudet).8
Finally, tax law may not be directed towards an individual tax subject, which is the 
principle of general law-making (generalitetsprincipen), a principle emanating from the 
preparatory works of the IG as a consequence of the legality principle.9
3.17.2. Terminology 
3.17.2.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
a. In general 
There is no explicit definition of retroactivity in the Swedish Constitution and its prepara-
tory works. Nor is there any definition in any other legislative acts. However, the provision 
in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG could be deemed to contain an implicit definition. 
In the questionnaire formal retroactivity is defined as when ‘the effective entrance 
date of (one of more provisions of) a statute is set at a date prior to the moment on which 
the statute enters into force’. Chapter 2, Article 10 IG prohibits a provision from being 
applied to a taxable transaction occurring before the decision of the parliament. That would 
coincide with the definition of formal retroactivity in the questionnaire.
However, a problem for Sweden (or at least for the Swedish national report) is that 
there is an exception to the prohibition when the government sends a communication to 
the parliament. An act which later is decided by the parliament could also be applied to 
transactions before the decision of parliament if they occurred after the Communication 
was submitted. Taxation during this period means formal retroactivity, using the definition 
in the questionnaire, but is not a prohibited form of retroactivity according to Chapter 2, 
Article 10 IG. We will use the definition of retroactivity in the questionnaire, but we would 
like to stress that we consider that the negative effects of formal retroactivity are normally 
considerably reduced when the Communication Procedure is applied in a responsible way. 
b. Conceptual variations 
In tax law doctrine as well as in the prevailing opinion in several other legal areas, a distinc-
tion is made between true/actual/formal retroactivity and false/material retroactivity.10 True 
retroactivity represents the situations which are considered retroactive because new rules 
are applied to transactions that have already occurred, e.g. transactions that were tax-free 
when they were undertaken. False retroactivity stands for the idea that new rules can have 
retroactive effect on past transactions. Concerning the value added tax, Melz has established 
a separate terminology in which he distinguishes between retroactivity, which signifies true 
retroactivity, and retrospective effects, signifying false retroactivity.11
7.	 Anders	Hultqvist,	Legalitetsprincipen	vid	inkomstbeskattningen	(Stockholm:	Juristförlaget,	1995),	at	p.	100.
8.	 Hultqvist	supra	note	6,	at	p.	126.	
9.	 Hultqvist,	supra	note	6,	at	p.	115.
10.	 See	for	example	Katarina	Fast,	‘Om	skyddet	mot	retroaktiv	beskattning	–	i	belysning	av	regeringsformen	och	
Europakonventionen’,	Skattenytt,	akademisk	årsskrift,	årgång	1	2011,	p.	118;	Robert	Påhlsson,	Konstitutionell	
skatterätt	(Iustus	förlag,	2009),	at	p.	32;	Wiweka	Warnling-Nerep,	‘Till	frågan	om	legalitet	och	retroaktitivitet	i	
svensk	rätt’,	Juridisk	Tidskrift	2008/2009	nr	4,;	Jan	Darpö,	‘Miljövårdskraven	i	tiden	(I)’,	Förvaltningsrättslig	
Tidskrift	2001/1-2;	Jan-Mikael	Bexhed,	‘Retroaktiv	skattelagstiftning	–	kan	regeringsformens	förbud	kringgås?’,	
SkatteNytt	1993,	at	p.	154.
11.	 Peter	Melz,	Mervärdeskatten	–	rättsliga	problem	och	grunder,	(Stockholm:	Juristförlaget,	1990),	at	p.	233.
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c. Clear distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
The definition of actual retroactivity is rather clear, also as it appears in the Swedish Consti-
tution and is therefore not particularly controversial. 
However, the definition of false retroactivity is rather vague and leaves several ques-
tions unanswered. In tax law doctrine there are many different views on what may consti-
tute false retroactivity. At present, the concept is of no particular constitutional value, as will 
be further explained below.
Only the definition of true retroactivity will be used in legal practice, since it is the 
only form of retroactivity which enjoys constitutional protection. This can be said to be 
connected to the provision concerning ex post evaluation of law, laid down in Article 11:14 
IG, which will be further elaborated on below.
The retroactivity prohibited in the Swedish Constitution (Chapter 2, Article 10 IG) 
covers every transaction which occurred before the date of decision by parliament (or the 
date of a Government Communication; see above). It is thus not permissible to apply a new 
rule to a transaction that occured before the date of the decision, even if it is within the 
same year. Although this is somewhat contentious, some taxes, such as the wealth tax, are 
considered to be levied according to circumstances at the end of the year and amendments 
are thus allowable only if they are decided before the end of the year.12
The distinction, is of some material relevance, but is of limited constitutional value. 
The question of false retroactivity might be considered in the legal interpretation of a law or 
a statute. Such considerations concerning de facto retroactivity may occur as well if, in a 
particular case, the protection of property laid down in the first protocol, Article 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms might be relevant. 
3.17.2.2. Relevance of tax period 
The constitutional provision in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG offers protection against obvious 
retroactivity and results in reasonable foreseeability in most cases. In a number of situations 
the provision is not applicable although reasons for a wider coverage are present. A short 
overview will be given.
For income from employment, tax rules may not be revised after the point in time when 
income has been received or is disposable. Before this point in time, e.g. after the contract is 
concluded and during the time the service is rendered, the tax may be increased.
This situation could be considered acceptable for practical reasons and because the 
employee normally has no other alternative activities with different (better) tax effects.
The liability for taxes from income from business often arises at the time of the delivery 
of goods or the rendering of service. The result is largely similar to the employment situa-
tion. Tax rules may be changed after the conclusion of the contract, production of the goods, 
etc.
However, the negative consequences may be more important in a business than for 
an employee. In a business it could be more important to factor in the effect of changes in 
taxation rules, because in a business environment the competition is harder, investments 
more extensive and more alternatives are available.
For VAT the situation is similar to business income. The consequences could, however, 
be more onerous as VAT is not a tax as a proportion of the business income, but could 
amount to a payment far bigger than the income. That is because VAT is considered to be 
shifted to the purchaser.
If a seller calculates the VAT according to the tax rate in force when a contract is con-
cluded, there is a risk that the tax rate could be increased before delivery. If the purchaser is 
12.	 The	wealth	tax	was	repealed	in	2008.
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a taxable person with right to deduction of VAT, it would normally not be a problem to 
invoice VAT, calculated with the new tax rate. In other cases it may not be as easy to shift the 
VAT increase to the purchaser without an explicit clause to that effect in the contract.
The liability for taxes concerning income from capital arises for capital gains at the 
point of time of the sale (binding contract). That means that the seller can be sure of the tax 
effects when he signs the contract. At the time of the capital investment – purchase of real 
estate, stocks, etc. – there is however no guarantee that taxation may not increase.
Anyhow this situation could be considered satisfactory. A wider protection, from the 
time of the investment, would result in fairly unequal results, as capital gains of equal char-
acter could be taxed considerably differently because of different dates of the original 
investment. It would also create a lock-in effect, as there is a tax incentive to hold on to an 
investment covered by favourable tax rules instead of exchanging it for a new investment 
which would be covered by less favourable tax rules.
3.17.2.3. Interpretative statutes 
The Swedish legal system does not contain any (retroactive) interpretative statutes. 
3.17.2.4. Validation statutes
The Swedish legal system does not contain any (retroactive) validation statutes.
3.17.2.5. Comparison moment
Like the Netherlands legal system, the date of entry into force of a law in the Swedish legal 
system corresponds to the date of publication of the law. All laws and ordinances are pub-
lished in the Swedish Code of Statutes (Svensk Författningssamling, SFS), which is available in 
printed form and on the internet.13
The relevant moment of comparison in order to determine whether a law has retroac-
tive effect is the date of the entry into force of the law. 
A rather recent example is a government proposal regarding the taxation of 
loss-making companies in order to hinder undesired tax planning. The law entered into 
force on 1 January 2010, but the effective date is 5 June 2009.14
3.17.2.6. Concept of retrospectivity
a. Definition of retrospectivity
As stated above, there is a distinction between actual and false retroactivity. False retroactiv-
ity would be what is mentioned in the questionnaire as retrospectivity.
b. Examples of retrospectivity
There are some examples of cases which would represent retrospectivity, to which we refer 
below. The Council on Legislation has discussed legislative proposals concerning not only 
retroactivity but also retrospectivity on several occasions. This is also true for the case law 
concerning retrospective effects. 
13.	 See	www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=3910;	www.lagrummet.se.
14.	 Prop	2009/10:47,	Ändringar	i	reglerna	om	beskattning	av	underskottsföretag;	Skr.	2008/09:225.
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3.17.2.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
a. In general 
According to the preparatory works of Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, the concept of retroactive 
legislation not only comprises substantive tax law but in some cases procedural tax law as 
well.
b. With respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect 
The distinction between retroactivity concerning substantive tax law and procedural rules 
relating to taxation has been applied by the Supreme Administrative Court.
c. Rules considered procedural rules
The application of the prohibition of retroactive tax law in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG does not 
embrace all procedural rules concerning taxation, but mainly refers to rules regarding 
evidence. 
3.17.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity 
3.17.3.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
The prohibition of retroactive tax legislation (förbud mot retroaktiv skattelag) is provided for 
in Chapter 2, Article10 IG as follows:
‘No taxes or charges due the State may be exacted except inasmuch as this follows 
from provisions which were in force when the circumstance arose which occasioned the 
liability for the tax or charge. Should the Riksdag find that special reasons so warrant, it may 
however provide under an act of law that taxes or charges due the State shall be exacted 
even although no such act had entered into force when the aforementioned circumstance 
arose, provided the Government, or a committee of the Riksdag, had submitted a proposal 
to this effect to the Riksdag at the time concerned. A written communication from the Gov-
ernment to the Riksdag announcing the forthcoming introduction of such a proposal is 
equated with a formal proposal. The Riksdag may furthermore prescribe that exceptions 
shall be made to the provisions of sentence one if it considers that this is warranted on 
special grounds connected with war, the danger of war, or grave economic crisis.’ (Arti-
cle 2:10 second paragraph.)
The prohibition of retroactive tax law is provided for in the first sentence. There are 
some exceptions to the prohibition. An exception applies when the government or a parlia-
mentary committee has presented a tax bill to parliament. In such a case, the tax can be 
levied already as of the day that the bill was presented to parliament. The same applies when 
the government transmits to parliament a written communication stating that a tax bill will 
be forthcoming.15 This possibility has frequently been used, especially in order to hinder 
undesirable consequences of tax law, such as undesirable tax planning and tax evasion. 
The prohibition of retroactive tax legislation was introduced in 1980. A Committee of 
inquiry regarding an increased protection of rights and freedoms in the IG proposed an 
expanded protection against retroactive legislation, which until then had only applied 
under criminal law.16 The prohibition in this field of law was considered particularly 
important because of the onerous character of taxation for the citizens, not least with 
regard to the fact that a large part of the income of citizens is subject to taxation. It was also 
considered possible to sufficiently define retroactivity in relation to tax law.
15.	 Hultqvist,	supra	note	6.
16.	 SOU	1978:34,	Förstärkt	skydd	för	fri-och	rättigheter,	Betänkande	av	rättighetsskyddsutredningen.
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The protection from retroactive tax law laid down in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG is among those 
rights considered to be absolute and cannot be abrogated other than by a change in the IG 
(see Chapter 8, Article 14 and the introduction above). 
It may be concluded that Chapter 2, Article 10 IG is concerned with what we would 
generally call formal retroactivity or true/actual retroactivity. The prohibition only concerns 
retroactive tax legislation which is onerous to the taxpayer. Consequently, there is no objec-
tion to retroactivity in tax law that would be favourable to taxpayers.17 
In order to decide whether onerous retroactivity is at hand, it is necessary to establish 
what kind of transaction gave rise to the tax liability and at what point in time it gives rise to 
a liability to pay tax, e.g. a delivery, the closure of a contract or a sale. This point in time is 
different for different taxes. 
According to the Swedish Income Tax Act, income from employment is normally 
subject to tax when payment is received or at the disposal of the taxpayer,18 and income 
from business is normally subject to tax when the income should be reported according to 
general accounting principles.19 For value added tax, tax liability arises at the time of sup-
ply of goods or services.20
This means that an increase in the tax rate during the fiscal year, which would pertain 
to income earned before the tax law was amended, would constitute a breach of the prohi-
bition of retroactive tax legislation. The same applies to tax deductions. If an increase in the 
tax rate is introduced during the fiscal year that applies only for compensations or deduc-
tions thereafter it would, however, be in line with the provision laid down in 2:10 IG.21 
The provision might seem to cover only substantive tax rules. Nevertheless, according 
to the preparatory works of Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, it is also supposed to cover procedural 
rules to some extent, e.g. when it comes to questions relating to the burden of proof.22
According to Hultqvist, the provision in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, not only comprises 
legislative acts but also regulations. The Swedish term ‘föreskrift’ embraces both legislative 
acts and statutory regulations.23 
As mentioned above, Chapter 2, Article10 IG provides that tax laws in certain cases 
can be promulgated according to a proposal from the Committee on Taxation of the Riks-
dag (Skatteutskottet) or a government proposal elaborated in a particular written communi-
cation. The communications may be detailed, but are seldom final enough to provide for an 
absolute foreseeability of the consequences of the forthcoming legislation.24
The provision in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG is not very detailed. It does not give any 
examples of situations in which this particular legislative procedure is adequate, nor does it 
prescribe any limits for the time period that may prevail between the communication and 
the bill presented to the parliament. According to the preparatory works, this procedure is 
mainly to be used in situations when it is considered necessary to rapidly hinder further 
undesirable tax planning or tax evasion. Nevertheless, the proposed rules must be in accor-
dance with general requirements of legal security and must be considered reasonable for 
17.	 SOU	1978:34,	p	161;	Påhlsson,	supra	note	9,	at	p.	32.
18.	 Income	Tax	Act,	Inkomstskattelagen,	ch.	10	sec.	8	and	ch.	41	sec.	8.
19.	 Income	Tax,	Inkomstskattelagen,	Act	ch.	14	sec.	2.
20.	 Value	Added	Tax	Act,	Mervärdesskattelagen,	ch.	4	sec.	2.
21.	 SOU	1978:34.
22.	 SOU	1978:34	at	p.	160.
23.	 Hultqvist,	supra	note	6,	at	p.	142.
24.	 Påhlsson,	‘Retroaktiv	stopplagstiftning	–	en	utvärdering	av	stoppskrivelseinstitutet’,	Skattenytt,	Akademisk	årskrift,	
årgång	1	2011,	s	43.
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the taxpayers.25 A study by professor Påhlsson in 2011, however, reveals that the use of 
written communication procedures lack precision and forseeability.26
The procedure for written communication by the government is further regulated in 
the Riksdag Act (RA). According to Chapter 3, Article 6 RA the Government may communi-
cate information to the parliament by means of a written communication. A written com-
munication is to be delivered to the Secretariat of the Chamber (Kammarkansliet). It is noti-
fied by the Speaker (Talmannen) to a meeting of the Chamber (Kammaren) after copies have 
been distributed to the members. 
This means that the government is not able to deliver such communications orally to 
the parliament. Furthermore, a mere mention of retroactive tax legislation in preparation of 
the Budget Bill is not sufficient to constitute a written communication within the meaning 
of Chapter 2, Article 10 IG.27
According to the mandatory preparation of business (beredningstvång) provided for 
in Chapter 4, Article 1 RA, government bills, written communications from the Government, 
submissions or reports from a parliamentary body other than a committee and private 
members’ motions must be referred to a committee for preparation. Before a matter is 
referred to a committee for preparation, it is tabled at a meeting of the Chamber, unless the 
Chamber decides on immediate referral.
In tax matters the committee for preparation is the Committee on Taxation (Skat-
teutskottet). The committee will then prepare the written communication before it is noti-
fied to the Chamber.
The time at which the tax law elaborated according to the particular legislative proce-
dures prescribed in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG is set will be at the date of when the written 
communication is delivered to the Secretariat of the Chamber and hence becomes a public 
official document according to Chapter 2 of the Freedom of the Press Act, or if the proposal 
has been elaborated by the Committee on Taxation, the point in time when the proposal is 
notified to the Chamber (immediate effect). As mentioned above, it is also possible that the 
law will enter into force at an earlier date than the day of the introduction of the proposed 
legislation if it is considered necessary in order to hinder continued tax planning in a cer-
tain field or tax evasion.28 
In order for the written communications procedure or the bill presented by the Com-
mittee on Taxation to be valid, it has to be effectively communicated to the public, prefera-
bly through a press conference in connection to the introduction of the written communi-
cation or committee proposal.29 
3.17.3.2. Transitional policy of government
a. Is there a transitional policy of government?
There is no particular transitional policy elaborated by the government. There are, however, 
situations described in the preparatory works for when transitional rules are necessary, 
which could be said to constitute a policy for the government. 
25.	 Prop.	1978/79:195	p.	55,	SOU	1978:34	at	p.	157.
26.	 Påhlsson,	supra	note	22.	
27.	 Prop.	1978/79:195,	at	p.	176.
28.	 Prop.	1978/79:195,	at	p.	162
29.	 Prop.	1978/79:195,	at	p.	162.
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b. Transitional policy laid down in a document or an act 
Transitional rules will always be enacted by law in connection with the tax act in question. 
No other means would be possible in respect of the legality principle. The transitional rules 
might further be scrutinized by the Council on Legislation.
Further information on how transitional rules ought to be applied is generally laid 
down in the preparatory works. 
c. Transitional policy with respect to retroactivity and grandfathering 
No information available.
d. Transitional policy and favourable retroactive effect
No information available.
3.17.3.3. Ex ante control by an independent body 
a. Advisory body such as Council of State
According to Chapter 8, Articles 20-22 IG the government is obliged as a matter of principle 
to remit major items of draft legislation to the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet), which is 
composed of members of the Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) and the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court (Högsta Förvaltningsdomstolen). In brief, the consultations of the Council are to 
ensure conformity with the Constitution and the legal system in general, internal consis-
tency within laws, and to safeguard the principles of the rule of law in law-making.
b. Rules to review retroactivity
The provision on the scrutiny of the Council on Legislation, laid down in Chapter 8, Arti-
cle 21 IG can be said to provide for a check-list on good legislation. 
The Council’s scrutiny relates to
– the way in which the draft law relates to the Constitution and the legal system in general;
– the way in which the different provisions of the proposed law relate to each other; 
– the way in which the proposed law relates to the requirements of the rule of law;
– whether the proposed law is so framed that the resulting law may be expected to satisfy 
the stated purposes of the proposed law;
– the problems likely to arise in applying the proposed law.
More precise rules concerning the composition and the working procedures of the 
Council on Legislation are laid down in the law (2003:333) on the Council on Legislation.30 
The Council on Legislation has scrutinized retroactivity on several occasions in accor-
dance with Chapter 8, Article 21, which in certain cases has led to rejection of the law by the 
parliament. 
In 1986 the introduction of new legislation imposing a one time wealth tax on life 
insurance companies, certain mutual societies and pension foundations (Lag om tillfällig 
förmögenhetsskatt för livförsäkringsbolag, understödsföreningar och pensionsstiftelser), which 
was to be applied retroactively, was the object for the scrutiny by the Council on Legisla-
tion.31 The Council stated that the legislation in question could not be said to constitute a 
breach of the prohibition in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, even though it was considered not to 
be entirely compatible with the purpose of the provision.
30.	 The	Constitution	of	Sweden	–	The	Fundamental	Laws	and	the	Riksdag	Act,	(Stockholm:	Sveriges	Riksdag,	2000),	at	
pp.	35	and	79.
31.	 Prop.	1986/87:61,	Frederik	Sterzel,	Skatt	och	egendomsskydd,	Äganderätten	–	dess	omfattning	och	begränsningar,	
(Uppsala:	Iustus	förlag,	2009),	at	p.	102ff.
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This practice concerning Chapter 2, Article10 IG not only concerns taxes but also fees. In 
2001 the legislation concerning a concession fee for a Swedish television company, TV4, was 
changed retroactively since an omission had been made in the legislation concerning pay-
ments during the first six months of 2001. The law was therefore proposed to be changed so 
that TV4 would pay a double fee during the last six months of 2001. The Council on Legisla-
tion did not approve this and stated that the procedure constituted a flagrant attempt to 
circumvent the protection stipulated in Chapter 2, Article10 IG.32 
A more recent statement concerns new legislation regarding deferral of capital gains 
tax due to an exchange of personal dwellings.33 The tax credit caused by this deferral was 
previously free of interest. The new legislation, however, means that everyone who has been 
granted such a deferral, irrespective of when this happened, had to pay interest on the 
deferred amount by 1 January 2008. It has been debated whether this constitutes a breach 
of the prohibition of retroactive tax law in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG.34 The Council on Legisla-
tion did not find the proposed legislation contrary to Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, since it would 
represent a general liability from the mentioned date and because taxpayers would have 
enough time to take relevant actions in order not to pay the interest, e.g. by restoring the 
deferral of taxation before 31 January 2007.35 
In conclusion, there are no particular rules regarding tax legislation, only the general 
rules as stated above, which apply to all kinds of legislation. More specific guidelines are 
given in the preparatory works to Chapter 2, Article10 IG.
c. Rules to review grandfathering 
The technique of grandfathering clauses is not, to our knowledge used in retroactive tax 
legislation. If this were to be used in a legislative proposal, it would most likely be referred 
to the Council of Legislation for scrutiny. 
d. Rules to review favourable retroactivity
As mentioned above, there is no prohibition in Swedish tax law on any level that would 
prohibit retroactive tax legislation in favour of taxpayers.
3.17.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.17.4.1. Legislating by press release?
There is no instrument such as legislating by press release in the Swedish legal system. 
As mentioned above, the legislative practice regarding retroactive tax legislation is 
explained in the prohibition against retroactive tax law, Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, which 
prescribes a special rapid legislative procedure. This is complemented by certain rules in the 
Riksdag Act. Furthermore, the preparatory works to the provision in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG 
provide information on how the government or the Committee on Taxation will actively 
communicate its proposal to the public, other than by the ordinary publication procedures 
that are relevant for all legislation, in order to forewarn the public and especially certain 
groups of particulars that might be concerned, so that they can take proper actions in order 
32.	 See	for	example	Frederik	Sterzel,	Finansmakten	–	i	konstitutionens	centrum	och	periferi	in:	Eivind	Smith	and	Olof	
Petersson,	eds.,	Konstitutionell	demokrati,	(Stockholm:	SNS	Förlag,	2004),	at	p.	99.
33.	 Chapter	47	of	the	Income	Tax	Act	(Inkomstskattelagen).
34.	 See	e.g.	Jacob	Roupe,	Svensk	skattetidning	2008:6-7,	Skatten	(‘räntan)	på	gamla	uppskov	vid	bostadsbyten	strider	
mot	regeringsformen.	
35.	 Prop.	2007/08:27	at	p.	240.
367
Fast, Melz & Hultqvist Part 3   3.17. Sweden  – 3.17.4.4. 
to comply with the proposed rules. This is normally done through a press release or even a 
press conference.
The obligation to communicate a proposal concerning retroactivity concerns all 
retroactive tax legislation. 
There is, as mentioned above, no instrument called legislating by press release. How-
ever, it is an essential part of the legislative procedure concerning retroactive tax law that 
the law will be communicated to the public in an effective way, which is practically always 
carried out through a press release. 
3.17.4.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
In certain cases the date may reach further back in the past than the date of a written com-
munication. Most commonly this would be the case concerning issues like tax avoidance. 
Nonetheless, there have been other situations where retroactivity has been used to increase 
the public finances during an upward economic trend, such as the introduction of a new 
legislation in 1986 imposing a one time wealth tax on life insurance companies, certain 
mutual societies and pension foundations (Lag om tillfällig förmögenhetsskatt för livs-
försäkringsbolag, understödsföreningar och pensionsstiftelser). The introduction of this law was 
highly controversial. It was also subject to a complaint to the European Court of Human 
Rights with reference to the protection of property.36
3.17.4.3. Pending legal proceedings
Retroactivity which might affect pending legal proceedings should be regulated in the 
transitional rules. In addition, the situation can be dealt with by the courts through the 
application laid down in Article 11:14 IG
It is not common for pending legal proceedings to be excluded. Normally this is not a 
practical problem since most pending proceedings concern circumstances that happened 
long before the retroactive legislation became effective. Retroactivity is generally not 
granted for more than perhaps a couple of months and not years. In the case that a legisla-
tive proposal is introduced as a reaction to a court judgment, it is, in principle, always after 
a judgment from the Supreme Administrative Court, which means that pending proceed-
ings in the lower courts already have been going on for some time, relating to dates long 
before the period of retroactivity. 
3.17.4.4. Favourable retroactivity 
As mentioned above, the prohibition laid down in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, only concerns 
retroactive tax legislation which is onerous to the taxpayer. Consequently, there is no objec-
tion to retroactivity in tax law, which would be favourable to taxpayers.37 One example of 
this was in connection with the repeal of the inheritance and gift tax law which entered into 
force on 1 January 2005. At the end of December 2004, following the tragic deaths of many 
Swedish citizens in the tsunami disaster in South East Asia, retroactivity was granted 
through a special law from 17 December 2004.38
36.	 ECHR,	appl	No.	13013/87	Wasa Liv	Ömsesidigt,	Försäkringsbolaget	Valands	Pensionsstiftelse	and	a	goup	of	approxi-
mately	15	000	individuals	vs	Sweden.
37.	 SOU	1978:34,	p.	161;	Påhlsson,	supra	note	9,	at	p.	32.
38.	 Prop.	2004/05:97,	Undantag	från	arvsskatt	och	gåvoskatt.	
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3.17.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.17.5.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
Sweden does not have a specific constitutional court. However, the constitutionality of the 
use retroactivity in legislation can be determined by the courts at any level and by other 
public bodies, such as the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket) 39
Currently the law states that if a court or other public body finds that a provision 
conflicts with a rule of constitutional law or other superior statute, or finds that a procedure 
laid down in law has been disregarded in any important respect when the provision was 
made, the provision may not be applied.
In 2011, the IG was amended to provide for an expansion of the power of judicial 
review. Previously, in order to determine that a provision adopted by the Riksdag was 
unconstitutional the unconstitutionality had to be manifest (uppenbarhetsrekvisitet). How-
ever, the manifest criterion was highly criticized.40
3.17.5.2. Examination method 
Apart from the obligation for any court or other public body to examine the constitutionality 
of provisions according to Chapter 11, Article 14 and Chapter 12, Article 10 IG, the constitu-
tionality of a provision may also be scrutinized by means of re-opening of court cases that have 
been determined to be final and restoration of lapsed time (Chapter 14, Article 13 IG),
Re-opening of cases and restoration of lapsed time are granted by the Supreme 
Administrative Court or, inasmuch as this has been laid down in law, by an inferior adminis-
trative court if the case concerns a matter in respect of which the government, an adminis-
trative court or an administrative authority is the highest instance. In all other cases, 
re-opening of cases or restoration of lapsed time is granted by the Supreme Court or, inas-
much as this has been laid down in law, by another court of law which is not an administra-
tive court.
Furthermore, outside the protected area in Chapter 2, Article 10 IG, there is a general 
principle of public law that there is a presumption of non-retroactivity. Retroactivity can 
only be at hand if this explicitly can be read from either the provisional regulations of a 
legislative act, the motives of the act in question or the purpose of the named act. The legis-
lative action must also be in accordance with legal certainty and justice. This principle is 
illustrated in the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (see e.g. RÅ 1988 ref 132, 
1996 ref 57). This means for example that favourable decisions, such as permits from the 
public authorities, will not be able to be withdrawn because of new legislation other than in 
very rare circumstances (e.g. RÅ 1995 ref 10).41 
The prohibition concerning retroactive tax law in the IG, was considered by the 
Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) in the year 2000.42 The case concerned the regulations 
laid down in the Tax Collection Act (1997:483), Skattebetalningslagen, establishing a personal 
liability for representatives of insolvent legal persons to pay the taxes due (ställföreträda-
ransvar). These provisions had been changed in such a way that the subjective elements had 
been removed. According to the provisional regulations, these changes were to be applied 
retroactively. The Supreme Court stated that the provisional regulations were not applicable 
in this respect, since they gave a less favourable result than the former rules comprising 
39.	 See	Chapter	11,	Article	14	and	Chapter	12,	Article	10	in	the	IG	(Lagprövning).
40.	 See	e.g.	Joachim	Nergelius,	‘HD	underkänner	grundlagsstridig	skattelag’,	Juridisk	Tidskrift	No.	4	1999/00,	at	p.	907.
41.	 Wiweka	Warnling-Nerep,	‘Till	frågan	om	legalitet	och	retroaktitivitet	i	svensk	rätt’	Juridisk	Tidskrift	2008/09	No.	4,	
42.	 NJA	2000	s	132.
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subjective elements and thus were contrary to the prohibition concerning retroactive tax 
legislation. This was the first the first time a law was determined to be unconstitutional. 
There are several cases concerning retroactivity in relation to taxation. The case 
RÅ82 1:74 concerned a tax rule regarding condominiums. The Supreme Administrative 
Court found that the rule applicable had entered into force on 1 January 1981, and there-
fore could not be applied on contracts closed on or before 31 December 1980.
The case RÅ 1989 ref. 116 I concerned capital gains taxation (kapitalvinstbeskattning). 
An increase in the tax rate which had been enacted before the payment day of the sale was 
considered applicable. A related case RÅ 1989 ref 116 II, regarded an increase of a stamp 
duty (stämpelskatt). The increase was applicable to shares which were registered at that 
point in time, since the registration date gave rise to the tax liability. 
The most debated case RÅ 1992 ref. 10 concerned the above-mentioned one time 
wealth tax on life insurance companies, certain mutual societies and pension foundations 
(Lag om tillfällig förmögenhetsskatt för livförsäkringsbolag, understödsföreningar och pensionss-
tiftelser). The Supreme Administrative Court came to the same conclusions as the Council on 
Legislation that the law was not contrary to the prohibition concerning retroactive tax law.
The legality principle is generally applied in practice. However, since the mid-eighties 
the courts have developed a practice, through which, they disregard how the transactions in 
question are labelled: a kind of substance over form method which is intended to prevent 
tax avoidance. This may actually be in contradiction of the legality principle laid down in 
the IG. This practice is controversial and raises issues of retroactivity as well as issues regard-
ing the principle of equality.43 
In conclusion, it has only happened once that a court determined that a tax law was 
retroactive and thus unconstitutional. Other cases have been concerned with the scope of 
the retroactivity, that it is e.g. which transactions will be hit by the retroactivity. 
3.17.5.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
Swedish courts are obliged to test the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of the 
First Protocol of the ECHR (P1-1) according to the law (1994:1219) on the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR has moreover a partic-
ular protection in Chapter 2, Article 19 IG which states: No act of law or other provision may be 
adopted which contravenes Sweden’s undertakings under the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This rule mainly affects the legislator, but 
has appeared to be relevant, when interpreting the law on the ECHR, in cases regarding 
conflicts between the ECHR and Swedish laws. 
No Swedish court has determined a tax law is retroactive and thus contrary to 
P1-1 ECHR.
3.17.5.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The Swedish courts will examine the retroactive law in relation to the constitutional provi-
sion laid down in c
Chapter 2, Article 10 IG. This provision can be seen as a consequence of the legality 
principle in tax law. 
43.	 Anders	Hultqvist,	‘Skatteundvikande	förfaranden	och	skatteflykt’,	Svensk	Skattetidning	2005/5.	
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3.17.5.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity 
As stated in 3.17.5.2, a general principle of public law is a presumption of non-retroactivity 
outside the protected area of Chapter 2, Article 10 IG. Retroactivity can only be at hand if 
this can explicitly be read from either the provisional regulations of a legislative act, the 
motives of the act in question or the purpose of the named act. The legislative action must 
also be in accordance with legal certainty and justice. This principle, as mentioned above, is 
illustrated in the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (see e.g. RÅ 1988 ref 132, 
1996 ref 57). This means for example that favourable decisions, such as permits from the 
public authorities, will not be able to be withdrawn because of new legislation other than in 
very rare circumstances (e.g. RÅ 1995 ref 10).44 
3.17.5.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity 
No information available.
3.17.6. Retroactivity of case law
3.17.6.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course
Chapter 2, Article 10 IG prohibits application of statutory law which is retroactive. A deci-
sion by a court could overturn or change established case law. This previous case law was 
probably perceived by taxpayers as the standard which should continue to be applied, and a 
change may therefore result in an unexpected taxation which is a kind of retroactive effect.
In Swedish law there is a general principle of non-retroactivity in judgments and 
decisions. However this is not laid down in any legislative act. Case law decided by the 
Supreme Administrative Court should only be changed by a decision of the full court.45 
However, decisions in this form are rare and changes are also made in regular cases. In gen-
eral, the court tries to be cautious when changing case law (see RÅ 2004 ref. 1), but if such a 
decision is made, no limitations exist regarding applying the new case law to other cases 
which are still within the legal time-limits for a decision.
The prevailing opinion is that changes in administrative practice ought to be avoided 
pending legislative action.46 This is certainly the case concerning tax surcharges, which 
should not be levied in the case of retroactive legislation. 
The practice in Swedish courts concerning taxation according to a certain substance 
over form doctrine (genomsyn) which goes beyond the underlying civil law legislation and 
the application of the general clause against tax avoidance laid down in the law against tax 
avoidance (skatteflyktslagen), is disputable in relation to the legality principle in tax law.47 
This application of tax law or rather creation of new rules in case law is likely to give rise to 
several problems not only regarding the legality principle as such, but also when it comes to 
the retroactive effects of such application and the principle of equality laid down in chap-
ter 1, Article 9 IG48 
44.	 Wiweka	Warnling-Nerep,	‘Till	frågan	om	legalitet	och	retroaktitivitet	i	svensk	rätt’	Juridisk	Tidskrift	2008/09	No.	4,	
45.	 Article	5	Act	of	General	Administrative	Courts	(lagen	(1971:289)	om	allmänna	förvaltningsdomstolar).
46.	 Robert	Påhsson,	‘Om	likhet	inför	skattelag’,	SkatteNytt	2004/11,	at	p.	672.
47.	 Hultqvist	has	therefore	suggested	that	the	promulgation	of	retroactive	tax	laws	according	to	the	written	communi-
cation	procedure	prescribed	in	the	2:10	IG,	would	be	more	preferable	with	respect	to	the	legality	principle	than	the	
use	of	case	law	doctrine	in	the	field,	Hultqvist,	supra	note	37.
48.	 Anders	Hultqvist,	‘En	tätningskommission	i	stället	för	genomsyn	och	skatteflyktslag’,	Svensk	Skattetidning	2007/4.
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3.17.7. Views in the literature 
3.17.7.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity 
The literature regarding the prohibition on retroactive legislation is rather scarce in both 
tax law doctrine and public law doctrine. In a monograph from 1975 Hagstedt has dis-
cussed the problem of retroactive tax legislation, but he was referring to the situation 
before the IG was introduced.49 Since then, a few papers and chapters in different doctrinal 
works have dealt with the question of retroactivity.50 Hultqvist viewed the prohibition as a 
part of the legality principle in tax law in his thesis of 1995.51 Professor Påhlsson at the 
Gothenburg School of Economics has examined the subject on several occasions. In his 
thesis he looked at retroactivity concerning public advice given by the Swedish Tax Agency. 
He points out how important it is for the Tax Agency to consider retroactivity in the making 
of its public advice statements. He has also dealt with the issue in his 2006 work on the 
principle of equality in tax law, where he discusses retroactivity in relation to the principle 
of equality.52 Furthermore, he has published the first text book on constitutional tax law in 
editions from 2009 and 2011, where he examines the protection against retroactive tax 
legislation.53 Most importantly he published a study in 2011 concerning the prohibition of 
retroactive tax legislation. The prime focus of this study is on the written communication 
procedure, its efficiency, and compatibility with the rule of law. He has come to the conclu-
sion that the constitutional provision, although in accordance with European law, needs to 
be reformed in order to live up to the requirements of the rule of law.54 Professor Stefan 
Olsson, Karlstad University has dealt with retroactivity in the field of excise duties.55 Kata-
rina Fast, doctoral candidate in public law at Stockholm University, is currently working on 
a thesis concerning taxation and protection of property, where the issue of retroactive tax 
law is a part of the project. She published a study in 2011 on the protection against retroac-
tive tax law in the IG and the ECHR, where she concludes that the constitutional protection 
against retroactive tax law is weak, despite its characterisation as an absolute right in the IG. 
She concludes that reform is needed.56 There is also a current project on retroactivity in 
public law being carried out by Professor Wiweka Warnling Nerep, Stockholm University. 
Furthermore, the Faculty of Law at Stockholm University has initiated a project on tax legis-
lation that concerns questions of retroactivity.57 
3.17.7.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
The law and economics view has not been particularly concerned with retroactivity or retro-
spective effects although the Swedish economists engaged in the field of law and economics 
recommend strong institutions and legal certainty as important factors for economic 
49.	 Jan	Anders	Hagstedt,	Retroaktiv	skattelag	(Stockholm:	P.A.	Nordtedt	&	Söners	Förlag,	1975).
50.	 See	e.g.	Påhlsson,	supra	note	9,	at	p.	32;	Stefan	Olsson,	Punktskatter	–	rättslig	reglering	i	svenskt	och	europeiskt	
perspektiv,	(Uppsala:	Iustus	Förlag,	2001),	at	p.	208;	Jan-Mikael	Bexhed,	‘Retroaktiv	skattelagstiftning	–	kan	
regeringsformens	förbud	kringgås?’,	SkatteNytt	1993	at	p.	154;	Melz,	supra	note	10,	at	p.	233.
51.	 Hultqvist,	supra	note	6.
52.	 Påhlsson,	supra,	note	43.
53.	 Påhlsson,	supra,	note	9.
54.	 Påhlsson,	supra,	note	22.
55.	 Olsson,	supra,	note	47.
56.	 Fast,	supra,	note.	9.
57.	 www.skattelagstiftningsprojektet.se.
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growth. They have been inspired by American economists such as James Buchanan, Ronald 
Coase and Douglass North.58
There has been no particular debate concerning the law and economics view on retro-
active tax legislation. 
58.	 See	e.g.	Daniel	Waldenström,,	‘Privat	äganderätt	och	ekonomisk	tillväxt’,	in:	Niclas	Berggren	and	Nils	Karlson,	eds.,	
Äganderättens	konsekvenser	och	grunder,	(Stockholm:	Ratio,	2005).
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3.18.
Turkey
Billur Yalti
3.18.1. Terminology
3.18.1.1. Distinction between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’
Neither ‘retroactivity’ nor ‘retrospectivity’ is explicitly provided or defined under the tax 
provisions of the Turkish Constitution (TC)1 or any other tax law. The TC only provides a 
prohibition of the retroactivity of unfavourable criminal laws, stating that ‘no one shall be 
punished for any act which does not constitute a criminal offence under the law in force at 
the time committed; no one shall be given a heavier penalty for an offence other than the 
penalty applicable at the time when the offence was committed. The provisions of the above 
paragraph also apply to the statute of limitations on offences and penalties and on the 
results of conviction’ (Article 38, TC). Non-retroactivity of unfavourable criminal laws is also 
regulated in the Turkish Criminal Code2. Accordingly, the Turkish Criminal Code provides 
in Article 7 that favourable criminal provisions have to be applied to criminal actions com-
mitted at the time of a previous law. With respect to private law, the Law on the Application 
of Turkish Civil Code3 also provides explicitly in Article 1 and 2 for the non-retroactivity of 
the provisions of the new Turkish Civil Code4, except the provisions related to public order 
and general morality.
In the Turkish legal discourse on taxation, the term ‘retroactivity’ (geriye yurume) is 
used to define the application of laws to past events. However, a distinction has been estab-
lished between ‘real retroactivity’ (gercek geriye yurume) (retroactivity) and ‘unreal retro-
1.	 Official	Gazette	of	9.11.1982,	No.	17863	(2nd	issue.).	Official	English	translation	published	in	the	website	of	the	
Turkish	Grand	National	Assembly,	www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/english.htm	
2.	 Turk	Ceza	Kanunu,	No.	5237	(Official	Gazette	of	12	October	2004,	No.25611).
3.	 Turk	Medeni	Kanununun	Yururluğu	ve	Uygulama	Sekli	Hakkinda	Kanun,	No.	4722	(Official	Gazette	of	8	December	
2001,	No.	24607).
4.	 Turk	Medeni	Kanunu,	No.	4721	(Official	Gazette	of	8	December	2001,	No.24607).
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activity’ (gercek olmayan geriye yurume) (retrospectivity) by the tax literature5. The Turk-
ish Constitutional Court (TCC) follows this distinction in its jurisprudence6.
3.18.1.2. Relevance of tax period
In the Turkish legal discourse on taxation, the criterion for the distinction between real and 
unreal retroactivity is the ‘taxable event’. 
Unreal retroactivity (retrospectivity) refers to the situations in which a new provision 
is introduced before the completion of a taxable event. In such cases, even though the tax-
able event commenced, the final legal effect of it has not occurred. Thus, the actual tax obli-
gation has not arisen at the time of the introduction of the new law. Since the new law 
applies from the beginning of the current year but is introduced prior to the completion of 
the tax period, this kind of law is characterized as ‘unreal retroactive’ and considered in 
principle to be justifiable in terms of the rule of law. For example, Law No. 44447 entered 
into force on 11 August 1999, and stipulated that the individual income tax rates enumer-
ated under the tariff was increased 5% as from 1 January 1999. 
In cases where the new law is introduced after the completion of the taxable event, 
such a law is regarded as ‘real retroactivity’ (retroactivity) and considered in principle to be 
unjustifiable. For example, Law No. 11378 entered into force on 31 March 1969, and stipu-
lated that the corporate income tax rate is increased from 20% to 25% as from 1 January 
1968. In this case, the new law applied to the previous year.
With respect to the retroactivity of tax laws, a distinction between ‘economic retroac-
tivity’ and ‘legal retroactivity’ has also been suggested in the literature9. Accordingly, the 
term ‘economic retroactivity’ stipulates new additional taxes codified under a different 
name, such as ‘Economic Balance Tax’ introduced on 7 May 199410 as a one-off tax applied 
at 10% on the income derived in 1993. The so-called tax was applied in addition to the indi-
vidual income tax and corporate income tax in the form of a ‘new’ tax. Under the suggested 
distinction, legal retroactivity means any retroactive application of a law that amends any 
provisions of an existing tax law11. However, such a distinction does not introduce new or 
further criteria to replace ‘the completion of the taxable event’ used to distinguish between 
retrospective or retroactive applications. 
5.	 Nami	Cagan,	Vergilendirme	Yetkisi	(Istanbul:	Kazanci	Hukuk	Yayinlari,	1982),	at	p.179	et	seq.;	M.	Oncel,	A.	Kumrulu	
andN.	Cagan,	Vergi	Hukuku,	14th	edition	(Ankara:	Turhan	Kitabevi,	2006),	at	pp.	47-48.	This	distinction	has	also	
been	followed	by	other	authors	such	as,	Selim	Kaneti,	Vergi	Hukuku,	2nd	edition	(Istanbul:	Filiz	Kitapevi,	1989),	at	
pp.45-46;	Gulsen	Gunes,	Verginin	Yasalligi	Ilkesi,	2nd	edition	(Istanbul:	12	Levha	Yayincilik,	2008),	at	p.137;	Billur	
Yalti	and	Selcuk	Ozgenc,	Vergi	Hukuku	Pratik	Calisma	El	Kitabi,	2nd	edition	(Istanbul:	Beta	Yayinlari,	2007),	at	p.56;	
Yusuf	Karakoc,	Genel	Vergi	Hukuku,	4th	edition	(Ankara:	Yetkin	Yayinlari,	2007),	at	p.141;	A.	Volkan	Ozguven,	Turk	
Vergi	Hukukunda	Geriye	Yurumezlik	İlkesi	(Ankara:	Maliye	ve	Hukuk	Yayinlari,	2007),	at	p.24.	
6.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1989/6,	K.1989/42,	7.11.1989	(Official	Gazette	of	6	April	1990,	No.20484);	Constitutional	
Court,	E.2001/36,	K.2003/3,	16.1.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	21	November	2003,	No.	25296);	Constitutional	Court,	
E.2001/392,	K.2003/60,	4.6.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	18	December	2003,	No.25320);	Constitutional	Court,	
E.2001/34,	K.2003/2,	14.1.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	19	November	2003,	No.25294);	Constitutional	Court,	E.2004/14,	
K.2004/84,	23.6.2004	(Official	Gazette	of	22	November	2005,	No.	25974);	Constitutional	Court,	E.1995/6,	
K.1995/29,	6.7.1995	(Official	Gazette	of	10	February	1996,	No.22550);	Constitutional	Court,	E.1994/85,	K.1995/32,	
13.7.1995	(Official	Gazette	of	28	September	1996,	No.22771);	Constitutional	Court,	E.	1999/51,	K.2001/63,	28.3.2001	
(Official	Gazette	of	29	March	2002,	No.	24710).
7.	 Law	No.	4444	(Official	Gazette	of	14	August	1999,	No.	23786).	
8.	 Law	No.1137	(Official	Gazette	of	31	March	1969,	No.	13162).
9.	 Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.88-89.
10.	 Law	No.	3986	(Official	Gazette	of	7	May	1994,	No.21927).
11.	 Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	89.
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3.18.1.3. Interpretative statutes
In the Turkish legal order parliamentary interpretation is not accepted12. Under the old 
Constitution of 1924, the parliament was authorized to interpret the statutes enacted. How-
ever, in the Constitution of 1961 and also in the current Constitution of 1982, pursuant to 
the principle of separation of powers, this authority has been repealed. Thus, an interpreta-
tive statute by which the parliament clarifies the meaning of a previous statute and explains 
what has to be understood by its provisions is not a valid instrument. 
3.18.1.4. Validation statutes
The Turkish legal order does not recognize the phenomenon of validation statutes which 
retroactively eliminate previous individual judicial decisions that deviate from the legal 
practice or the view of the tax authorities. Under Article 138 of the TC, it is provided that ‘the 
legislative and executive organs and the administration shall comply with the court deci-
sions; these organs and the administration shall neither alter them in any respect, nor delay 
their execution’. Thus, the parliament may not overrule or eliminate an individual judgment 
given by a court in an individual case. However, parliament may enact generally applicable 
laws deviating from the jurisprudence, in which case the timing issues arising from the 
effective dates of such laws are subject to consideration under the distinction between real 
and unreal retroactivity.
3.18.1.5. Comparison moment
In the Turkish legal order no conceptual distinction is made between the date of entry into 
force and the effective date of a statute. Although the publication of laws in the Official 
Gazette is a prerequisite for the application of its provisions, the legislator is authorized to 
set the effective date (meriyet-yururluk)13. The effective date of a statute is usually set as the 
date of publication, however deviations may arise as a prior or a subsequent date. In rare 
cases, if the effective date has not been provided for in the text of the statute, the provisions 
are applicable 45 days later than the publication date14. 
For example, regarding the Value Added Tax Law (VATL) published in the OG of 
25 November 198415, the provisions authorizing the Ministry of Finance entered into force 
on that date, whereas the remaining provisions entered into force on 1 January 1985. The 
legislator, deviating from the date of publication, may set the effective date of one or more 
provisions of a statute as a prior date granting the statute retroactive or retrospective effect. 
For example, the Corporate Income Tax Law (CITL), published in the OG of 21 June 200616, 
provided that certain provisions are applicable as of the publication date, whereas most of 
its provisions effectively (and retrospectively) applied from 1 January 2006. However, the 
transfer pricing provisions of the CITL were effectively applicable from 1 January 2007.
For the purposes of retroactivity, the comparison moment is the effective date of a 
statute. In addition, in cases where the legislator introduces one-off additional taxes based 
on the previous year’s income tax base, or on the previous year’s lump-sum tax amounts 
(such as the motor vehicle tax), the moment of the publication in the OG is considered for 
12.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	18.
13.	 Adnan	Guriz,	Hukuk	Baslangici,	4th	edition	(Ankara:	Siyasal	Kitabevi,	1994),	at	p.114.
14.	 Kanunlarin	ve	Nizamnamelerin	Sureti	Nesir	ve	İlani	ve	Meriyet	Tarihi	Hakkinda	Kanun,	No.1322	(Official	Gazette	of	
4	June	1928,	No.904).
15.	 Katma	Deger	Vergisi	Kanunu,	No.3065	(Official	Gazette	of	25	November	1984,	No.	18563).
16.	 Kurumlar	Vergisi	Kanunu,	No.	5520	(Official	Gazette	of	21	June	2006,	No.	26205).
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the comparison, despite the fact that the publication date and the effective date coincide, 
the material effect of the law is retroactive. 
3.18.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
As mentioned above, retrospectivity (unreal retroactivity) is defined as the introduction of a 
new tax provision which negatively affects the tax obligations of the taxpayer after the com-
mencement of but prior to the completion of the taxable event17. Under the distinction 
between real and unreal retroactivity, a statute which enters into force on 1 January 2010, 
and stipulates that a certain tax exemption is repealed as from that date without grand-
fathering accrued but unrealized gains would be regarded as an example of real retroactiv-
ity if the taxable event is defined by the law as the ‘accrual’ of a certain income type (such as 
business income). In such a case, a vested right exists for the taxpayer for the exemption as 
of 31 December 2009 and the application of such a law would be unjustifiably retroactive. 
However, if the taxable event is described by the law as the ‘collection’ of a certain income 
(such as professional income or rent received from immovable property), then such a law 
would neither be considered retroactive nor retrospective, since the act of collection would 
be realized after the law entered into force (at the beginning of the tax period). For the 
latter case, assuming that the law repealing the exemption entered into force on 4 March 
2010 without a grandfathering clause, it would be an unreal retroactive (retrospective) 
application, since the taxable period for the year 2010 has not been completed. 
The investment allowance, which was one of the exempt items in calculating the 
taxable income, and was abolished18 beginning from 1 January 2006 by a law published in 
the OG of 8 April 2006 without grandfathering clause for the period of 1 January 2006 and 
8 April 8 2006 is a recent example of the retroactivity discussions in Turkish tax law19. Under 
a transitional provision, taxpayers were allowed to benefit from the allowance for three 
years for their investments realized as of 31 December 2005. However, no transitional provi-
sions were concerned on the investment expenditures realized between 1 January 2006 and 
8 April 2006. Some practitioners argued that the law was abolished after the completion 
date of the advance tax payment period between 1 January 2006 and 31 March 2006 and the 
law was retroactively applied contrary to the principle of protection of vested rights20. 
However, some practitioners advocated another view, which in the opinion of the author of 
this report was correct, that the law had only retrospective effect21. Since the advance tax 
payment is a collection procedure in nature having temporary consequences and the tax 
position of the taxpayer is determined finally and definitively at the end of the year, the abo-
lition of the exemption for 2006 income would only be retrospective (unreal retroactivity). 
Nevertheless, the TCC found the relevant provision to be retroactive and annulled22 the 
statute on grounds of the principle of the rule of law and forseeability.
17.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	47.
18.	 Law	No.	5479	(Official	Gazette	of	8	April	2006,	No.	26133).
19.	 The	investment	allowance	amount	was	calculated	by	the	application	of	investment	allowance	rate	on	the	total	
amount	of	fixed	assets	purchased	or	constructed.	For	example,	if	the	cost	price	of	a	fixed	asset	was	100	units,	and	if	
the	rate	of	the	investment	allowance	was	40%	of	the	fixed	asset,	the	first	40	units	of	profits	resulting	from	the	
investment	were	tax	exempt.	The	investment	allowance	was	generally	spread	over	several	years.	If	the	profits	were	
not	sufficient	to	cover	the	whole	investment	allowance,	the	excess	is	revalued	by	the	wholesale	price	index	deter-
mined	by	the	State	Statistics	Institute	in	the	following	years.
20.	 Bumin	Dogrusöz,	‘Yatirim	İndiriminde	Hak	Kullanimi’,	Referans	Gazetesi,	7.5.2009.
21.	 Tahir	Erdem,	‘Yatirim	Indirimi	İstisnasinin	Yururlukten	Kaldirilmasinin	Hukuki	Analizi’,	Mali	Pusula,	No.22,	October	
2006,	at	p.108;	Ersin	Nazali,	‘Vergi	Hukukunda	Kazanilmis	Hak	Kavrami	ve	01.01.2006-08.04.2006	Tarihleri	
Arasinda	Yapilan	Yatirim	İndirimi	Harcamalarinin	Durumu’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.308,	April	2007,	s.142.	
22.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.2006/95,	K.2009/144,	15.10.2009	(Official	Journal	of	8	January	2010,	No.27456).
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3.18.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
In Turkish legal discourse, with respect to the impact of a statute having immediate effect, a 
distinction has been made between substantive statutes and procedural statutes. The proce-
dural rules on civil law23 and criminal law24 have ‘immediate effect’ on pending proceed-
ings25. Retrospective application of procedural tax laws is accepted by the TCC26 and the 
literature27. Procedural rules are technical and formal rules regulating the mode of applica-
tion without having any impact on the substance of taxes within the meaning of an increase 
in the tax burden. The essential character rather than the designation is decisive for a rule to 
be characterized as a procedural one. For example, criminal and administrative penalties 
are regulated under the Tax Procedure Law (TPL)28; however, they are not characterized as 
rules on procedure. Statute of limitation rules, provisions relating to documentation, or 
evidence and the burden of proof are considered to be procedural rules and subject to the 
principle of immediate effect. 
The amendments on the statute of limitations applicable from 1 January 1961 
increasing the period of statute of limitations from three years to five years have been dis-
cussed by the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) in respect of retroactivity. The SAC stated 
that the new law had immediate effect for taxes for which the previous three-year period 
had not been completed, whereas the new provisions could not be applicable to taxes which 
had been subject to the statute of limitations before the introduction of the new law. For the 
latter cases, the taxpayers had been entitled to benefit from vested rights and an opposite 
application would unacceptably lead to real retroactivity29. 
The discussion whether the provisions on interest on late payments inserted in the 
TPL on 1 January 1986 were procedural or substantive can be a good example of the Turkish 
approach on the procedural rules. The legal issue was whether the new provision had imme-
diate effect and also covered the tax assessments for the tax periods completed prior to the 
introduction of the new law. In the literature it was considered that the new late payment 
interest provision was a procedural rule on the collection of taxes subject to immediate 
effect30, whereas the Supreme Administrative Court characterized it as a substantive rule 
increasing the financial obligations of a taxpayer and could not be retroactively applied for 
previous tax periods completed before 1 January 198631.
23.	 Article	578	of	the	Law	No.	1086	on	the	Procedural	Rules	Applicable	to	Civil	Proceedings	(Official	Gazette	of	2,	3,	4	July	
1927,	Nos.	622,	623,	624).
24.	 Nur	Centel	and	Hamide	Zafer,	Ceza	Muhakemesi	Hukuku,	4th	edition	(Istanbul:	Beta	Yayinlari,	2006),	at	p.51	et	seq.
25.	 Guriz,	supra	note	13,	at	pp.116-117;	Abdullah	Dinckol,	Hukuka	Giris	(Istanbul:	Alkim	Yayinlari,	2000),	at	pp.	128-129.	
26.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1989/6,	K.1989/42,	7.11.1989	(Official	Gazette	of	6	April	1990,	No.20484).
27.	 Akif	Erginay,	Vergi	Hukuku	(Ankara:	Savas	Yayinlari,	1990),	at	p.39;	Kamil	Mutluer,	Vergi	Genel	Hukuku	(Istanbul:	
İstanbul	Bilgi	Universitesi	Yayinlari,	2006),	at	p.51;	Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	p.127,	et.seq.
28.	 Vergi	Usul	Kanunu,	No.213	(Official	Gazette	of	10	January	1961,	No.10703).
29.	 Supreme	Administrative	Court,	4th	Chamber,	E.1972/5771,	K.1973/4033,	18.9.1973	(Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	
note	5,	p.141,	footnote	49).
30.	 Ahmet	Kumrulu,	‘Vergi	Davalarında	Uygulanan	Gecikme	Faizi	Hakkinda	Dusunceler’,	Ankara	Universitesi	Hukuk	
Fakultesi	Dergisi,	Vol.XL,	Nos.1-4,	1988,	at	p.	248.
31.	 Supreme	Administrative	Court,	Grand	Chamber	Unification	Decision	E.1988/5,	K.1989/3,	3	July	1989,	(Official	
website	of	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court:	www.danistay.gov.tr).
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3.18.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.18.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
Under the Turkish TC of 1982, there is no explicit limitation for the retroactivity of tax stat-
utes. The previous TC of 1961 did not provide an explicit provision as such either. However, 
during the discussions in the constituent assembly on the draft TC of 1961, some members 
argued for the introduction of an explicit provision concerning non-retroactivity of tax 
statutes which was confronted by the majority of members with the argument that the state 
might need to apply retroactive tax laws in extraordinary financial conditions32.
The TC of 1982 only provides a provision on the non-retroactivity of unfavourable 
criminal laws that ‘no one shall be punished for any act which does not constitute a crimi-
nal offence under the law in force at the time committed; no one shall be given a heavier 
penalty for an offence other than the penalty applicable at the time when the offence was 
committed. …’ (Article 38, TC). This provision is an explicit limitation to the retroactivity of 
unfavourable criminal laws also covering criminal sanctions regulated to punish the fraud-
ulent actions of taxpayers, as well as tax penalties applied as monetary administrative sanc-
tions.
Although there is no explicit provision for the limitation of retroactivity of substan-
tive tax statutes, such a limitation derives from the principle of the rule of law that is laid 
down in Article 2 of the Constitution, which defines the Turkish Republic as ‘a democratic, 
secular and social state governed by the rule of law’. The TCC considers ‘the principle of 
non-retroactivity of laws, which naturally covers also the tax statutes, as a general principle 
of law deriving from the principle of the rule of law and the principle of legal certainty’ and 
states that ‘despite the fact that the principle of non-retroactivity is not explicitly provided 
in the Constitution, the Court considers itself authorized to evaluate the constitutionality of 
a law under the principle of the rule of law and the principle of proportionality’33. 
Besides the above approach, it is argued in the literature that the principle of non-ret-
roactivity may also be derived from the principle of legality34 whereby it is explicitly pro-
vided for in Article 73(3) of the TC that ‘taxes, fees, duties, and other such financial imposi-
tions shall be imposed, amended, or revoked by law’. Accordingly, the concept of ‘law’ 
implies the qualitative requirements, one of which is the ‘foreseeability’35 of the applicable 
legal provisions. Thus, the concept of foreseeability also constitutes a subordinating ele-
ment also covering the timing issues of a law, and requires that a law be applicable to events 
occurring following its enactment within the context of legal certainty36.
32.	 Erginay,	supra	note	27,	at	pp.	42-43.	See	also	Nami	Cagan,	‘Anayasa	Tasarısında	Vergi	Ve	Benzeri	Mali	Yüküm-
lülükler’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.	13,	September	1982.
33.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1989/6,	K.1989/42,	7.11.1989	(Official	Gazette	of	6	April	1990,	No.20484).
34.	 Yalti	and	Ozgenc,	supra	note	5,	at	p.54;	see	also	Nihal	Saban,	Vergi	Hukuku,	5th	edition,	(Istanbul:	Beta	Yayınlari,	
2009),	at	p.	26.
35.	 While	explaining	the	meaning	of	the	concept	‘in	accordance	with	the	law’	provided	in	the	European	Convention	of	
Human	Rights	(ECHR),	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECrtHR)	states,	‘the	expression	‘in	accordance	with	
the	law’,	within	the	meaning	of	Article	8	§	2	(Article	8-2),	requires	firstly	that	the	impugned	measure	should	have	
some	basis	in	domestic	law;	it	also	refers	to	the	quality	of	the	law	in	question,	requiring	that	it	should	be	accessible	
to	the	person	concerned,	who	must	moreover	be	able	to	foresee	its	consequences	for	him,	and	compatible	with	the	
rule	of	law’,	Kruslin	v.	French,	Application	No.	7/1989,	27	March	1990,	para.27;	For	an	example	of	case	law	regarding	
tax	law,	see	also	Spacek,	s.r.o.	v.	The	Czech	Republic,	Application	no.	26449/95,	9	November	1999,	para.	54,		
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case	Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database).
36.	 Yalti	and	Ozgenc,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.54-55;	Billur	Yalti,	Vergi	Yukumlusunun	Haklari	(İstanbul:	Beta	Yayınları,	
2006),	at	p.64	et	seq.
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3.18.2.2. Transitional policy of the government
The Turkish government has no transitional policy in general or in the field of tax statues.
3.18.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body 
In the Turkish legal order, although the Constitutional Court exists, no ex ante advisory 
procedure is applied for legislative proposals. Article 155 of the TC, while describing the 
functions of the Supreme Administrative Court, provides that an opinion must be given 
within two months of time on draft legislation submitted by the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers. However, submission of draft legislation to the SAC is not obligatory 
and no practice as such has been exercised with respect to tax legislation.
3.18.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.18.3.1. Legislating by press release
In Turkey the instrument of legislating by press release is not used. However, sometimes the 
government may inform the public by press release on planned tax amendments without 
clarifying whether such an amendment will be retroactively applied or not. Such announce-
ments have been made with respect to tax policy changes, or measures with which eco-
nomic or financial results were expected or a substantial tax reform was envisaged. Such 
information releases have (or had) no effect on the retroactivity discussions or on the juris-
prudence of the TCC. However, in the literature it has been asserted that in cases where 
taxpayers may predict and know a tax amendment to be retroactive by way of a press 
release, such a press release can be regarded as a justification for retroactivity37.
3.18.3.2. Legislative practice 
In Turkish tax history, many retroactive applications have been carried out by way of 
increasing the applicable tax rates or introducing new one-off additional taxes based on the 
income of previous years. The retroactive legislation has been justified by the legislator by 
the tax policies concerning inflation and economic crisis, budgetary deficits, natural disas-
ters or for technical reasons38.
3.18.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
No specific information on the effects of retroactive provisions on pending cases has been 
determined by the author of this report. 
3.18.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
a. Favourable retroactivity in respect of taxes
The TCC states that the tax statutes on tax obligations which are favourable to taxpayers may 
be retroactively applied, provided that the equality principle is not infringed39. According 
to some scholars, retroactivity of favourable tax laws is acceptable within the limitation of 
37.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.47.
38.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	48;	Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	p.91	et	seq.
39.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1989/6,	K.1989/42,	7.11.1989	(Official	Gazette	of	6	April	1990,	No.20484).	
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equality principle since there is no provision in the TC preventing to do so40, whereas some 
scholars strongly oppose this view on grounds that such retroactive application would be 
contrary to the equality principle and fairness41, and that would infringe the legality princi-
ple42 and be abused by political considerations43.
In Turkish tax practice, such a favourable retroactive application was carried out with 
respect to the reduction of tax rates of the Inheritance and Transfer Tax on 15 August 1959. 
The new provisions were applied also to taxable events occurring between 1957-1959 and 
resulting in tax refunds. The purpose of this exercise was restitution in integrum to the tax 
regime applied prior to 195744. A similar application was introduced by Law 590445 that 
entered into force on 3 July 2009, which provided income tax exemption for special indem-
nities derived by employees before that date. 
Another example of favourable retroactivity is the provision introduced on 
26 November 1999 by Law 4481 on Earthquake Taxes46 which provided a tax exemption to 
the heirs for their inherited assets from the death of persons in the earthquakes that 
occurred on 17 August 1999 and 12 November 1999. 
b. Favourable retroactivity in respect of criminal sanctions and tax penalties
The TC provides a prohibition of the retroactivity of unfavourable criminal laws which also 
covers the criminal sanctions regarding taxpayers, as well as the tax penalties applied as 
monetary administrative sanctions. Accordingly, the TC requires the retroactive application 
of a favourable penal provision to the previously committed crimes. 
For example, criminal sanctions applied upon tax fraud committed by using fake 
invoices in the form of imprisonment between three years and five years were reduced by 
Law 436947 to between 18 months and 3, years respectively. A transitional provision con-
cerning the application of the favourable rule for pending cases, however, excluded the 
cases where convictions had been delivered by the courts. The TCC surprisingly cancelled the 
provision on grounds of equality without discussing the principle of retroactivity of favour-
able sanctions48. 
Another example concerns the Tax Procedure Law No.213, which entered into force 
on 1 January 1961. A transitional provision regulated that favourable administrative tax 
fines (as well as the sanctions) provided for by the law should be applicable to the offences 
committed prior the introduction of the law. The law was applied to pending cases and only 
taxpayers who had already paid their tax fines at the material time did not benefit from this 
application49.
40.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	50.
41.	 Kenan	Bulutoglu,	Turk	Vergi	Sistemi,	6th	ed.(Istanbul:	Fakulteler	Matbaasi,	1978),	at	p.26;	Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	
p.116,	footnote	384.
42.	 Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.114-116.
43.	 Gunes,	supra	note	5,	at	p.139.
44.	 Bulutoglu,	supra	note	41,	at	p.	26.
45.	 Law	No	5904	(Official	Gazette	of	3	July	2009,	No.27277).
46.	 Law	No	4481	(Official	Gazette	of	26	November	1999,	No.	23888).
47.	 Law	No.	4369	(Official	Gazette	of	29	July	1998,	No.23417).
48.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.2000/21;	K.	2000/16,	6.7.2000	(Official	Gazette	of	29	November	2000,	No.24245)
49.	 Erginay,	supra	note	27,	p.42.
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3.18.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.18.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles 
In the Turkish legal system it is possible for the Constitutional Court to test the retroactivity 
of a tax statute for compatibility with the Constitution50. While explaining its fundamental 
approach to the retroactivity issues, the TCC states: ‘Under the principle of non-retroactivity, the 
statutes must be applied to subsequent legal actions, events or transactions that are occurred after 
their enactment. Exceptional cases may appear which are accepted as necessary for public interest 
or public order or for the protection of vested rights or for the improvement of financial rights’51. 
3.18.4.2. Examination method
In the jurisprudence of the TCC, there have been few cases where the retroactive application 
of the tax laws has been tested in terms of compatibility with the Constitution, most of 
which has found to be compatible.
A group of cases concerns statutes increasing the tax burden for previous events. The 
first case was related to the introduction of lump-sum taxation of individual taxpayers 
determined by indicators of living standards resulting in minimum tax payments even in 
loss cases. The statute which was introduced as of 3 December 1988 applied from 1 January 
1988. The TCC stated in its decision that the statutes increasing the tax burden after the 
completion of the taxable event should be tested against the principle of non-retroactivity; 
however, it found the statute to be unreal retroactivity (retrospective) on grounds that the 
statute entered into force within the same year prior to the completion of the taxable event, 
and that the provisions covered the indicators of living standards valid for 1988. The TCC 
referred to the purpose of the law which was the introduction of a safety measure for the 
payment of taxes and the prevention of tax loss, and found the statute to be in accordance 
with the public interest. Referring also to the proportionality principle, the TCC considered 
that the remaining time period before the completion of the taxable period was reasonable 
and long enough to be informed and be prepared for the application of the provision. Con-
sequently, the statute was found to be compatible with the principle of legal certainty52. 
50.	 a)	 According	to	Article	148	of	the	TC,	‘the	Constitutional	Court	shall	examine	the	constitutionality,	in	respect	of	
both	form	and	substance,	of	laws,	decrees	having	the	force	of	law,	and	the	Rules	of	Procedure	of	the	Turkish	
Grand	National	Assembly.	Constitutional	amendments	shall	be	examined	and	verified	only	with	regard	to	their	
form.	…’.
b)	 A	case	may	be	brought	before	the	TTC	by	annulment	action	or	by	contention	of	unconstitutionality	before	other	
courts.	Accordingly,	‘the	President	of	the	Republic,	parliamentary	groups	of	the	party	in	power	and	of	the	main	
opposition	party	and	a	minimum	of	one-fifth	of	the	total	number	of	members	of	the	Turkish	Grand	National	
Assembly	shall	have	the	right	to	apply	for	annulment	action	to	the	Constitutional	Court,	based	on	the	assertion	
of	the	unconstitutionality	of	laws	in	form	and	in	substance,	of	decrees	having	the	force	of	law,	of	Rules	of	
Procedure	of	the	Turkish	Grand	National	Assembly	or	of	specific	articles	or	provisions	thereof ’	(Article150	TC).	
According	to	the	contention	procedure,	‘if	a	court	which	is	trying	a	case,	finds	that	the	law	or	the	decree	having	
the	force	of	law	to	be	applied	is	unconstitutional,	or	if	it	is	convinced	of	the	seriousness	of	a	claim	of	unconstitu-
tionality	submitted	by	one	of	the	parties,	it	shall	postpone	the	consideration	of	the	case	until	the	Constitutional	
Court	decides	on	the	issue.	…	The	Constitutional	Court	shall	decide	on	the	matter	and	make	public	its	judgment	
within	five	months	of	receiving	the	contention.	If	no	decision	is	reached	within	this	period,	the	trial	court	shall	
conclude	the	case	under	existing	legal	provisions.	However,	if	the	decision	on	the	merits	of	the	case	becomes	
final,	the	trial	court	is	obliged	to	comply	with	it’	(Article	152	TC).
51.	 Constitutional	Court	E.2005/128,	K.2008/54,	7.2.2008	(Official	Gazette	of	1	July	2008,	No.26923).
52.	 Constitutional	Court	E.1989/6,	K.1989/42,	7.11.1989	(Official	Gazette	of	6	April	1990,	No.20484).
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The TCC reaffirmed its jurisprudence in a case on a similar statute that was introduced on 
30 November 2000 establishing the application of living standards from 1 January 200053.
In another case, the TCC tested the statute that entered into force on 11 August 1999, 
and held that the individual income tax rates enumerated under the tariff were increased 
5% as from 1 January 1999 and found it to be retrospective under the criteria on the comple-
tion of the taxable event, and further found the increase in tax burden to be proportional and 
fair54. The last case was on motor vehicle tax that was introduced on 2 January 2004 and 
applied from 1 January 2004. The statute increased the lump-sum tax amounts which auto-
matically accrued on 1 January 2004 and was payable within two instalments in January and 
July, 2004. According to the TCC, the statute entered into force prior to the payment dates 
and resulted only in justifiable retrospectivity55.
The other group of cases is related to the statutes introducing one-off additional 
taxes. In the first case, the TCC considered the compatibility of economic balance tax which 
was introduced on 7 May 1994 and which was applied at 10% in addition to the individual 
income tax and corporate income tax to the income derived in 1993. The TCC, reaffirming its 
jurisprudence that a statute is retroactive if applied after the taxable event’s completion, 
held that the economic balance tax was a new tax rather than an additional one, introduced 
within the sovereign rights of the state for the purposes of encountering the effects of financial 
crisis, and that the taxable event for this new tax was the submission of income and corpo-
rate tax returns declared to the tax offices in 1994. The TCC concluded that the statute was 
compatible with the principle of the rule of law56. In the second case considered, the statute 
introducing a Net Asset Tax on 7 May 1994 applicable to the existing assets as of 31 Decem-
ber 1993 or to the turnover of that year, depending on which would raise the higher tax. The 
TCC described the net asset tax applied on the assets held by the taxpayers as a new wealth 
tax rather than an additional or an extraordinary tax and did not annul the statute. How-
ever, the TCC, without reasoning in respect of retroactivity and referring to the ability of 
taxpayers to pay taxes, held in general terms that the net asset tax calculated on the turn-
over of 1993 was incompatible with the principle of the rule of law57.
A similar decision by the TCC was on a statute published on 26 November 1999 intro-
ducing one-off additional earthquake taxes, such as additional income and corporate 
income tax based on the income derived in 1998, additional real estate tax and additional 
motor vehicle tax paid in 1999. The TCC held that such retroactive applications were justi-
fied by the public interest concerns because of the social and economic conditions after the 
earthquake, and by the need to eliminate economic deprivation and to maintain social 
solidarity58. 
Finally, a recent case on a statute abolishing the investment allowance with a 
restricted grandfathering clause is another example for the TCC’s jurisprudence. The invest-
ment allowance59 applying as an exempt item in calculating the taxable income was abol-
ished60 beginning from 1 January 2006 by a law published in the OG of 8 April 2006. Under 
a transitional provision, taxpayers were allowed to benefit from the allowance for three 
years for their investments realized as of 31 December 2005. The TCC held the transitional 
provision which was restricting the application of the exemption within a three-year period 
53.	 Constitutional	Court	E.2001/36,	K.2003/3,	16.1.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	21	November	2003,	No.	25296);	Constitu-
tional	Court	E.2001/392,	K.2003/60,	4.6.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	18	December	2003,	No.25320).
54.	 Constitutional	Court	E.2001/34,	K.2003/2,	14.1.2003	(Official	Gazette	of	19	November	2003,	No.25294).
55.	 Constitutional	Court	E.2004/14,	K.2004/84,	23.6.2004	(Official	Gazette	of	22	November	2005,	No.	25974).
56.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1995/6,	K.1995/29,	6.7.1995	(Official	Gazette	of	10	February	1996,	No.22550).
57.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.1994/85,	K.1995/32,	13.7.1995	(Official	Gazette	of	28	September	1996,	No.22771).
58.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.	1999/51,	K.2001/63,	28.3.2001	(Official	Gazette	of	29	March	2002,	No.	24710).
59.	 For	information	on	investment	allowance,	see	footnote	19	above.	
60.	 Law	No.	5479	(Official	Gazette	of	8	April	2006,	No.	26133).
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incompatible with the principle of the rule of law and the principle of foreseeability and 
legal certainty61.
3.18.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
In the Turkish legal order neither lower administrative tax courts nor the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court (SAC) have the authority to assess the conformity between a retroactive tax law 
and the Constitution; however, the case is different for the ECHR. With respect to interna-
tional conventions, the TC provides that ‘in situations where domestic legislation conflicts 
with international treaties regarding human rights, international treaties prevail’ (Arti-
cle 90 (5) TC). As a legal consequence of this provision, the determination of the inconsis-
tency of a retroactive tax law with the ECHR vests primarily on the lower tax courts, or 
regional administrative courts, or the SAC, wherever the hearing was held before. However, 
national courts have never tested the retroactivity of a tax statute against Article 1 of the 
First Protocol (‘protection of property’) to the ECHR up till now. 
As far as the ECHR is concerned, although retroactive tax legislation is not as such 
prohibited by Article 1 of the First Protocol (‘protection of property’) (P1-1) to the ECHR, 
according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)62, a retro-
active tax provision’s compatibility with P1-1 may still be tested by answering the question 
whether, in the taxpayers’ specific circumstances, the retroactive application of the law 
imposed an unreasonable burden on them and thereby failed to strike a fair balance 
between the various interests involved. For such a test, the reasons for the retroactivity (rea-
sonable purpose test) and the impact of the retroactive law on the position of the taxpayers 
(confiscatory taxation) must be evaluated63.
By the combined effect of Article 90(5) of the TC and the ECHR, which is superior to 
the national law, lower tax courts or the higher courts have the authority to test national 
retroactive tax legislation under the standards established by the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and determine whether it is in conformity with the ECHR. This evaluation may give 
cause for a lower tax court or the higher courts to neglect a national retroactive tax rule and 
apply the relevant provision of the ECHR; meaning that the administrative judiciary would 
cancel an administrative tax decision that relates to an individual taxpayer on grounds that 
the tax decision conflicts with the ECHR. However, this outcome may also give rise to vari-
ous controversies and problematic discussions, including whether such a judicial decision 
intrinsically refers to a determination of a constitutional conflict between the national tax 
law and the TC; whether the administrative judiciary would find itself competent to deter-
mine such a constitutional problem, or whether on the contrary it would regard its duty 
and function as only to measure the consistency between decisions of the tax administra-
tion and national laws64.
61.	 Constitutional	Court,	E.2006/95,	K.2009/144,	15.10.2009	(Official	Journal	of	8	January	2010,	No.27456).
62.	 M.A.	and	Others	v.	Finland,	Fourth	Section,	Admissibility	Decision,	Application	No.	27793/95,	10.6.2003.	The	juris-
prudence	of	the	ECrtHR	produced	in	the	case	of	MA	and	Others	v.	Finland	first	introduced	to	the	Turkish	tax	litera-
ture	for	discussion	in	Yalti,	supra	note	36,	at	pp.	69-70.
63.	 Furthermore,	in	the	case	of	National	&	Provincial	Building	Society	v.	the	United	Kingdom	(Application	No.	
117/1996/736/933-935,	23.10.1997),	the	ECrtHR	tested	the	relevant	retroactive	tax	legislation	against	P1-1	and	found	
its	purpose	to	be	legitimate,	and	the	information	on	the	parliamentary	discussions	to	be	adequate	with	respect	to	
foreseeability.	See,	Billur	Yalti,	‘Mülkiyet	Hakki	versus	Vergilendirme	Yetkisi:	İnsan	Haklari	Avrupa	Mahkemesine	
Gore	Mulkiyet	Hakkina	Mudahalenin	Siniri’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.	227,	July	2000.
64.	 For	the	legal	issues	arising	from	Article	90(5)	of	the	TC,	see	Yalti,	supra	note	36,	at	p.35	et	Seq.;	Billur	Yalti,	‘Separa-
tion	of	Powers	in	Turkish	Tax	Law’,	National	Report	submitted	for	the	EATLP	Congress,	June	2009,	Spain,	in:	Ana	
Paula	Dourado,	ed.,	Separation	of	Powers	in	Tax	Law,	EATLP	International	Tax	Series,	vol.7	(The	Netherlands,	2010),	
at	pp.	229-231.	
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3.18.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The principle of non-retroactivity in taxation covers not only the parliamentary legislation 
but also the subordinating legislation issued by the Council of Ministers or any other 
administrative body under their regulatory competence65. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Administrative Court is competent to test the retroactivity of such subordinate legislation 
against the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. Since the provisions of the TC are 
fundamental legal rules binding upon legislative, executive and judicial organs, and admin-
istrative authorities and other institutions and individuals (Article 11 TC), the subordinate 
regulations must be in conformity with the principle of the rule of law the meaning of 
which has been clarified so far by the TCC in its jurisprudence. For example, the Supreme 
Administrative Court cancelled the Decree of the Council of Ministers which was issued on 
31 December 1992 concerning an increase of income withholding tax rate from 10% to 15% 
applied to gains arising from government bonds and debentures issued on and after 12 
February 1992 on grounds of the principle of the rule of law66. Another example is that the 
Supreme Administrative Court decided to annul the Decree of the Council of Ministers 
released in August 1991 which decreased the rate of export exemption from 16% to 12% for 
income derived in 1991, stating that the fact that the Decree was retrospective did not elimi-
nate or diminish the violation of the principle of certainty67.
3.18.5. Retroactivity of case law
Under the Article 153 of the TC, ‘the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final. Laws shall 
cease to have effect from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the annulment deci-
sion. Where necessary, the Constitutional Court may also decide on the date on which the 
annulment decision shall come into effect. That date shall not be more than one year from the 
date of publication of the decision in the Official Gazette. In the event of the postponement of 
the date on which an annulment decision is to come into effect, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly shall debate and decide with priority on the draft bill or law proposal, designed to 
fill the legal void arising from the annulment decision. Annulment decisions cannot be 
applied retroactively. Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published immediately in 
the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on 
the administrative authorities, and on persons and corporate bodies’.
In Turkish legal order, an annulment decision of the TC does not have any effect on 
the previously paid tax on a tax assessment, unless an appeal against the tax assessment has 
been made in time (i.e., within 30 days after the date of the assessment). Thus, taxes paid 
prior to the annulment decisions are not refundable. However, it is argued in the literature 
that an annulment decision has retroactive effect on taxes accrued but not yet paid as of the 
date of the annulment decision68. 
Under the TC, the TCC may postpone for public interest purposes the effective date of 
an annulment decision prospectively for a year or less. In such cases, although the TTC’s 
decision is published in the Official Gazette, the annulled legislation remains in force until 
the period determined by the TCC. The TCC establishes such a transitional rule in order to 
65.	 Oncel,	Kumrulu	and	Cagan,	supra	note	5,	at	p.50;	Gunes,	supra	note	5,	at	p.142;	Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	p.142	
et.seq.
66.	 Supreme	Administrative	Court,	Grand	Chamber,	E.1994/364,	K.	1996/15,	12.1.1996	(Official	website	of	the	Supreme	
Administrative	Court:	www.danistay.gov.tr).	
67.	 Supreme	Administrative	Court,	Grand	Chamber,	E.1992/299,	K.1993/63,	9.4.1993	(Official	website	of	the	Supreme	
Administrative	Court:	www.danistay.gov.tr).
68.	 Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.200-201.
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prevent a legal void, which might arise from the immediate effect of an annulment decision, 
by giving notice to the parliament to take legislative action. However, the legitimacy and 
the validity of the application of an annulled legislation which has been found to be uncon-
stitutional but is in fact in force in the legal order for a transitional period is an on-going 
discussion in Turkish legal discourse. With respect to tax legislation, it is accepted by the 
Supreme Administrative Court that tax legislation subject to prospective annulment deci-
sion of the TCC cannot be applied in pending legal proceedings69; thus, the retroactive 
effect of such TCC judgments is accepted in practice if an appeal against a tax assessment 
arising from the annulled legislation was made in time prior to the annulment decision. 
Moreover, it is argued in the literature that on the equity and fairness basis70, the tax 
administration should not continue to apply the tax legislation annulled as such and pro-
duce a tax assessment based on a legislation the unconstitutionality of which has been 
declared by the TCC and an immediate legislative action should take place. If such an assess-
ment is made, taxpayers should appeal against the decision and the tribunal should estab-
lish a preliminary issue and suspend the trial until the annulment decision enters into 
force71.
3.18.6. Views in the literature
In the Turkish tax literature, there is a general opinion that the retroactivity of tax statutes is 
in principle incompatible with the principle of the rule of law and legal certainty and legal-
ity. Economics-based views or other non-traditional legal views have not led to a debate. 
In the Turkish literature, some authors argue that in exceptional cases, such as under 
extraordinary economic conditions and circumstances and social needs, the retroactivity of 
tax laws may be justified if the principle of ability to pay and social and economic justice is 
maintained72 and if the retroactive measure is not arbitrary and disproportional73. There is 
a general opinion that whether a retroactive tax law is justifiable can be considered on 
case-by-case basis by the TCC. However, the jurisprudence established so far by the TTC is 
strongly opposed by the literature74. 
69.	 Supreme	Administrative	Court,	3rd	Chamber,	E.1991/685,	K.	1991/2980,	27.11.1991;	Supreme	Administrative	Court,	
Grand	Chamber,	E.2006/140,	K.2006/203,	6.7.2006.	(Official	website	of	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court,	www.
danistay.gov.tr).
70.	 Ulku	Azrak,	‘Anayasa	Mahkemesinin	Iptal	Kararlarinin	Geriye	Yurumezligi’,	Anayasa	Yargisi,	vol.1,	1984,	at	p.159	
et.seq.
71.	 Necmi	Yuzbasioglu,	‘Anayasa	Mahkemesinden	Sonra	Vergi	Ziyai	Cezasi’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.	293,	January	2006,	s.8.
72.	 Erginay,	supra	note	27,	at	p.43.	See	Sevig	who	refers	to	‘compelling	reasons	regarding	public	welfare’,	Veysi	Sevig,	
‘Vergi	Yasalarinin	Geriye	Islerligi’,	Yaklaşım,	June	1995,	s.	67.	
73.	 See,	Cağan,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.180	-181;	Nami	Cagan,	‘Demokratik	Sosyal	Hukuk	Devletinde	Vergilendirme’,	Ankara	
Universitesi	Hukuk	Fakultesi	Dergisi,	vol.37,	no.1,	1980,	at	p.143;	Gunes,	supra	note	5,	at	pp.138-141.
74.	 a)		 See	for	example,	Merih	Oden	and	Mustafa	Akkaya,	‘Hayat	Standardi	Esasinin	Anayasaya	Uygunlugu	Sorunu’,	
Ankara	Universitesi	Hukuk	Fakültesi	Dergisi,	Vol.	50,	No.	2,	2001,	at	p.26	et.seq;	Elif	Sonsuzoglu,	‘Deprem	
Nedeniyle	4481	Sayili	Yasayla	Getirilen	Ek	Vergi	Mükellefiyetleri’,	Vergi	Sorunlari,	No.139,	April	2000,	s.138;	
Gulsen	Gunes,	‘Anayasa	Mahkemesinin	Ekonomik	Denge	Vergisine İlişkin	Bir	Kararinda	‘Geriye	Yurumezlik	
Ilkesi’	Yaklaşimina	Elestirisel	Bakis’,	Yaklasim,	June	1996,	s.68	et.seq.;	Billur	Yalti,	‘1923’ten	2003’e	‘Kazandiklar-
imiz’:	‘Cumhuriyet	Hukuku’,	‘Kazanamadıklarimiz’:	‘Hukukun	Cumhuriyeti’,	Vergi	Hukukunda	Geldigimiz	Yere	
Yakin	Tarihten	Bakmak:	Panaromik	bir	Calişma’,	Ankara	Universitesi	Hukuk	Fakultesi,	Cumhuriyetin	Kurulusun-
dan	Bugune	Turk	Hukukunun	80	Yillik	Gelisimi	Sempozyumu,	A.U.Hukuk	Fak.Yay.	No.538,	(Ankara,	2003),	at	
pp.94-95;	Ozguven,	supra	note	5,	at	p.	209	et.seq.
b)		 An	exceptional	view	is	also	expressed	in	the	literature	that	a	new	constitutional	provision	regarding	the	
non-retroactivity	of	substantive	tax	laws	should	be	introduced.	See,	Yildirim	Taylar,	‘Anayasa	Mahkemesi	
Kararlari	Isiginda	Vergi	Hukukunda	Hukuki	Guvenlik	Ilkesi’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.	307,	March	2007;	Gulsen	Gedik,	
‘Cagdas	Anayasa	Hazirlik	Surecinde	Vergi	Odevinin	Yeniden	Tasarlanmasi’,	Vergi	Dunyasi,	No.334,	June	2009.
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
386
In the view of the author of this report, in either retroactivity or retrospectivity cases, the 
test established under the criteria of the completion of the taxable event must be comple-
mented by a test based on proportionality; thus, the former criterion should not be taken as 
an absolute test. In every case, whether a fair balance between public and individual bene-
fits is established, and whether the retroactive law is a rational means in order to realize a 
legitimate legislative purpose and whether the final result of the law is excessive, arbitrary 
or disproportional should be considered75. For example, in Turkish practice, additional 
one-off earthquake taxes76 introduced in 1999 were retroactive in a literal sense; however, 
covering the emerging financial deficits arising from the earthquake appeared to be a legiti-
mate purpose and the tax burden was proportionally spread through society. Nevertheless, 
such a legitimate justification arising from economic and financial deficits may not be 
found with respect to other retroactive additional taxes when attention is paid to the para-
doxical practice between bi-annual tax amnesties77 and frequent additional one-off taxes 
introduced for the purposes of removing budgetary deficits. With respect to retrospective 
applications, it must be stated that a rate increase at the end of the year but prior to the 
completion of the taxable event, such as 25 December or 30 December, cannot be consid-
ered justifiable in terms of legal certainty and proportionality. Thus, the period of retrospec-
tivity (whether it is modest or not) must be considered as a criterion for whether the appli-
cation is proportional. 
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3.19.
United Kingdom1 
David Williams2
3.19.1. Terminology
3.19.1.1. Distinction between retroactivity and retrospectivity
There is no distinctive answer for this in the United Kingdom. All forms of legislative or 
judicial action that result in a legal provision taking effect before the date on which it was 
officially promulgated are identified by the one term ‘retrospective’ without any further 
identifying phrases. The choice of use of ‘retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ appears to be a mat-
ter of regional common usage of the English language, with no identifiable international 
distinctive use of either term. In both England and Wales and in Scotland3 preference is 
given widely to the use of ‘retrospective’ rather than ‘retroactive’4 by both lawyers and 
politicians but with little formal distinction being made between the meanings of the 
terms. This appears true in Ireland as well. By contrast, in the USA the term ‘retroactive’ is 
used (with a stress on the first syllable not present in European English usage) rather that 
‘retrospective’. That appears to have been the approach in Canada also, though more 
recently the terms have been given separate meanings in the courts.5 Australia is some-
where in between.6 It is therefore intriguing to note that the European Court of Justice 
1.	 Note:	the	replies	in	this	report	have	been	provided	to	the	original	questionnaire,	but	have	been	updated	to	June	
2012	by	the	author.	The	author	is	most	grateful	to	the	editors	for	finalizing	the	draft	of	his	national	report	and	
adding	the	standard	headings.
2.	 I	must	emphasize	that	my	views	do	not	represent	the	official	views	of	any	body	or	person	–	least	of	all	any	of	those	in	
the	Westminster	village	(the	inner	group	of	politicians,	policy	advisers	and	lobbyists	in	London)		–	and	are	purely	
personal	comments.
3.	 The	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	legislation	and	cases	about	taxation,	where	the	law	of	Scotland	should	be	the	same	as	
the	law	of	England	and	Wales.	Procedure	is	not	the	same	in	the	Scottish	courts	to	the	other	British	courts,	and	
general	jurisprudence	is	not	the	same.	Any	comment	on	cases	other	than	taxation	cases	in	this	paper	is	limited	
either	to	the	law	of	England	and	Wales	or	to	other	areas	where	the	law	is	the	same	in	Scotland	as	in	England	and	
Wales.	The	House	of	Lords	was	the	final	court	for	both	national	jurisdictions	until	September	2009.	It	is	replaced	by	
the	United	Kingdom	Supreme	Court.	
4.	 For	example,	the	standard	work	Words	and	Phrases	legally	defined,	3rd	edition,	1990	(Butterworths)	did	not	even	
include	a	definition	of	‘retroactive’	while	defining	‘retrospective’	as	an	ambiguous	term.
5.	 See	Re	Royal	Canadian	Mounted	Police	Act	(Can)	[1991]	1	FCR	529,	548	where	a	usage	similar	to	that	of	the	Dutch	
usage	is	suggested.	This	does	not	seem	to	have	influenced	the	debate	elsewhere	in	the	English-speaking	world.	
Does	it	reflect	the	bilingual	nature	of	Canada?
6.	 Source:	searches	of	terminology	use	on	various	Google	national	search	pages	(e.g.	www.google.co.uk,		
www.google.com,	www.google.com.au	etc)	and	also	through	various	electronic	case	law	databases	in	particular	
that	at	www.bailii.org.uk).
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follows American usage7 and not that of its English-speaking Member States.8 I follow the 
clear majority British usage in using the term ‘retrospectivity’ in this paper. 
3.19.1.2. Relevance of tax period 
In the sense used in this question, retrospectivity is standard practice in United Kingdom 
tax statutes and rarely receives any analytical comment in the context of taxes in practical or 
theoretical literature.9 This is because of the practice for over 100 years of introducing new 
tax laws at the beginning of the tax year (6 April for income tax and National Insurance 
Contributions; 1 April for all other direct taxes; dates vary for indirect taxes) in one Finance 
Act following a Budget published shortly before the tax year begins. The Provisional Collec-
tion of Taxes Act 1968 provides that if the House of Commons passes a Budget Resolution 
providing for a tax or a change in a tax within one month of 5 April in a year, and the 
Finance Act is enacted by 5 August that year, then the tax provision operates as if it starts at 
the beginning of the income tax or financial year.10 The retrospective aspect of this process 
is a necessary result of the continuing constitutional fiction that taxation is imposed annu-
ally. Income tax is still an annual tax.11 It cannot be levied for a tax year unless there is legis-
lation in that year imposing it. There must therefore be a Finance Act early in every tax year. 
I illustrate below the operative dates from which a Finance Act takes effect.
3.19.1.3. Interpretative statutes
a. Phenomenon of ‘interpretative statutes’ explicitly known?
Yes. There is a general Act of Parliament called the Interpretation Act 1968. Section 16 (Gen-
eral Savings) deals with issues that arise, including the retrospective effect of legislation, 
when one enactment is changed by another. 
The text is:
7.	 Is	this	an	example	of	European	English	diverging	from	British	(and	Irish)	English?
8.	 The	House	of	Lords	and	the	courts	below	have	on	several	occasions	recently	cited	passages	from	ECJ	decisions	using	
the	term	‘retroactive’	while	individual	judges	use	the	term	‘retrospective’.	Most	noticeable	are	cases	where	the	
United	Kingdom	Advocate	General	has	also	used	the	term	‘retrospective’	in	a	case	coming	from	the	United	Kingdom,	
and	is	cited	as	doing	so,	so	leaving	the	ECJ	use	of	the	term	standing	as	an	unavoidably	obvious	different	use	of	
language.	See	for	example	Fleming	v	HMRC	[2008]	UKHL	2	where	all	the	British	judges	and	Advocate	General	Jacobs	
use	‘retrospective’	while	the	judgment	of	the	ECJ	is	cited	as	using	‘retroactive’.	No	attempt	is	made	to	differentiate	
the	meanings	of	the	terms.	
9.	 You	are	invited	to	read	the	introductory	provisions	at	the	start	of	every	modern	annual	edition	of	Tolley’s	Yellow	Tax	
Handbook	which	deals	with	the	direct	taxes.	The	2006	edition	advises:	‘In	view	of	the	increasing	practice	of	passing	
tax	legislation	with	retrospective	effect,	it	is	necessary	when	dealing	with	past	years	to	consider	whether	the	provi-
sions	have	been	affected	or	amended	by	subsequent	legislation.	It	then	sets	out	a	list	of	retrospective	changes	made	
by	the	Finance	Act	2006.	The	list	contains	51	separate	retrospective	changes.	It	is	clear	from	the	list	that	the	publish-
ers	do	not	regard	as	retrospective	anything	that	took	effect	on	or	after	the	start	of	the	tax	year	or	financial	year	in	
which	the	Act	took	effect	(it	was	given	Royal	Assent	on	19	July	2006).	It	notes	the	dates	on	which	the	measures	came	
into	effect.	Four	–	one	dating	back	to	1992	–	are	deemed	always	to	have	had	effect,	in	other	words	are	deemed	to	have	
been	passed	by	Parliament	when	the	original	legislation	was	passed.
10.	 This	followed	a	series	of	cases	brought	by	an	MP,	Mr	Thomas	Bowles,	in	1910	to	1912	asking	the	courts	to	strike	down	
taxes	levied	under	resolutions	as	unconstitutional.	Pragmatism	triumphed	over	principle	and	the	procedure	
described	above	has	operated	(not	always	entirely	within	the	time	frame	set)	since	an	Act	was	passed	in	1913	to	the	
same	effect	as	the	1968	Act	without	any	further	legal	challenges.
11.	 The	Income	Tax	Act	2007	and	linked	legislation	requires	to	be	put	into	effect	in	any	tax	year	by	a	‘trigger’	section	in	
the	annual	Finance	Act	imposing	income	tax	in	that	year.	
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’16 General savings
1. Without prejudice to section 15, where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal 
does not, unless the contrary intention appears, –
a. revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes 
effect;
b. affect the previous operation of the enactment repealed or anything duly done 
or suffered under that enactment;
c. affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred 
under that enactment;
d. affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence 
committed against that enactment;
e. affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such 
right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment; 
 and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, contin-
ued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, 
as if the repealing Act had not been passed.’
Section 23 of that Act applies the same presumptions to subordinate legislation.
b. Legal basis for ‘interpretative statutes’
The United Kingdom has no written constitution in the sense meant here, nor any General 
Tax Act, nor any special terminology of this kind. There is nothing directly relevant in the 
Interpretation Act 1968 other than section 16. Section 16 is a statutory presumption 
enacted to save the provisions having to be repeated in every Act of Parliament.
It has been common practice for governments throughout the last 100 years to 
impose ‘the view of the tax authorities’ in legislation in the sense that it uses an Act of Parlia-
ment to reverse the effect of a court decision or to remove a doubt about interpretation in 
favour of the official view. There are no general legislative provisions dealing with this. The 
courts will give effect to the will of Parliament.12
3.19.1.4. Validation statutes
As noted above, Parliament may decide to reverse the effect of a decision of the courts on a 
point of tax law to restore the approach taken by the tax authorities or to ‘plug’ a ‘loophole’ 
that allows the tax charge to be sidestepped (avoided) legally in a way that was not 
intended. The decision when that law should start is a policy decision for the Treasury which 
is normally endorsed by Parliament. In recent years such legislation is more likely to occur 
while a case is still going through the appeal system rather than waiting for the final appeal 
to the Supreme Court (until 2009, the House of Lords). In many cases the legislation will 
operate from the beginning of the next tax year. In some cases an official Government 
announcement is made in Parliament of an intention to legislate and effect will be given to 
that legislation from the date of the announcement. In other cases the relevant government 
department (sometimes the Treasury and sometimes Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) 
issues a press release announcing the plans to legislate. Legislation that predates any official 
warning is rarer, but again it is a matter for Parliament to consider on any specific occasion 
on which the point arises. The debate is political and perhaps economic or commercial in 
12.	 This	answer	is	given	without	reference	to	additional	considerations	arising	from	the	operation	of	European	Union	
law	in	the	United	Kingdom.	Separate	consideration	is	given	below	to	whether	the	European	Convention	on	Human	
Rights,	which	became	internally	effective	in	the	United	Kingdom	under	the	Human	Rights	Act	1999	from	2000,	now	
provides	additional	answers	to	this	question.
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content and not usually framed by reference to legal rules (though ‘human rights’ are often 
invoked such debates in a political sense).
3.19.1.5. Comparison moment
The general rule is that an Act of Parliament comes into force on the date of the Royal Assent 
(and before it is published). In practice, that rarely happens for major Acts, and never for 
fiscal measures. The normal practice is that the Act will itself either (a) provide for the date 
or dates from which it is to have effect or (b) provide that the Act will come into effect on 
such day or days as are provided by government order (statutory instruments called Com-
mencement Orders) (these do not in practice predate the date of the order and usually 
postdate it). As noted above, the standard practice for Finance Acts is to provide that the 
main measures, such as rates of tax, come into force at the beginning of a financial year 
– usually the year in which they are given the Royal Assent – with effect being given to much 
of the content by the 1968 Act and Budget Resolutions. So no ‘comparison moment’ arises.
3.19.1.6. Concept of retrospectivity
As ‘retrospectivity’ in the wide sense employed here has been the standard practice of all 
political parties that have attained government in the United Kingdom for many years past, 
there is in practice a focus on specific retrospective measures only if (a) they seek to alter the 
effect of a judicial decision after it has been taken with the aim of restoring the situation on 
which that decision was based (and not merely the application of the practice to other simi-
lar cases) or (b) they seek to change the way in which tax laws apply to a situation after the 
taxpayer (or taxable person) is no longer able to change that situation. See for example the 
case of James v IRC mentioned below.13
An example of how modern UK Finance Acts come into effect is the Finance Act 2004. 
This followed a Budget Statement on 17 March 2004 (the usual time), was published on 15 July 
2004 (unusually late) and received the Royal Assent on 22 July 2004 (the usual time). In the 
wide sense, everything that took effect before 15 July 2004 or applied from that date to 
arrangements made before 15 July 2004 was retrospective. In a fiscal sense, it was retrospective 
for direct taxes if it took effect before the start of the tax year on 1 or 6 April 2004. In a budget-
ary sense, it was retrospective if it took effect before the Budget resolutions passed on 17 March 
2004. In the narrowest sense it was retrospective for direct taxes if it took effect from the date 
on which an announcement was made about the new measure (or no announcement was 
made and the provision took effect before it was introduced to the House of Commons as a 
clause in the relevant Finance Bill.) Provisions in the Act took effect retrospectively in all those 
senses. Nor was there anything unusual about most of those measures.
The rate of tobacco products duty was increased from 6pm on 17 March 2004 (‘as the 
Chancellor sat down’). 
The rate of alcoholic liquor duty was increased from midnight on 21 March 2004 (to 
allow shops time to change their prices).
Amendments to the law to deal with VAT avoidance schemes came into effect on 
22 July 2004 to allow for regulations to be made, with the actual date to be given in the 
regulations.
Income tax rates and allowances came into effect on 6 April 2004.
The corporation tax rates and allowances came into effect on 1 April 2004.
Changes to the law on transfer pricing to deal with the European Court’s judgment in 
the Lankhorst-Hohorst case (C-324/2000) were applied to chargeable periods beginning on 
13.	 Infra	note	15.	
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or after 1 April 2004 (6 April for income tax), with special provision made to divide account-
ing periods that straddled the date.14
Measures to counteract the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Camas v Atkin-
son [2004] STC 860 (about capital costs of investment companies) came into effect in the 
same way as the transfer pricing changes.15 The opportunity was taken to change other 
related tax provisions at the same time. The Treasury was also given power by regulation to 
make further amendments to legislation to complete the changes. 
The accounting principles on which companies prepare their accounts for tax pur-
poses were changed to allow companies to prepare their tax accounts in line with the corpo-
rate requirements of EC Regulation 1606/2002. This was available for all accounts periods 
starting 1 January 2005. 
Provision was made for a new scheme dealing with construction industry sub-con-
tract workers, with intended start date for the scheme announced as April 2006 but the 
details left to regulations.
Changes were made to a number of allowances for personal income tax, some from 
6 April 2004 and some from 6 April 2005. An amendment to the provisions allowing indi-
viduals to deduct certain charitable payments from their taxable income were given effect 
from 6 April 2003. This was to the advantage of the taxpayers and charities.
A detailed measure to impose a charge to income tax by reference to the enjoyment of 
property previously owned was introduced from 6 April 2005. This was widely criticized in 
political terms as retrospective because it imposed a tax charge on individuals who had given 
away property (usually to close relatives) but retained some use of the property (e.g. giving 
away ownership of a house but continuing to live there rent free as a tenant for life, as a way of 
avoiding inheritance tax). The criticism was because the individuals could not now take back 
what they had given away so as to undertake the arrangements in a way that would avoid the 
new tax charge. In what legal, as against political, sense was this retrospective?
Other income tax changes were made for varying reasons from 7 May 2004, 8 April 
2004 and 18 June 2004. 
New rules were introduced to deal with taxation of payments of interest and royalties 
to give effect to EC Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 (the Interest and Royalties 
Directive). This broadly took effect on 8 April 2004, but special provision was made to allow 
taxpayers to claim exemption from 1 January 2004. These deem payments to have been 
made under the Act after it was passed, and also gave retrospective effect expressly to the 
relevant regulations (see s. 106). 
Measures to counteract tax avoidance involving loss relief or partnerships was brought 
into effect from 10 December 2003, the day on which an Inland Revenue press release 
announced that the government would legislate. Measures to block companies from obtaining 
tax advantages from schemes involving artificial payments were introduced from 2 July 2004, 
the date on which the Treasury announced that it would seek legislation in the Finance Bill to 
deal with the issue. Measures to stop tax avoidance through ‘gilt strips’ took effect from 15 Jan-
uary 2004, again the date of the relevant announcement in an Inland Revenue press release. 
Other measures took effect, following announcements, on 3 March 2004 and 2 July 2004.
Major reforms to taxation of pension schemes were provided, with effect from 5 April 
2006. These had been subject to major consultation since 2002. 
An amendment to the Finance Act 2001 (on aggregates levy) was deemed to have 
come into force on 1 April 2004 (to avoid losing an EU grant facility in Northern Ireland).
14.	 See	s.	37	of	the	Act,	an	unusual	approach.
15.	 See	s.	38,	amending	s	75	of	the	Taxes	Act	1988	to	restore	the	Revenue	view	of	the	operation	of	the	section.	Ss.	43	and	
44	included	transitional	provisions	adopting	the	straddle	approach	similarly	to	s.	37
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The final example from that Act is new legislation requiring taxpayers and their advis-
ers to disclose ‘notifiable’ tax avoidance schemes to the tax authorities. This covers proposed 
schemes as well as schemes that have been implemented. It was announced as coming into 
effect on 1 August 2004. 
3.19.1.7. Distinction between substantive and procedural statutes
As noted above, the general approach in United Kingdom law is that substantive changes 
take place from the date of Royal Assent (or, in the case of Finance Acts, from the beginning 
of the tax year) unless other provision is made. The normal approach to procedural changes 
is that they have immediate effect on enactment (or other commencement date) and apply 
to all existing transactions or cases.16 
However, there are often transitional ‘grandfather’ provisions dealing with current 
issues. 
For example, when the new appeal tribunal structure for all taxes was introduced in 
April 2009 there were important differences to the procedural rules that applied to existing 
appeals. But both parties and judges were given considerable freedom to decide if the old 
rules or the new rules (or some combination of the two) should apply to tax appeals directly 
affected by the changes. 
By contrast, the United Kingdom government’s attempts to impose retrospective time 
limits on late claims for adjustments of value added tax liabilities were found by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice to be in breach of European Union law. This is mentioned not because 
of the European Union point but to make the point that there was no legal principle of 
United Kingdom law (or of English law) that was or could have been argued by the taxable 
person to achieve the same limit on retrospective removal without prior announcement of a 
procedural right to make a late claim. In particular, the appeal in the European jurispru-
dence to the concept of proportionality is not reflected in this way in English law.
3.19.2. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.19.2.1. Constitutional limitations to retroactivity of tax statutes
There are none.17 
16.	 See	Lord	Brightman	in	Yew	Ban	Tei	v	Kandarann	Bas	Mara	[1983]	1	AC	553,	558	(opinion	of	the	Privy	Council):	‘…	
there	is	at	common	law	a	prima	facie	rule	of	constitutional	law	that	a	statute	should	not	be	interpreted	retrospec-
tively	so	as	to	impair	an	existing	right	unless	that	result	is	unavoidable	on	the	language	used	…	There	is,	however,	
said	to	be	an	exception	in	the	case	of	a	statute	which	is	purely	procedural	because	no	person	has	a	vested	right	in	
any	particular	course	o	procedure,	but	only	a	right	to	prosecute	or	defence	a	suit	according	to	the	rules	for	the	
conduct	of	an	action	for	the	time	being	pursued.’
17.	 ‘As	the	constitutional	law	of	England	stands	today,	Parliament	has	the	power	to	enact	by	statute	any	fiscal	law,	whether	
of	a	prospective	or	retrospective	nature	and	whether	or	not	it	may	be	thought	by	some	persons	to	cause	injustice	to	
individual	citizens’:	Slade	J	in	James	v	IRC	[1977]	STC	280	at	204.	That	case	concerned	a	challenge	to	the	retrospective	
effect	of	a	provision	in	the	finance	Act	1974	that	amended	the	1973	Finance	Act	to	increase	the	top	rates	of	income	tax	
charged	in	that	–	the	1973	–	Act	for	that	–	the	1973	–	tax	year.	The	judge	cited	the	authorities	about	interpreting	a	statute	
to	ensure	it	had	a	clear	meaning,	and	found	that	it	was	completely	clear.	But	compare	the	decision	of	the	five-judge	Privy	
Council	in	Income	Tax	Commissioner	v	Esperance	[1983]	STC	789.	Three	of	the	judges	found	that	an	income	tax	measure	
of	the	Mauritius	Parliament	was	clear	and	was	clearly	retrospective.	Two	other	judges,	dissenting,	found	that	the	
language	of	the	draftsman	was	obscure	and	unclear	and	that	the	provision	was	not	retrospective.	And	see	also	Lord	
Morris	in	CEC	v	Thorn	Electrical	Industries	[1975]	STC	617,	[1975]	1	WLR	1661:	‘an	ambiguity	is	not	created	merely	
because	an	unsuccessful	argument	as	to	the	meaning	of	words	has	been	skillfully	presented.’	
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3.19.2.2. Transition policy of government
The reader is referred to the answer given to the previous question. 
3.19.2.3. Ex ante control by an independent body
England adopted a Bill of Rights following the Dutch conquest of England in 1688/9 under 
William of Orange.18 That provided that no tax could be levied without consent of Parlia-
ment. This removed Royal Prerogative and other royal powers from the power to levy tax but 
put no other limits in their place. And none have been put in place since. (Indeed, the situa-
tion is further limited because since 1912 the House of Commons has exercised the powers 
of Parliament alone.19) Nor is there any formal body to advise Parliament – or now the 
House of Commons – on the exercise of its powers. 
3.19.3. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.19.3.1. ‘Legislating by press release’
This is used. See several examples in connection with the Finance Act 2004 above. It is used 
whenever it is felt appropriate.
3.19.3.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
The reader is referred to the answer given to the previous question. 
3.19.3.3. Pending legal proceedings
Retrospective effect is given to measures designed to affect existing cases. Sometimes these 
have retrospective effect although this overrides the effect of a case that has been decided or 
is to be decided. More common is the approach of changing the law but not applying it to 
any case in which notice of appeal was not given before a given date, perhaps the date on 
which the law was passed or the date on which the Government announced that it was 
going to ask Parliament to change the law.20 
3.19.3.4. Favourable retroactivity
See the examples in the Finance Act 2004 above. These are not totally atypical as examples 
(to use a deliberate English double negative). The use of such legislation is not uncommon 
18.	 For	a	highly	readable	recent	account	of	how	the	Dutch	conquered	the	English,	who	then	reversed	the	process,	see	
Lisa	Jardine,	Going	Dutch:	How	England	plundered	Holland’s	glory	(Harper	Press,	2008).	
19.	 Following	the	Parliament	Act	1911.
20.	 For	social	security	benefit	purposes	(but	not	tax)	there	is	a	general	legislative	power	that	prevents	the	result	of	an	
appeal	applying	to	cases	that	have	not	been	appealed	at	the	date	of	a	decision	if	the	decision	alters	the	previously	
accepted	official	interpretation	of	a	legislative	provision:	Social	Security	Act	1998,	sections	25	(decisions	involving	
issues	that	arise	on	appeal	in	other	cases)	and	26	(appeals	involving	issues	that	arise	on	appeal	in	other	cases).
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(although it may be that only the government department and the taxpayer concerned are 
aware of the potential litigation). As to the situations in which it occurs, it depends.21
3.19.4. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.19.4.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
There is no basis for a test against legal principles, other than as arising from issues of Euro-
pean Union law or the European Convention of Human Rights.
3.19.4.2. Examination method
The reader is referred to the answer to the previous question.
3.19.4.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR
This was tested in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in R(Huitson) v Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs.22 This was a challenge by judicial review of the provisions in section 
58 of the Finance Act 2008. The section was designed to counteract a tax planning scheme 
involving a foreign trust with UK resident trustees in combination with a foreign partner-
ship. The section changed the definition of who were partners of the partnership in a way 
that stopped the scheme working. The amendments were expressly stated as to ‘treated as 
always having had effect’. The section made clear that this applied to all tax laws since 1970. 
The law was passed despite a campaign against it because of its retrospective effect.23
The section was challenged as being in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol. In a strong 
judgment, the Court of Appeal accepted that the claim by the appellant for tax relief so as 
not to have to pay UK income tax was a ‘possession’ for the purposes of Article 1. It did so by 
confirming the decision of the judge in the Administrative Court who ruled that the section 
did not violate the article.24 The test applied was whether the section ‘imposed an unrea-
sonable burden on the claimant and thereby failed to strike a fair balance between the 
various interests involved.’25 The court found that the appellant had entered into a scheme 
that was wholly artificial and of doubtful efficacy. The section prevents some taxpayers 
gaining GBP 200 million at the expense of taxpayers generally. It avoided lengthy litigation. 
It was proportionate. And there was no legitimate expectation affected, as this was a scheme 
that had not been accepted by a court or tribunal or by the tax authorities. 
At the same time the Court of Appeal heard a challenge to the section made under European 
Union law.26 The challenge was that the effect of section 58 was incompatible with the 
21.	 On	what?	I	am	not	quite	sure.	There	is	considerable	secrecy	about	much	tax	litigation,	and	it	can	be	some	years	
before	a	dispute	becomes	public	knowledge.	This	is	a	result	of	several	factors	including:	a	high	level	of	confidential-
ity	respected	by	the	government	department	(including	the	fact	that	government	ministers	never	get	involved	in	
individual	tax	cases);	the	presence	of	powerful	confidentiality	clauses	and	strong	professional	standards	protecting	
publicity	between	taxpayers	and	their	advisers;	and	the	absence	of	publicity	in	most	cases	about	ongoing	appeals	
until	a	decision	is	made	by	the	tribunals.	And	until	relatively	recently	most	first	level	tribunal	decisions	in	direct	tax	
cases	were	not	published	at	all.	
22.	 [2011]	EWCA	Civ	893.
23.	 See	www.notoretrotax.org.uk.
24.	 [2010]	EWHC	97	(Admin).
25.	 See	MA	and	34	others	v	Finland	(2003)	37	EHRR	CD	210.
26.	 R(Shiner)	v	HMRC	[2011]	EWCA	892.	
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freedom of movement of capital within the EU. The Court agreed with HMRC that there was 
no relevant movement of capital on the facts of the case, so the challenge failed. The Court 
set out, but did not decide, other issues of EU law said to be relevant to the case. It adopted 
its decision about violation of human rights in the Huitson case for this case also. 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court has refused permission for an appeal against these 
decisions. This therefore confirms the relevance of a challenge against retroactive laws 
under Article 1 of the First Protocol, but suggests that this is unlikely to be successful for 
abusive tax avoidance where there has been no indication that the avoidance is accepted by 
the tribunals or tax authorities. Since 2003 all tax avoidance schemes must be registered 
with HMRC. It will be important with regard to retrospective legislation about any new 
scheme to establish if it was registered and if so whether HMRC challenged it at that time. 
3.19.4.4. Examination method for testing against principle of legal certainty
Other than in cases involving European Union law or human rights law, British courts 
approach the issue of certainty not as a separate principle but as an aspect of the task of a 
court of identifying the true intention of Parliament in passing legislation. The courts oper-
ate a number of presumptions when doing this, and some may be relevant to this question. 
For example, the courts will presume, if legislation is otherwise ambiguous, that Parliament 
intended that the law should be consistent with United Kingdom treaty obligations rather 
than inconsistent. In a similar way, the courts will test examine legislation to see if on a 
proper interpretation of the law it is the intention of Parliament that the law have retrospec-
tive effect. If the intention of Parliament is clear (and it usually is in modern provisions) 
then the courts will take the issue of certainty no further. This has not been articulated as an 
application of the principle of legal certainty but rather of the common law duty of judges 
to ensure fairness.27 
3.19.4.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
It is not unknown for a court to deal with a difficult situation, which might include an issue 
of this sort, by resolving the problem in favour of a party disadvantaged by the difficulty by 
reference to some other issue and not the issue that caused the difficulty. But in cases where 
the court, having approached the case in the way outlined in the previous answer, finds that 
Parliament cannot have intended the unfairness occasioned by a retrospective application 
of a rule, it will adopt another interpretation. I am not aware of any recent tax case in which 
that has been done with regard to substantive tax law in the United Kingdom. 
3.19.4.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
In the United Kingdom the reason is simple: Parliament is sovereign. 
27.	 ‘It	is	not	simply	a	question	of	classifying	an	enactment	as	retrospective	or	not	retrospective.	Rather	it	may	well	be	a	
matter	of	degree.	The	greater	the	unfairness	the	more	it	is	to	be	expected	that	Parliament	will	make	clear	if	that	is	
intended.’	Originally	part	of	a	judgment	of	Staughton	LJ,	but	since	endorsed	and	followed	on	several	occasions,	for	
example	by	the	House	of	Lords	in	Plewa	v	Chief	Adjudication	Officer	[1995]	1	AC	249	(HL).	This	is	a	longstanding	
judicial	approach:	see	for	example	Smith	v	Callender	[1901]	AC	297	and	Ingle	v	Farrand	[1927]	AC	417.	See	also	
L’Office	Cherifien	des	Phosphates	v	Yamashita-Shinnion	Steamship	Co	Ltd	[1994]	1	AC	486	(HL)	for	a	thorough	
review	of	the	case	law	and	a	further	statement	of	the	test:	‘whether	the	consequences	of	reading	the	statute	with	the	
suggested	degree	of	retrospectivity	are	so	unfair	that	the	words	used	by	Parliament	cannot	have	been	intended	to	
means	what	they	might	appear	to	say’	(Lord	Mustill	at	p	525).
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3.19.5. Retroactivity of case law
3.19.5.1. Temporal effect of judicial change of course 
The United Kingdom’s Supreme Court started work in October 2009. Previously its jurisdic-
tion was exercised by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. It was very rare for the 
House of Lords to change its mind about anything as it followed a rule that it is normally 
bound by its own decisions. The Supreme Court is following this approach in taxation cases. 
The practical answer to this issue with regard to decisions about taxation is that any such 
change would be made by legislation and not by the courts. 
More generally, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords considered the ques-
tions of the prospective and retrospective28 effects of judgments in detail recently in 
National Westminster Bank v Spectrum.29 Some of their Lordships considered that the House 
of Lords had the power to make decisions that were proactive only in effect, but none iden-
tified any specific situation on which this could be done, and all of them agreed that there 
had been no example of the operation of that power to date. However, they recognized that 
Parliament sometimes provides that decisions of the courts or tribunals have prospective 
effect only, save for the individual case.30 
It might be argued that there is a major exception to that general statement in rela-
tion to tax cases. This is with regard to the way United Kingdom courts interpret legislation. 
Traditionally, the United Kingdom courts took a very literal approach to taxation cases, 
including cases of tax avoidance. In the ‘ground-breaking’ case of Ramsay v IRC31 the House 
of Lords set out a new more liberal approach to interpreting tax statutes. But this is not a 
new rule of law or a new principle, as the House of Lords itself emphasised in 200632. After a 
powerful debate in the higher courts, the general consensus is that the ‘new’ approach as it 
was termed at the time is a reminder that tax statutes should be interpreted in the same way 
as any other statutes. Increasingly, however, this takes into account the policy behind the 
legislation as well as the wording of the legislation itself.33
3.19.6. Views in the literature
3.19.6.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
As indicated above, there is little sustained comment on this question outside the context of 
specific provisions. There was some comment in the professional and business literature 
about the decision in Huitson ‘opening the door’ to retrospective legislation but little funda-
mental analysis. 
28.	 On	a	point	of	linguistic	usage,	while	‘prospective’	is	the	opposite	term	to	‘retrospective’,	‘proactive’	has	a	different	
common	usage	and	is	not	identical	in	meaning.	It	is	used	with	the	meaning	‘anticipatory’	or	acting	in	advance	to	
anticipate	a	difficulty	before	the	difficulty	occurs.	‘Prospective’	has	a	more	passive	sense	of	‘looking	forward’	rather	
than	‘acting	forward’.	I	note	that	‘prospective’	is	used	as	the	opposite	term	to	‘retroactive’	rather	than	‘proactive’	in	
the	passage	quoted	from	Graetz	and	Kaplow.	
29.	 [2005]	UKHL	41.
30.	 See	as	an	example	the	devolution	Acts	of	1998	(e.g.	the	Scotland	Act	1998).	
31.	 [1982]	AC	300.	The	courts	have	looked	at	this	issue	several	times	since	–	see	the	Tower	MCashback	decision	noted	
below.	
32.	 Deutsche	Morgan	Grenfell	Plc	v	HMRC	[2006]	UKHL	49.	
33.	 The	most	recent	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court	is	in	HMRC	v	Tower	MCashback	LLP1	[2011]	UKSC	19,	where	the	
Supreme	Court	overturned	decisions	in	the	courts	below	to	affirm	a	decision	of	the	Tax	Tribunal	disallowing	a	tax	
avoidance	scheme.	
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3.19.6.2. Debate on law and economics view on transitional law
That debate is a fascinating debate but – aside from the issue of section 58 – is not one that 
has attracted too much attention in Britain. There are, I suggest, two separate issues behind 
it which have received attention. The first is the question of the extent to which taxation is 
used as a policy instrument to achieve non-fiscal objectives. But it is difficult to see how 
retroactive taxes (to use the questionnaire’s term) will achieve some of those objectives. For 
example, while there may be a consensus that smoking is bad and therefore should be seen 
as an appropriate object of a ‘sin tax’, it is difficult to see how that objective is enhanced by 
raising taxes after people have smoked (even if that could be done in an administrative 
effective way). But it could be enhanced by cutting taxes if someone can prove he or she has 
not smoked for a defined period. Is that retrospective taxation? To answer that, we must 
answer another question. Does this debate include negative taxes as well as positive taxes? 
For example, was the retrospective measure in the Finance Act 2004 that increased the tax 
allowance made available on a charitable gift a form of retrospective taxation? Or was it an 
obscure way of giving a new public finance grant to charities that had been successful in 
collecting funds in the past?
The second issue is that of non-payment of imposed taxes by evasion, avoidance or a 
combination of the two. When is it proper to impose criminal liability (including adminis-
tratively imposed penalties and fines) or civil liability (including ordinary tax liability) on a 
taxpayer or third party that so arranged matters that tax was not paid when, in the view of 
the government, it should have been paid? 
As a broad statement, the combination of specific criminal offences against taxation 
laws and the common law offence (in England and Wales) of cheating the public revenue 
are wide enough to deal with what would generally be perceived as criminal activity with-
out the need to introduce new laws. Considerable sums are collected from previous evaders 
with minimum publicity and no public criminal prosecutions. 
The main debates in the United Kingdom have been about defining what is unaccept-
able avoidance of taxation and then designing the means to limit it. That debate is beyond 
the scope of this paper although in practice the two issues interact.
If I may conclude with a personal comment, it is that there remains little discussion 
about retrospective tax legislation outside the ‘Westminster village’ and those who seek to 
influence the current policy makers.
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3.20.
United States
Charlotte Crane
3.20.1. Introduction
In the United States there is no source of authoritative law affecting this area other than 
judicial decisions examining legislative acts under general constitutional provisions. There 
is, furthermore, a general sense that the common law approach to judicial decisions may 
result in decisions – even by the same court – that can be reconciled only in terms of their 
results and not necessarily in terms of the specific language or rationale stated in the opin-
ion. As a result, it is almost impossible to answer the questions posed in section 3.20.2 ‘On 
terminology’ separately from the questions posed in section 3.20.5 ‘Ex post evaluation of 
retroactivity in case law.’ This difficulty is compounded by the fact that since the introduc-
tion of the Graetz/Kaplow/law and economics approach, most traditional law review articles 
deal with the issues only from a normative perspective; few attempt to deal with the actual 
practices either of courts or of legislatures. The debate in the American law reviews is almost 
entirely theoretical; there has been no sustained attempt to review the outcomes of actual 
cases or the actual practice of legislatures under a post-Graetz approach.
In the United States, constraints on retroactive legislation can be found both in the 
federal Constitution and in the state constitutions. The constraints based in the federal 
Constitution apply both to Congress and to the state legislatures. In theory, these con-
straints should be applied the same at both levels. As noted below in the case of validation/
curative statutes, however, the institutional position of the states and their subunits are 
sufficiently different that situations for which there no federal counterparts have emerged. 
The constraints based in a state constitution apply only to the legislature of that state. 
Even though these state constitutional provisions may contain exactly the same language and 
can be traced to common sources, each highest court in a state is free to interpret these con-
straints independent of the interpretations of other courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
United States. This practice compounds the difficulty of stating conclusions regarding the 
meaning given in the United States to any particular language. The attitude toward retroactive 
tax legislation in the state courts is considerably more hostile in at least some instances than 
the attitude in the federal courts. Some of this difference may, however, reflect the fact that 
state legislatures tend to engage in more controversial legislative practices. (This is turn 
reflects the fact that most state legislatures are under considerably more onerous fiscal con-
straints than the federal government, including debt limitations and balanced budget require-
ments.) The responses in this questionnaire include these state practices (labeled ‘subnational’ 
and set at the margin) as examined under both federal and state constitutional limitations, 
but no assurance can be given that all state practices are reflected in these responses. 
This report deals only with constraints on legislative actions. Very different assump-
tions about the legitimacy of retroactivity can be found with respect to with administrative 
actions. When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity by 
applying the law to a particular fact pattern, its correction of a previously mistaken determi-
nation does not purport to change the applicable law, and therefore, like a judicial interpre-
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tation, is ordinarily given retroactive effect. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 
(1957) (permitting retroactive revocation of a ruling holding taxpayer to be taxable as a 
non-taxable membership organization). Under the most commonly used letter ruling prac-
tice, however, the ordinary practice is to revoke with prospective effect only, in order to 
induce taxpayers to participate in this practice. 
Until 1996 a similarly broad degree of discretion was permitted Treasury and the IRS in 
the promulgation of new substantive rules through regulations. E.g., CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965) (permitting retro-
active effect to the withdrawal of an acquiescence in an earlier unrelated case). New constraints 
were imposed by Congress in 1996 on the ability of Treasury and the IRS to announce positions 
with retroactive effect relating to statutes enacted after 1996. These statutory constraints on 
administrative decisions map considerably more easily into the distinctions made in this 
questionnaire. In general, the Treasury, in conjunction with the IRS, has authority to promul-
gate regulations interpreting legislative language. Although the circumstances under which 
courts must defer to administrative decisions are still not entirely clear, see Mayo Found. for 
Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. (2012), in general, the courts must defer to such 
regulations when the meaning of the statute is ambiguous. 
Since 1998, however, 26 U.S.C. 7805 has prescribed the extent of retroactivity allowed 
in tax regulations as follows: 
“(1) No regulation will ‘apply to any taxable period ending before the earliest of 
[certain] dates.’ [These dates all deal with events that would provide taxpayers 
with notice of the regulation; that is, the date a regulation is filed with the federal 
register (apparently, even if it does not actually appear in that publication until 
several days later), the date on which a proposed version of the regulation was 
similarly filed, or the date on which ‘any notice substantially describing the 
expected contents of any temporary, proposed or final regulation is issued to the 
public.’ 
[Specific exceptions permit retroactivity only in the case of]
(2)  Regulations issued within 18 months of the enactment ‘of the statutory provision 
to which the regulation relates’
(3)  Regulations to prevent abuse
(4)  Regulations ‘to correct a procedural defect in the issuance of any prior regulation’
(5)  Regulations ‘relating to internal Treasury Department policies, practices or proce-
dures’
(6)  Regulations if authorized ‘by a legislative grant from Congress authorizing the 
Secretary to prescribe the effective date with respect to any regulation’
(7)  Regulations if the regulation allows retroactive application only on the taxpayer‘s 
election.”
Some of the tension between the judicial attitude toward retroactivity in legislation and the 
constraints imposed by Congress on federal tax authorities can explained by the institu-
tional roles of the courts and Congress. A significant part of the tension may nevertheless be 
attributable to the differing institutional views regarding the legitimacy of retroactivity. 
3.20.2. Terminology
3.20.2.1. Retroactivity and retrospectivity 
In the United States there is no clear distinction made between ‘retroactivity’ (applying to a 
period before enactment, and thus formally retroactive) and ‘retrospectivity’ (effecting actions 
taken prior to enactment, and thus materially retroactive). Although in the United States, both 
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‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’ may be used, ‘retroactive’ is by far the more common term 
and it is used to describe both a statute meant to have effect on a date prior to its enactment 
and to a statute that effects prior economic positions (including accrued but unrealized gains). 
In many contexts, the former may be more controversial than the latter.
The term ‘retrospective’ has no particular significance in the jurisprudence involving the 
power of the federal Congress to enact tax legislation that either is ‘effective’ as of a date prior 
to its enactment or alters the results of previously established economic positions. As discussed 
below in section 3.20.5, such ‘retrospective’ taxation of most types of income streams and 
many types of transactions would be uncontroversial. Thus, for instance, the various courts 
considering the application of a 1950 statute that effectively changed a the rate applicable to a 
payment received in 1964 as an installment on a sales contract closed in 1946 in Picchione v. 
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1490 (1970), affd. 440 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 
(1971), merely had to conclude that the result of the statutory change was not so harsh as to 
violate due process, without having to commit to the degree of retroactivity involved. 
Although there is no technical significance to retrospectivity in taxation, legislatures are 
generally sensitive to it when entirely new taxes are enacted. Thus, the federal government 
upon first enacting an income tax, defined the base to avoid an extraordinary amount of ‘ret-
rospective’ taxation of capital gains by setting the basis for measuring such gains at the fair 
market value at the time when the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution first came into 
effect permitting the enactment of the income tax in 1913. (Prior to that date, according to the 
opinion of the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), Congress 
had no power to impose an income tax at least with respect to many types of income.) 
This limitation was not so much the result of a Congressional view that, even had the 
power to tax such income been present, the retrospective nature of a tax on previously 
accrued gains would have made it unconstitutional, but an acknowledgment that prior to 
that date there may have been no power to impose an income tax, and that any attempt to 
reach prior accruals might be beyond the reach of its taxing authority. 
Subnational. In several states (Colorado, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee) 
the state constitution expressly prohibits ‘retrospective’ legislation or legislation ‘retrospec-
tive in operation; in several others (Georgia, Ohio, Texas) the prohibition is on ‘retroactive’ 
legislation. 
Even in the states with specific constitutional provisions, no distinctions between the 
terms ‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’ are discernible in the case law discussing these prohi-
bitions. See, e.g., Shangri-la, Inc. v. State, 113 N.H. 440 (1973)(tax on capital gain realized in 
March 1970, included in business profits tax first imposed in January 1970, although gain 
admitted to be economically accrued prior to January 1970 not ‘retroactive’ and thus not 
unconstitutional under NH provision); Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493 (2006)(permitting, 
despite constitutional prohibition on ‘law[s] taxing retrospectively sales, …or other acts 
previously done’, an increase in income tax rates, in a statute enacted in September 2001, 
increasing rate on entire 2001 year). 
Many states when enacting their separate income taxes similarly limited their effects, 
even if there was no obvious lack of power to tax such gains as they accrued earlier. See, e.g., 
Cook v. Revenue Div. of Michigan, 396 Mich. 176 (1976)(applying the Michigan rule, which 
allowed proportionate exclusion of gains accrued before but realized after enactment, to 
employer-sponsored savings accounts)
3.20.2.2. Relevance of the tax period 
The legal discourse in the United States does not usually employ a conceptual distinction 
between actual retroactivity (that is, a provision that applies to a previous year) and de facto 
retroactivity (that applies as of the beginning of the current year). 
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In the United States both provisions could be called ‘retroactive,’ but, as above, there is 
generally no significance to using this label in determining the limitations on the power of 
Congress to tax. The labelling of a particular provision as ‘retroactive’ will not be determina-
tive of its validity. 
Despite the lack of formal distinction between these two types of retroactivity, de 
facto retroactivity is far more common and is generally completely uncontroversial, at least 
when the tax is directed at income or value and not on any particular transaction. Even 
when defined in terms of particular transactions, retroactivity within the year of enactment 
is likely to be viewed as benign. Indeed, a federal tax provision enacted in a later month 
having an effective date in an earlier month, that is, changing the results of transactions 
occurring earlier in the same year, is common. The Supreme Court has taken note of the 
phenomenon, see United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 297 (1981)(calling this a ‘custom-
ary Congressional practice,’ and permitting changes enacted in October 1976 to have effect 
on transactions after 1 January 1976). The practice dates at least to the first enactment of the 
income tax after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, on 2 October 1913, retro-
active to 1 March 1913, and was present in a multitude of congressional acts both before 
and after, see the instances listed in the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Untermeyer v. Anderson, 
276 U.S. 440 (1928). 
This practice is occasionally justified on the ground that the tax is on the overall 
income of the year, and ‘income’ is not final until the end of the taxable year. This justifica-
tion has not been relied upon in modern cases scrutinized under federal standards; indeed, 
taxes enacted in a period after the close of the taxable year first affected have not been 
treated differently from taxes enacted within that year, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 
(1938) (Wisconsin statute enacted in 1935 affecting dividends paid in 1933). 
Subnational. This distinction was relied upon in earlier state cases, in which the ratio-
nale was that a tax could be a prospective tax on the privilege of doing business, even if its 
measures included past events, e.g., Oleson v. Borthwick, 33 Haw. 766 (1939) (upholding 
inclusion in income tax base of dividends paid in 1934, upon change in law not occurring 
until 1935); Neild v. District of Columbia 110 F. 2d 246 (C. A. D. C. 1940). This logic seems to 
play an especially important role in those states with a stronger prohibition on retroactivity 
generally, e.g., Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493 (2006)(permitting, despite constitutional prohibi-
tion on ‘law[s] taxing retrospectively sales, …or other acts previously done’, an increase in 
income tax rates, in statute enacted in September 2001, increasing the rate on the entire 
year of 2001) and in General Dynamics Corp. v. Sharp, 919 S.W.2d 861 (Texas 1996) (giving 
effect to, ‘as not retroactive’ an alteration in the formula for determining the corporate 
franchise tax to include a component based on earned surplus, which for this taxpayer 
included amounts under contracts begun eight years earlier, since a franchise tax is not 
‘retroactive’ in violation of the state constitution simply because it ‘draws upon antecedent 
facts’ relating to prior years, so long as it ‘pays for the privilege of doing business’ prospec-
tively’; also noting that even if tax was ‘retroactive,’ it is not impermissibly so since it does 
not impair vested rights). However, in at least one state with a stricter prohibition on retro-
activity, this logic was not sufficient, Lakengren v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio St. 2d 199, 339 N.E.2d 814 
(Ohio 1975)(holding impermissibly retroactive the application of a statute enacted 
20 December 20, 1971, which added income as alternative measure in addition to net worth 
as a measure of the 1972 corporate franchise tax, as applied to income earned in taxable 
year ending Feb 1971)
3.20.2.3. Interpretive statutes 
In the United States two very common practices (technical corrections and statutes purport-
ing to clarify the originally intended meaning) might fall within the meaning of ‘interpreta-
tive’ statute. Only the first is explicitly acknowledged as a distinct practice. Neither has any 
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constitutional significance. Since the degree of permissible retroactivity under the federal 
Constitution is so broad, there is no special doctrine needed to justify these practices. Con-
gress is far more likely, as a political matter, however, to enact such statutes than other 
provisions with either ‘retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ effect.
Technical Corrections. The practice most common at the federal level is the enactment 
of ‘technical corrections.’ ‘Technical corrections’ would include (1) changes to statutes that 
contained clear errors in drafting, both in grammar and in effect and (2) language that was 
intended to be ‘interpretative’ in the common sense of clarifying the intent of the prior 
statute. 
Technical corrections packages are fairly routine, enacted essentially after every major 
piece of tax legislation. They are by definition ‘revenue neutral,’ in the sense that they are 
enacted only to restore the expectations of the enacting Congress with regard to the origi-
nal measure. They are also generally assembled as bipartisan legislation, agreed to by the 
relevant staffs and are likely to move through Congress without amendment.1 
Clarification of intended meaning. A federal statute might purport to declare the mean-
ing of a previously enacted statute, without fitting the generally understood meaning of 
‘technical correction.’ Although such statutes are far less likely to be enacted than ‘technical 
corrections,’ they might be enacted in response to judicial interpretations, or, in rare cases, 
to positions taken by the government in litigation or in anticipation of litigation. Such a 
practice was approved by the Supreme Court in an early case, Stockdale v. Ins. Cos., 87 U.S. 
323 (1873) (in convoluted set of opinions, allowing 1870 tax on 1869 income of entities and 
generally approving of congressional acts interpreting prior legislation).
This was also the practice involved in United States v. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351 (1989)
(considering a statute enacted to reverse the decision of a trial court that interest paid on 
certain obligations was not subject to tax). In that case, however, the Supreme Court did not 
have to rule on the retroactivity issue because within the same case it reversed the substan-
tive judicial decision that had led to the corrective statute. This change in judicial law ren-
dered the corrective statute (referred to as a ‘clarification’ in the legislation itself) superflu-
ous. 
Early cases found limits on such interpretive legislation when it threatened to 
encroach on ‘vested rights’ defined in contracts with the state itself. E.g., Koshkonong v. Bur-
ton 104 U.S. 668 (1882)(giving effect to a statute that directed the use of the shorter of two 
possible statutes of limitation, but denying effect to one that would result in a lower inter-
est rate paid on state bonds). But a taxpayer is ordinarily not treated as having a vested 
position in any statute setting forth a tax law, no matter how significant its economic 
impact. Therefore, there is no particular reluctance to enact provisions that endorse an 
administrative position already asserted by tax authorities despite the assertion of contrary 
positions by taxpayers. (However, Congress also may indicate in legislative history that no 
inference is intended as to the relationship of a new provision with an administrative posi-
tion regarding prior law, see, e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).) Nevertheless, 
Congress may acknowledge in an interpretive statute a difference between taxpayers who 
have clearly relied on the prior law and those who have not. Thus, in the statute involved in 
Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351 (1989), Congress honoured the exemption claimed by those who 
did not include the notes in question in their estate tax returns (many of whom had paid a 
premium on the expectation that the notes would be exempt from estate tax), even as it 
denied the refund claims of those who had included it in their returns. 
The Congressional reaction to a recent rather notorious administrative pronounce-
ment may help demonstrate the wide degree of latitude within which Congress may legally 
1.	 See	generally	Mark	Gerson,	‘Technically	Speaking:	The	Art	of	Tax	Technical	Corrections’,	2007	Tax	Notes	Today,	at	
pp.	44-35.
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act, and the likelihood that its actions will be constrained more by politics than by law. On 
30 September 2008 Treasury announced, claiming apparently to be acting under regulatory 
authority granted by Congress, that the limits on the survival of carryover operating losses 
when a business changes ownership would be applied in a very generous way to the finan-
cial industry. Legislation that was signed in February 2009 ‘clarified’ that this announce-
ment was outside of the authority previously granted. This legislation stopped short of 
entirely revoking the position in the announcement and provided that for deals in place 
before 16 January, the day on which legislation containing these provisions was introduced, 
the announcement ‘shall be deemed to have the force and effect of law with respect to any 
ownership change.’ 
3.20.2.4. Validation statutes 
‘Validation statutes’ are possible, but in general are not recognized as a distinct category 
treated as creating any special challenges under the federal constitutional standards regard-
ing retroactivity. It is assumed that the primary distinction between the ‘interpretative’ 
statute that is the subject of question and the ‘validation’ statute here is the intervention of 
a judicial decision. These provisions, even when they reverse taxpayer victories, are permit-
ted and will be given retroactive effect with respect to those cases for which a final judg-
ment has not been entered. See, e.g., New England Baptist Hospital v. United States, 807 F.2d 
280 (1st Cir. 1986), Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
No. 86-1187 (20 April 1987); Temple University v. United States, 769 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1985).2 
However, such statutes in general could not change the outcome of a case that had 
already been finally determined by a court and a final judgment entered. This prohibition 
stems not from a simple rule against retroactivity, but concerns for separation of powers 
that would render all such judicial interference with the final decisions of courts invalid, see 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
In a series of older cases, such validation or ratification was permitted in situations 
involving far more retroactivity than involved in most modern cases. For instance, in Rafferty 
v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226 (1921), the Court allowed a curative act enacted in 1920 to 
legitimate tariffs collected in 1916 and subsequently held invalid, when litigation challeng-
ing such collection was still pending; in United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907), 
the Court allowed a similar curative act enacted in 1906, ratifying a tariff collected between 
1899 and 1902 for which courts had held there was no authority after the status of the Phil-
ippines changed on the ending of hostilities there.
In a dissent from a procedural order, Justice White indicated that this category may 
still have legal significance in Van Emmerik v. Janklow, 454 U.S. 1131 (1982), when he stated 
that ‘The difficulty in discerning the difference between permissible curative legislation and 
unconstitutionally retroactive legislation is apparent from an examination of our case.’ In 
this case a state court had upheld curative legislation enacted in 1981 that retroactively (re)
imposed a sales tax initially erroneously collected in 1969 after that same state court had 
ruled that the original tax had been invalidly collected.
Congress recently had an opportunity to enact this type of curative tax legislation in a 
situation involving an enormous number of taxpayers, but declined to do so; in this particu-
lar case there is no public record of the reasons for its reluctance to act in this way. Over 
2.	 For	a	survey	of	the	Congressional	practice	in	reaction	to	the	decisions	of	the	Supreme	Court	(perhaps	significantly	
making	no	note	of	Congressional	intent	with	respect	to	retroactivity)	see	Nancy	C	Staudt,	Rene	Lindstadt	and	Jason	
O’Connor,	‘Judicial	Decisions	as	Legislation:	Congressional	Oversight	of	Supreme	Court	Tax	Cases,	1954-2005’,	
82	N.Y.U.	L.	Rev.	1340	(2007),	at	pp.	1383-1394.
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most of the twentieth century, an excise tax was imposed on ‘long-distance’ telephone ser-
vice, with ‘long distance’ defined as service for which the rate charged was determined by 
duration of the call and distance. Beginning in the late 1980s telephone service providers 
began to charge a ‘flat rate’ for long distance calls – some such providers apparently under-
standing that in doing so they might avoid the excise tax. The government urged the courts 
to interpret the statute so as to permit continued collection for ‘long distance’ service even if 
the measure of the charge no longer fit the statutory description; the courts refused. 
Although Congress could have enacted an ‘interpretative’ provision (as described in the 
above question) when this problem first surfaced, see Rev. Rul. 79-404, 1979-2 C.B. 382 and 
GCM 37273 (ruling that the excise applied to certain maritime telephone service, despite 
the lack of fit with the statute), or a ‘validation’ provision, as that term is used here after the 
government began to lose in the district courts, it chose not to do so for reasons that do not 
appear in the public record. Instead, after the government lost numerous cases in the 
courts, the government granted refunds based on formulaic determinations rather than 
actual computations of amounts owed. The adequacy of this administrative limitation on 
remedies is still snarled in litigation. See, e.g., In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax 
Refund Litig., 539 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2008), en banc hearing granted sub nom. Cohen v. 
United States, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Even now, Congress has failed to act, apparently 
because the political stakes are difficult. 
Subnational. In practice in the states, a distinction may be made between those ‘vali-
dating’ or ‘curative’ provisions which redefine liabilities in ways that would have been 
clearly within the power of the taxing body if enacted or properly assessed at the earlier 
time, and those which purport to grant power (for instance, to a more local unit of govern-
ment) that has been determined not to have been present at the earlier time. Zaber v. City of 
Dubuque, 789 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 2010) (noting the distinction in other jurisdictions, but 
indicating that both were equally valid in Iowa, and that when a longstanding local tax is 
ratified by the state legislature a higher degree of retroactivity will be permitted than when 
an entirely new tax is enacted, relying in part on the difference between granting refunds 
and foregoing future revenues); IEC Arab Ala., Inc. v. City of Arab, 7 So. 3d 370 (Ala. 2008)
(allowing the1997 alteration of measure of use tax to close retroactively to the1994 judi-
cially expanded gap in sales/use tax base after change in federal commerce clause limita-
tions rendered the earlier tax invalid); Gautier v. Crescent City, 138 Fla. 573 (1939)(permit-
ting retroactive validation of faulty real estate tax assessment). Such attempts at curative 
legislation may be partially blocked by limitations on a state legislature’s ability to affect 
the outcomes of pending, not just final, cases. See, e.g., Jefferson County Comm’n v. Edwards, 
2010 Ala. LEXIS 85 (14 May 2010). 
3.20.2.5. Comparison moment
Taxing statutes in the United States frequently involve effective dates that differ from the 
date upon which the statute enters into force. Federal statutes ordinarily become law or ‘are 
enacted’ (and thus ‘enter into force’) immediately upon the final act prescribed by the Con-
stitution (generally signing by the President, a vote to override a Presidential veto of a bill 
passed by both the House and the Senate, or the passage of time without Presidential 
action). No additional act of publicity is required. See generally United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 
200 (1980)(reviewing those circumstances in which a statute can be presumed to have 
become effective from the beginning of the day it is signed and those circumstances in 
which it will not be treated as effective until the time it is actually signed). 
The relationship of such dates to the effective date of the statute has no special legal 
significance. As noted in section 3.20.2.2 above, tax statutes are regularly ‘enacted’ with 
‘effective dates’ that are several months earlier, and sometimes enacted with ‘effective dates’ 
that are dates before the beginning of the current calendar year.
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Although a bill will become ‘enacted’ and ‘enter into force’ as a ‘public law’ under the above 
procedure, particular sections of such laws frequently will have separate effective dates. 
These effective date provisions can be very detailed, with very different rules applying to 
different situations. Although these rules will almost always be stated in seemingly general 
terms (e.g., [this provision will not apply to] contracts that became binding before [specific 
date], they frequently have been written with the specific circumstances of specific taxpay-
ers in mind. These special transitional rules will frequently be found only in the ‘statutes at 
large’ and will not be included in the codified versions of the statutes. (This legislative pro-
cedure is different from the ‘private bill’ procedure, through which very rarely special 
exceptions to the general application of tax provisions can be made.) 
Subnational. Many states have special constitutional limitations on the date on which 
statutes may enter into force, with, for instance, different procedures and majority require-
ments for statutes that are to have an effective date before they enter into force. Even in 
these states, this distinction does not seem to affect the legislature’s ability to impose a tax 
with an early effective date, so long as the special limitations on such legislation generally 
are met. E.g., Homestake Mining Co. v. Johnson, 374 N.W.2d 357, 363-64 (S.D. 1985) (holding 
that despite a provision requiring a supermajority in order to have a statute enter into force 
before 90 days after its passage, there need be no supermajority to have a statute that does 
not enter into force until that time require a report that takes into account taxable activity 
prior to that time; Mecham v. State Tax Comm’n, 17 Utah 2d 321(1966)(holding that a statute 
that could not ‘take effect’ until 11 May 1965, could nevertheless set rates for taxable years 
beginning 1 January 1965).
3.20.2.6. Concept of retrospectivity
As noted above, since the conclusion that a tax statute is ‘retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ has 
no legal significance in itself, there is no single definition or set of criteria used to distin-
guish such statutes. The most commonly articulated test applied to statutes to determine 
their invalidity in light of their impact on prior commitments is whether they are ‘harsh and 
arbitrary,’ many statutes that are described as ‘retroactive’ will pass muster under this test. 
As described further in section 3.20.5, the Supreme Court of the United States has not found 
any statute invalid because of its retroactive effects since 1930, and even before that, only in 
a few very limited contexts. 
The literature in the United States recognizes that any change in taxes will affect the 
value of commitments and investments in place at the time. It is generally well-accepted 
that changes such as changes in the rate at which unrecognized gains would be taxed and 
changes in the rules affecting the ability to offset future items of loss against future items of 
gain of a slightly different sort are within the legislature’s power. Therefore, the question for 
courts examining legislation under the federal standards regarding retroactivity is not 
whether the statute is retroactive or retrospective, but whether the operation of that statute 
is so harsh or arbitrary that it violates due process. (See section 3.20.5 below for further 
discussion of this standard.)
Somewhat more controversial is the ability of the legislature to change the terms of 
tax legislation that has been enacted in order to induce particular behaviour. Congress 
rarely withdraws the benefits it has expressly provided through such legislation, so it is diffi-
cult to conclude what the reaction of the courts would be. The only case in which the mod-
ern Supreme Court has held that Congress enacted a statute that was invalid because of its 
retroactive effect involved a statute that the Court viewed as having attempted to alter the 
terms of a binding contract. See the discussion of these cases in the answer to section 3.20.5 
below.
Subnational. Even in those states whose constitutions contain express limitations on 
‘retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ legislation, it is difficult to ascertain a particular standard 
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applied in assigning these labels. (One aspect of the problem seems clear: there is very little 
discussion of these questions outside of judicial opinions, and if the legislature in a particu-
lar state, adhering to its view of its constitution, does not enact arguably retrospective tax 
measures, the courts never opine upon them.) Thus in Martin v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 
707 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985) the court allowed effect to a statute passed in mid-1982 to alter 
the assessment of a newly converted condominium property as of 2 January 1982, and in 
doing so hinted that a deviation in the way an old tax was administered could be different 
from new tax; but the court then went on to indicate that its view would not be substantially 
different from results in jurisdictions with no express limit on retroactivity.
Some noteworthy situations in which state courts have denied that legislation had 
retroactive effect have arisen when a state imposes a tax measured almost entirely by the 
amount of income shown on a federal tax return. In some such cases, the courts have simply 
ignored the fact that the amounts shown on the federal return may reflect past events. Thus, 
in Tiedemann v. Johnson, 316 A.2d 359 (Me. 1974) the state court held that the use of the 
federally reported adjusted gross income resulted in a tax that was ‘wholly prospective,’ 
even though the federal amount included gains on real property resulting from installment 
sales which had occurred before the enactment of the state income tax. Marco Associates, Inc. 
v. Comptroller of Treasury, 265 Md. 669 (1972)(essentially same as Tiedeman).
In Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n, 74 Ohio St. 3d 417 (1996) the court allowed appli-
cation of a statute enacted on July 1, 1989 extending the state income tax to cover payments 
received after that date by a non-resident who won the lottery in March 1988, despite a state 
constitutional prohibition on ‘retroactive laws.’
3.20.2.7. Distinctions between substantive and procedural statutes
A formal and strict distinction between substantive and procedural retroactivity is made 
only with respect to the criminal law, where a constitutional prohibition on ex post fact 
laws, generally limited to substantive provisions, is very strictly adhered to. 
Therefore there is no clear distinction between substantive and procedural rules that 
would apply to tax rules enacted by Congress. The tolerance for relatively high degrees of 
retroactivity in mere procedural changes is, however, likely to be even greater than that in 
changes in substantive liabilities. Cf. McGehee Family Clinic, T.C. Mem. 2010-202 (allowing the 
imposition of a penalty for failure to follow filing procedures enacted after transaction was 
entered into but before filing was required, and resisting labelling this effect as ‘retroac-
tive’). (The distinction between substantive and procedural rules may apply to tax rules 
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury, since such a distinction is pro-
vided for by statutes under which such rules are promulgated). 
Subnational. Although the starkest case found was one in which the retroactive applica-
tion favoured the taxpayers, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Wenona, 163 Ill. 288 (1896)(requiring retroactive 
application of statute that afforded taxpayers subject to special assessment the right to a jury 
trial on the question of whether the benefit to the payer adequately justified the assessment), 
in general states will allow retroactive application of changes in tax procedures. Even those 
states which take relatively restrictive approaches to retroactive taxes appear more willing to 
accept retroactive procedural or ‘remedial’ changes, e.g., Woodmoor Imp. v. Property Tax Adm’r, 
895 P.2d 1087 (Colo. App. 1994) (giving effect to a provision that reduced the period in which 
claims challenging assessments could be made from six years to two); Smith v. Davis, 426 
S.W.2d 827 (Texas 1968) (taxpayer has no vested right protected by the state prohibition on 
retroactive laws in a statutory provision in effect at the time a referendum approved a public 
project requiring that changes in property tax rates to fund that project be approved by vot-
ers). State ex rel. City of South Euclid v. Zangerle, 145 Ohio St. 433, 62 N.E.2d 160 (1945) (there is 
no vested right in an existing method or procedure for collection of taxes and assessments).
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It is not clear whether retroactive limits on the time at which interest on refund will begin 
running will be viewed as merely ‘procedural.’ Revenue Cabinet v. Asworth Corp., 2009 Ky. 
App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. Ct. App. 20 November 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1046 (2011) (giving 
effect to a statute that shortened the period during which interest ran and reduced the rate 
paid, without discussion of the nature of the right to interest on refunds) See the references 
in section 3.20.6 regarding the retroactivity of case law and refund remedies. 
3.20.3. Ex ante evaluation of retroactivity
3.20.3.1. Constitutional limitations 
The US Constitution contains only one provision that expressly forbids retroactive legisla-
tion, Article I, Sec. 9, cl. 3 provides that ‘No…ex post facto law shall be passed.’ This provision 
has been held to apply only to criminal proceedings, and thus not to ordinary tax matters, 
or more generally, to ‘economic legislation’ of broad application. Two other provisions are 
relied upon by those challenging retroactive tax legislation, the fifth amendment (‘No per-
son shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law’) and the 
contract clause (Article 1, Sec. 10, cl.1.)(These two provisions are literally applicable only as 
a limitation on the federal government, but have been incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply to the states. 
Subnational. All states are subject to the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the federal Constitution. The authorities developed under this provision have been 
considered throughout this questionnaire as ‘federal’ authorities. Every state also has its 
own equivalent of a ‘due process’ clause, and most have ‘ex post facto’ and ‘contract’ clauses. 
Rarely are these provisions found by modern courts to have content different from their 
federal counterparts.
As noted above, several states have provisions specifically restricting retroactive civil 
legislation. In Colorado, Missouri, New Hampshire, Tennessee the state constitution 
expressly prohibits ‘retrospective’ legislation; in North Carolina the proscription is on ‘ret-
rospective tax’ legislation particularly. In Georgia, Ohio, and Texas the prohibition is on 
‘retroactive’ legislation.
3.20.3.2. Transition policy of government 
The terms of transition policy with respect to tax changes are the sort of guideline that 
would ordinarily be dealt with as an internal rule of Congress; Congress has never articu-
lated a general rule. The leadership of each Congress is free to set this type of rule, and fre-
quently does so; for instance, specific rules are prescribed relating the effect of tax changes 
on the deficit (so-called ‘Pay-go’ rules), but no Congress had adopted a specific restraint on 
retroactivity. 3
On occasion, when a major reform effort is undertaken, Congressional leaders will 
signal, albeit perhaps vaguely, their intentions about the degree of retroactivity anticipated. 
Thus, in a speech to the Economic Club of New York in February 1985, House Ways and 
Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski in anticipation of the process that would lead to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 stated: 
‘The price of reform must be affordable. No one sector should be crippled by the 
elimination of present breaks. No person should be penalized tomorrow for doing some-
thing that’s perfectly permissible today.
3.	 For	more	on	this	type	of	rule,	see	Elizabeth	Garrett,	‘Harnessing	Politics:	The	Dynamics	of	Offset	Requirements	in	the	
Tax	Legislative	Process’,	65	U.	Chi.	L.	Rev.	501	(1998).
411
Crane Part 3   3.20. United States – 3.20.4.1. 
The transition from the old code to the new code must be without abrupt and arbitrary 
changes. Transitional rules will be a major concern in drafting.’4
Shortly thereafter, this position was affirmed in a joint statement with Rostenkowski’s 
counterpart in the Senate.5
Subnational. No similar policies at the state level were encountered in this research, 
but the research was not exhaustive.
3.20.3.3. Transition policy and favourable retroactive treatment
The general interpretive presumption against retroactive application of changes applies to 
taxpayer-favourable changes. No specific policies granting or denying retroactive effect to 
tax statutes that are favourable to taxpayers were identified, cf. City of New York v. Permanent 
Mission of India, 618 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2010) (giving retroactive effect to a federal change 
granting an exemption from local property taxes) except in the increasingly common fed-
eral legislative practice of extending lapsed provisions that benefit taxpayers on a retroac-
tive basis. See section 3.20.4.4 below. 
Subnational. In some states, however, such practices can raise problems if they are 
viewed as ‘gifts of public property’ to the taxpayers benefitted. Cf. Preston v. State Bd. of Equal-
ization, 25 Cal. 4th 197 (2001)(court gave retroactive effect to a statute ‘clarifying’ prior law 
so as to undo the effect of judicial decision which retroactively benefited the taxpayer and 
thus would make a gift of public funds)
3.20.3.4. Ex ante control by an independent body
In the United States, at the federal level, there is no means by which Congress may obtain an 
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court, and there is no other authoritative institution. 
Subnational. Such procedures are available in some states, and can be used both to 
determine whether the court would interpret the legislation to have retroactive effect and 
whether such legislation was impermissibly retroactive. See, e.g., Opinion of Justices, 370 
A.2d 654 (Me. 1977)(ruling that a submitted initiative that if passed, would void a legisla-
tively enacted local tax, would not be interpreted to have retroactive effect); Opinion of the 
Justices (Current Use Reimbursement Program), 137 N.H. 270 (1993)(holding invalid as 
impermissibly retrospective under New Hampshire’s relatively strict express prohibition, a 
change in the penalty for change of use under a favourable ‘current use’ property tax 
scheme). 
3.20.4. Use of retroactivity in legislative practice
3.20.4.1. Legislating by press release
Is ‘legislating by press release’ used in your country to provide an effective date as of a date 
earlier than the date of statutory enactment? 
Congress will frequently use a date prior to the enactment date of legislation as the 
limit of the extent to which the substantive provisions will be retroactively applied. Various 
dates may be used, including
4.	 Tax	Notes,	26	February	1985.
5.	 Tax	Notes,	25	March	1985.
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‘– a date connected to an administrative pronouncement, or
– a date with significance in the legislative process including
– a presidential budget message,
– a committee announcement or press release, 
– the introduction of a specific bill, 
– the release of a committee report, 
– the date a bill is passed by both houses,
– the date a conference agreement is reached, 
– or the date of enactment itself.’6 
The courts have not expressly relied upon these earlier announcements in determining the 
degree of retroactivity to be permitted, although in the leading case allowing retroactive 
application of tax legislation, United States v. Carlton (1994), the Court recited that such 
announcements had been made. The extent of retroactivity was relatively small given this 
announcement (retroactive to October 1986, from an administrative announcement in 
January 1987 warning of legislation introduced in February 1987 and finally enacted in 
December 1987, but the behaviour of the taxpayer affected by the retroactivity had already 
occurred (in December 1986). 
3.20.4.2. Retroactive effect further back than first announcement
Although the relationship between the date of first announcement of a proposed provision 
and the date at which it is first effective will be relevant to whether the result is so ‘harsh and 
arbitrary’ as to violate due process, it will only be one of the various factors considered. 
The classic list of accepted federal practice has changed little from this 1960 sum-
mary: 
“–  Legislation is commonly made retroactive to the beginning of the year of enact-
ment. At times, too, there are provisions enacted shortly after the end of the first 
year to which they are retroactively made applicable. 
–  Provisions which are nominally prospective only will frequently have future appli-
cation to transactions irrevocably entered into years previously. In contrast, Con-
gress will at times exempt situations entirely when before the date of enactment, 
transactions had been completely culminated or even where only binding con-
tracts or other commitments had been made. 
–  Retroactivity may be employed to eliminate a ‘loophole’ or ‘unintended benefit,’ 
although even here – depending upon the egregiousness or the revenue loss at 
stake – Congress leans towards post-enactment application. 
–  Retroactivity is at times adopted to correct technical errors in prior legislation – 
‘technical,’ ‘clerical,’ ‘typographical,’ or ‘grammatical’ errors. Related to this is the 
so-called ‘clarifying’ amendment, made to ‘reflect’ a supposed ‘Congressional 
intent,’ which is usually made retroactive but may be made prospective when 
doubt exists about the meaning of the prior law. 
–  Mention should also be made of legislation which confers a benefit on taxpayers 
or corrects hardships inadvertently created in previously enacted legislation. Here 
retroactivity is generally considered unobjectionable, although recognition must 
be given to the cost-shifting effect of the overall burden on other taxpayers.”7
6.	 See	generally	Testimony	of	Mortimer	Caplin,	former	IRS	Commissioner,	Hearings	Before	the	Subcommittee	on	the	
Constitution,	Committee	on	the	Judiciary,	United	States	Senate,	15	April	1996	available	at	Tax	Notes,	April	16,	1996.
7.	 Laurens	Williams,	‘Retroactivity	in	the	Federal	Tax	Field’,	12	U.S.C.	Law	School	Tax	Inst.	79	(1960).
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3.20.4.3. Pending legal proceedings 
There are no established modern guidelines for determining when Congressional acts 
should interfere with pending legal proceedings, except for the general rule that, because of 
separation of powers concerns, Congress cannot act to undo the result of a final judgment 
for which all legal proceedings are finished. 
Early cases allowed Congress to affect the outcome in pending cases through the 
enactment of retroactive legislation, e.g., United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907) 
(holding valid a curative act enacted in 1906, ratifying a tariff collected between 1899 and 
1902 for which courts had held there was no authority after the status of the Philippines 
changed on the ending of hostilities), but see Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm’rs, 
258 U.S. 338 (1922)(holding state legislature could not ratify illegally collected tax after 
final judgment holding such exaction illegal, although unclear whether judgment was 
result of presence of final judgment, after which the legislature could no longer act, or the 
pure retroactive nature of tax). See section 3.20.2.4 above, regarding curative legislation.
3.20.4.4. Favourable retroactivity 
Favourable retroactivity is common when, as part of the income tax, Congress enacts 
‘extender’ legislation after a provision that was subject to sunset has expired. For instance, 
the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 (dealing with a wide 
variety of incentive and special relief provisions) was not enacted until October 2008, but 
was effective for tax years beginning after 31 December 2007. This practice is not distin-
guishable from that in which the provisions with similar retroactive effect are unfavourable. 
3.20.5. Ex post evaluation of retroactivity (in case law)
3.20.5.1. Testing against the Constitution and legal principles
In the United States both the federal courts and the state courts have the authority to, at the 
behest of litigants, test the retroactivity of a statute for compatibility with the federal Con-
stitution. It is generally accepted, as one might infer from the answers above, that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has the final word on the degree of retroactivity that 
would be permissible under the due process clauses of the federal Constitution, as they 
apply both to Congress and to the state legislatures. The highest courts in the several states 
will have final word on the degree of retroactivity permitted to the state legislatures under 
the distinct provisions in each state constitution.
3.20.5.2. Examination method. Restraints on retroactivity based on the federal 
Constitution 
a. In general
There are technically two strains of federal constitutional doctrine that might be relied 
invoked to limit the enactment of retroactive taxes. The first involves potential limits on the 
power of the federal Congress to impose retroactive taxes, primarily under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s command that property not be taken by Congress without Due Process of Law, but 
also under the ‘contract clause.’ 
The second involves the potential limits under the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
state legislatures’ ability to impose taxes. In modern practice the two lines of Supreme Court 
authority based on federal law are generally viewed as one. Both strands involve interpreta-
tion of essentially the same language and, in general, have involved the same type of review. 
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However, because the federal government and the states are subject to substantially differ-
ent limitations on their taxing powers and because the procedures according to which 
taxpayers may invoke the power of courts to challenge taxes, the overall pattern of the cases 
historically has been somewhat different. As further described below, in several instances, 
the Supreme Court has disallowed that the actions of state legislatures attempting to 
remove taxpayers’ rights to pursue refunds in the same way that a curative statute might 
have allowed.
Note that in the analysis that follows, the distinction between cases involving ‘simple 
retroactivity’ and ‘validation/curative’ provisions is made entirely for ease of comparison; 
the distinction is rarely if ever made in a way that affects the outcome of cases. The distinc-
tion between these two types of retroactivity and retroactivity that ‘impairs contracts’ is a 
significant legal distinction, but the latter will depend upon the presence of a binding 
mutual contract and not on mere reliance. 
b. Federal constitutional limitations on Congressional acts: simple retroactivity 
There is no modern opinion of the Supreme Court holding an Act of Congress unconstitu-
tional solely as a result of its retroactive effect. In general, the Court has indicated that the 
retroactive Congressional acts will be permitted so long as they serve a ‘legitimate legisla-
tive purpose furthered by rational means.’ No special standards apply to retroactive tax 
provisions as such. 
Those cases in which challenges have been raised have never, however, dismissed the 
possibility that a tax provision could be invalid because of its retroactive effect. This possi-
bility has arguably led to restraint on the part of Congress to avoid objectionable retro-
activity.8 
The more significant of these cases, and the language used therein, include: 
In United States v. Carlton (1994), the Court gave effect as of October 1986 to a statute 
enacted in December 1987, announced January 1987 for which legislation introduced in 
February 1987, which removed the tax benefit associated with a transaction undertaken by 
an estate in December 1986, for transfer tax relating to a death that occurred December 
1985. The amendment was accepted by the Court as curative, given the legislation history of 
both the original 1986 provision and the later act, although that characterization arguably 
not determinative. 
The majority opinion articulated the standard to be applied: The due process stand-
ard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive effect, therefore, is the same as that gener-
ally applicable to retroactive economic legislation: ‘Provided that the retroactive applica-
tion of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational 
means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive prov-
ince of the legislative and executive branches.’ 
Justice O’Connor, concurring, stated: ‘The governmental interest in revising the tax 
laws must at some point give way to the taxpayer’s interest in finality and repose. … In every 
case in which we have upheld a retroactive federal tax statute against a due process chal-
lenge the law applied retroactively for only a relatively short period prior to enactment.’
In United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986), the Court allowed a statute signed 
10/4/86 to limit the ability to claim unified credit for estate and gift taxes, where the limit 
applied to those making gifts in the month before new provisions enacted and limit 
intended to block double benefit such as that hoped for in case. The case provides little in 
the way of interesting insight, since its reasoning was largely that the estate paid no more 
tax as a result of the change than it would have without it – the retroactive feature of the 
8.	 For	a	summary	of	the	modern	cases,	see	Charlotte	Crane,	‘Constitutional	Limits	on	the	Power	to	Impose	a	Retro-
active	Tax’,	in:	Blessings	of	Liberty:	The	Constitution	and	the	Practice	of	Law	(1988).
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legislation had simply meant that the taxes were more than they would have been if there 
had been no retroactive feature. 
In United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981), the Supreme Court permitted legis-
lation enacted in October 1976 to apply to tax years beginning anytime in 1976 in the 
threshold for determining when an alternative base and rate would apply. In language far 
more permissive than that used in Carlton, it indicated that the mere fact that an increase in 
tax rates was made retroactive would rarely constitute a violation of the due process clause. 
According to the Court:
‘Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he 
assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those 
who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since 
no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessar-
ily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that 
the taxable event, the receipt of income, antedated the statute.’
The Court included three criteria which other courts have interpreted as indicative of 
the situations in which retroactivity might not be permitted: 
Namely, whether the taxpayer could have altered his behaviour to avoid the tax if it 
could have been anticipated by him at the time the transaction was effected; whether the 
taxpayer had notice of the tax when he engaged in the transaction; and whether the tax is a 
new tax and not merely an increase in the rate of an existing tax.
In only one set of cases has the Supreme Court held that simple retroactive taxes 
imposed by Congress are invalid; in these cases the result was held to be a denial of due 
process. These cases all involved the imposition of new estate or gift taxes that applied to 
transfers occurring before the effective date of the statute. The modern federal estate tax 
was not enacted until 1916; the modern gift tax component – extending the transfer tax 
scheme to gifts not made in contemplation of death – was not permanently enacted until 
1932, but it was temporarily introduced in 1924, and was repealed within two years. 
Because this line of cases is the sole authority for denying effect to retroactive tax legislation 
based on the limitations contained in the due process clauses in Article I and in the Four-
teenth Amendment, these cases are very frequently cited. Therefore, it may be helpful to 
provide more detail about these cases, in the order in which they were taken up by the 
Court: 
In Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) the Court held that an inter vivos transfer 
(not in contemplation of death) to a trust in 1907, the corpus of which was to be distributed 
at the settlor’s death could not constitutionally be subject to a tax enacted by statute effec-
tive 19 February 1919 (called the Revenue Act of 1918), since such a tax would be so arbi-
trary and capricious as to amount to confiscation under the Fifth Amendment. In this case, 
the Court’s opinion made much of the fact that the property actually included in the dece-
dent’s estate would bear the burden of a tax measured by property over which the execu-
tor’s of the estate would have no control, since they would have no control under state law 
of the previously settled property. 
In Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), the Court evenly divided in a case consider-
ing the effect of the June 1924 enactment of a [by then known to be temporary] gift tax first 
introduced in Congress in February 1924 on gifts made in January 1924. An opinion in 
which four of the justices joined held that the tax was arbitrary (‘It seems wholly unreason-
able that one who, in entire good faith and without the slightest premonition of such conse-
quence, made absolute disposition of his property by gifts should thereafter be required to 
pay a charge for so doing.’); in a second opinion the other four justices thought the taxing 
statute inapplicable to the gifts in question. 
In Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928), the Court held that the retroactive 
provision of the gift tax of the Revenue Act of 1924 [again, by then known to be temporary] 
enacted 2 June 1924 was invalid as applied to a gift made on 23 May 1924 (at which date the 
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ultimate enactment was all but certain, that is, the conference between the House and Sen-
ate to reconcile deviations between the legislation by those two houses had been held, and 
all that remained was ratification by the two houses of the conference agreement and a 
presidential signature). In a strident dissent, Justice Brandeis listed in detail the many prior 
federal tax statutes with far more retroactivity than was present in this case, as well as sev-
eral instances of similar retroactivity in foreign jurisdictions.
The anomalous nature of the Untermeyer result was made clear only a few years later, 
when in Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931), it was held that a February 1919 change 
in the rates could apply to a December 1916 transfer made in contemplation of death: ‘a 
mere increase in the tax, pursuant to a policy of which the donor was forewarned at the time 
he elected to exercise the privilege, did not change its character.’ There were no dissents. 
These cases were effectively dismissed by the majority of the Court (but not by the 
dissent) in Carlton: 
These cases were decided during an era characterized by exacting review of economic 
legislation under an approach that ‘has long since been discarded… To the extent that their 
authority survives, they do not control here.’
c. Federal constitutional limitations on Congressional action: invalidations and cures 
Congress has not enacted any provisions that have either attempted to cure defective tax 
collections, or attempted to block taxpayers’ attempts at refunds for improperly collected 
taxes, so there are no modern cases looking at the possible limitations that might apply. It is 
clear, however, that the separation of powers doctrine prevents Congress from interfering 
with a judgment once it is final. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
d. Federal constitutional limitations on Congressional action: alteration of tax consequences in 
breach of contract
In United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996), the Supreme Court held that the government, 
because of the existence of an implied duty of fair dealing, cannot alter a regulatory treat-
ment that was the object of a contract between the regulated party and the government. 
(The standard that it used to determine that the contract term in question was material is 
not clear, and the case is in many respects sui generis.) In a series of cases involving essen-
tially the same contracts, the federal courts have treated the tax treatments claimed to have 
been promised as unsusceptible to even congressional change. See, e.g., Centex Corp. v. 
United States, 431 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Nat’l Australia Bank v. United States, 452 F.3d 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Local Okla. Bank v. United States, 452 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006).9
e. Federal constitutional limitations on state legislative actions: simple retroactivity
The Supreme Court of the United States has been just as unwilling to interfere with the 
imposition of retroactive state taxes it has been to interfere within the enactment of retroac-
tive federal taxes. In only one case, decided in the same era as the case involving retroactive 
federal taxes cited above, Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931)(four justices dissenting) was a 
state tax on successions held invalid because of its retroactive nature, here, with the Court 
citing under both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the contracts 
9.	 A	good	entry	into	the	relationship	between	the	contract	clause	doctrines	involved	in	Winstar,	the	general	due	
process	limitations	on	retroactive	taxation,	and	the	other	limits	on	governmental	takings	of	private	property	can	be	
found	in	the	pamphlet	prepared	by	the	Congressional	Research	Service,	Retroactive	Taxation	of	Executive	Bonuses:	
Constitutionality	of	H.R.	1586	and	S.	651,	CRS	(25	March2009)	(analysing	legislation	that	would	impose	taxes	on	
those	businesses	receiving	stimulus	package	bailouts	and	paying	bonuses).	See	generally	Daniel	S.	Goldberg,	
‘Government	Precommitment	to	Tax	Incentive	Subsidies:	The	Impact	of	United	States	v.	Winstar	on	Retroactive	Tax	
Legislation’,	14	Am.	J.	Tax	Policy	1(1997);	Charlotte	Crane,	‘Honoring	Expectations	about	Taxes:	Are	Roth	IRAs	Differ-
ent?’	(manuscript	available	on	SSRN).
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clause (apparently treating the establishment of a trust as a ‘contract’ with the state). This 
case involved the same gift as that involved in Nichols v. Coolidge; the state tax was held 
invalid because it was deemed to be a tax on a succession to a gift completely vested (both 
through the establishment of the trust in 1907 and in the relinquishing of the settlors’ 
rights in the trust in 1917) before the 1921 enactment of the taxing act or of any other law 
taxing successions received by lineal descendants of the donor. The anomalous nature of 
this case seems apparent in light of the decision in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) (Rob-
erts, McReynolds and Butler dissenting) in which a change in the Wisconsin income tax 
enacted in March 1935 was allowed to operate on a dividend received in 1933. 
f. Federal constitutional limitations on state legislative actions: ineffective cures 
In Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm’rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922) the Court held that a state 
legislature could not ratify an illegally collected tax after final judgment holding such exac-
tion illegal, although it is unclear whether the judgment was the result of the presence of a 
final judgment or the pure retroactive nature of tax. A review of the cases that have been 
decided by state courts reveals a conflict within the state courts regarding when curative 
actions will be barred by either the federal or the state constitutions. 
In a closely related context, however, the Supreme Court has been very hostile to attempts 
by state legislatures to limit the fiscal effect of judicial opinions holding state taxes invalid. 
This is a far greater concern for states than for the federal government, because there are 
many more restrictions on the powers of states to impose taxes. Some of these restrictions 
are based in constitutional law that may evolve over time, leaving a large amount of previ-
ously collected revenue subject to claims for refund. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court 
intimated that it will not accept prospective applications of decisions invalidating state 
taxes, at least if the state does not provide a method of challenging the tax before payment. 
Newsweek, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 522 U.S. 442 (1998), Reich v Collins 513 US 106 (1994); 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 
496 U.S. 18 (1990). Although in all three of these cases the Court’s language suggests that it 
believed the states in question had acted in bad faith by changing the remedies available to 
the taxpayers, the full import of this line of decision has yet to be fully understood. See, e.g., 
Ex parte Surtees, 6 So. 3d 1157 (Ala. 2008)(refusing to block taxpayer suits); E.C. Garcia & Co. 
v. Ariz. State Dep’t of Revenue, 178 Ariz. 510 (1993)(legislature cannot change terms of refund 
suits for pending claims).10 
g. Federal constitutional limitations on state legislative actions: alteration of tax consequences in 
breach of contract
No relevant authorities were found involving the invocation of federal standards to hold a 
state legislative action removing a tax benefit to involve a breach of contract. Since the find-
ing of constitutionally protected contractual rights in this context is extremely difficult, it is 
likely that litigants rely on other, probably more favourable limitations derived from state 
constitutional provisions.
Subnational. Restraints based on the state constitutions on simple retroactivity. It should be 
noted, furthermore, that many state constitutions either have provisions that clearly impose 
stricter limits on tax retroactivity than the limits imposed by federal Constitution, or have 
similar ‘due process’ provisions that have been interpreted by the state courts to impose 
more stringent limitations. So long as the appropriate state court does not purport to be 
relying on federal precedent in interpreting similar language, it is free to interpret language 
similar to the federal language as imposing a greater constraint on its legislature; there is 
no imperative for uniform interpretation of similar language across state constitutions. A 
10.	 See	generally	John	Coverdale,	‘Remedies	for	Unconstitutional	State	Taxes’,	32	Conn.	L.	Rev.	73	(2000).
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thorough examination of all of the relevant precedent would, therefore, require a separate 
set of answers for each of the 50 states, and perhaps for the several other distinct territorial 
jurisdictions. The cases included here are only examples and do not represent an exhaustive 
survey of possible cases.
Examples of cases finding retroactivity invalid, and which are most in tension with 
the federal (lack of) restraint include: 
Oberhand v. Director, 193 N.J. 558 (2008)(as matter of ‘manifest injustice’ a plurality 
refused to apply a retroactive reduction in the deduction for transfers to a spouse under the 
estate tax, where decedents had died between the effective date of federal statute and the 
date of a state enactment ‘decoupling’ the state provisions from the new federal). 
Rivers v. State, 327 S.C. 271 (1997) (purporting to apply the federal standards articu-
lated in Carlton, but holding that 1991 denial of refund enacted in 1989 to remove retroac-
tive capital gains tax enacted in 1988 and relating to 1987 violated the state due process 
clause).
Cagan’s, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev. Admin., 126 N.H. 239, 249, 490 A.2d 1354, 1361 (1985) (tax 
on sales from vending machines would be impermissibly retrospective under New hamp-
shire’s specific prohibition if a regulation dated 15 October which removed exemption that 
was admitted by the court to be erroneous were allowed to apply to sales transactions which 
occurred prior to 15 October).
Clarendon Trust v. State Tax Com., 43 N.Y.2d 933 (1978)(holding invalid a 1973 statutory 
change, conforming the treatment of trust capital gains with changes made in 1972 increas-
ing the taxation of individual capital gains, despite evidence, including publications for 
taxpayer use, indicating 1973 statute was correcting an error)
People ex rel. Beck v. Graves, 280 N.Y. 405 (NY Ct. App. 1939)(holding that a statute 
including in income rentals relating to mineral property outside the state made such rent-
als taxable for the first time, and thus was not ‘clarifying’, and given its purported 19-year 
retrospective reach, was ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and palpably unjust.’
Examples of holdings finding retroactivity valid, but suggesting justifications for 
allowing retroactivity that would be unnecessary under the approach used in applying the 
federal standards include:
Brink Elec. Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 472 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1991)(holding that since 
1988 legislation only clarified ambiguities about whether 1984 and 1979 statutes imposing 
a gross receipts tax applied to contracts with federal and state government, the 1988 act 
could be applied retroactively to contracts granted in 1987)
Martin v. Board of Assessment Appeals of State,707 P.2d 348 (1985) (despite Colorado’s 
prohibition on legislation ‘retrospective in operation,’ allowing a 3 May 1982 change in the 
factors to be taken into account in assessment of property for tax years beginning 1 January 
1982); American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Adams, 28 Colo. 119, 63 P. 410 (1900)(allowing 
April 1897 legislative change to operate retrospectively with respect to property taxes for 
moveable property in 1897)
Examples of state cases finding no limitation on retroactive taxation include:
Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886 (1929)(giving effect to tax enacted in 1929 on incomes 
earned in 1928); Du Laney v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 185 Ark. 517(1931)(allowing a tax rate 
increase on gross insurance premiums paid in same year as, but before effective date, 
although admitting ‘retroactive’ nature of tax). 
Subnational. Restraints based on the state constitutions on validations and cures. State 
courts have been pressed harder to allow validation and curative statutes, and, in general, 
have allowed rather dramatic retroactivity: 
Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 2009 Ky. LEXIS 196 (2009)(finding no constitutional 
problem with 2000 statute that denied right to file combined return to corporate groups for 
years prior to 1995 (reinstating administrative position that had been reversed by court in 
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1994) even though clearly effort to stem loss of revenue resulting from judicial position)
(with dissent). 
Ex parte City of Arab & Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 7 So. 3d 379 (Ala. 2008)(allowing 1997 
alteration of use tax to cure judicially expanded three-year gap in sales/use tax base)
U.S. Bancorp v. Dep’t of Revenue, 337 Ore. 625 (2004)(allowing application of rule pro-
mulgated in 1995, in response to judicial decision, to apply to 1988-1992)
Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 1 A.D.3d 722 (2003)(allowing retroactive effect to stat-
ute intended to cure commerce clause/apportionment problems with tax previously in 
effect)
Not all state courts have been as deferential, see, e.g., City of Modesto v. National Med, 
Inc., 128 Cal. App. 4th 518 (2005)(not allowing retroactive application of an ordinance that 
would replace unconstitutional (for failure to apportion) tax with constitutional tax).
Some states may have a bar to this type of curative legislation even when the litiga-
tion giving rise to the issue is still pending, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Revenue Div, 103 N.M. 
20 (1981) refusing to find a legislative act that undid a judicial decision rejecting an admin-
istrative position merely ‘curative’ when the judicial decision had found the statute unam-
biguous, and therefore refusing to apply it retroactively in light of the state constitutional 
prohibition on legislation that ‘shall affect the right or remedy of either party * * * in any 
pending case.’
Subnational. Restraints based on the state constitutions on retroactivity frustrating con-
tract-like rights. The state cases will be the most divergent in their approaches to this type of 
retroactivity, since the constitutional provisions relating to this type of retroactivity are far 
less uniform, and the propensity in each state to engage in the reliance-inducing behavior is 
different. Sample outcomes include:
Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 211 P.3d 1, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)(allowing 
retroactive removal of the possibility of obtaining a credit for pollution control devices for 
motor vehicles. The credit was initially enacted in 1994, to begin in 1995; claims began to be 
filed in 1999 for credits motor vehicle devices; legislature reacted in March 2000 to clarify. 
The court held that whether the legislature intended to restore its original intent, or merely 
had decided that the costs involved were too great, there was no denial of due process in the 
legislation removing the credit.)
Baker v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 209 Ariz. 561 (Ct. App. 2005, rev. denied)(allowing retro-
active removal of incentives first defined in January, enhanced in April, enhancement 
removed in December, after moratorium in October. The unenhanced version can constitu-
tionally be applied to a purchase made in September before the enhancement was removed 
without creating a contract clause problem; stating that Carlton ‘clarifies that a retroactive 
modification of a tax benefit is constitutionally permissible as long as its purpose is neither 
illegitimate nor arbitrary and the period of retroactivity is modest. Nothing in the opinion 
limits constitutional retroactivity to drafting errors.’
Lower Vill. Hydroelectric Assocs. v. City of Claremont, 147 N.H. 73 (2001)(state law remov-
ing authority of municipalities to enter into agreements for payments in lieu of taxes vio-
lated state prohibition on retrospective laws even though formalities of agreement had not 
been completed).
Proof of actual reliance seems not to have made a difference in International Home 
Foods, Inc., Rayovac Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 264 Mich. App. 44 (2004)(holding that SBT, not 
constrained by 86-272, may be applied retroactively to taxpayer, despite fact that DOT had 
advised taxpayer it would have no tax liability).
Replan Dev., Inc. v. Department of Housing Preservation & Dev., 70 N.Y.2d 451(1987)
(upholding removal of temporary special tax treatment for conversion of single-room-occu-
pancy dwellings after taxpayer had purchased and begun construction on such a project).
First American Nat’l Bank v. Olsen, 751 S.W.2d 417 (1987)(permitting the inclusion of 
state bonds, exempt until disparate treatment of federal bonds under federal law raised 
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issues, in corporate franchise tax base, since that was not ‘on’ the bonds but on the privilege 
of doing business, and thus not impairing obligation of contracts, despite express constitu-
tional prohibition on retroactivity).
3.20.5.3. Testing against Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR 
The courts in the United States would not be required to consider whether a US statute were 
invalid under this standard, and would be highly unlikely to refer to precedents of other 
jurisdictions in cases involving this kind of constitutional analysis. 
3.20.5.4. method for testing against principle of legal certainty
The courts in the United States might well consider the desirability of legal certainty in deter-
mining whether the effect of a particular statute was ‘harsh and arbitrary’ and therefore 
denied due process of law, but there is no independent requirement relating to legal certainty. 
3.20.5.5. Interpretations by courts to avoid retroactivity
Countless opinions will include reference to the idea that statutes should be interpreted so 
as to avoid issues regarding their validity, and interpretations of statutes that might raise 
issues regarding retroactivity are generally not excepted, even when the likelihood of the 
validity of the statute being threatened is small.
In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988), the Supreme Court openly 
acknowledged this practice when it interpreted a statute to exempt certain government debt 
only from income taxes, and not from estate tax, and thereby avoided questions regarding the 
constitutionality of a statute that had clarified that such debt was subject to estate tax after a 
judicial decision otherwise, with retroactive effect only for those who had included the debt in 
their transfer tax return. This approach to interpreting tax statutes has long been an uncontro-
versial practice; see, e.g., Levy v. Wardell, 258 U.S. 542 (1922) (rejecting out of hand the argu-
ment of the government that transfers made by a decedent dying in December 1916 com-
pleted in 1907 should be considered subject to the estate tax enacted in September 1916); 
Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529 (1929)(similarly with respect to intent to tax transfers to trusts 
prior to effective date); Reinecke v. Northern Trust, 278 U.S. 339 (1929)(interpreting the 1921 
estate tax to not include within the decedent’s estate trusts which could only be revoked with 
the participation of someone in addition to the original grantor/decedent). 
Subnational. A similar practice is common in the states, and ordinarily seems not be 
different in those states with express prohibitions and those states without. In at least one 
state, prospective operation (that is, the new decision will only apply after the most recently 
ended tax period) is required by statute when ‘a reasonable person would not have expected 
the decision or order based on prior law, previous policy or regulation.’ (§ 143.903 R.S.Mo.)
California Co. v. State, 141 Colo. 288(1959)(interpreting severance tax to apply only pro-
spectively in state with specific prohibition on retroactivity; brief and unexceptional treatment).
In a handful of cases, however, the express prohibition may have resulted in a differ-
ent interpretation than would have been reached otherwise. So long as the court under-
stands itself to have the power to ‘sever’ the invalid portions of a statute and apply only the 
valid part, the court’s decision may not reveal whether it is avoiding a constitutional prob-
lem by interpreting the intent of the statute to be only prospective, or whether it is simply 
refusing to enforce the invalid portion of the statute. See, e.g., Roberts v. Gunter, 251 Ga. 276, 
(1983) (bank share tax statute, passed in March 1975 stating that it did ‘apply to all taxable 
years beginning on or after January 1, 1975,’ could not retroactively impose a tax on prop-
erty held by a bank before the statute was enacted, in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Article I, 
Sec. I, Para. X.)
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3.20.5.6. Reasons for lack of judicial limits to retroactivity
Courts in the United States are generally content to recite that Congress is free to make 
policy, limited only in very limited circumstances. The articulated approach with respect to 
retroactive tax laws is not different from the approach to all economic legislation that does 
not impinge upon a relatively small group of specially protected individual rights. 
3.20.6. Retroactivity of case law 
The Supreme Court of the United States has been inconsistent in its decisions over the last 
few decades with respect to the appropriateness of prospective overruling in general and 
with respective to tax rulings in particular. The inconsistencies are even greater when one 
looks not only at those cases in which the Court itself was determining whether to make its 
decision prospective only, but also those cases in which it reviewed a state court determina-
tion denying a refund remedy. In Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), eight 
members of the Court agreed that prospective application of new limitations on state taxing 
powers was appropriate; the difficulty in implementing this possibility is evidenced by the 
fact that, in this case, four members of the Court believed that the rule involved in this case 
was clear under prior law. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), the 
judgment of a badly divided Court resulted in the application of a new rule in a similar case 
retroactively. In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), the Court con-
firmed that state courts considering similar challenges to statutes within their states were 
not free to apply their decisions only prospectively when the federal courts announcing the 
rule had applied them in the traditional retroactive way (although this retroactivity did not 
necessarily mean all taxpayers would be entitled to refunds). The effect of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), observing that ‘the 
remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution 
is primarily a question of state law’ and concluding that state courts are free to apply new 
rules expanding the rights of criminal defendants with more retroactivity than is allowed in 
collateral attacks in federal courts is not yet known.
In tax cases arising in the states since American Trucking, furthermore, the Court has 
included language relating to the remedies that must be afforded taxpayers that many have 
read to preclude strictly prospective overruling. This language suggests that due process 
requires that in every case taxpayers must be given a chance to challenge a tax before pay-
ment, or have a right to a refund upon payment; the limitations on pre-payment challenges 
of many taxes in many jurisdictions suggests that prospective application of pro-taxpayer 
decisions may not suffice. 
The evolution of this approach is considerably complicated by the difficulty that state 
taxpayers have in bringing their claims in federal courts. In general, if there is an adequate 
and efficient state remedy, state taxpayers may not have their challenges to state taxes heard 
in federal courts. Although state courts are far more likely to allow state taxpayers to pro-
ceed in their attacks on state taxes by way of class actions and without exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies, they are far more accustomed to allowing state revenue departments and 
state legislatures formulate remedies other than refunds when challenges to state taxes are 
successful. Attempts by state legislatures to simply deny refunds, and by state courts to erect 
unexpected hurdles to such refunds may ultimately be successfully challenged when 
brought to the Supreme Court, see, e.g., 513 U.S. 106 (1994) and McKesson Corp. v. Division of 
Alcoholic Beverages 496 U.S. 18 (1990), cases involving such manoeuvring may languish for 
many years in the state court system. 
Subnational. Many states courts have given their decisions striking down taxes pro-
spective effect only. See, e.g., Arizona State Tax Comm’n v. Ensign, 257 P.2d 392 (1954), denying 
rehearing but giving prospectively only effect, 254 P.2d 1029 (Ariz. 1953). 
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It would appear that such practices would not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence on the circumstances in which refunds of illegal taxes can be denied, so long as tax-
payers had a meaningful pre-payment opportunity to avoid paying the tax. 
3.20.7. Views in the literature
3.20.7.1. Opinions regarding retroactivity
In general, academic writers in the United States continue to find few constitutional prob-
lems with retroactive tax legislation. The desirability of the various transition policies when 
tax changes are made is still a matter of considerable debate. 
The views of academic writers, and the tolerance implicit in the statements of the 
Supreme Court in its recent decisions, are for the most part not reflected in the actions of 
Congress. Congress, like the state legislatures, is careful not to enact legislation that is likely 
to be offensive to voters. Thus, although tax legislation is generally retrospective in its effect 
on returns from prior commitments and retroactive to the beginning of the taxable year in 
which it is enacted (or, where there is good excuse and adequate notice, a few months into 
the prior year), there is relatively little legislation with more severe retroactive effect. There 
is, therefore, relatively little activity that would have prompted further debate.11
The general expectation of retrospective effect on prior commitments has had the 
somewhat perverse effect of inducing legislative changes that are generally retrospective, 
but which include elaborate and particular ‘grandfathering’ provisions not all of which are 
visible to the general public. See, e.g., Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556 
(5th Cir. 1992) (finding selective transition benefits not violating equal protection).12 These 
selective grandfathering practices might not exist were more general anti-retroactivity 
policies in place.
In the scholarly literature. The premises, but not necessarily the conclusions, of the 
Graetz/Kaplow position are generally accepted in the scholarly fiscal literature in the United 
States. According to these premises, any change in law, no matter how its effective date is 
stated, will affect the value of existing commitments. Given this starting point, little effort is 
devoted to distinguishing the types of retroactivity that are invalid from those that must be 
allowed by their formal characteristics, rather than their effects on economic outcomes. 
The premises shared by this body of scholarship also include the idea that all legal 
rules must be analysed with an emphasis on not just on the incentives created by such rules, 
but also their results in efficiency and welfare terms. The costs associated with the resulting 
outcomes must be compared with the outcomes that would obtain otherwise. The outcomes 
permissible under this approach (conveniently labelled ‘ex ante’) were in the earlier litera-
11.	 Several	recent	political	developments	provide	evidence	of	this	legislative	behavior,	and	the	resulting	‘stall’	in	the	
more	practical	literature.	In	2010	Congress	actively	considered	several	measures	to	which	substantial	objections	on	
retroactivity	grounds	might	have	been	raised.	First,	a	special	tax	to	be	imposed	on	the	bonuses	received	by	execu-
tives	working	for	financial	firms	that	benefited	from	economic	stimulus	was	debated	but	never	enacted.	Second,	the	
estate	tax	portion	of	the	transfer	tax	regime	was	allowed	to	expire	(at	least	for	one	year)	for	decedents	after	31	
December	2009	(with	an	accompanying	denial	of	a	step-up	in	basis	at	death),	and	many	proposals	pending	in	2010	
would	have	retroactively	reinstated	it	for	these	decedents.	Legislation	passed	18	December	2010,	did	so	reinstate	the	
tax,	but	allowed	estates	to	elect	to	use	the	rules	in	place	during	2010.	Some	observers	believed	that	under	the	older	
Supreme	Court	precedents,	a	delay	in	enacting	until	2011	would	have	subjected	the	reinstatement	to	substantially	
higher	scrutiny.	Lee	Sheppard,	‘Would	Estate	Tax	Reinstatement	be	Constitutional?’,	25	January	2010;	Mitchell	Gans,	
‘Retroactive	Estate	Tax:	Can	It	Be	Made	Constitutional?’,	Tax	Notes,	11	January	2010.	
12.	 See	generally	Lawrence	Zelenak,	‘Are	Rifle	Shot	Transition	Rules	and	Other	Ad	Hoc	Tax	Legislation	Constitutional?’,	
44	Tax	L.	Rev.	563	(1989).	
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ture often viewed as in tension with approaches that emphasize reliance and fairness (‘ex 
post’). 
In general, the subsequent literature assumes the premise put forth by Graetz and 
concludes that the nominal effective date is morally (and therefore should be legally) irrele-
vant.13 The more recent contributions to this debate have generally been sceptical both 
about whether a single transition policy is appropriate and whether the presence of an 
announced transition policy would in fact change taxpayer or legislative behaviour. See 
section 3.20.7.2 below for further discussion of the nuances of these approaches.
In practical politics. The closest that the Graetz position has come to being a conscious 
part of the real political debate on tax transition policy is in the discussion in the United 
States about the move from an income tax to a consumption tax.14 That discussion is pre-
mised on the lack of quasi-constitutional constraint on retroactive tax changes. Even in that 
discussion, the focus was on ‘minimizing unfair losses’ and ‘undeserved windfalls.’ More 
recently, and despite a political climate increasingly hostile to embracing the notion that 
any tax change can appropriately be enacted retroactively, the Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation has also embraced the Graetz approach.15 
The Graetz/Kaplow position has never been whole-heartedly embraced beyond the 
academic literature. Neither author, for instance, seems ever to have been cited by a state 
court (although not all state courts would consider it appropriate to cite such material, 
many would). Graetz has been cited only twice by federal courts, and then only for the prop-
osition that regulation generally should not be viewed as creating vested rights. 
The distrust of the Graetz/Kaplow view among real political actors seems most obvi-
ous in the calls during the 1990s for constitutional amendments that would limit Congress’ 
power to tax, including one proposal to amend the Constitution to provide that ‘No Federal 
tax shall be imposed for the period before the date of enactment of the tax.’ (The lack of 
precision in this language strongly suggests that the motives of its sponsors were largely 
political posturing in the wake of the 1994 Carlton decision, discussed above.) 
Among practicing lawyers. There is an active group of anti-Graetz/Kaplow authors 
among the practicing bar. Perhaps the best indication of this is the more than a dozen stu-
dent notes published in law reviews criticizing the result in 1994 Supreme Court decision in 
Carlton. There is considerably more litigation over the retroactivity of state tax measures 
than federal tax measures for several reasons. First, historically, states have felt greater fiscal 
stress and therefore state legislatures have frequently responded with legislation that either 
involves entirely new tax instruments or is less carefully drafted. Second, the power of the 
states to impose taxes is far more constrained than is the power of the federal government. 
(Such constraints are found not only in the federal Constitution’s commerce clause but also 
in the various state constitutions and especially in the organic laws establishing various 
units of local government within the states). Therefore, states and their subunits are far 
more likely to be in a position to need curative tax legislation with retroactive effect (re-im-
posing the part of a tax instrument that would have been valid) and to limit a taxpayer’s 
ability to obtain the benefit of newly articulated limits on the state taxing power, arguably 
with retroactive effect. 
13.	 A	symposium	sponsored	by	the	University	of	San	Diego	on	these	issues	can	be	found	at	13	J.	Contemp.	Leg.	Issues	
(2003)	and	includes	contributions	by	Barbara	Fried,	Louis	Kaplow,	Jill	Fisch,	Richard	Epstein,	Dan	Shaviro	and	Kyle	
Logue.
14.	 See,	for	instance,	United	States	Treasury,	Blueprints	for	Tax	Reform,	at	pp.	181-206,	www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-pol-
icy/library/blueprints/ch6.pdf.
15.	 Compare	Retroactive	Taxation:	hearing	before	the	Subcommittee	on	the	Constitution	of	the	Committee	on	the	
Judiciary,	United	States	Senate,	103rd	Cong,	2d	Sess.,	on	S.J.	Res.	120,	August	4,	1994	(1996),	S.	Hrg.	103-1080	(Serial	
No.	J-103-66)	with	Joint	Comm.	on	Taxation,	Description	and	Analysis	of	Proposals	to	Replace	the	Federal	Income	
Tax,	(JCS-18-95),	at	87-92	(5	June	1995),	www.jct.gov.
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The members of the tax bars in the various states therefore have a considerably greater stake 
in the continued vitality of anti-retroactivity doctrine. Their writings continue to raise 
objections to various types of retroactivity.16
3.20.7.2. Debate on law and economics view 
The Graetz/Kaplow view of the interaction between the taxpayer and the legislature has 
been generally accepted in the academic literature in the United States. Its observations 
about the arbitrariness of attempts to distinguish among degrees of retroactivity are well 
accepted. Its limitations in the face of real political processes were exhaustively explored by 
Daniel Shaviro in When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief And 
Retroactivity (2000). Several more sceptical views have emerged which, although not reject-
ing the premises of the Graetz/Kaplow view, approach a complete rejection of its conclu-
sions. These are driven by the observations of the wing of law and economics that views the 
restraint of government action to be among the most important constitutional principles. 
Under this view, a government that chooses too frequently to upset legitimate expectations 
will pay a very high price to induce any reliance on the part of economically rational actors. 
The newer literature recognizes that the absence of a strong presumption against 
retroactivity is likely to change legislative behaviours in undesirable ways. Taxpayers with 
substantial pre-commitments are more likely to fear changes, and legislators are more likely 
to act in ways that allow them to benefit from those fears. As a result, with a presumption in 
favour of retroactivity and against general grandfathering, the cost of using the tax system 
to induce behaviour will inevitably increase. The methods through which the tax system can 
induce behaviours will change, as taxpayers will insist on more immediate benefits, for 
instance, through reductions in the time period during which taxpayers may be exposed to 
a legislative change of mind. Taxpayers with substantial pre-commitments will devote more 
resources to secure limited grandfathering. 
It cannot be overemphasized that the scholarly debate referred to above, with very 
few exceptions, shows little awareness of the jurisprudence developed under the possible 
sources of federal limitation of retroactivity (which, in general, are consistent with the 
Graetz/Kaplow position tolerating considerable degrees of retroactivity) or the jurispru-
dence under the state limitations (which, as reported in section 3.20.5.2 above, are far less 
likely to be consistent with that position), or the literature or practices in other jurisdic-
tions.
16.	 Paul	Frankel	and	Amy	Nogid,	‘The	Manifest	Justice	of	The	Manifest	Injustice	Doctrine:	The	Time	has	Come	to	Invoke	
the	Ex	Post	Facto	Clause	to	Bar	Retroactive	Tax	Increases’,	49	State	Tax	Notes	(6	August	2008),	at	pp.	599	ff.;	
Jennifer	Carr	and	Cara	Griffith,	‘Retroactive	Taxation:	A	Necessary	Evil’,	State	Tax	Notes,	31	October	31	2005,	at	p.	473.		
F.	Daniel	E.	Troy,	‘Retroactive	Tax	Increases	and	the	Constitution’,	available	at	www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/
HL613.cfm;	Ronald	Z.	Domsky,	‘Retroactive	Taxation:	United	States	v.	Carlton	–	The	Taxpayer	Loses	Again’,	16	N.	Ill.	U.	
L.	Rev.	77	(1995-1996).
